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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, LAW AND ORDER, AND LITIGATING SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ALABAMA, 1954-1973

by
JOSEPH M. BAGLEY

Under the Direction of Robert Baker and Michelle Brattain

ABSTRACT
This study examines the legal struggle over school desegregation in Alabama in the two decades
following the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board decision of 1954. It seeks to better understand the
activists who mounted a litigious assault on segregated education, the segregationists who opposed
them, and the ways in which law shaped both of these efforts. Inspired by the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) campaign to implement Brown, blacks sought access to
their constitutional rights in the state’s federal courts, where they were ultimately able to force
substantial compliance. Whites, however, converted massive resistance into an ostensibly colorblind
movement to preserve “law and order,” while at the same time taking effective measures to preserve
segregation and white privilege.
As soon as the NAACP implementation campaign began, self-styled moderate segregationists
began to abandon self-defeating forms of resistance and to fashion a creed of “law and order.” When
black activists achieved a litigious breakthrough in 1963, the developing creed allowed segregationists to
reject violence and outright defiance of the law, to accept token desegregation, and to begin to stake
their own claims to constitutional rights – all without forcing them to repudiate segregation and white
supremacy. When continuing litigation forced school systems to abandon ineffective “freedom of

choice” desegregation plans for compulsory pupil assignment plans, these so-called moderates began
using their individual rights language to justify flight to private segregationist academies, independent
suburban school systems, and otherwise safely white school districts. Political and legal historians have
underappreciated the deep and broad roots of the narrative of white racial innocence, the endurance of
massive resistance, and the pivotal role which school desegregation litigation played in channeling both
into a broader movement towards modern conservatism.
The cases considered here – particularly the statewide Lee v. Macon County Board of Education
case – demonstrate the effectiveness of litigation in bringing down official state and local barriers to
equal opportunity for minorities and in enforcing constitutional law. But they also showcase the limits
of litigation in effecting social justice in the face of powerfully constructed narratives of resistance
seemingly built upon the nation’s founding principles.

INDEX WORDS: Alabama, Civil rights, School desegregation, Integration, Education, Law, Politics,
Litigation, Conservatism, New Right, Social justice, Equality, Constitutional law, Massive resistance,
Segregationists, Segregation, White supremacy, Individual rights, Freedom of association, Liberalism,
Racial innocence
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INTRODUCTION

Even when, as the pressure grew, some few wise citizens were bold enough to face the
inevitable and come out with a plea for law and order, there was no heart in their voices and
their words were unaccompanied by any moral conviction.1
We cannot have respect for “law and order” while at the same time using every available means
short of violence to circumvent or defy the law of the land as interpreted by the courts. Only by
positive steps, beginning with admission of our sins, can we begin to purge our society of the
sickness in its soul.2

-Letters to the Editor of the Birmingham News, September, 1963

On September 3, 1954, a group of black students, parents, and local leaders in Montgomery,
Alabama tried to turn the Supreme Court’s recent Brown v. Board of Education decision into a
meaningful reality. They attempted to register at the Harrison Elementary School – a new, twentyclassroom facility, completed just in time to open its doors to 650 children, all of them white. Harrison
was built to accommodate a growing white neighborhood on the city’s southern edge. The
Montgomery city-county school board had chosen a location just a few blocks south of the encroaching
white sprawl, anticipating even more growth in the coming months and years. Beyond the school’s back
doors, even farther south, was the Abraham’s Vineyard neighborhood – an all-black section which had
once been on the outskirts of town. For decades Abraham’s Vineyard had been served by a threeclassroom, three-teacher black elementary school known as The Vineyard School. It enrolled about 80
students, all black. Harrison and Vineyard sat on the same block. Despite the Brown decision, the
school board had given no thought to replacing one with the other, however. The two schools simply

1

Birmingham News, Sept. 30, 1963, reprinted as Southern Regional Council Report L-46, Nov. 15, 1963,
Facts on Film, Southern Education Reporting Service (Nashville: Tennessee Microfilms, 1958-1973), 1963-64
Supplement, Miscellaneous Materials.
2
Birmingham News, Sept. 23, 1963.
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sat together on a dividing line between two worlds – separate and wholly unequal. It was a line which
no one had dared to cross until that day.3
Earlier that year, the Vineyard School had been slated for abandonment by the Montgomery
school board, but the Abraham’s Vineyard Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) had protested. They
pleaded that the school instead be renovated and brought up to standard. The PTA argued that if the
neighborhood school were abandoned, children who had always walked down the street to school
would have to be bussed across town to another black school. The board had agreed to renovate the
tiny, dilapidated schoolhouse, which it also moved to the other end of the block, where it faced the
black neighborhood to the south instead of the approaching white neighborhood to be served by
Harrison. The improvements to the Vineyard School revealed much about the state of segregated
education in Alabama. They included a new paint job, the addition of a new classroom (the third), and
the installation of running water, inside toilets to replace the outhouses, and new furniture. The school
board assumed the Abraham’s Vineyard residents would be pleased with the makeover. But as the
beginning of the school year approached, Vineyard was still without gas, electricity, or a lunchroom, and
its lot was damaged and un-landscaped from the moving of the facility.4
September 3, 1954 was enrollment day in Montgomery, and the Harrison School opened its
doors to students for the first time. After most of the white students had enrolled and gone home for
the day, a group of black families from the Abraham’s Vineyard neighborhood marched in the sweltering
95-degree heat to the school and attempted to enroll their children. Along with the group were E.D.
Nixon and Horace Bell, local leaders with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
3

Southern School News, Oct 1, 1954; Southern School News was a publication of the Nashville-based
Southern Education Reporting Service, a group of journalists and educators dedicated to disseminating and
cataloguing information on school desegregation in the southern and border states from 1954 to 1973. United
States District Judge Frank M. Johnson used the phrase “meaningful reality” to describe the goal of plaintiffs in the
case of Lee v. Macon County Board of Education in 1967; see Chapter 12 for the full quotation; see also Joseph
Bagley, A Meaningful Reality: The Desegregation of the Opelika, Alabama City School System, 1965-72 (M.A. thesis,
Auburn University, 2007).
4
Southern School News, Oct 1, 1954.
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People (NAACP). Upon arriving at the new school, the party was cordially invited into the principal’s
office to fill out enrollment forms. The principal obliged the group with this formality and some
attendant pleasantries. He then informed the parents that their addresses indicated that the children
lived in another district and could not, therefore, enroll. This was true after all. The Harrison
attendance area had been carefully gerrymandered to ensure all-white enrollment. Few whites in
Alabama thought the School Segregation Cases – collectively known as Brown v. Board – would actually
have any real impact in the state, but the Montgomery school board had planned accordingly in case
they did. If the board could no longer admit that attendance was based on race, it would draw
boundaries around neighborhoods as such and claim the process was colorblind. They were, as it
turned out, ahead of their time.5
The Abraham’s Vineyard PTA issued a statement three days later arguing that the school board
had failed to live up to all of its promises. The school board said it had done its part and was still in the
process of making the necessary improvements. School officials added that the recent Harrison
enrollment attempt had been organized by “white agitators,” namely one Aubrey Williams, the son of a
local publisher. Williams’ father was a former Roosevelt bureaucrat and the editor of one of a very few
openly anti-segregation publications in the state. The younger Williams had, in fact, been along in a
strictly observatory, perhaps even celebratory, capacity. In pinning activism on “outside” agitation,
however, the school board was again anticipating the norm.6
Montgomery school officials also proved prescient in their public response to what was soon
referred to as the “Harrison incident.” The chairman of the school board, T.L. Bear, announced that he
and the school board would continue to uphold the law: the law of the state of Alabama. The state’s
constitution expressly forbid race “mixing” in schools, and Bear was sworn to uphold it. “If and when,”

5

Southern School News, Oct. 1, 1954; Montgomery Advertiser, September 3, 4, 1954.
Southern School News, Oct 1, 1954; Fred Gray, Bus Ride to Justice: Changing the System by the System
(Selma: Black Belt Press, 1995), pp. 204-5.
6

3

he said, “the Supreme Court hands down a ruling declaring segregation unconstitutional in all states,
and the Alabama legislature passes a law in accordance with it,” then the Montgomery County Board of
Education would then consider what it should do about enrollment. Until then it was not even up for
consideration. Such was the mindset of many white Alabamians who bothered to concern themselves
with the legal ramifications of the School Segregation Cases decision. Brown was simply the law of the
case, not the law of the land.7
State and local NAACP officials were planning even then to force the issue in federal court. Bell
and Nixon announced to the press at the time of the Harrison enrollment attempt that they were
tagging along as “observers,” but Bell himself told reporters that he was “certain” that the NAACP would
not “let the matter drop.” They began even then to consider a legal challenge to the racial
gerrymandering of district lines. As head of the local NAACP branch’s education committee, Nixon
drafted and delivered a 12-point program request to the school board in October. The school board did
not respond. W.C. Patton, the state’s NAACP field secretary, told the press that this was just the
beginning of a statewide campaign to force desegregation. Other attempts were sure to be made, and
each would form the basis for a legal challenge to Alabama’s segregated system of education. Indeed,
the national and regional NAACP had begun organizing an implementation program the week after the
school cases decision was handed down. The resulting NAACP petitioning drive was the opening salvo in
a legal battle which would stretch into the 1970s and beyond.8
The attempted enrollment at Harrison Elementary was the first effort to desegregate an
Alabama school. After its unceremonious failure, schools in the state would remain entirely segregated
for almost another ten years. As many of Montgomery’s black leaders began to focus their attention on
other battles, beginning famously with segregated city busses, the days progressed as usual at Harrison

7

Montgomery Advertiser, September 4, 1954.
Montgomery Advertiser, September 4, 1954, New York Times, September 3, 1954; Birmingham News,
Oct 31, 1954.
8
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and The Vineyard School and hundreds of other schools in the Deep South. The usual in south
Montgomery that fall was a tableau that revealed at once the imprint of the past, the imperatives of the
present, and the promise of the future. Under the warm October sun, children at Harrison played at
recess in an open lot behind the school – its gleaming facade a testament to the school board’s
commitment to providing its students with modern facilities. Across that same lot, Vineyard students
played in the shadow of their own school – its meager renovations a testament to how far whites in the
South might go to maintain the myth of “separate but equal” in the face of Brown. According to one
account, there was “no physical barrier” between the two playgrounds and “[no] apparent line of
demarcation” between the school children. But “whether by instruction or choice,” the children left a
“no-man’s land of perhaps 100 yards between them.”9

*****
This dissertation is an examination of the resulting 20 years of school desegregation litigation in
Alabama. It seeks to better understand the role of law in both social justice movements and the
resistance movements which have opposed them. Nearly ten years after the Harrison incident, the
litigious efforts of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) and local activist-plaintiffs in the
federal courts finally breached the walls of the Jim Crow schoolhouse in Alabama. This breakthrough
forced a rearticulation of massive white resistance which has been the most compelling legacy of the
school desegregation contest. In the immediate aftermath of Harrison, so-called “massive resistance”
triumphed, with the political ascendancy of hardline segregationists and the statewide banishment of
the Alabama NAACP. These developments, along with violent resistance and economic reprisal, forced
blacks to again seek access to their constitutional rights in the state’s federal courts. When the litigious
breakthrough occurred in 1963, some moderate segregationists began to fashion a creed of “law and

9

New York Times, September 3, 1954; Southern School News, October 1, 1954.
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order.” It allowed them to reject self-defeating forms of resistance, without forcing them to repudiate
segregation and white supremacy. They reluctantly accepted court-ordered token desegregation, not
because it was the right thing to do, but because the alternatives had either been exhausted or were too
risky.
When continuing litigation forced school systems, beginning in 1969, to abandon ineffective
“freedom of choice” desegregation plans for compulsory assignment plans, these self-styled moderates
rekindled massive resistance, this time using a language of constitutional individual rights to justify their
flight to segregationist academies, independent suburban school systems, or otherwise safely white
school districts where they could enjoy “equal justice under the law.” Whites began to see their evasion
of integrated education as part of a narrative of righteous resistance to encroachments upon these
rights, and they understood themselves to be besieged by a federal government sympathetic to only the
claims of an unworthy and needlessly dissatisfied minority. Black activist-litigants ultimately succeeded
in forcing substantial compliance with Brown, but the law itself allowed whites to channel their
resistance in effective ways. In Part I of this dissertation, I describe the process whereby black activistlitigants were nearly defeated by the forces of massive resistance but managed to achieve breakthrough
in 1963. In Part II I explain how white resistance responded by adjusting its message to the imperatives
of “law and order.” I argue that massive resistance became massive evasion, and that, as a
consequence, the goal of equal educational opportunity has remained elusive.

Part I: The Triumph of Massive Resistance and the Litigious Breakthrough, 1954-63
The School Segregation Cases were the culmination of decades of race relations litigation
shepherded by the national NAACP.10 But the May 17, 1954 decision reported as Brown v. Board of

10

On the long history of the School Segregation Cases, leading up to the 1954 and 1955 decisions, see
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality
(New York: Vintage, 1977).

6

Education of Topeka was as much a beginning as it was an end, especially in Alabama. Segregated
education was a pillar of white supremacy in Alabama and across the South. Dogged resistance to any
change in the status quo began almost immediately among the most committed segregationists. As
soon as blacks began to assert their claims to the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate, resistance spread to all
levels of white society, variegated though it would become. A new group of segregationist leaders
quickly organized resistance to any implementation of the decision by forming a number of collective
defense organizations, most notably the White Citizens’ Council – a white supremacist group whose
entire reason for being was defiant resistance of any breach of the color line in education. The Citizens’
Council used propaganda, mass meetings, and economic reprisal to forestall the implementation of
Brown. The Council in Alabama also counted among its membership emerging leaders in the state
government, and these officials initiated a campaign in the legislature to erect as many legal barriers to
desegregation as possible. Their success in pitching these efforts to the white electorate as sustainable
barriers to integration led to a takeover of all levels of the state government and the creation of a united
hardline-segregationist front in 1958.
As Michael Klarman and Adam Fairclough have argued, the fervent commitment of the these
segregationists allowed them to forcefully marginalize would-be racial moderates, or the more liberallyinclined among whites.11 They were able to do so in Alabama, in part, by taking advantage of the
political mal-apportionment that had long supported the so-called Bourbon leadership. They also
sought to bifurcate the issue of segregation: they fully racialized politics in the state and characterized
anyone who did not support outright and immediate defiance as an integrationist, a race-traitor, or in
committed Cold Warrior fashion, a communist.12 Failure to commit to “massive resistance” of school

11

Michael Klarman, “Why Massive Resistance,” pp. 21-38, and Adam Fairclough, "A Political Coup d’état?:
How the Enemies of Earl Long Overwhelmed Racial Moderation in Louisiana," pp. 56-75, in Clive Webb, Ed.,
Massive Resistance: White Opposition to the Second Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
12
See, for the Red-baiting of moderate white politicians and black activists in Cold Warrior fashion,
George Lewis, "White South, Red Nation: Massive Resistance and the Cold War," in Webb, Massive Resistance, pp.

7

desegregation was also represented as a failure to defend the honor and integrity of the state from
“outside agitators,” especially the federal government. The memory of the Civil War, Reconstruction,
and the “Redemption” of the South in its fight for the “Lost Cause” of states’ rights and the antebellum
way of life was, therefore, bound up in these accusations.13
The ideology of the White Citizens’ Council included a number of other recruitment tools which
have not received as much attention. The threat of integrated classrooms was roundly characterized as
a threat to the southern white woman’s bedroom, and segregationists used this threat as way to
frighten whites into action. Miscegenation – sexual intercourse and/or marriage between white men
and black women – had long been the core fear in the heart of many southern white men. It threatened
their own manhood and portended the demise of western civilization through the “mongrelization” of
the white race.14 Thus, through appeals to biological racism and gendered identity, segregationists
mobilized additional white support.
Another tool for segregationists, both within the Citizens’ Council and without, was an appeal to
maintaining “law and order.” Appeals to resistance within the law allowed segregationists to separate
themselves from working class white supremacists, like those associated with the Ku Klux Klan, whose
violent methods of repression were seen as crass and unproductive. The economic argument inherent
in the “law and order” creed also won over many middle class white segregationists. Reluctant
segregationists could easily admit that violent resistance, just like integrationist agitation, had the
potential to disrupt business at home, to tarnish the state’s image abroad, and to handicap or even

117-35. See also George Lewis, Massive Resistance: The White Response to the Civil Rights Movement (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
13
See, for the memory and lasting socio-political impact of the Civil War and the Lost Cause, David
Goldfield, Still Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2004).
14
Jane Daily, "The Theology of Massive Resistance: Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred After Brown," in
Webb, Massive Resistance, convincingly demonstrates the importance of miscegenation fears to the massive
resistance movement, though she does so strictly in support of the argument that white religious leaders found
ways to support the movement.
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destroy industrial recruitment.15 Acknowledging the intellectual inadequacy of white supremacy, the
wrongheadedness of defiance, or the immorality of segregation were all much more difficult. Those
segregationists who utilized and were won over to the cause of “law and order” represented the first in
a succession of so-called moderates who, rather than work towards peaceful and meaningful
compliance and implementation, continually frustrated these efforts, ultimately leading to sustained
and substantial evasion.16
As Brian Dougherty and Charles Bolton have argued, scholars have mistreated massive
resistance to integrated education in another important way. Few have acknowledged that
segregationists resistors were reacting so urgently in their defense of the color line as a direct result of
the activity of local black activists. Dougherty and Bolton have effectively demonstrated that “many
elements of southern massive resistance appear to be more closely related to the actions of blacks and
black organizations than previously noted.” The School Segregation Cases decisions and the threat of
federal involvement beyond them were alarming, but it took black action on the ground to instill the
fear in whites which ignited massive resistance. Just as the contributors to Dougherty and Bolton’s
collection of essays on the implementation of Brown have argued about other states, the spike in
segregationist organization and legislation in Alabama was closely related, specifically, to the
implementation drive of the NAACP.17 Scholars have often adequately portrayed massive resistance
without giving equal treatment to that which was being resisted, especially in regards to the NAACP,
15

See, for similar arguments about “business progressives,” Glen T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local
and National Movements in the Civil Rights Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), J. Mills
Thornton, Dividing Lines: Municipal Politics and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Montgomery, Birmingham, and
Selma (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002), and Jeff Roche, Restructured Resistance: The Sibley
Commission and the Politics of Desegregation in Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998).
16
Even when many of these so-called moderates acceded to the futility of defiance, the focus remained
on compliance with the “law of the land,” not on the intellectual inadequacy of white supremacy or the immorality
of segregation. This provided the intellectual foundation for “white flight”-style evasion.
17
Brian J. Dougherty and Charles C. Bolton, With All Deliberate Speed: The Implementation of Brown v.
Board of Education (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), p viii; the argument is made in the
introduction and fleshed out in some of the essays, but none of these covers Alabama; J. Mills Thornton, in
Dividing Lines, makes this argument about segregationists in Birmingham, where he suggests that massive
resistance did not materialize until the first NAACP petitions were filed with the local board of education in 1955.
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which has been, itself, dismissed by some scholars of the movement as a “stodgy and elitist”
organization, out of touch with the core of the movement.18
NAACP members in communities, large and small, across Alabama engaged in a sustained
petitioning and registration drive in the years following the Brown decision and the Supreme Court’s
follow-up implementation decree, known as Brown II.19 Local school officials met this campaign with a
mixture of disregard and contempt. The Citizen’s Council met the threat with its own campaign of
economic reprisal. And each round of petitions encouraged the segregationist leadership in the state’s
legislature to more urgently pass legislation in defense of the assault. Despite intransigence, reprisal,
and the ever-present threat of violence – from even some members of the supposedly non-violent
Citizens’ Councils – blacks continued to petition school authorities for implementation, with the
understanding that litigation would likely soon follow. Not only, as Daugherty and Bolton argue, does
this activism represent an “essentially unknown” aspect of NAACP history, it is not generally credited
with being at the heart of black civil rights activism in the 1950s. In Alabama this is reflected in an
overabundance of popular and scholarly attention paid to the more visible campaigns of the early
“classical phase” of the civil rights movement, namely the Montgomery bus boycott and the attempted
enrollment of Autherine Lucy at the University of Alabama.20

18

See, in this vein, James Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled
Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Webb, Massive Resistance, Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to
Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004);
Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1960s (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969, 1997); Lewis, Massive Resistance; and J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to
Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration, 1954-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
19
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
20
Dougherty and Bolton, With All Deliberate Speed, pp. vii, vii-ix. See, for treatments of the movement in
Alabama in the 1950s, generally, Wayne Flynt, Alabama in the Twentieth Century (Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press, 2004), Frye Gaillard, Cradle of Freedom: Alabama and the Movement that Changed America
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), and Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters, America in the King Years,
1954-1963 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). See, for the bus boycott, specifically, David Garrow, Bearing the
Cross: Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: Harper, 1999); Thornton,
Dividing Lines; Fred Gray, Bus Ride to Justice; and Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1992 (New
York: McMillen, 1993). See, for the Lucy Crisis, E. Culpepper Clarke, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last
Stand in Alabama (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). The over-attention to flashpoints like the bus boycott

10

Despite the efforts of local activists, and as a direct result of the massive resistance their activity
engendered, Alabama maintained absolute segregation in its public schools for nine years after Brown.
For most of that time, the NAACP was barred from operation in Alabama by Attorney General John
Patterson, who used white supremacist jurists in the discriminatory state court system to oust the
organization in 1956. The successful attack-campaign won Patterson the governor’s chair and
represented the culmination of the rise of arch-segregationist leaders in Alabama. Their triumph was
concomitant with the demise of Governor Jim Folsom, whose liberal attempts at moderation failed to
sway voters like the segregationists’ own defiant appeals to hardliners and law-and-order-style appeals
to would-be racial moderates.21 With the NAACP out and the arch segregationists in, the outlook for
implementation of Brown reached its lowest point.
From this nadir, a group of black activists took their challenge to the federal trial courts, the only
place where they had any hope of securing their constitutional right to desegregated education.
Initially, this had to be done without the assistance of the NAACP or the federal government; however,
the NAACP-LDF and the United States Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division (CRD) soon assisted in
what would become a litigious assault against Jim Crow schools. The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth in
Birmingham provided the model: local activists who were shielded from economic reprisal filed
complaints in federal district courts with the assistance of willing local counsel and, ultimately, the LDF
and CRD. By 1963, activists had filed suit in four cities, and the Justice Department had filed two suits of
its own. Some federal judges sympathetic to segregationists’ desire to maintain the status quo initially
frustrated these efforts. But the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed these decisions and remanded
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the cases with demands that relief be granted. A sustained effort in court finally brought about a breach
in the wall of segregated education in Alabama that fall, but not without a dramatic stand mounted by
Governor George Wallace and other obdurate segregationists. The efforts of not only Wallace, but
countless other state and local elected officials encouraged continuing defiant resistance. At the same
time, Wallace’s failure indicated the futility of blatant and expressed defiance of the law. Whites had to
somehow account for the success of the desegregation litigation campaign and fashion a resistance
movement within the bounds of the law before desegregation proceeded beyond mere tokenism.

Part II: The Litigious Assault and the Rearticulation of Resistance, 1964-73
The NAACP-LDF, the CRD, and local activist-plaintiffs followed-up the litigious breakthrough with
an all-out assault on segregated schools in Alabama. The primary front in this assault was the case of
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education. State-level interference with initial court-ordered
desegregation efforts in several cases in 1963 opened up the possibility of a statewide injunction , which
plaintiffs subsequently sought in Lee v. Macon. State authorities pressured local school officials to defy
federal court orders and threatened to exploit local segregationist opposition. School boards – which
were generally loath to desegregate regardless – found themselves caught between state authority and
community pressure on one side and federal authority on the other. Though it took 4 years of
sustained, reckless defiance from the state and continuing recalcitrance from local school systems, the
plaintiffs in Lee ultimately secured the first statewide structural injunction in United States legal history.
This brought 99 school systems under one injunction and the concomitant supervision of a three-judge
federal district court. As a “litigating amicus curiae,” the United States was represented in the case by
the Civil Rights Division, which acted as the investigative and advisory arm of the court. The LDF and its
associated counsel continued to represent the interest of the plaintiff class. Thus the CRD, the LDF, the
court, and in the case of Lee v. Macon, Judge Frank M. Johnson especially, engineered the restructuring
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of the Alabama public education system over the course of many years. Some school systems remained
under injunctions in cases splintered from Lee v. Macon as of 2013. The new relief concept introduced
in the case served as a model for activist-litigants, for the Justice Department, and for federal judges.
Not only did it promise to finally and significantly accelerate school desegregation, it struck at the heart
of the segregationist doctrine of states’ rights by subjecting state institutions and state citizens to
prolonged and direct supervision and administration by federal authorities.
Along with the Lee case, blacks filed at least 19 other successful school desegregation cases in
Alabama as part of the litigious assault. Some of these cases proved to be influential in their own right,
especially Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education and Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County. Both suits became important battlegrounds in the struggle to effectively desegregate
metropolitan areas and in the concomitant fight over “busing.” In addition to this and other litigation,
there were federal administrative efforts to end segregated education, independent of the CRD. After
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) pursued its own implementation program across the South. The so-called HEW
desegregation Guidelines were sanctioned and even adopted as a model in the Jefferson case. But HEW
soon found itself subject to court scrutiny and even censure. The department’s enforcement
mechanism – the deferral or suspension of federal funding – ran afoul of the Lee v. Macon court when it
was used against systems which the court considered to be in compliance. HEW was soon enjoined
from interfering with the administration of the court’s decree and subsequently limited to an advisory
role.
Throughout the litigious assault, the judges on the state’s federal benches exerted a
tremendous influence on the pace and nature of desegregation. For example, Judge Johnson, as part of
the three-judge panel adjudicating the Lee v. Macon case, set the tone for speedy and effective
desegregation. Judge Daniel Thomas and others, however, utilized any and all opportunities for delay.
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Crucial to the fate of desegregation litigation in Alabama, then, was the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. A
majority of judges on the appellate court had come to favor more stringent desegregation plans by the
second half of the 1960s, and a core group known as “The Four” began to take a lead role in fashioning
desegregation jurisprudence. By 1968 the judges’ irritation at the continuing intransigence of white
school officials at all levels in Alabama and elsewhere led to the rejection of the so-called “freedom of
choice” method of desegregation.
Freedom of choice was designed to allow all students within a school district to choose the
school which they wished to attend, regardless of its past identification as a black or white school. To
operate effectively, such a system required the removal of “choice-influencing factors” such as racially
identifiable faculties. School boards refused to implement such plans in good faith. They relied instead
on assumptions of black teacher inferiority and on assumptions – which turned out to be self-fulfilling
prophesies – that whites would refuse to send their children to formerly all-black schools. Freedom of
choice promised nothing more than tokenism and showed no realistic possibility of ever eliminating
what was being called the “dual school system based upon race.”
From 1968 into the 1970s, litigation forced school districts to abandon freedom of choice and to
use compulsory pupil assignment in order to eliminate their dual systems. Segregationists protested
and avoided compulsory assignment as fervently as any whites had resisted school desegregation since
the Brown decisions themselves. The foremost proponent of this resistance at the state level was not
George Wallace, but his protégé and successor, Albert Brewer. Brewer chastised his former mentor for
failing to prevent desegregation, condemned federal judges who issued desegregation orders (including
those who did so only upon the command of the appellate court), and generally worked to frustrate any
and all efforts to move desegregation beyond tokenism. When Wallace defeated Brewer and returned
to the governor’s chair, he had, himself, been forced to adopt a more realistic defense of white privilege.
By that time school systems had begun to desegregate system-wide, but many whites had already
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exercised what they were beginning to call their “freedom of association” and fled these systems for
private schools known as segregationist academies, for whiter school districts, or for safely white
independent suburban school systems around the state’s major cities, especially Birmingham.

Law and Order, Strategic Accommodations, and Colorblindness
So-called massive resistance ultimately failed to prevent school desegregation, but its
transformation in the wake of that failure has perhaps been of more consequence. Initially recognized
as a period of intense opposition to desegregation that gave way in the early 1960s to reluctant
compliance, some scholars have come to realize that resistance simply adapted. Violent resistance
continued, and even peaked in Alabama as schools were desegregated for the first time in 1963. The Ku
Klux Klan, the National States’ Rights Party, and other extremist groups responded to the breach of the
color line with increased activity, rather than with any sort of retreat. But resistance remained protean.
As black activists and their erstwhile allies in the federal government achieved breakthrough despite this
spike in violent resistance, most segregationists were forced to make what historian Joseph Crespino has
called “strategic accommodations.”22 In a sort of orderly retreat, they reaffirmed their rejection of
violent resistance, and they begrudgingly accepted the rule of law and the authority of the federal court
system. In a seemingly proactive call to maintain “law and order,” segregationists then established such
reaffirmation and acceptance as the standard for morally sound behavior and responsible citizenship.
When black activists carried the struggle into the courtroom, whites crafted their defense accordingly.
There would be no moral awakening. As legal historian Tony Freyer has argued in reference to the
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school desegregation battle in Little Rock, Arkansas, the failure to achieve such an awakening was a
principal factor in limiting desegregation’s effectiveness.23
Massive resistance was able to survive in an arguably more potent form. Gone were the “stands
in schoolhouse doors” associated with demagogues like Wallace, the legislative sessions devoted to
what supporters and detractors alike called “nigger bills,” and the attempts to banish the NAACP using
the state court system. They were gone because they were ineffective against the litigious assault in the
federal courts. Segregationists replaced this form of resistance with a more subtle form that became all
the more powerful by denying its own roots. Using the phrase massive resistance to characterize only
the period of unsuccessful, reckless, and ultimately self-defeating defiance has had the effect of
obscuring the potency, dedication, and success of this resistance which followed.
Resistance after 1963 was largely in the style of the “law and order” creed. Its origins lie most
immediately with the birth of the Citizens Councils, largely on the basis of the Councils’ own explicitly
non-violent resistance strategy. Just as non-violence then never would have been confused with
acceptance, calls to “law and order” in the 1960s carried with them no semblance of wider
acquiescence. Law-and-order segregationists abhorred violence and outright defiance of federal law,
but they did not repudiate segregation or white supremacy. Particularly after the outbreak of tragic
violence in the wake of the state’s first federal school desegregation orders, “law and order” came to
mean only minimal acceptance, somewhere between simple non-violence and court-ordered
compliance. For some it meant continuing to pursue some seemingly legal means of defiance. Courtordered desegregation brought increasingly intense, defiant rhetoric; desperate demonstrations; and,
most significantly, a reinvigorated movement to establish private, segregated schools. Carrying the
banner for this group of segregationists was Wallace. At the same time, many formerly defiant
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segregationists rejected the Wallace line and began to take up the “law and order” call as a way to rally
whites behind compliance with court orders. A majority of these people were either local school
officials who recoiled at the thought of risking a contempt citation and the threat of a fine or jail time, or
local city/county officials and businesspeople who feared the closure of all public schools upon the
establishment of viable private schools for whites. Their compliance efforts never exceeded the bare
minimum required by federal authorities, and their public statements in support of such efforts were
unfailingly dressed in reluctance, regret, and occasionally outright disgust.
The persistence of law-and-order-style segregationist defiance, along with the failure of
compliant segregationists to embrace more than law and order, constituted a vital transitional point in
Alabama politics. Both segregationist groups had to accept, on some level, that token desegregation of
previously all-white schools was inevitable once it was ordered by the federal courts and backed by the
federal executive. Situating this acceptance within a narrative of law and order allowed them to
continue to assail the federal government, even as they accepted its primacy under the rule of law in the
federal system, and it allowed them to cling to their fundamental beliefs in white supremacy and racial
separation. Ultimately, many of these Alabamians would channel their critiques and beliefs into a more
politically sophisticated movement. As Crespino has argued about whites in mostly rural Mississippi,
they “rearticulated their resentment in ways that would resonate” within the broader American political
arena. By 1965 in Alabama, the brash and openly racist segregationist politicians of the old, rural Black
Belt aristocracy were on their way out of politics. They were being replaced by those, in cities and
towns alike, who found ways to remain true to their segregationist principles while at the same time
working reluctantly towards compliance with federally-ordered desegregation. Support for law and
order provided a bridge between bitter-ender type resistance and the eventual acceptance of
widespread school desegregation by a white population which continued to find it repugnant. Once that
acceptance had come, whites began to seek out other avenues of evasion, beyond violence and outright
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defiance. They stopped assailing school desegregation law itself and instead began to decry limitations
on their personal freedoms, irrespective of race. It was, in a sense, the individualized equivalent of
arguing that the Civil War had been fought over states’ rights and not slavery.24
Central to this rearticulation was the adoption of what historian Matthew Lassiter has called
“colorblindness.” Lassiter has argued that southern whites in metropolitan areas in the wake of
desegregation rallied around a “color-blind discourse” which championed “meritocratic individualism”
and denied its own origins in the defense of structural racism. The development of a “suburban
ideology of racial innocence” thus became a way for many whites to preserve class-based privileges.
The law and order narrative anticipated such “colorblind” assertions, and it applied not only in the
metropolitan areas which are the subject of Lassiter’s study, but to the rural areas of the state as well.
Law and order presaged late-60s and 70s suburban colorblindness not only in its disingenuous disregard
for race in the preservation of white privilege, but also in its function as a strategic accommodation. For
whites in Alabama to begin to assert their meritocratic individualism, they first had to accept the failure
of massive resistance to prevent desegregation in the first place. Embracing law and order allowed
whites to continue on the path of evasion even as they repudiated the path of continuing total and
violent defiance. As Lassiter has himself argued, “open support for compliance with the law and
preservation of public education, rather than an absolutist defense of the racial caste line,” allowed for
the development of a “colorblind” ideology of school desegregation. Segregationists in Alabama were
well within the bounds of “law and order” not only when they began to escape desegregated city school
systems for white suburbs with independent systems of their own, but also when they set up and
enrolled in a rash of new private academies for whites only. Their actions were only irresponsible if they
were violent, directly encouraged violence, or constituted direct defiance of court orders. These
standards, and this disingenuous disregard for old, openly racist forms of resistance not only began to
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take form as soon as the NAACP went to work in Alabama trying to implement Brown, they drew even
then on a long tradition of racial “innocence” and racial denial.25
When whites in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s justified their flight, they did it not by claiming the
continuing validity of white supremacy and segregation, but by claiming a right to what historian Kevin
Kruse has identified as “freedom of association.” In his study of metropolitan Atlanta, Kruse has argued
that “white resistance to desegregation was never as immobile or monolithic as its practitioners and
chroniclers would have us believe,” and that segregationists were able to “preserve and, indeed, perfect
the realities of racial segregation outside the realm of law and politics.” When “forced to abandon their
traditional, populist, and often starkly racist demagoguery,” they instead “craft[ed] a new conservatism
predicated on a language of rights, freedoms, and individualism.” Clinging to the language of law and
order was the first step in such a transformation for Alabama’s segregationists. It was the mechanism
by which they first abandoned traditional “massive resistance,” allowing them to then set about crafting
the more durable iteration. It was an important reason why massive resistance was able to adapt and
thrive.26
Political historians like Kruse, Lassiter, and Crespino have ushered in a new era in the study of
the conservative counterrevolution of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. They have moved beyond the oncedominant interpretation of historian Dan Carter. In his biography of George Wallace, Carter first
emphasized the role of race, and indeed racism, in the rise of the New Right. Carter argued that Wallace
learned to use coded racial language to appeal to racist white supremacists across the country, and that
Richard Nixon ultimately adopted this same technique as part of his so-called “Southern Strategy” in the
1968 and 1972 presidential elections. According to Carter, the art form was perfected by Ronald Reagan
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in his presidential bids in the 1980s and even carried forward by the likes of George H.W. Bush and Newt
Gingrich. The new school of historians of modern conservatism has rejected Carter’s thesis in favor of a
more nuanced interpretation. Among other things, they have rejected the top-down nature of the
thesis, deemphasized the roles of both Wallace and Nixon, given credit to local southern whites for first
mastering the art of coded racial language, added layers of motivation to whites fleeing the Democratic
Party, and taken the new story of grassroots resistance national – from the suburbs of Detroit to the
exurbs of Los Angeles.27
What the new school has underappreciated is the early, continuing, and pivotal role which
litigation played in channeling the conservative counterrevolution. This has obscured the depth and
breadth of the roots of the ideology of racial innocence. From the moment NAACP efforts to implement
Brown ignited the White Citizens’ Council movement, the imperatives of litigation in federal court
shaped the way that whites battled the civil rights movement. Though the new school has
demonstrated that modern conservatism was molded from more than just civil rights backlash, the
effort to preserve segregation and white privilege was nonetheless at the heart of the maturing
conservative movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By the time persistent efforts in federal court
brought about school desegregation in Alabama for the first time in 1963, the most thoughtful
segregationists already had a model for effective resistance, even if many were still moved by selfdefeating forms of defiance. As school desegregation cases dragged on, whites across the state – from
the large metropolitan areas to the small towns and rural counties – perfected their defense by learning
to satisfy the courts first. The threat of defeat in federal court was the primary motivating factor in
27
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crafting a segregationist last stand against federal government threats to not only states’ rights but
individual rights as well. This libertarian defensiveness became the nexus for other political concerns.
The new school has appreciated this but has failed to afford early school desegregation litigation the
sort of formative status which it deserves and to credit the continuing litigious battle with shaping the
rearticulation of resistance. Segregationists began to learn how to rearticulate their resistance, how to
blind others to their racial strategies, and how to assert their claims to what they always understood as
freedom from the threat of racial dominance, all by learning to combat the dogged litigious assault
mounted by black activists seeking access to equal educational opportunity.

Efficacy, Backlash, and the Role of the Lower Courts
The persistence of massive resistance and the strategic accommodations of segregationists
fostered by the law-and-order narrative beg the question of the efficacy of the Brown decision. Michael
Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is currently the dominant interpretation of the efficacy of Brown
and the role it played in the civil rights movement. Klarman’s “backlash thesis” holds that the impact of
Brown was minimal, incidental, or at best unintended, and that the segregationist reaction against it was
ultimately of more consequence. As Klarman explains, the failure of litigation during the period of
massive resistance forced blacks to consider other tactics, even as Brown “plainly inspired” continuing
black activism. The white reaction to the ensuing direct action campaigns of the movement in the early
1960s, he argues, was so violent and intense precisely because of the climate Brown had created.
Brown had raised the stakes, and whites, in the radicalized political environment, reacted to
demonstrations with “brutal suppression.” When this violent reaction was broadcast across the nation
and Americans recoiled, it persuaded the Kennedy Administration and the Congress to pass the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which Klarman argues was “plainly the proximate cause of most school
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desegregation in the South.”28 A closer look at the implementation of Brown in Alabama reveals a more
nuanced picture.
First, Klarman underappreciates litigation as part of the arsenal black activists successfully used
throughout the 1950s and 60s. His interpretation misses the importance of the sustained petitioning
and litigation campaign that blacks waged to even crack the surface of segregated education. It also
underestimates the faith that black activists placed in litigation in general at a time when direct action
had, itself, produced very little without the support of federal courtroom challenges.29 In Alabama there
is little evidence to support the conclusion that Brown’s inspirational impact and litigation’s subsequent
failure propelled blacks into the direct action movement, which then became the principal catalyst for
change. The filing of the litigation that ultimately broke the color line in the state’s schools was the
result of a continuous process that dated back to the moment Brown was decided. The breakthrough
occurred in 1963 because blacks had discovered that litigants – by then working with the NAACP-LDF –
had to be shielded from economic reprisal, and because enough judges on the Fifth Circuit appellate
court had become, in Klarman’s own words, “fed up with the intransigence and disingenuousness of
southern whites.” Additionally, many of the most violent acts perpetrated by segregationists in
28
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Alabama were, in fact, in direct retaliation for engagement in the school desegregation litigation which
produced this breakthrough. Thus, the backlash which caused so many Americans to recoil was, itself,
part of a litigious narrative.30
Klarman also underappreciates the cultural and political significance of law and order as a
vehicle for continuing resistance. Scholars have challenged Klarman’s interpretation by arguing that
hardline southern resistance to racial change was less a product of Brown than a continuation of trends
well developed before 1954.31 This was undoubtedly the case in Alabama, as the violence perpetrated
by the Klan and other segregationist groups was part of a long tradition of suppression of dissent.32
There was also a long tradition of non-violent resistance to change, most notably in the form of the
Dixiecrat Revolt – the late 1940s attempt to harden the Democratic Party on race.33 Similarly, there was
continuity in resistance in the years following the peak of direct action protest and violent backlash,
which Klarman’s interpretation obscures. In the backlash narrative, significant, impactful resistance
flares with the direct action campaigns and fades along with them. Certainly, the violent suppression of
the direct action movement disgusted a majority of the American populace and helped encourage the
reluctant federal executive and legislative branches to support the passage of the Civil Rights Act.
Focusing on trial court litigation reveals that the significant impact of segregationist resistance lies
elsewhere, however. And it demonstrates that, in Alabama, the Civil Rights Act was not the proximate
cause of most school desegregation; litigation was. The reaction of the violent minority of
segregationists was ultimately less significant than that of the vast majority of segregationists who
embraced the law and order creed in response to that litigation and in order to satisfy the federal
courts. This allowed them to denounce violence and outright disobedience of court orders, while at the
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same time maintaining their fundamental beliefs in segregated education and white privilege. And it
provided the foundation for the final evasion of Alabama’s long-running school desegregation cases by
way of white flight.34
Finally, Tony Freyer and Timothy Dixon have criticized Klarman for neglecting the role of the
lower federal courts in general and for making “quasi-realist assumptions” about the motivations of
judges, in particular Frank Johnson. Without rejecting the backlash thesis wholesale, they argue that
Klarman has misconstrued judges’ motivations by painting them as heroic figures standing up for the
movement because of personal courage, cultural values, or political inclinations. This is also an
indictment of Jack Bass, whose important study of the Fifth Circuit and civil rights cases has portrayed
the so-called Fifth Circuit Four – along with District Judges Johnson and Skelly Wright – as “Unlikely
Heroes.” Freyer and Dixon maintain that such portrayals have, in the past and in the present, opened
up judges to unwarranted charges of judicial activism. They argue that jurists like Johnson operated
from more nuanced motivations which included commitments to “fundamental fairness” and to the role
of courts as guarantors of constitutional rights for the disadvantaged. The impact of these judges’
jurisprudence on civil rights litigation was mixed, according to Freyer and Dixon. It allowed black
activists to maintain faith in the federal judiciary and ensured that “the status quo [did not persist]
longer than it did.” But it also provided southern politicians with “the political advantage of resistance.”
In other words, judges like Johnson gave public officials like George Wallace someone to demonize as
they tried to rally segregationist voters. Freyer and Dixon’s focus on lower courts has thus revealed
important reconsiderations. A closer look at the course of school desegregation litigation in Alabama’s
trial courts allows us to even further problematize the dominant interpretation.35
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The fundamental premise undergirding Klarman’s argument is that judges and their values are
generally reflective of the society which produces them and that they are, thus, not well placed to effect
significant social change. Though Klarman is primarily concerned with the justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Alabama’s federal district judges have seemed to demonstrate that this is only partially true.
Alabama’s federal trial court judges were generally reflective of white Alabama society – insofar as most
of them believed in the legal and moral righteousness of segregation. Those judges who were
exceptions to this rule – including but not limited to Johnson – were the main facilitators of
desegregation law enforcement in Alabama and were highly influential beyond the state’s borders.
Along with Johnson, Circuit Judge Richard Rives and his colleagues on the Fifth Circuit court proved to be
the practitioners of genuine colorblindness. They led the way, in fact, in holding school systems and
state officials accountable, such that when the long-silent Supreme Court finally spoke as to the nature
and timing of school desegregation implementation, it was following the Fifth Circuit.
In a segregated society, the mere enforcement of desegregation law was significant social
change. In this regard, we may consider certain of Alabama’s jurists to have facilitated social change
through their commitments to equality before the law and fundamental fairness. That they achieved
this against the will of the vast majority of Alabama’s whites is significant. Not only did litigation matter
in Alabama, then, it was the only way black activists could have hoped to have met with even partial
success. At the same time, litigation has certainly had its limitations in effecting social justice. Equal
educational opportunity has remained elusive in Alabama and elsewhere because segregationists were
forced to find solutions within the law which even judges committed to colorblind justice have been
unable to assail. More fundamental change would seem to have to have required one of two unlikely
developments: a white moral awakening or the pursuit of solutions outside of the American political
tradition.
the Southern Judges of the Fifth Judicial Circuit Who Translated the Supreme Court’s Brown Decision into a
Revolution for Equality (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981).
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PART I: THE TRIUMPH OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE AND THE LITIGIOUS BREAKTHROUGH, 1954-63

CHAPTER 1: THE NAACP, THE WHITE CITIZENS’ COUNCIL, AND BI-RACIAL LIBERALISM

On November 29, 1954, over 1,200 white Alabamians attended a rally in Selma, Alabama in the
heart of Alabama’s Black Belt. Cutting across the south-central part of the state and including the
capital city of Montgomery, the Black Belt was thusly named for its rich black soil. That land had been
tilled by slaves when the region was home to the majority of the state’s cotton plantations. In 1954 it
remained the only majority black region of the state, where a small minority of whites clung more tightly
to absolute white supremacy than whites anywhere else in the country. The crowd gathered on a chilly
Monday night in Dallas County that fall to hear about a new movement that had originated in
neighboring Mississippi in the immediate wake of Brown. Two members of the Mississippi legislature
and a Presbyterian minister were summoned to speak to the Alabama group about what was being
called the White Citizens’ Council.1
Mississippi state representative J.S. Williams told the crowd of mostly men that the Citizens’
Council might look like another well-known defender of white supremacy, but it was “not a Ku Klux
Klan.” The Council renounced violence, whereas the Klan did not. The Council championed the rule of
law and “law and order,” whereas the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) took the law into its own hands. The KKK
existed to frustrate a wide list of stated enemies that included Catholics and Jews; the Council had a
more narrow mission. Having distanced his organization from such a crass, violent, lower-class
organization as the KKK, Williams began to explain the Council’s own, more specific raison d’etre. “Our
1
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purpose,” he continued, “is to give a direct answer to the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People: we have a heritage in the South for which we should ever be vigilant.” Specifically, it
was the NAACP which was seeking to destroy, through litigation, the cherished constitutional pillar of
white supremacy that was segregated education. Williams said, “The NAACP’s motto is ‘The Negro shall
be free by 1963.’ . . . And shall we accept that,” he asked. The answer was a resounding, “No!”2
Continuing to whip the crowd into a frenzy, Williams told the men of the Black Belt that the
maintenance of segregation was an “honor-bound and Christian cause.” To stand by as that system was
destroyed by the NAACP and by the federal judiciary would be not only dishonorable but dissatisfying to
God – circumstances that were probably equally horrifying to the average southern white man. In any
case, Williams argued, “We can’t have it, for if we do it would ruin the economic system of the South.”
Southerners were still dependent on black labor, especially in the Black Belt. What if blacks forgot their
place? The answer was clear enough. Finally he laid before the Alabamians the choice that would
become the political imperative of the next ten years. “The men of the South,” he said, “are either for
our council or against it. There can be no fence-straddling.” While Williams over-estimated the
importance of the Citizens’ Council itself, albeit only slightly, he was right about the relevance of its
mission. Many in Alabama would distance themselves publically from the Council. But any white
politician who hoped to survive after the School Segregation Cases decision had to stand clearly one side
of that fence, and one side only: that of continued segregation, and therefore of defiant resistance.3
One week later, Councilors held another organizational meeting in west Alabama’s Marengo
County. About 400 or so of the western Black Belt’s white men gathered to hear harangues from fellow
segregationists, including Alabama state senator Walter Givhan. Givhan, who would become one of the
state’s leading Councilors, told the crowd that America was “a white man’s country. It always has
been,” he said, “and it always will be.” He identified the NAACP as the principle enemy trying to ruin
2
3
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this arrangement. It was this organization that was trying to dupe the good negroes of Alabama. This
was how Givhan and others professed most blacks to be: ignorant and otherwise inferior, but
nonetheless content in their situation and, therefore, “good.” Good negroes did not want to destroy
segregation. NAACP “outsiders” and “trouble makers” were the real threat.4
The senator explained further the goals of the Council’s enemy. It was the NAACP’s intention,
Givhan told the men, to wrest political control of the white man’s country from him, specifically to put a
black man in the office of Vice President and to then assassinate the President. “You say it can’t happen
here,” he barked, “but I say it can and will unless we stand up and fight.” Givhan then touched the most
sensitive nerve of all. He assured the white men in the audience that the principal goal of the NAACP, in
the long run, was to “open the bedroom doors of our white women to the Negro men.” Miscegenation
– a violation of Alabama law, an abomination to God, and the deepest fear in the heart of the southern
white man – was the real endgame. The NAACP was pursuing “mixing” in schools, but the logical and
desired outcome was racial “mixing” in the bedroom, which would result in the “mongrelization” of the
white race. These were the stakes. So, when good men banded together in the White Citizens’ Council,
Givhan assured them, they could face the issue of school desegregation, loaded as it was with so many
potential consequences, with the confidence that “the whole of the U.S. Army is not strong enough to
force that upon us.”5

*****
The U.S. Supreme Court decision which came to be called simply Brown I had alarmed some
Alabama lawmakers. Even before the decision was reported, some legislators had begun to use their
offices to build defense works against it. The prevailing hope was, of course, that it would never have
any impact in the state’s schools or on the South’s peculiar social arrangement. After the Harrison
4
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Elementary School enrollment attempt in Montgomery and the initiation of sustained NAACP activity,
however, all whites in Alabama were wide awake. The imperative of the legislature became not simply
blunting Brown, but assaulting it, destroying it. Outside the legislature, Citizens’ Councils became the
preferred organizational outlet for white anxieties. These were the most significant movements, then,
awakened in Alabama as a direct or indirect result of the Brown decision: the legislative effort to nullify
Brown; the effort to force implementation, undertaken by black parents with the assistance of the
NAACP; and the effort to doggedly resist any such implementation, undertaken by segregationists, many
of whom affiliated themselves with the Citizens’ Council and similar organizations.
NAACP activity in the state to that point had been mostly limited to middle class black activists’
efforts to register voters in a select few cities. Many blacks who had not been active members of the
NAACP subsequently responded to a national and regional drive to force implementation of the Court’s
decision. This implementation drive then led segregationists to more urgently coordinate their defense.
The powerful, middle-class-driven Citizens’ Council challenged and ultimately supplanted the violent KKK
for leadership of Alabama’s white supremacists. Many in this new order of segregationists were
members of the state legislature, and those politicians who did not formally join such organizations
dedicated themselves to an active preservation of the color line in education. In short, Brown put hope
into the hearts of many integrationist-inclined blacks, while it put fear into the hearts of many
segregationist whites, and each group engaged in early efforts to either effect or forestall the decision’s
promise. They subsequently reinforced each other.
The NAACP and the Citizens’ Council did not account for the sum total of organized reaction to
Brown, of course. There were other white supremacist groups that emerged in response to the
decision, some of which splintered from – or blurred into – the Council itself. Existing groups like the
KKK benefitted from a surge in membership and an increase in activity, as well. In addition to these,
there were a small number of white liberals who joined with black intellectuals in a bi-racial movement
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for moderation. The Alabama Council on Human Relations (ACHR) was the strongest manifestation of
this movement, but its impact remained marginal. The Citizens’ Council’s call for “law and order,” and
its characterization of the NAACP as a trouble-making group of “outsiders,” won over many whites who
might have been swayed by bi-racial liberals’ calls for cooperation and discussion. Even if many whites
remained aloof from the Council, its’ message of “law and order” and moderation carried the day
among a greater number than is represented by their numerical strength. Law and order and
moderation, in effect, meant anything short of KKK-type violent resistance. Indeed, Alabamians might
have first heard the phrase when the “Southern Law and Order Commission” in 1913 sent an antilynching petition to southern governors. For many councilors themselves, law-and-order moderation
meant economic reprisal. For many politically inclined whites, both within the Council ranks and
nominally without, it meant erecting as many effective legal barriers to any breach of segregation and
white supremacy as possible. Alabama Governor Jim Folsom would eventually be the last liberal
standing, while activists on both sides swirled around him in a frenzied effort to organize massive
resistance and persistent pressure, and as the effort to block Brown helped solidify race as the locus of
Alabama politics.6

Politics and Race in Alabama, 1875-1954
Brown did not infuse politics in Alabama with race, of course. Racial conflict was a fact of life in
Alabama by the 1950s. It had only been 20 years since the “Scottsboro Boys” tragedy had exposed the
lengths to which whites in Alabama would go to preserve the integrity of white supremacy in the state,
including, in that case, flagrant abuse of the criminal justice system. It had been less than a decade since
Alabama politicians had contributed to the temporary fracturing of the Democratic Party occasioned by
the “Dixiecrat” revolt against the national party’s civil rights plank. Alabama’s white power structure
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had dealt at various times since Reconstruction with populist, biracial threats from the working class,
especially in the industrial cities of Birmingham and Mobile. And white violence against blacks thought
to be encroaching into white neighborhoods in Birmingham was so prevalent by the 1950s as to afford
the city the unfortunately apt nickname of “Bombingham.”7
Alabama historian Wayne Flynt has concluded, “From the time freedmen received the vote in
the late 1860s, race played a pivotal role in state politics.” According to Flynt, class was often cast
alongside race. The political alliance that governed the state in the late Nineteenth and for much of the
first half of the Twentieth Century was born of racial and class-based imperatives. The Black Belt
“planter” elites, large landowners who lorded over masses of black tenant farmers much like antebellum
planters had done before them, could trace their ascendance back to the “redemption” of the state
from “radical Republican” Reconstruction rule in 1875. These Democrat planters took advantage of the
national retreat from Reconstruction policy, appealed to average whites, and took firm control of the
state by championing white supremacy and low taxes, in contrast to the “tax-and-spend” policy of the
supposedly corrupt and inept “black Republicans.” The Alabama Bourbons, as they came to be called,
maintained power amid a late 19th Century Populist challenge by aligning themselves with the
industrialists and businessmen of Birmingham and its several small, satellite cities. These so-called “Big
Mules” of the Birmingham district and the planters of the Black Belt, equally frightened by the prospects
of a Populist coalition of poor blacks and whites, enthroned themselves and destroyed the Populist
uprising with the adoption of the 1901 state constitution. This document (which remained the state’s
foundational charter as of 2013) solidified Bourbon control by effectively disenfranchising thousands of
poor whites and blacks through the use of voter residency requirements, criminal restrictions, a
property requirement, and, most damningly of all, an annual, accumulative poll tax. The 1901
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constitution also ensured white solidarity, however, by institutionalizing segregation, which, along with
black disenfranchisement, institutionalized white supremacy.8
Changes wrought by the Great Depression, the New Deal, the Second World War, and black
challenges to white supremacy all brought race closer to the center of Alabama politics, ultimately at the
expense of class. The Depression breathed life into progressive traditions in the state and gave rise to a
cadre of New Deal liberals that competed with the Bourbon conservatives for power during the 1930s
and 1940s. These liberals capitalized on the votes of small farmers in the state’s northern Piedmont and
southeastern Wiregrass regions and the votes of laborers in Birmingham and Mobile. The high water
marks of this movement were perhaps the gubernatorial terms of Bibb Graves (1927-31, 1934-38).
Graves, though, was twice succeeded by Bourbon conservatives and was himself affiliated with the
great, longtime defender of white supremacy, the Ku Klux Klan. The long term prospects of the liberal
movement were even dimmer than its short term failures, though. Conservatives and some
progressives remained staunchly opposed to the more liberal aspects of the New Deal, and as the
Roosevelt and Truman Administrations cautiously began to abandon their traditional deference to Jim
Crow segregation and to court the growing black vote in the North and West, southern Democrats in
Alabama and across the South began to prepare a challenge to the direction of the national party. Many
white Alabamians returned home from the war eager to wrest control of southern politics from this old
guard and to modernize the South. But growing black activism among veterans and the Truman
Administration’s nascent support for civil rights put these new southern leaders on the defensive and
forced potential would-be racial moderates to harden their racial politics to fend off conservative
attacks.9
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These changes unleashed by the New Deal and the war gave rise to the Dixiecrat Revolt of 1948.
The so-called revolt was the culmination of southern conservative backlash against the New Deal and a
visceral response to the Truman Administration's support for civil rights legislation aimed at lynching,
the poll tax, segregated interstate transportation, and the permanent establishment of the Fair
Employment Practices Commission. In response to these growing threats, conservative southern
Democrats resurrected Confederate President Jefferson Davis’ post-bellum clarion call of “states'
rights,” which harmonized well with long-echoing calls for "local control." Alabama’s Big Mules and
Black Belters had been demanding “local control” since the New Deal. Roosevelt’s policies had come to
represent, to them, new threats of federal intrusion into matters they saw fit to regulate themselves,
and more importantly, threats to their ascendancy. Alabama’s conservative leaders realized, though,
that such grievances did not resonate with the white working class, which they were trying to control.
To win votes in Alabama, the Bourbon coalition leaders eventually “remembered a classic lesson of
Alabama politics,” as one historian has written. They knew that “if they shouted ‘nigger’ often enough
and loud enough, the white working class would listen,” and they did. Nationally, the Dixiecrats
mounted a third party challenge to Truman’s election which was designed to bring the party back to a
defensive position on states’ rights and, in effect, on Jim Crow and white supremacy in the South. The
Dixiecrats in Alabama succeeded in taking control of the state’s Democratic party apparatus and leaving
“loyalist” Truman electors off of the primary ballot, ensuring victory for the Dixiecrat candidate – South
Carolina’s Strom Thurmond. Among those Alabamians who remained loyal were future Governor
George C. Wallace and his political mentor, Governor James E. “Big Jim” Folsom.10
Folsom was a populist and racial moderate from the Wiregrass region who ascended to the
governorship by by-passing the usual political channels (courthouse gangs) and by going directly to what
he called the branchheads of politics – the people themselves. As a loyalist, he supported Truman and
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opposed the Dixiecrat split. He supported expanded civil rights for poor whites and blacks alike, actively
sought the abolition of the poll tax, and fought the Bourbon alliance by trying to reapportion the state’s
legislature, which remained increasingly and absurdly weighted towards the sparsely populated Black
Belt. Folsom’s innovative grassroots campaign won him the governor’s chair, but his progressive stance
on civil rights (to say nothing of his administration’s infamously egregious corruption and his own often
outrageous, drunken behavior) won him few friends among the state’s established power brokers. The
very same election that brought Folsom to Montgomery, after all, produced the Boswell Amendment – a
response to the Supreme Court’s Smith v. Allwright decision outlawing the all-white Democratic primary.
The Boswell Amendment made voter registration so complicated that it effectively disfranchised most
blacks and many poor whites who had not managed to claw their way onto voter rolls. Folsom opposed
the amendment and boldly continued to oppose such measures throughout his career. His progressive
stance on racial matters ultimately doomed the legislative passage of nearly anything he valued most
dearly though, namely poll tax abolition and reapportionment.11
Alabama’s constitution prohibited governors from holding consecutive terms in office, but the
popular Folsom won two non-consecutive terms in office which bookended the lone term of Gordon
Persons, whose own time in Montgomery demonstrates further the growing importance of race in
Alabama politics. The Dixiecrats in Alabama had been assailed by those who saw their ballot
manipulation as an attack on the democratic process; Folsom himself had made hay of accusing the Big
Mules and Black Belt planters of being anti-democratic. Like Folsom, Persons was a loyalist and
therefore reaped the benefits of a voter backlash against the Dixiecrats’ extremism and their complete
evisceration of Folsom’s populist agenda. Nevertheless, Persons was a staunch segregationist, refusing
to put himself out on the limb on which Folsom precariously rested. Tellingly then, Persons had a good

11

Grafton and Permaloff, Big Mules and Branchheads, pp. 1-12, 79-111; George E. Simms, The Little
Man’s Big Friend: James E. Folsom in Alabama Politics, 1946-1958 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985),
pp. 22-39.

34

working relationship with the legislature and was able to achieve most of his modest goals, including
initiating prison reform and instituting speed limits and increasing highway expenditures. He had
campaigned on the issue of abolishing the poll tax but settled for a watered-down compromise measure
which eliminated only the accumulative feature of the tax. Persons also supported the "Little Boswell"
Amendment, a back-up plan to continue black disenfranchisement which had been conceived after the
original was deemed unconstitutional by a federal court.12
Persons was the Governor of Alabama when Brown was handed down in the summer of 1954.
According to historian Wayne Flynt, the Court’s decision – along with the sustained direct action protest
and litigation campaign known collectively as the ‘Montgomery bus boycott’ the following year –
completed Alabama’s “transition from a political culture heavily influenced by class conflicts to one
almost entirely defined by race.” Persons’ response to the school cases decision represented the socalled moderate political approach to racial matters amid this transition. He had no inclination
whatsoever to desegregate anything, but he nonetheless eschewed the kind of race-baiting and
vehement defiance that traced its origins to the Dixiecrats and would come to characterize subsequent
administrations. Despite pressure from the legislature to call a special session to initiate defiant
legislation, Persons insisted on caution, claiming that "no intelligent legislation can be passed until the
subject is clarified and until the legislature knows what it is facing." While he resisted the pull of the
most reactionary white supremacists, his actions demonstrated the futility of the moderate approach.
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Ultimately, Persons did essentially nothing in response to Brown, but this left a vacuum which Alabama’s
legislators gladly filled as soon as they got the chance.13
Within the legislature, leaders were then emerging that represented a new generation of
doggedly committed segregationists. Both factions of the Black Belt—Big Mule alliance were preparing
to resist desegregation, though each had a slightly different approach, born out of their respective
demographic and economic situations. Representative of the Black Belt planters was state senator Sam
Engelhardt. Engelhardt claimed to have entered politics solely to keep blacks from governing his home
county of Macon and “taking his property.” He had inherited a 6,500 acre cotton plantation in the
overwhelmingly black county, and most of his land was worked by poor black tenant farmers. Blacks
outnumbered whites roughly four-to-one in Macon County. In Macon and across the Black Belt, the
substantial black majorities in the various counties made the white elites there take up what has been
called an "angry, do-or-die approach" to maintaining segregation, because threats to segregation
represented threats to their "entire fortunes – indeed their entire identities." If blacks were ever
afforded the vote, or were ever given the education that might prepare them for something other than
sharecropping, then the political and economic foundations of Black Belt white supremacy would
crumble. “That’s why I’m in this thing,” Engelhardt once said of his political career. He would
rhetorically ask, “If you have a nigger tax assessor what would that do to you? What would a nigger
sheriff do to you? What would a nigger judge do to you?” Making matters more precarious for
Engelhardt was that Tuskegee, the Macon County seat, was home to the famed Tuskegee Institute –
a prestigious black institution of higher learning established as a teachers’ school in the late Nineteenth
Century. Along with a federal Veterans’ Administration hospital, the Institute fostered a stable-if-small
black middle class intelligentsia and an active NAACP chapter, making the city a seedbed of grassroots
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agitation against Jim Crow and disenfranchisement. Such threats in Engelhardt’s backyard made his
defense of white supremacy all the more urgent.14
Engelhardt would soon emerge as one of the most ardent segregationist in Alabama and the
leader of the state’s White Citizens’ Councils. The senator made no secret of his views on race and on
the potential for school desegregation, once arguing publically that "desegregating the schools will lead
to rape! Damn niggers stink,” he said, “they're unwashed. They have no morals; they're just animals."
He continued, "The nigger is depraved! Give him the opportunity to be near a white woman, and he
goes berserk!" The logical conclusion was that "the nigger isn't just a dark-skinned white man. He's a
separate individual altogether." Such impassioned defenses of biological racism were not uncommon
among Alabama’s white leadership. Deeply-held beliefs about race such as this were maintained by
probably a substantial majority of whites in the state. But among prominent politicians, it was generally
only the Black Belters who had the audacity to state such matters publically.15
The situation was somewhat different for the Big Mules. Representative of the state’s industrial
and corporate interests was Birmingham lawyer and state senator Albert Boutwell. Boutwell grew up in
the Black Belt but moved to the state’s largest city after graduating from law school at the University of
Alabama. He was first elected to the state senate in 1946, where he quickly became a leader in the antiFolsom, conservative “economy bloc” and subsequently served as floor leader for Governor Gordon
Persons. He was known as a shrewd lawyer, a staunch conservative, and friend to business. As a
representative of the growing city of Birmingham, he might have favored Folsom’s call for
reapportionment, but as a Big Mule, his alliance with the Black Belt planter contingent made this a
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sensitive issue. Of course the two sides saw eye-to-eye on segregation, and Boutwell quickly established
his credentials by serving on the segregationist “Interim Committee” in Birmingham, a group of white
power brokers that sought to blunt any efforts to desegregate Birmingham’s public facilities.16
As a leader of his city’s Big Mule contingent, Boutwell was concerned with maintaining “law and
order,” the most fundamental tenet of white “moderate” segregationists. Without law and order, the
rationale went, business stagnated. This position had been developing in “Bombingham” for years, as
black encroachment into white neighborhoods led to continuing dynamite attacks on black homes, and
as the black middle class and returning World War II veterans began to attempt to assert their voting
rights. This violent response to the black challenges of the 1940s had its own roots in the city’s
conservative reaction to the biracial trade unionism of the 1930s and before, which had been violently
and often clandestinely suppressed. By the 1950s, though, moderates, many of them veterans
themselves, counseled that the violent response of the mostly working class Klan was bad for the city’s
image, industrial recruitment, and business in general. Absolute maintenance of the color line was
imperative, but there were more legally sound and civilized ways to defend it, some thought. Boutwell
represented such interests in the Interim Committee and in the state legislature. Engelhardt and the
Black Belt elites also denounced violence, but theirs was nonetheless that "angry, do-or-die approach"
that owed much to the violent response of poorer whites and also encouraged such a response at the
same time. This set the planters ever-so-slightly apart from the Big Mules, whose segregationist defense
has been called "determined but nevertheless distant” and could often be mistaken for real racial
moderation. Boutwell and other less-vitriolic segregationists, like Alabama’s U.S. senators Lister Hill and
John Sparkman, would remain publically aloof from groups like the KKK and even the Citizens’ Council,
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while at the same time openly supporting the groups’ stated cause: vigilant preservation of segregation
and white supremacy.17
One week before the Supreme Court handed down Brown, Jim Folsom won the Democratic
primary for governor and, in effect, won the governor’s office. He had campaigned on a populist agenda
again, promising farm-to-market roads, old-age pensions, and a constitutional convention to replace the
1901 document which undergirded the Big Mule—Black Belt power structure. Even Folsom had been
forced to temper his message on race, though. He promised not to make blacks attend school with
whites, which simultaneously signaled his recognition of anti-integrationism among blacks and, more
importantly, his at least tacit support for segregation.18 Nonetheless, Folsom’s second term would
demonstrate that men like Boutwell and Engelhardt, who were set to become two of the incoming
governor’s most powerful foes in the statehouse, were riding the tidal wave of race beyond the
beachhead of power in Alabama and into the heartland of white supremacy. Race may have been
woven into the state’s political culture over decades, but Brown had jolted all parties in Alabama into a
state of heightened awareness, activity, and urgency that marked the years that followed, if not as a
new political era altogether, then as a period of significantly intensified and tightly channeled continuity.

Legislating against Brown
The Alabama state legislature passed a resolution in the late summer of 1953, as the U.S.
Supreme Court was preparing to rehear the School Segregation Cases. Bracing themselves for a
catastrophic ruling, the legislators decried the difficulties that desegregation might bring, while at the
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same time giving frank admission of, and a glimpse into, the institutionalized nature of the system of
segregated education in the state. The legislature lamented that:
The employment, seniority and tenure of teachers, the location and design of schools, the
number and routing of school busses, the content and arrangement of the curriculum in every
school, the standards of instruction, and practically every other aspect of the educational
system of the state are based upon the present separation and would have to be drastically
revised if the principal of separation should be invalidated.19

If this sort of public statement of legally segregated fact came as a surprise to anyone, they had not read
the 1901 constitution, which stated the matter plainly enough: “Separate schools shall be provided for
white and colored children, and no child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school for the
other race.” When the Supreme Court flatly declared this arrangement unconstitutional in 1954 with
Brown v. Board of Education, Alabama’s legislators responded with a barrage of legislation. Some of it
condemned the decision, the Court, and the federal government in general, while much of the rest of it
was aimed at avoiding any sort of implementation in the state by a variety of means, ranging in potential
effectiveness from the probably hopeless to the seemingly foolproof. One former Dixiecrat attorney
observed to the Birmingham press that all of these new laws would “have to be appealed to the
Supreme Court” if challenged. “And if they are held illegal” he said, “still another batch of new laws can
be tried and tested. This can go on for a long time – and what can the Court do?”20
Sam Engelhardt went to work before Brown was even decided, introducing school closure and
private school bills into the legislature as early as 1951; he even introduced a bill that would have
converted all public education to televised instruction to be broadcast into children’s homes. These preruling bills were considered extreme and were rejected, as were two similar private school bills
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Engelhardt introduced in the early session of the 1953 legislature. Engelhardt’s proposals would have
amended the language of the Alabama constitution, eliminating the obvious requirement of a dual racial
system. He suggested replacing that system by introducing language allowing for “the establishment,
operation, financing and regulation of free private schools.” If the parents of ten or more students
wished to establish a private school, they could do so by setting up private school corporations. They
could then buy or rent real estate, build or otherwise establish schools, and then administer them as
they saw fit, most especially by controlling who was admitted to them. These corporations could also
apply for “allotments” of funds similar to those already given by the state, only in this case the
allotments were per pupil, as opposed to per teacher. But with the School Segregation Cases still under
consideration by the Court, legislators outside the Black Belt were not yet prepared to surrender public
schools to a privatized system. Engelhardt’s bills languished in committee as the 1953 session ended.21
When Brown was announced in the summer of 1954, the Alabama State Board of Education
formally resolved to continue operating its schools as it had in the past, articulating the legal
interpretation that most southern politicians had very quickly adopted. On the motion of Persons, who
as governor was ex officio president, the board acknowledged in a formal resolution that “the ruling of
the Supreme Court on the so-called ‘segregation’ cases has raised considerable doubt and many
questions . . . as to the policy to be followed by [school officials] in the school year of 1954-55.” But
Alabama’s constitutional provision for separate schools for the white and black races had “never been
stricken by any court in the land,” the resolution continued, and therefore the public schools of Alabama
would continue to operate under it, “irrespective of any action by any court in any case in which a unit
of the public school system of Alabama is not a party.” The board concluded that Alabama’s public
school system was “administered under the State Constitution and the statutes passed by the Alabama
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legislature,” to which there had been no challenge and no change. Therefore, it announced, there
would be no change in operation the following school year.22
As many southern educators and politicians had declared or would subsequently declare, Brown
was the law of the case, not the law of the land. Widely held as it was, incoming state Superintendent of
Education Austin Meadows revealed the insecurity of this position when he pledged to actively work to
“find a legal way to maintain segregation in our schools” (emphasis added). The Montgomery minister
and black community leader S.S. Seay articulated the wider implications of this sort of legal denial when
he responded to news of the board’s resolution by saying, “We are facing a day of judgment in America,
and none of us is making preparations to meet this judgment.” Most in the state legislature knew that
more would be needed to stymie the forces of desegregation than a hopelessly untenable legal
interpretation, and so they began to make better preparations to meet the judgment.23
The legislators appointed a committee to study the decision via executive sessions and to
propose a course of action. They tapped Albert Boutwell to chair the committee, which also included
Sam Engelhardt. Boutwell announced in September, 1954 that his group was recommending to
Governor Persons that all sections of the Alabama Constitution pertaining to public schools be rewritten
to eliminate any mention of “public,” and that provisions be written-in allowing for the widespread
establishment of state-subsidized private schools. This was to be achieved mostly through a single
constitutional amendment, which read, “Nothing in the constitution shall be construed as creating or
recognizing any right to education or training at public expense, nor as limiting the authority or duty of
the legislature to require or impose conditions or procedures deemed necessary to the preservation of
peace and order.” Peace and order could be maintained, and “confusion and disorder” avoided, by
giving parents the right to choose to “attend schools provided by their own race.” With the constitution
thus amended, the committee reasoned that segregated education would be maintained not by law, but
22
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by choice, as they figured that most black parents would not risk choosing white schools. In the event
that some did, the public schools could simply be abandoned in favor of private schools, for which the
state would provide grants-in-aid. In case of legal challenges, school officials could themselves be legally
deemed “judicial” officers and supposedly put beyond the reach of civil litigation.24
When it was released in October, 1954, the full text of the Boutwell Committee Report revealed
the rationale behind the “peace and order” excuse. The report summarized the likely results of “forced
integration” such as that portended by Brown. “The recent outbreaks of violence in border states and
communities” (that is, in the old “Border States” of the Confederacy where the black population was
significantly lower and where desegregation had begun in earnest) “are pale reflections,” wrote the
committee, “of the result of a forced integration in this state.” It insisted that “if we are to save our
schools and our children from violence, disorder, and tension, it is imperative that prompt action be
taken.” The legislature should not shut down every public school in the state, but it should be aware,
the committee beseeched, that “some school systems in the state may at any time be faced with an
intolerable situation.” It was taken as a given, and given the sanction of reasonable understanding, that
white citizens faced with the “intolerable” burden of black students in white schools would resort to
violence and economic reprisals. “White employers” the report read, “would be strongly induced to
withhold employment from Negro parents who would take advantage of the intended compulsion,
leases would likewise be terminated, and trade and commercial relations, now in satisfactory progress,
would be affected.”25
If the supposed inevitability of a violent white backlash and campaign of economic reprisal was
not enough to convince the legislature to pass the committee’s proposals, the plight of the black student
in white schools was added to the list of the unfortunate outcomes of “forced integration.” The
Boutwell Report lamented that “Negro children would be harmed, and warped by belligerent
24
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resentment of their forced acceptance, by innumerable daily incidents emphasizing it, and by the sharp
disclosure of a generally lower scholastic aptitude.” Appropriate education could not take place in such
an “abnormal and unwholesome atmosphere of tensions and resentment.”26
The ultimate goal of the Boutwell proposal was not the statewide abolition of public schools,
nor indeed state-level, absolute defiance of any breach in segregated education. It delegated the
authority for school closure to local school authorities. The committee concluded that “the
overwhelming majority of the citizens of Alabama,” were “unalterably opposed to the idea of permitting
the use of the public school system to coerce racial integration,” and that all whites and the vast
majority of blacks would prefer to go to schools for their own race. However, it also allowed that some
“might be willing to concede the right of white and Negro families to send their children to mixed public
schools.” In the event that this was acceptable to the local community as a whole, it would be allowed,
provided there was an adequate “application of tests and standards.” In effect all of this meant that in
areas like the Black Belt, where the threat of blacks overrunning whites was highest, any breach of the
color line would be undoubtedly seen as an “intolerable situation,” and black applications to white
schools would result in school closure and the establishment of white private schools. Where the black
population was relatively smaller, applicants could be screened and either let in on very select basis
where whites were willing to accept a token number, or summarily rejected where they were not. This
was ostensibly a “freedom of choice” plan which would create a three-pronged school system, one
white, one black, and one mixed, in which there was “no compulsory mixing of races,” and under which
there would thus be no violation of any one’s equal protection.27
When a number of conservatives expressed concern over consideration of a mixed set of
schools, even under so-called freedom of choice, members of the Boutwell Committee indicated that
none were genuinely intended. Boutwell point man Joe Johnston announced that “there may have been
26
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some misunderstanding about the purpose of the bill. It has been reported – incorrectly,” Johnston told
the press, “that it is a bill to provide a certain type of school. Its real purpose is to give the legislature
more authority to make changes from time to time as the situation requires.” Even in affording the
legislature this “authority to make changes,” Boutwell argued, it put the real power “in the hands of
local people, even to the extent of providing an alternative system of schools.” When some expressed
concern over the drastic measure of school closure, Boutwell assured them that this was a “last
resort.”28
Members of the Boutwell Committee, and the great majority of legislators in general, pleaded
with Persons to call a special session of the legislature, so that they could pass the committee’s
proposals along with any other bills drafted in response to Brown, such as those being considered across
the South. Persons recommended waiting until the Court issued its implementation decree and
submitted the committee’s proposals to advisors. The governor was clearly taking a wait-and-see
approach. With his term nearing an end, and with the Supreme Court waiting on incoming Justice John
Marshall Harlan to join it before making a decision on implementation, this wait-and-see approach
become the do-nothing approach. At a conference of southern governors that fall, which Persons
declined to attend, seven governors signed a pledge to study and implement all legal means feasible to
“preserve the right of the states to administer their public school systems to the best interest of all the
people.” Among the six who attended but declined to sign the pledge was incoming Alabama Governor
Jim Folsom.29
Persons left Folsom an increasingly besieged governor’s chair. Folsom was prepared to do all
that he could to keep a rash of segregationist legislation from overtaking his own legislative program.
But would it be enough for the governor to counsel not just wait-and-see, but ‘let us use moderation?’
Increasingly, over the course of his last four years in public office, Folsom saw events spiral out of his
28
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control. The organization of Citizens Councils and the implementation activity of the NAACP, in
particular, marked his first years in office and only deepened a crisis that he would have rather avoided
altogether. Hope and fear were powerful emotions, however, and each had helped awaken activists in
Alabama and had insured that no politician could escape what would become the great question of the
next 15 years in Alabama politics: on which side of the racial fence would one stand. There was, indeed,
to be no “fence-straddling” anymore on the question of segregated education. With the Supreme
Court’s highly anticipated implementation decree still to follow Brown I, the forces mobilized by the
initial decision continued to plan for the best and the worst.

The NAACP and “Operation Implementation”
From the moment Brown I was handed down, the NAACP began organizing an implementation
drive. At the direction of the NAACP National Office in New York, the Southeast Regional Office began
to reach out to local branches in the late spring and early summer of 1954, encouraging immediate
action to capitalize on what it called “our greatest victory.” The Secretary of the southeast office was
Ruby Hurley. Hurley had come to the South from the national office in New York in 1952 and had begun
to work on fulfilling the NAACP’s goal that the Negro be “Free in ’63,” traveling throughout the region,
visiting its over 300 branches to monitor and guide activity, and following up on complaints from local
people. She was also responsible for prodding the regions’ branches into maintaining or increasing their
memberships and raising money for the organization’s Freedom Fund. By 1954 she had already been
the victim of written and telephoned threats to her physical safety. Once Brown came down, she
nonetheless took on the primary role of overseeing the implementation effort in the South.30
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Hurley attended the NAACP annual conference in Atlanta on May 22nd and 23rd, 1954, at which
the association’s leaders formulated their implementation plan: to have local branches petition boards
of education for recognition of the Supreme Court’s decision and for an immediate end to compulsory
segregated education. Practiced in litigation above all else, the association knew the petitions would be
an important first step. While they were not likely to persuade any school boards to dismantle their
dual systems, they would at least pave the way for civil actions against those boards in each case. The
NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. – often called LDF or simply the Inc. Fund – was
prepared to provide counsel in such of those cases as it could. LDF attorneys were veterans of the
School Segregation Cases litigation effort and knew that the petitioning campaign must be carried out
carefully if it were to ultimately become part of a trial record.31
The NAACP announced its plan via the Atlanta Declaration. “All Americans are now relieved,” it
read, “to have the law of the land declared in the clearest language. . . . Segregation in public education
is now not only unlawful; it is un-American.” The group had “canvassed the situation in each of our
states” and was “ready to work with law abiding citizens who are anxious to translate this decision into a
program of action to eradicate racial segregation in public education as speedily as possible.” It
announced the forthcoming petitioning campaign and an accelerated community action program aimed
at winning acceptance of the Court’s decision. It sought the cooperation of “teachers, parents, labor,
church, civic, fraternal, business, and professional organizations” and the U.S. government. The NAACP
would thenceforth commit “the fullest resources of the association” to the “great project of ending the
artificial separation of America’s children on the irrelevant basis of race and color.” W.C. Patton, NAACP
President of State Conferences and soon-to-be become the state’s first full-time Field Secretary, carried
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the news of the Atlanta Declaration to 200 of the association’s local leaders at a Montgomery meeting,,
which closed with an affirmation of the stated goal of the national organization – that the Negro be
“free in 1963.”32
In June Hurley herself moved on the Atlanta Declaration and told branches that, with the
Supreme Court’s May 17 decision, they were surely “now in a position to move forward and see [their]
goal with clearer vision.” She “admonished” branch leaders to “act promptly in getting petitions
singed,” to “have legal counsel or other well qualified persons represent them in conferences with local
school boards,” and to work with the state conference “on every step of this.” If they needed any
reassurance or encouragement, Hurley reminded them, “Segregation in public education has been
declared unconstitutional and the questions to be argued before the Court in the Fall will not change
that fact.”33 Hurley and others knew that whites were trying to claim the decision was simply the ‘law of
the case,’ which they all knew to be legally worthless. “We are fully cognizant,” she announced on a
radio broadcast, “of the resistance to the Supreme Court decision affecting segregation in public
education.” These efforts “to circumvent it,” she said, “will be lost – the law is binding.” She reminded
her own local branches that it was their duty to not only try and make their communities “understand
the evils of segregation” but to convince the whites in power there that they should “resign themselves
to the fact that state laws notwithstanding, segregation in public education is legally dead. When it will
be buried,” Hurley wrote, “is up to the people in our communities.” It was the local NAACP’s role, then,
to “hasten the day of the funeral.” Hurley understood that resistance might mean it would take some
time; just how much was harder to ascertain.34
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To get a sense of what to expect in Alabama when this process of making funeral arrangements
actually began, Hurley initiated talks that summer with W.C. Patton. Patton, who had been “working
like a house-afire” for “a year and a half,” told her that when branches actually got down to filing
petitions, that they should “expect almost anything.” Patton’s ground work had shown him that whites
were organizing resistance already, and anyone who picked up a newspaper could see that the
legislature was preparing for a fight. Nonetheless, Hurley told the New York office, “I think we are at the
point where concentrated effort will pay off” in Alabama.35
The Alabama NAACP State Conference held a subsequent meeting of branch officers and
handed out copies of the Atlanta Declaration, petitions, and retainer forms. At the very same time,
State Superintendent of Education Austin Meadows was distributing copies of the newly passed
Alabama Pupil Placement Law to the state’s local education officials. Just as Meadows understood that
local superintendents and boards of education would be the ones administering Alabama’s defense of
segregation, so Ruby Hurley knew that the local branches could make or break the association’s
implementation efforts. She told the branch officers of the region in September that “the real work
must be done by you and the people in your community. Your National Office and your Regional Office
cannot do the job for you,” she wrote, “we can only show you the way and help you along.”36
As E.D. Nixon was organizing the filing of a petition to the Montgomery County Board of
Education and helping plan the Harrison Elementary enrollment attempt, some NAACP branches in
Alabama were preparing to file petitions of their own, as encouraged by the regional office. In addition
to the Montgomery action, branches organized and filed petitions with school boards in the fall of 1954
35
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in the city of Anniston (east of Birmingham), in the industrial Birmingham suburb of Fairfield, and in the
small south Alabama town of Brewton. These earliest attempts revealed the dynamics of subsequent
attempts and the response they elicited. The grievances were clear: the signatories of the Fairfield
petition all had to walk past white schools to get to their assigned schools – which were inferior in any
case. The remedies were clear: the petitions, usually bearing the signatures of 20-30 parents of school
children, asked for school boards to take “immediate steps” to comply with the Supreme Court’s
mandate and to bring to an end compulsory segregated education within the system. The NAACP
branches offered to assist the school boards in any way possible in bringing this about; thus, biracial
cooperation was a fundamental request. The standard official and unofficial responses also quickly
became clear. The Montgomery school board took the ‘law of the case’ approach and reasoned that it
need do nothing. After nearly two weeks had passed with no action announced by the Fairfield Board of
Education, the chairman of the local NAACP branch stated that he had “hoped to hear from them before
this, but we are still acting in good faith,” he said, “expecting to have word from the board.” The
Anniston school board announced that it would consider the petition and then proceeded to simply let
the matter die there. School officials were generally content in ignoring such requests, as had been
expected in most cases.37
If refusing to officially respond to petitions was a seemingly benign response, the behind-thescenes strategy employed by school officials was both more sinister and more effective. It was first
revealed by the response of several signatories to the Brewton petition. The local school board in
Brewton turned the petition it received over to the local newspaper, which subsequently published the
list of signees. Twelve parents who had signed then denied having done so, and three disavowed any
association with the NAACP. Many blacks whom local leaders had convinced to sign petitions were not
in a position to withstand the coming barrage of pressure from whites, usually in the form of the threat
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of economic reprisal but also including the threat of violence. The average black parent could not afford
to risk losing a job or being unable to obtain credit or being evicted. Many petitioners would later deny
having signed or would deny knowing what it was they had signed. NAACP leaders, at least, were in
most cases in positions that made them immune to some of this pressure. For example, the president of
the Fairfield branch was a local minster, and the leader of the Anniston branch was a dentist. But the
parents who signed were not always so lucky.38
In December, 1954, speaking to the NAACP’s Southeast Regional Advisory Board, the
association’s Director of Branches, Gloster Current, declared that the organization would persist in its
effort to force implementation on the South despite the beginnings of an economic reprisal campaign
organized by the Citizens’ Councils. Current told the assembled state conference presidents, field
secretaries, and other officers that the NAACP would continue to “use every legal means at its disposal
to combat these tactics by bigots and others.” It would “not be deterred” by those who would “frighten
and intimidate the Negro leaders throughout the South” and who would engage in “frantic efforts to
circumvent the Court’s ruling.” Current then addressed legislative efforts to stave off Brown
implementation, arguing “Integration will work in Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, and
other states in this region,” if and only if “the public officials, including the governors and members of
the state legislatures . . . adopt law-abiding, progressive attitudes rather than continually seeking to
develop methods designed to delay and frustrate effectuation of the ending of segregated schools.”
Most southerners were “law-abiding,” he said, they simply needed progressive leadership.39
Ruby Hurley echoed Current’s sentiments in February of the next year, announcing her region’s
Third Annual Conference of Branches to be held in Atlanta later that month. Despite the resistance the
NAACP had encountered, including “actions by state legislatures, citizens’ councils and other groups that
38
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are advocating circumvention of the law,” she said, “we will continue to work as we have in the past
forty-six years and ultimately, after the tumult and din has died, we will win.” When around 200
delegates converged on Atlanta for the conference, they considered what progress had been made,
which was minimal, what problems the organization was facing, which were many, and what steps
should be taken moving forward. The association was determined, said Hurley, to force upon the South
the recognition that the school cases decision was “a second Emancipation Proclamation” and “the law
of all the land.” Accordingly, the delegates released a joint statement announcing their determination
to continue the implementation struggle, much as they begun it, per the Atlanta Declaration. The
NAACP in the southeast was going to ensure that “boards and school officials” would be “continually
pressured by NAACP units” until the task was complete. The association would not be “alarmed,” the
statement read, by the “undemocratic and unconstitutional methods” of the state governments of the
South.40
The plan for the fall of 1955 was to be much as it had been 1954: to have local branches file
petitions in their communities and to prepare, as necessary, for litigation. While everyone knew that
litigation meant a long fight, the conference nonetheless set the regional goal for implementation of
Brown – meaning the actual desegregation of schools in southern school districts – for September of
that year. This was a hopelessly optimistic date, but branches had to at least seem to be acting in good
faith in petitioning school boards, rather than simply announcing petitioning as preparation for
litigation. There was some hope that a few progressive white officials would comply in some parts of
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the South. Whether they did or not, the officials reasoned, it was still “the beginning of the end” for
segregated schools.41
The petition drive in 1954 had not had the impact that the NAACP wanted, but Hurley, W.C.
Patton, and the local branch officials had reason to be optimistic about 1955. Membership was on the
rise in the state, at least. And nothing had occurred which would make anyone believe that the NAACP’s
approach was not the best hope to achieve implementation. Many blacks in Alabama thought so, as the
number of members of the NAACP in the state jumped from just under 5,000 in 1953 to nearly 8,000 by
the end of 1954. Membership gains in early 1955 were not as significant as they had been the previous
year, and the actual number of new memberships produced by the state’s forty-plus branches routinely
fell sort of lofty regional office expectations. But the numbers continued to rise. By mid-year 1955, the
state’s branches could boast more than 14,000 members.42
Brown II was not the ruling that the NAACP had hoped for, or called for in its own brief, but it
was not wholly discouraging either. The plan for 1955 had been to continue the petitioning drive, which
was by then being called “Operation Implementation.” Brown II allowed for such a program to operate,
insofar as the NAACP and the lower federal courts understood the ambiguous language of the High
Court’s ruling – especially “all deliberate speed” – to mean the substantially same thing. There would be
many interpretations of that phrase over the coming years from federal benches, but none of those
issued in 1955 was the same as the NAACP’s understanding that it might mean that very fall. Parker’s
Briggs ruling that July very quickly indicated what the NAACP might be up against in the federal trial
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courts. Accustomed to remaining undeterred by singular setbacks, though, the NAACP at all levels
continued to put faith in the course theretofore charted.43
The second annual round of petitioning in Alabama began in earnest in August, 1955, and the
patterns were much the same as they had been in 1954, except that the number of school boards being
petitioned was significantly higher. The NAACP in Mobile presented the school board there with a
petition bearing the names of 32 parents of black children. “The May 31 decision,” the petition read, “to
us, means that the time for delay, evasion, or procrastination is past. Whatever the difficulties in
according our children their constitutional rights, it is clear that the school board must meet and seek a
solution to that question in accordance with the law of the land.” Mobile school authorities responded
by announcing that “the traditions of two centuries can be altered by degrees only,” and that they
would continue to operate a dual racial system. “Any integration now,” the board argued, “is impossible
without a disruption of our school system to such an extent to substantially impair its efficiency for an
indefinite period.” The state legislature had just passed the Pupil Placement Law, in addition to its
consideration of myriad other segregation bills, and school boards across the state were thus
encouraged to avoid unnecessary compliance in this fashion. So when NAACP local officials filed
identical petitions that week in Gadsden, Butler County, Phenix City, and Sam Engelhardt’s Macon
County, the public response – when there even was a one – was the same: terse, evasive, and
dismissive. For example, Gadsden officials retorted that they would “not be rushed into any precipitate
action” and did not “have time nor inclination to listen to harangues by radical groups of either race or
their representatives.” By the end of the month, NAACP branches had filed petitions with the boards of
education in Birmingham, Bessemer, Jefferson County, Montgomery, Bullock County, Attalla, Anniston,
Roanoke, and Selma. These represented Alabama’s largest cities and smallest towns, the Birmingham
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district, the Black Belt, and the Piedmont. The NAACP was active across the state and was flexing its
muscle despite the rebuffing most had figured they were sure to get.44
No sooner had the petitions been filed that fall, though, than black parents began to recant.
Nine of the thirty parents in Bullock County who had signed asked the school board to strike their names
from the petition and swore in affidavits that they had been “misinformed” as to their purpose. The
affidavits indicated that the nine thought they were petitioning simply for “better roads” or “better
schools,” not for integration specifically. In Selma five petitioners asked that their names be withdrawn,
claiming ignorance of the real reason for the document. Two of the five disavowed any association with
the NAACP. In Greenville six more people requested retraction of their names from the NAACP petition
to the Butler County Board of Education. Like the Selma parents, the Butler County parents gave various
reasons for their recanting, all of which were some way of saying there had been a misunderstanding.
One official indicted that “the petition on face did not state what they [had] in mind when they signed
it.” The petitioners themselves were supposed to have said that they “signed the petition without
knowing what was in it.” In one instance, a man claimed, “I informed the man who brought me the
petition that I wanted my community improved and I surely did want a water line run to my place.”45
W.C. Patton knew the real reason for the withdrawals. In announcing an investigation into the
issue, the NAACP field secretary defended the state’s branches. The petitions were, as a matter of
course, thoroughly explained to all who signed, he told reporters. The real reason for the repudiations
was “fear.” In Selma the situation was clear enough: when news of their participation was published by
the Selma Times-Journal, 16 of the 29 signatories to the local NAACP petition were fired, and others
were made victims of various other means of economic reprisal. Within days of the publication of the
petition, Otis Washington was fired from the Selma Marble and Granite Works, where he had worked
44
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for the past nine years. Ethel Griffin was dismissed from her job as a maid but told by the woman who
employed her that she could return if she would withdraw her name. Interior decorator Ernest Doyle
had his credit withdrawn and his debts called in by his white creditors. Local farmer Richard Winston
was unable to secure his usual annual spring loan from the bank and could not get similar credit from
any other bank in Selma. Daniel Stevens was fired from the local YMCA. Local barber H.W. Shannon
was kicked out of the building in which he ran his business, without compensation for rent already paid.
All of the victims were members of the local NAACP. The situation was much the same in Butler,
Bullock, and Houston Counties.46
The chairman of Selma’s local Dallas County Citizens’ Council, Alston Keith, announced that the
firings there had been “spontaneous” and that the Council deserved neither “credit nor censure” for the
measures. But he left no doubt as to the impetus for such actions. “I don’t believe,” Keith said, “there
would have been unity of action that there was without the educational work of the Citizens’ Council.”
In case anyone did not understand what sort of “educational work” he was referring to, Keith added that
the employers who had fired the petitioners, withheld credit, called in debts, and kicked out tenants, all
“did just what we have been advocating right along.”47

The White Citizens’ Council, Law and Order, and Bi-racial Liberalism
In September of 1954, the Birmingham News announced, “A refined descendant of the Ku Klux
Klan is ‘riding’ again in the South to protect Dixie’s schools from the U.S. Supreme Court.” This time, the
state’s flagship newspaper wrote, “there are no bed-sheet robes, no violence thus far, and none of the
racial mumbo-jumbo of the night riders of the Reconstruction era. In place of the bullwhips,” it
continued, “the new ‘citizen councils’ have substituted ‘economic pressure’ to handle what they term
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‘agitators’ – who think the Supreme Court way rather than the Southern way on segregation.” The
News captured the fundamental roots, goals, and tactics of the Council, all of which were linked to the
Klan and the decades-long struggle to maintain white supremacy in the face of federal intervention.
Like the Klan, the Council was a white supremacist organization whose goals were the defense of
segregation and white domination and the time-honored duty to ‘keep the Negro in his place.’ The
Council differed from the Klan in that it jettisoned “bed-sheet robes, violence, and mumbo-jumbo” for a
tactical approach fit for mid-twentieth century success.48
Southern resistance to Brown in the 1950s was perhaps most visibly channeled through the
state legislatures, but as one observer of the resistance movement wrote, a "militant minority . . . were
unable to sit idly by while their legislators, often with considerable success, endeavored to place
impediments between the nation's law and the regions' schools." These men aligned themselves with
"some 90 different private groups newly organized to resist the Second Reconstruction," the most
powerful of which, by far, were the Citizens' Councils. The Councils "in the course of a few short years
would claim among [their] members governors, congressmen, judges, physicians, lawyers, industrialists,
and bankers, as well as an assortment of lesser men who crowded membership rosters and packed
municipal auditoriums to dedicate themselves to the preservation of ‘states' rights and racial integrity.’"
The Council movement began in Mississippi in the summer of 1954, but it quickly spread to Alabama as
the NAACP made clear its intention to press for implementation. Across the South, the best indicator of
the intensity of white resistance to desegregation was the ratio of blacks to whites in a particular
community or county. So it is not surprising that white organization took hold in Alabama in the heart of
the Black Belt.49
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When white men in Selma organized the state’s first Council in November of 1954, a spokesman
told reporters that, unlike the KKK, the Council was “not anti-Negro; we only want segregation
maintained. And we are not vigilantes. We will operate openly and violence is the furthest thing from
the minds of the council members.” The Council would instead use economic reprisal; it was the heart
of the Council’s strategy of resistance from the beginning. “The white population in this county controls
the money,” the spokesman said, “and this is an advantage that the council will use in a fight to legally
maintain complete segregation of all races.” Specifically, the white men of the Selma Citizens’ Council
would “make it difficult, if not impossible, for any Negro who advocates desegregation to find or hold a
job, get credit or renew a mortgage.” Councilors would form committees which would investigate
blacks who might be suspected of “agitation” and decide whether or not to apply the “pressure.” Most
blacks in Dallas county were probably “all right,” the man conceded. Thus it was the Selma Council’s
“utmost desire to continue [the] happy relationship” between black and white, “but on a segregated
basis.”50
Councils sprung up throughout the Black Belt in late 1954 and early 1955. The vehemence with
which these white men would defend segregation, as well as their deepest concerns, were revealed in
some of the harangues spit forth from the podiums at the organizational meetings of these Councils. At
the Marengo County organizational meeting, after Walter Givhan had warned that miscegenation and
the assassination of the president were the ultimate goals of the NAACP, the president of the
neighboring Council in Perry County, a Dr. Lawrence Crawford, told the gathered that the Council was
the only organization through which good white men could “keep the Negro out of our schools, out of
our churches, and out of the bedrooms of our white women.” Another man took the podium at the
same meeting to declare that if any black person tried to desegregate a school in his hometown that
“there [was] going to be blood spilled on the campus.” John Givhan (Walter’s brother) proposed dealing
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with a potentially insolent black tenant farmer as such: “knock the black nigger in the head with a
goddamn brick and kill the black bastard.” A Mississippi organizer at the meeting interrupted the
senator’s brother to say, “The next morning after the Citizens’ Council organizes here, the nigger in
Marengo County will be a different nigger.”51
Featured speakers often came from outside the state, generally leaders from Mississippi, but
sometimes segregationist luminaries from other states. For example, the former Governor of Georgia,
Herman Talmadge, addressed an audience of councilors in Selma which included Sam Engelhardt,
Walter Givhan, and Albert Boutwell. Talmadge managed to invoke the Lost Cause of the Civil War and
the threat of white slavery when he pledged resistance to the “scalawags and carpet-baggers of the
modern era” who would “sell the South down the river.” Mississippi Circuit Judge Tom Brady delighted
councilors at the same meeting when he argued that the Supreme Court could not “by a mandate shrink
the size of the Negro skull which is one-eighth of an inch thicker than a white man’s,” and that the court
could not “straighten the Negro’s hair or uplift the Negro ‘s nose – only God can do that.” Biological
racism was at the core of Citizens’ Council ideology, and the inherently inferior black man was a threat
not just to segregated education but the white race in general, as he had been since Reconstruction. By
the summer of 1955, Councils had been formed in eight counties of the Alabama – the Cradle of the
Confederacy – to protect the schoolhouses, churches, and bedroom doors of the state from just such a
threat.52
The Councils were initially assailed by a number of Alabama newspapers, most of them in cities
north of the Black Belt. The Councilors were called “Ku Klux Klansmen in top hat and tails” and derided
for their closed-door meetings. Even some Black Belt papers, including the Montgomery Advertiser and
the Selma Times-Journal, occasionally questioned the Council’s use of economic reprisal, though
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generally on the grounds that it was unwise economically, not because it was morally wrong. Within a
matter of months, however, as the power of the Council grew and as citizens across the state began to
sympathize with the movement, the critical voices fell silent. Black activism undoubtedly contributed to
this change, as threats to segregation and white supremacy became more immediate and more real,
and as more whites began to consider collective defensive action an attractive option. As one historian
has described, “Events became too turbulent, blacks too active, the Council too influential, and the
public that bought the newspapers and placed advertisements too committed to the Council approach
for early critics to hold out.”53
Early indications of this sort of change became clear as the NAACP petitioning campaign took off
again in August of 1955 and the Council movement reaped the rewards, with ten more Alabama
Councils organizing by year’s end. White men across the state answered the call when the Council
asked, “The NAACP organized – why not you?” Leaders formed four regional councils and an Alabama
Association of Citizens’ Councils with a headquarters in Montgomery, and they tapped Engelhardt as
Executive Secretary. Although probably somewhat inflated, the Councils’ declaration of its own strength
in early 1956 reflected its rapid growth: it was claiming 26 councils in 17 counties with around 40,000
members. Engelhardt would boast later that year of 100 councils. Though this number was likely quite
generous, there was no doubt that the NAACP’s continuing petition campaign, and a growing awareness
of the Supreme Court’s decisions and the NAACP’s intentions to implement them in general, gave rise to
a swift blossoming of the Citizens’ Council in the state.54
Indicative of the way the Council infiltrated small town Alabama is a case described by
investigative journalist and future Pulitzer Prize winner David Halberstam for Commentary magazine.

53

Gilliam, The Second Folsom Administration, pp. 132-5, see for quotation, p. 135.
McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, pp. 44-5; Southern School News, October, 1956; White Citizens’ Council
Advertisement, “Time for all White People to be Counted,” in NAACP Papers: Legal Department Case Files, Group
V, Series B, Box 34, NAACP v. Alabama (Papers of the NAACP: Part 23, Legal Department Case Files, 1956-65, Reel
4).
54

60

Halberstam called the town Clifford, a southwestern Black Belt town of around 15,000 people which the
reporter ostensibly renamed to protect blacks (or perhaps himself) from reprisal. Clifford experienced a
bout of white anxiety when Brown came down in 1954. By 1956 NAACP implementation activity in the
state had brought that anxiety to the fore and spurred a decided few into action. When the Supreme
Court followed up on Brown with its first decision striking down segregated public facilities, including
city pools, the mayor of the town called an urgent meeting to determine a course of action should any
blacks try to desegregate Clifford’s public pool. Local insurance salesman Royce Vansett spoke first at
the meeting and declared that the problem was the NAACP, which was “making a play for the young
niggers – they don’t care about the old ones, but they’re teaching the young ones a lot of these radical
ideas and holding meetings with them.” After tossing around possible solutions, like building a separate
pool for blacks or throwing the leader of the local NAACP chapter in the river, the city leaders turned to
state legislator and local attorney Reid Walles. Walles suggested, “What we need here is a Citizens
Council.” Walles said the Councils were “doing fine work all over the South” and had been quite
effective in “forming boycotts and other pressures against niggers, nigger-lovers, and a few politicians
that won’t go along with us.” Walles warned the men that they “may not worry about it now, but in five
years,” he said, “if your kids are playing and going to school with burr-headed niggers and the niggers
are taking over the town and molesting your women, well, don’t blame Reid Walles.” Intermarriage was
what the NAACP really wanted, according to Walles, and if the men of Clifford did not want “white girls
going off to dances with some big black buck and dancing to jungle music with him,” then they ought to
let Walles call in “a couple of good friends” who were “big men in the Councils. Why don’t we have
them down here to talk to us,” he offered, “so we can organize?”55
Once Councils were established, organizers employed a number of methods to attract new
members, not least of which was dissemination of propaganda. Illustrative of such propaganda was a
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leaflet passed out to white miners outside of Birmingham, near the aptly named industrial suburb of
Bessemer, in early 1956. The sheet purported to feature a speech made by a “Professor Roosevelt
Williams of Howard University” to an NAACP meeting in Jackson, Mississippi. This Williams had
supposedly told his fellow association members that “the negro is the white man’s superior,” as clearly
evidenced by the unparalleled success of “Jackie Robinson . . . Nat King Cole . . . Ralph Bunche [and]
Duke Ellington.” Accordingly, the NAACP demanded “the abolition of all state laws which forbid
intermarriage of the different races.” It was clear, according to Williams, that “the white woman is
dissatisfied with the white man, and they along with us,” he continued, “demand the right to win and
love the negro man of their choice, so they can proudly tell the world he is my man . . . a man in every
respect.” It was an enunciation of the white man’s greatest nightmare, and every word of it was
fabricated by the Council. It was later revealed, as admitted by the Councilmen in Mississippi who first
circulated it, that no such person as Roosevelt Williams even existed, nor was there any such meeting of
the NAACP at which such words were spoken. But the miners in Jefferson County did not know that.
The bottom of the pamphlet carried the simple message: “If you wish to help prevent this aim of NAACP
contact Citizens’ Council, P.O. Box 6221, Tarrant, Alabama.”56
With the proliferation of Councils in 1955 and into 1956, in Alabama’s cities, suburbs, and small
towns alike, it became clear that the carefully focused vision of Sam Engelhardt and other Bourbon
leaders was not shared by all who signed up for the Council’s mission of defending segregated education
and white supremacy. Local Councils, once organized, did not always limit their proposed actions to
economic reprisal, nor did they always confine them within the bounds of “law and order.” At the
organizational meeting of the Council in the lower Black Black’s Butler County, in October of 1956, a
speaker asked how many of the 800 men in attendance had never graduated high school. He then
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suggested to the 600 or so that raised their hands that “some of you men . . . might have to go back for
some reading, writing, and arithmetic. If negro children get into our schools,” he said, “you might have
to convince them that they shouldn’t be there.”57
In the cities and industrial suburbs especially, the Alabama Council’s respectable Bourbon
vanguard had a difficult time neutralizing a working class element whose ranks often blurred into those
of the more plebian associations like the Klan. The most influential leader of this latter cadre was a
would-be radio personality, one-time pamphleteer, and soon-to-be primary speech writer for George
Wallace: Birmingham’s Asa Carter. Carter was the president of the Birmingham Regional Council, to
which councilors were drawn mostly from the city’s working class suburbs like Tarrant and Fairfield.
Whereas Engelhardt’s councilors were, for all their vitriolic talk, highly concerned with keeping their
tactics within the realm of “law and order,” and whereas Boutwell and his Big Mule types were even
more concerned with the same, Carter and his brood drew no such permanent distinction. Carter as a
Councilor was simultaneously, and throughout his segregationist career, affiliated with the Klan, most
especially the Birmingham-area Ku Klux Klan of the Confederacy. Carter and his Klan affiliates were
responsible for a number of violent acts, some of which were high profile in nature. In the spring of
1956 alone, they were known to have participated in and encouraged the attempted stoning of
desegregation pioneer Autherine Lucy at the University of Alabama and to have attacked Nat King Cole
on stage at a concert in Birmingham. Carter’s Klan cronies later castrated a randomly chosen black man
in Birmingham as a message to the activist black minister Fred Shuttlesworth, and Carter himself once
shot one of his fellow Klansmen for insubordination.58
“Ace” Carter’s differences with the more reputable Council went beyond his propensity for
violence and his obvious association with the Klan, though. Some within his own regional council were
taken aback by his extremist statements, including the assertion that Rock and Roll was "sensuous negro
57
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music" that “promoted communism” and that threatened the "'entire moral structure of man, of
Christianity, of spirituality in Holy marriage,” and “of all the white man has built through his devotion to
God." Carter subsequently led what might be called a campaign against rock music, calling for boycotts
of Elvis Presley and Fats Domino records and organizing the attack on Cole. Carter also called for the
impeachment of Governor Folsom over the vote of the regional council’s board of directors. Carter
shared with Engelhardt and the others deep fears of "mongrelization, degradation, atheism, and
communistic dictatorship." He accused the Alabama Association of Citizens’ Councils (AACC) of meeting
these threats, though, with restraint and with engaging in "compromise," "evasion," and "political
chicanery." A frustrated Carter broke away from Engelhardt’s state organization and formed his own
Alabama Citizen's Council, whereupon the AACC changed its name to the Citizens Councils of Alabama.
While Ace Carter’s outfit became the outcast of the two, and while his influence in organization and
agitation was confined to the Birmingham area, he would find the statewide, and even nationwide,
pulpit he so desperately desired when he became one of George Wallace’s closest advisors. The
extremist wing of the Council was thus marginalized by the Bourbon wing in the late 1950s, but Carter
kept its message alive, and would soon bring it to hundreds of thousands of receptive Alabama voters.59
Meanwhile, the White Citizens Council was not the only white supremacist group organizing in
Alabama in response to the School Segregation Cases decisions. Almost immediately upon the Supreme
Court’s announcing the first decision, a group of white small businessmen in Mobile had formed an
organization they called simply The Southerners. The group retained prominent segregationist
Birmingham judge Hugh Locke to draft its constitution and announced its “dedication to segregation and
59

McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, pp. 52-55, see for quotations, pp. 54-5; see on Ace Carter, generally,
Dan Carter, Politics of Rage, pp. 105-9; see also Newman Douglas, Laura Browder, and Marco Ricci, The
Reconstruction of Asa Carter, Television Documentary, Directed by Marco Ricci (Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, 2010). Ace Carter later left Alabama, disappeared, resurfaced in Texas under an assumed named –
“Forrest” Carter – and began claiming to be a half-breed Cherokee Indian. He began writing novels and children’s
books. His Education of Little Tree garnered critical acclaim, while his Gone to Texas was adapted as the major
Hollywood motion picture, The Outlaw Josey Wales, starring and directed by Clint Eastwood. See a review of the
documentary film on Carter at Anniston Star, Aug. 28, 2011.

64

states’ rights.” In Birmingham local businessmen Olin Horton and William H. Hoover organized the more
ambitious and more successful American States’ Rights Association, Inc. (ASRA). Hoover owned a local
insurance company and personally financed the group’s activity in its infancy, including bankrolling the
reprinting of neo-Nazi literature. Hoover and Horton announced that “for the first time” a group had
been organized to “offer resistance to those organizations and individuals who enjoyed free-wheeling in
their assaults on segregation laws and customs,” which were “seeking to indoctrinate our school
children with socialism, communism and race integration, through school textbooks for the avowed
purpose of conditioning the children for citizenship in a world government.” They accordingly insisted
on “the return to the states of complete control of state-owned institutions, such as schools and
colleges, election machinery and segregation.” The ASRA subsequently published pamphlets on
venereal disease affliction, illegitimate birth, and incarceration, all by state, which revealed that blacks
were disproportionately represented in each category. The organization disseminated this information
along with the conclusion that “the larger the concentration of negro population, the higher the
incidence.” The ASRA also sponsored the radio program on which Ace Carter aired his anti-communist,
anti-black, and anti-Semitic commentary before being kicked off the air. In membership these groups
were perhaps relatively insignificant, but the subsequent careers of their founding fathers suggest
otherwise. Locke would go on to serve in the Alabama legislature and on Governor George Wallace’s
personally appointed school segregation council. Hoover became a trail blazer of the Birmingham
metropolitan “white flight” movement and founded what is today the area’s most populous and
prosperous suburban white haven, the City of Hoover.60
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The NAACP and other organizations like the Anti-Defamation League were keenly aware of the
diversity of white supremacist reaction to the Brown decision and the subsequent implementation drive
taken up by local NAACP-affiliated activists. By the end of 1955, the NAACP felt as if it had weathered a
storm, though, and it sought to galvanize support for a continuing effort. The association’s Southeast
Regional Advisory Board issued a report calling Operation Implementation the “number one objective of
the NAACP in this region.” Ruby Hurley assured her local branches that although “white citizens’
councils and their counterparts” had been gaining strength in Alabama and across the South and
applying pressure to black activists, the regional organization was “investigating every case of
intimidation that comes our way.” She acknowledged that “any thoughts that the Deep South would
accept with grace and dignity the fact that the bonds of slavery were being loosened for and shaken off
by its Negro citizens were dispelled completely before six months of 1955 had passed.” But she
continued to insist that the NAACP and its affiliates had “been holding the line remarkably well,” and she
expressed the hope that all would “keep the faith and continue to hold fast to our ideal of full freedom
so that we can carry on with the fight until we win – and win we must.” Hurley insisted that her office
and the national office were “working out plans of action to protect our people and counter-attack
these pressures.” In the meantime, she reminded the local branches, “it is only good sense to spend
your money with your friends and withhold it from your enemies.”61 The NAACP was prepared for a
fight and was willing to encourage direct action, in the form of a region-wide, unannounced economic
boycott, in order to directly engage in it.62
White supremacist organizers were equally prepared. Indeed, by early 1956 they were in hyperdrive. Whites’ defense of their social arrangement had been accelerated by the NAACP’s ongoing
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implementation campaign. It had been made all the more urgent by the Montgomery bus boycott and
by Autherine Lucy’s enrollment at the University of Alabama. Lucy had applied to the university, been
rejected on account of her race, and had filed suit in federal court with the help of the NAACP, obtaining
an injunction allowing for her enrollment. Meanwhile, activist teachers and ministers had organized a
boycott of the city of Montgomery’s segregated and oppressive bus line and were challenging the city’s
bus segregation laws in federal court. The Citizens’ Council reaped the benefits of both of these actions.
Montgomery city officials themselves, including Police Commissioner Clyde Sellers and Mayor T.A.
“Tacky” Gayle, joined the Council that January. The chairman of the city’s revenue board, L.R. Grimes,
joined as well and publicly announced his feeling that “every right-thinking white person in Montgomery
and the South should do the same. We must make sure,” he said, “that Negroes are not allowed to
force their demands on us.”63
In February, in the midst of the bus boycott and just days after a Klan-inspired mob drove
Autherine Lucy from the Alabama campus in Tuscaloosa, the Montgomery-based Citizens’ Council
hosted a massive rally at the State Agricultural Coliseum. Ten thousand “shouting, cheering, flag-waving
people” gathered there to hear what were described by newsmen as “blood curdling . . . tirades” about
what Governor Folsom himself would days later call the actions of “professional outside agitators.” It
was not simply the boycott and the Lucy crisis that had everyone up in arms. Mississippi’s U.S. Senator
James Eastland was a featured speaker at the rally, and he cut to the chase when he assured the
aroused gathering what he knew. “The good people of Alabama,” he said, “don’t intend to let the
NAACP run your schools.” This was not simply a reference to the University of Alabama; Eastland meant
the public elementary and secondary schools, and the Councilors knew it.64
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The very next day, blocks away from the huge Citizens’ Council rally, a small gathering of
Alabama’s black and white liberals gathered at the state’s black teacher’s college, Alabama State, for a
symposium on “resolving community conflicts” through biracial committees. The organizing association
was the biracial Alabama Council on Human Relations (ACHR), itself born of the old Alabama Committee
on Interracial Cooperation (ACIC). The ACIC had gladly accepted the call of the Southern Regional
Council (SRC) in 1947, when it offered an associational relationship under the emerging regional group’s
growing umbrella. The newly christened Alabama Council on Human Relations was, like its parent
regional council, “composed of liberal-minded Southerners white and Negro, who believe that the South
needs a more positive and courageous approach to its social, civic, economic, and racial problems." Its
members were decidedly liberal, especially as compared with the doggedly obdurate southern white
majority. The meeting at Alabama State Teacher’s College (ASTC) could hardly have contrasted more
starkly with the Citizens’ Council rally at the arena, perhaps if the ACHR had been advocating a socialist
revolution.65
But the ACHR was center-left from the beginning; it was never radical. As longtime ACHR
member and Montgomery-based civil rights activist Virginia Durr observed in retrospect, the ACHR was
"composed of extremely conservative liberal people, you know, people who were fine – the professors,
the blacks in it were all middle class blacks – and it was a very fine group of middle class people who did
believe in all the right things.” Its members, black and white, were wary of any accusations of
communism and sought to, for the most part, change the system of white supremacy from within the
system. Blacks in the ACHR tended to be educators and attorneys, and among its members were the
president of ASTC, H. Council Trenholm, as well as longtime Birmingham civil rights attorney Arthur
Shores and the emerging, young Tuskegee attorney Fred Gray. White members were often liberal
educators or outspoken clergymen from the Episcopal and Methodist Church. For some whites,
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membership was simply a way to define themselves by what they were not: the average, ignorant, hardheaded, conservative white segregationist. As a professor of history from Auburn University put it,
joining the ACHR was an opportunity to show these people that "some white people . . . could sit down
to a table, for God's sake, with somebody of the opposite color and eat . . . without any obvious,
immediate ill-effects.” Another member later recalled that for many, white and black, the ACHR was "a
counter-movement against anti-black citizens' groups, KKK, racists in the churches and in society in
general."66
The meager gathering of 300 at the ACHR Montgomery meeting at the same time as the huge
Council rally across town represented the glaring difference in strength of following between the two
organizations. The ACHR would never command anywhere near the following of the Councils, nor
would it exert anywhere near the influence. The ACHR continued to push for biracial cooperation,
though, throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. It played an important role in mediating the bus
boycott in Montgomery and helped establish a Mayor’s Committee on Human Relations in Mobile. Its
members continued to be active in monitoring school desegregation efforts throughout the state,
despite becoming targets themselves of state harassment, private threats of violence, and public
ostracization. But the ACHR’s milquetoast approach spoke neither to more immediatist black activists in
the movement, nor to the thousands of average white supremacists who had no interest in promoting
"greater unity in the State in all state-wide and racial development," reducing "race tension," and
"develop[ing]and unify[ing] leadership in the South on new levels of regional development and
fellowship," as the ACHR construed its mission.67
By championing law and order, the Citizens’ Council, and even unaffiliated legislative leaders like
Boutwell, won over many whites who might otherwise have been repulsed enough by the violence of
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the Klan to consider biracial cooperation. By 1956 the need for more feasible segregationist resistance
had been underscored by the events of the first two years after Brown I: the violent disturbances at
Tuscaloosa during Lucy’s attempted enrollment; increased Klan activity in general; the success of the
Montgomery boycott; the organization of white liberals in the ACHR; and, above all, the ever-looming
threat of desegregated public elementary and secondary schools. Councilors gathered in Birmingham in
April to hear Georgia white supremacist Charles Bloch speak about the continuing need for more
Councils and affiliated associations, like his own States’ Rights Council of Georgia. Speaking of the Klan
assault on Nat King Cole which Carter had organized just one week prior, Bloch said “it is not my
province . . . to discuss the incident that occurred here last Thursday night.” But he did tell the men
such “incidents” did “nothing to help the South in trying to solve [its] problems.” They only gave
“extremists all over the nation” more “excuses for agitation.” Bloch reminded the councilors that they
must use “all lawful means to bring about a reversal” of the unconstitutional Brown decisions and that
they must “prevent the use of force in their implementation” of that reversal. Bloch repeated himself
just so the audience would understand that he meant “lawful means.” The answer for white
southerners was to organize against “festering sores on the body of the nation such as the NAACP.”
These organizations had created all the “chaos and confusion,” on which they then thrived. They feared
“above all things, counter-attacking, opposing organizations” like the Citizens’ Council, which along with
its sister organizations like the American States’ Rights Association, could continue to effectively pursue
effective, “lawful means” to maintain segregation and white supremacy.68
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*****
Local blacks had jumped at the opportunity presented by the NAACP to effectuate some sort of
implementation of Brown. They participated in the regional petitioning drive and sought cooperation
from local school boards. School boards ignored these petitions, and white activists engaged in
economic reprisals against the signatories. The implementation effort, along with the Lucy crisis and bus
boycott, swelled the ranks of the Citizen’s Council and other white supremacist activist groups, even as
the NAACP’s own ranks grew and new members looked forward to the promise of Brown. Meanwhile,
white leaders in positions of power, many of them councilors themselves, were mounting a legislative
campaign of concentrated resistance against the decision. Jim Folsom tried to moderate the
segregationist drive, even reaching out to organizations like ACHR. But Folsom became increasingly
isolated in the governor’s mansion as the state’s capitol became the epicenter of an organized effort to
keep Alabama’s schools segregated as long as possible.
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CHAPTER 2: THE FALL OF JIM FOLSOM, THE RISE OF JOHN PATTERSON, AND THE BANISHMENT OF THE
NAACP, 1955-59

When Jim Folsom took office in January of 1955, he organized the first black inaugural ball in
Alabama history. The event was held at Alabama State College for Negroes, one of the nexuses of
organizational activity during the Montgomery bus boycott. The usual all-white affair was held the same
night, across town at the large state Agricultural Coliseum, the site of the recent mass rally of the White
Citizens’ Council. Folsom said he was simply reaching out to the people he called “our Negro brothers
and sisters,” as part of his administration’s “separate-but-equal policy.” The “brothers and sisters” had
helped put him in office, even if the contribution was relatively small. Folsom was one of a very few
white Alabamians who thought the black vote ought to fully reflect the black population. He saw
himself as a latter-day populist, leading Alabama’s poor blacks and whites together into a better day
when the Big Mules and Black Belt planters would no longer dominate state politics. For Folsom it was
never to be. He was subsequently assailed by both segregationists and blacks alike for having held the
segregated balls: by whites for legitimizing black political power and thumbing his nose at custom; and
by blacks for making a humiliatingly public display of Jim Crow. It was a microcosm of frustrations to
come.1
Such were Jim Folsom’s attempts at moderation. White supremacist organizational fervor
matched insistent black activism following the Supreme Court’s mandate in Brown II, and the governor’s
plain talk and common sense appeals to compromise fell flat. He dismissed the Citizens’ Council as the
re-incarnation of the Dixiecrats, whom he considered to be anti-Democratic in both the upper and lower
case “d” sense of the word. He routinely tried to veto the segregationist bills pouring out of the
legislature. He even reached out to the Alabama Council on Human Relations (ACHR) and attempted to
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form a biracial committee to study ways to handle crises, like the one looming over the public schools.
His attempts at biracial cooperation were a dismal failure. A confident and already powerful Citizens’
Council laughed at his disregard. And the legislature overrode his vetoes, forcing him to temper his own
stance on racial matters before his run for representative to the Democratic Convention.2 By the time
Folsom left office for the last time, a new group of committed segregationists politicians was not merely
on the rise, but on the verge of dominating state politics for the next decade. Its most foundational
commitment was to ensure that no black child ever attended school with a white child in the state of
Alabama.
As resistance to integrated education was building to a crescendo across the South in 1956,
Alabama Attorney General John Patterson positioned himself in the vanguard of the hardline
segregationist advance. And nothing represented the popularity of concerted defiance of the Supreme
Court and black integrationists better than Patterson’s efforts to destroy the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in Alabama. Patterson heard the increasingly loud wail of
segregationists as they engaged in a lively call and answer with the likes of Sam Engelhardt and Albert
Boutwell, and as they repudiated the great Alabama populist, Folsom. Patterson found his spot in the
defiant ensemble after consulting with his friend Lindsay Almond of Virginia, himself a proponent of
massive resistance. The Alabama lawyer thought he had found a technicality which would allow him to
run the NAACP out of the state for good. It nearly worked. Patterson was able to utilize Alabama’s
discriminatory and hostile state court system to harass the association into judicial submission for the
better part of a decade. If he failed to permanently banish the organization, he succeeding beyond his
wildest dreams in alerting Alabama voters to the clarity of his own booming segregationist voice.
Patterson’s crusade against the NAACP made him the quintessential massive resistance candidate and
won him a seat in the governor’s chair in 1958.
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As Patterson was campaigning on absolute defiance of outside interference, on the
maintenance of law and order, and on perpetual segregation of the races in Alabama schoolrooms,
massive resistance in Arkansas and Virginia was making national headlines. The Little Rock crisis and the
closure of schools in Virginia led the federal courts to try and shout their pronouncements more loudly
that the South’s segregationists. Some saw these rulings as a death knell for massive resistance and the
beginning of South-wide implementation of Brown. But in Alabama, rather than seriously question the
logic of massive resistance or begin to look towards some form of compliance and implementation,
segregationists closed ranks and renewed their defiant chorus. As the new governor took office in 1959,
and as the NAACP languished in exile, the state of Alabama looked more poised than ever to defy the
School Segregation Cases decisions and maintain segregated education forever, even if John Patterson
himself knew this to be impossible.

The Segregationist Rise, 1955-56
Folsom called the legislature into special session soon after taking office. He had previously
announced that he’d rather that Alabama were left out of the school segregation matter altogether. He
had expressed opposition to the recently proffered Boutwell Committee proposal, which provided the
state legislature with the constitutional authority to delegate school closure powers to local school
officials. It was assumed that in cases where school desegregation imposed an “intolerable burden”
upon whites, that school closure would pave the way for a nominally private system of white schools.
Folsom argued, “If we deed our schools to private individuals, they could make apartment houses out of
them; if strings are attached, the maneuver won’t hold up in court.” But he had been determined to call
a special session, nonetheless, so that the legislature could consider issuing a road bond to fund his
farm-to-market road program. The road bond dominated the session that winter as segregationist
legislation remained in the back of everyone’s mind. State senator Sam Engelhardt was preparing a
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number of proposals but told the press that Folsom was holding he and others hostage on the road
bond. He announced that Folsom threatened to use the governor’s spot on the state’s registration
board to appoint voter registrars in Engelhardt’s Macon County who would proceed to “register ever
damn nigger in the county” if Engelhardt did not support him on the road bond issue.3
Three days after threatening the governor, Engelhardt introduced a resolution denouncing the
Brown decision and vowing to uphold the state’s constitutional provision for segregated education. The
resolution channeled the “law of the case” interpretation becoming increasingly popular among
southerners. The school segregation ruling was “not binding on the state of Alabama or on the people
of this state and not to be respected by an official of this state.” Not only was the decision
unconstitutional, the Court’s conclusion that legally segregated education had been detrimental to black
children was, Engelhardt reasoned, “unqualifiedly false and completely untrue.” In Alabama at least,
“the remarkable progress made by colored children in segregated schools,” especially when compared
to that of black children outside the South, demonstrated plainly enough the “fallacy” of the Court’s
determination. Segregation had produced “great economic, cultural and social benefits to all of the
people of this state,” the resolution declared, and “any weakening or reversal of that policy would bring
about violence, disorder, breaches of the peace, riots, bloodshed, and ill-feelings.” Taking the
Birmingham industrialist, or Big Mule, law-and-order line then, Engelhardt argued that “regrettable
action of this kind” would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible, for civil authorities to prevent” if
segregation were ever breached. Accordingly, the resolution allowed legislators to “declare [their]
unqualified allegiance to this provision of the Alabama constitution (requiring segregation).” Engelhardt
could not miss a chance to introduce a jab at Folsom along the way, calling within the resolution for “the
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chief executive of this state to make known in a most appropriate manner a fixed determination to
uphold, support and defend this provision in our organic law in every lawful way.”4
In the early 1955 special session, Engelhardt’s western Black Belt counterpart, Walter Givhan,
also introduced a petition to the U.S. Congress to limit the U.S. Supreme Court’s and the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeals’ jurisdiction. According to the Dallas County Citizens’ Councilor, The High Court had
demonstrated, “through numerous opinions and decisions,” that it had lost respect for the separation of
powers and, more importantly, for states’ rights. While Engelhardt’s more substantive resolution was
sent to committee for consideration, Givhan’s resolution passed immediately and unanimously. Some
may have been reluctant to stand by the state’s constitutional mandate for segregation, fearful of the
legal ramifications of such a course. But everyone could agree that the Court had overreached.5
Folsom called two more special sessions of the legislature that winter and spring, to consider old
age pensions, which he succeed in securing, and statewide reapportionment via a constitutional
convention, which he wanted so badly but would never get. Meanwhile, the legislators waited for the
regular biennial session in May and on the Supreme Court’s pending implementation decree before
acting further on preserving segregated education.6 When the regular session convened, and when the
implementation decision came down, the lawmakers could then consider the Boutwell Committee
proposal, Engelhardt’s similar private school proposal from 1953, and at least two other plans that had
already been announced. One plan was crafted by Engelhardt as an alternative to the Boutwell
Committee recommendations and his earlier proposals, should his colleagues think privatization to be
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too drastic; the other was the official policy pursued by state Superintendent of Education Austin
Meadows.7
Engelhardt’s fallback plan was actually borrowed from a student who had proposed it at the
American Legion’s state Youth Legislature convention. The senator took the plan to a group of
attorneys, some of them working with the Boutwell Committee, and refined it. In essence it called for
the establishment of a “modern school placement system.” If the legislators were unwilling to do away
with compulsory public education, then perhaps they would allow local school districts to appoint school
placement boards, which could be given broad, almost unlimited, and certainly ambiguous powers to
place students in certain schools. The placement boards would assign students in their districts “to the
school and class in which they can reasonably be expected most fully to develop their talents and in
which each pupil will be taught in accordance with his ability to learn.” The boards could consider
aptitude and intelligence tests, a family’s distance from particular schools, a student’s “educational
background,” his “morals, health, and personal standards,” the wishes of the student’s parents, whether
or not a student would be separated from “long-established ties of friendship” and placed in “hostile
surroundings,” and finally whether a particular assignment would “cause or tend to cause a breach of
the peace, riot, or affray.”8
The “avowed purpose” of the Engelhardt Placement Plan was to ensure that “pupils can be so
grouped that the less advanced pupil shall not be penalized by being placed in the class with pupils who
are more advanced or capable of learning at a more rapid rate, and conversely, that exceptionally bright
and able pupils shall not be held back to a level below their ability to learn.” The desired effect would
be to maintain absolute segregation in schools, as it was widely believed that blacks would score
roundly lower than whites on aptitude and intelligence tests. Black schools were underfunded
compared with their white counterparts and were staffed by black teachers educated in these
7
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underfunded schools. And their pupils were, in the main, from significantly more troubled socioeconomic backgrounds than white students. In the case of black students who had risen above these
circumstances to excel and who ambitiously sought entrée into a white school to enjoy the best
education available to them, placement boards could simply apply any one of the carefully selected
factors which the board was given to consider. If the student lived closer to a white school, somehow
had a solid socio-economic and educational background and home environment, was considered to be
of good health, morals, and personal standards, and would be leaving no friends behind, then certainly
in each and every case the inevitably hostile reaction of some in the white community and the potential
for a “breach of the peace” would be all a placement board needed to deny the student placement at a
white school.9
The Engelhardt and Boutwell plans were so obviously disingenuous and evasive that the plan
proposed by Superintendent Meadows’ seemed, to some, to be more realistic. Meadows and other
educators and politicians in the South believed that the Court would not force the issue on “separate
but equal” and that somehow the dual system could stand if only black facilities were brought up to the
standard of white facilities and expenditures were equalized. Part of the rationale was that blacks
themselves would not force the issue if their own schools were not so obviously inferior. Meadows’
equalization plan, of course, would cost a lot more money than any of the others. He called for a 150
million dollar bond issue to fund the proposed facilities equalization program (bond issues were the
convenient way to raise money because the state’s tax structure was permanently saddled by
limitations in the 1901 constitution).10 Folsom came out in support of the bond issue, saying that the
state needed to do something to get black students out of the “shotgun shacks” that served as their
schoolhouses in many counties. He told a crowd of educators to avoid listening to the “noise” made by
those “guided by prejudice and bigotry,” undoubtedly referring to Engelhardt and Boutwell’s ilk. The
9
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governor argued for “wisdom and tolerance and objective thinking” instead of school closure.
Accordingly, he also endorsed an additional 36 million dollar increase in school expenditures; to fund
this, Meadows proposed repeal of the constitutional cap on the state’s 3 percent sales tax and repeal of
the federal income tax deduction on state income taxes. Having just financed the governor’s road and
welfare plans, many legislators were reluctant to support the increased spending and debt. More
importantly, few legislators, particularly of the Bourbon variety, wanted to see black and white
education equalized. In any case, all were awaiting the Supreme Court’s long-anticipated
implementation decree. Would the Court really force integration upon the South?11
On April 17, 1955, the Supreme Court handed down what came to be known as Brown II, its
statement on how implementation of the seminal decision should proceed. After Brown I, the Court had
asked for briefs on the issue from what were deemed to be the interested parties, beyond the parties to
the five original cases themselves. This included the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) and the attorneys
general of all the southern states. Alabama did not submit a brief in the fear that such a move would
indicate a recognition that Brown I was the ‘law of the land’ and would therefore jeopardize its own ‘law
of the case’ claim. Other states pleaded for a compromise, arguing that the decree should only apply to
the five cases before the Court, or that in the alternative, the South should be given some time to
adjust. The NAACP argued for the plaintiffs, as did the DOJ, that implementation should proceed
forthwith. They wanted the Court to make the decision applicable to the whole of the South and for the
Court to issue clear guidelines and a fixed date for the beginning of desegregation, perhaps as soon as
90 days from the date of the pending decision.12
Brown II represented a compromise. The justices knew that they lacked firm backing from the
Congress or the president and that they need not issue a ruling that the Court could not enforce. So
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they decided to “soften the blow” of Brown I. The implementation decree thus applied the ruling to the
entire South but effectively remanded the issue to the lower federal courts for further litigation. Just as
importantly, the Court provided very minimal, ambiguous instructions on how the trial courts were to
then proceed when subsequent litigation was initiated, and it declined to set a firm timetable for school
boards or the lower courts to follow. The justices insisted that local school officials should be allowed to
decide the particulars of desegregation within their own districts free from court orders, provided that
they made a "prompt and reasonable start" and continued acting "in good faith" to achieve
desegregation with "all deliberate speed." The district courts could allow for additional time before
ordering relief to any plaintiffs that came forward if such conditions, vague as they were, were met, and
if compelling reasons for delay existed, like necessary adjustments in administrative structure,
adjustments to transportation systems, or redistricting. “By issuing a flexible decree allowing for a
gradual and deliberate, step-by-step integration,” one Court scholar wrote, “it was hoped that southern
moderates would be encouraged to take the initiative.” If initiative was indeed what the Court had
hoped for, it was to be sorely disappointed for many years to come.13
The reaction among most political observers in Alabama was described by one reporter as
“restrained rejoicing.” This was certainly the case in the Black Belt, where leaders seemed to be assured
by the decision that desegregation would not actually ever occur in Alabama. Givhan called it “a
decided victory for the South . . . brought about by the constant fight the southern people have put up,
bringing to the attention of the American people that integration wasn’t feasible and never would have
worked, and that the southern people under no condition would have stood for it.” Other Black Belt
public officials echoed Givhan’s sentiment. Engelhardt reasoned that “segregation will never be
feasible,” and that regardless of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, “no brick will ever be removed
from our segregation walls.” State senator Roland Cooper of the Black Belt’s Wilcox County said that he
13
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could not “foresee where desegregation would be feasible or local conditions would warrant it in 100
years in Wilcox County.”14
Despite the friendly ruling and rejoicing, no one advocated abandoning the legislative courses
already charted. Meadows said that he believed the “overwhelming majority of Negroes realize that
segregation is what the people of Alabama want, and I believe they are friendly enough to cooperate
. . . . What this state needs,” he argued, “is school buildings and equipment.” Accordingly, he reiterated
his call for the bond issue, which he claimed would ensure that “a majority of Negroes will agree to stay
in their schools.” Only about five percent, Meadows thought, would still “gripe” if black schools could
be brought to standard with white schools. Folsom agreed and reaffirmed his stance that he was “not,
repeat not, in favor of turning the public school system over to private hands,” referring to the
Engelhardt and Boutwell proposals. Boutwell announced that it was “necessary that the people of
Alabama realize that the Supreme Court’s decision affects the children of Alabama now.” His
committee’s proposed bill would allow local authorities to decide how to proceed, just as the Court had
appeared to allow. Engelhardt’s placement bill would do the same, and as a somewhat restrained
measure, it began to look more attractive in light of the Court’s seeming retreat, especially since similar
plans had been adopted by then in Florida and Mississippi.15
When the regular biennial session of the legislature convened, it was an altered version of the
Engelhardt placement bill that became Alabama’s first substantive attempt to evade any
implementation of the School Segregation Cases decisions. The Senate Education Committee, chaired
by Boutwell, removed the provision for a placement board, which was deemed to be an unnecessary
legal liability, and instead gave local school boards the authority to place students in schools.
Otherwise, the Engelhardt bill was left mostly undisturbed, save for the addition of still more factors for
boards to consider when placing students in particular schools. Race was not explicitly among those
14
15

Southern School News, June 8, 1955.
Ibid.

81

factors, but its presence was easily detected. Ultimately, an identical bill originating from the House
passed first and was unanimously approved by the Senate in July. Folsom would not veto it, but he
refused to sign it. He told the press that he could “never get all excited about our colored brothers.
They’ve been here three hundred years and I estimate they’ll be here another three hundred years or
more.” I find them to be good citizens,” Folsom said, and “if they had been making a living for me like
they have for the Black Belt, I’d be proud of them instead of cussing and kicking them all the time.” The
bill became law without the governor’s endorsement.16
Thus, the Pupil Placement Law became the state’s preferred way of avoiding desegregation,
which it would do successfully for another eight years. Folsom opposed it on populist grounds, arguing
that it would “let rich folks send their kids all to one school and the poor folks to another school,” and
that in any case it was “merely a restatement of the present law.” Birmingham’s African American news
daily, the Birmingham World, called the plan “legally worthless and morally defective,” suggesting that it
could be successfully challenged in court. Most white political observers in Alabama applauded the law,
though, calling it “a skillfully wrought piece of legal machinery,” which “offer[ed] an excellent chance for
maintaining the present legal high standards of public schools in Alabama.” The law, after all, had been
drafted by the best lawyers in the legislature, along with the unofficial assistance of a special committee
on constitutional law appointed by the president of the state bar, the segregationist judge Walter Jones.
It was, many thought, “100 percent bombproof.” A local news columnist also suggested that the
placement law would have to be “bombproof” to withstand the “heavy bombardment that should be
normally expected in the next months and years.”17
Pupil placement became popular among southern legislators, and placement plans were
adopted in other southern states. In addition to giving school boards broad authority for assignment,
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placement laws generally forced those few blacks that most knew would try and apply for placement in
white schools to navigate a labyrinthine application and appeals process designed to either trip them up
on technicalities, intimidate them, or to frustrate them to the point of giving up their quest. More
generally, placement laws took the burden of initiating desegregation out of the hands of school boards,
where Brown II had assumed it would remain while authorities worked with “all deliberate speed,” and
put it back permanently in the hands of black students and their families. Finally, pupil placement
removed the legal liability for segregation from the state to the local level, making it more diffuse and
therefore more difficult to challenge, should legal challenge come. Placement law supporters in
Alabama argued, “The more law suits, the more congestion, the more widespread the litigation, the
better for all concerned.” As one legal scholar observed at the time, "Pupil placement laws are by far
the best device segregationists have yet discovered to keep Negroes out of federal courts and to make
civil rights litigation expensive, time-consuming, and frustrating. And it can all be done with the veneer
of legality."18
The Alabama legislators had every reason to be optimistic about pupil placement’s future in the
courts, given the judicial reactions to Brown II. The Supreme Court had put the fate of school
desegregation in the hands of the judges of the Federal District Courts and Courts of Appeals, who have
been described as “fifty-eight lonely men.” All of them were white, most of them were Democrats, the
vast majority of them were from and of the South, and a great many of them were avowed
segregationists. Exemplary of such men on the federal bench in the South was Judge Wilson Warlick of
North Carolina, who once said “I'm a states' rights individual, and I always have been. If I had anything
to do with the schools in North Carolina, I wouldn't let the federal government have any part of it.”
Some such judges began immediately to issue rulings favorable to segregationists.19
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Judge John Parker, also a North Carolinian, sat on the bench of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. A respected jurist, Parker wrote an opinion that July in one of the remanded original Brown
cases, Briggs v. Elliot, which became the preferred judicial interpretation of Brown for years to come.
What was ultimately and derisively dubbed the “Briggs Dictum” was Parker’s own narrow construction
of the High Court’s ruling. Writing for a three-judge panel, Parker saw fit to "point out" just "exactly
what the Supreme Court has decided and what it has not decided.” Parker wrote of the Court:

It has not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulate the public schools of the
states. It has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools or
must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools
they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any
person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains. . . . Nothing in the
Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to
choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration.
It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation. The
Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the state or state
agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals.20

Not only did this become a favored citation for a number of federal judges deciding subsequent school
desegregation cases, it provided segregationists with a judicially sanctioned rationale – individual
freedom of association – for segregated private schooling. In the trial courts of all but the most
progressive jurists, it meant that "anything other than outright defiance stood a decent chance of
approval.” And in the minds of segregationist lawmakers, it gave hope that their efforts to avoid
implementation, most especially passing pupil placement laws, might prove to be effective in avoiding
desegregation. By year’s end the lower courts would invalidate a number of states’ compulsory
segregation laws, but the Briggs Dictum interpretation made it possible for courts to stop with this
action. Whereas some of the more egregious placement laws were struck down eventually, the more
20
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carefully crafted, like Alabama’s, would be upheld. Parker himself would uphold North Carolina’s
placement law the following year, writing in his opinion that "somebody must enroll the pupils in the
schools. They cannot enroll themselves; and we can think of no one better qualified to undertake the
task than the officials of the schools and the school boards . . . ."21
Not all of Alabama’s lawmakers were content to rest with the successful passage of the
Placement Law, though. The legislature passed several other segregationist bills before the regular
session ended that summer. Representatives from the Black Belt’s Wilcox County pushed through a bill
that gave the county school board the authority to terminate, without notice, teachers that it had
reason to believe were advocating integration, or who belonged to any organization advocating
desegregation. The point of such a bill was to allow the school board to fire anyone who worked with
the NAACP. Folsom pocket vetoed it. The Wilcox representatives introduced another anti-NAACP bill
establishing an egregious licensing fee and membership fee to be assessed against organizations
soliciting in the county. Folsom vetoed this bill as well, only to see his veto subsequently overridden.
Engelhardt tried to push through a teacher-termination bill for Macon, similar to the one proposed for
Wilcox, but Folsom craftily waited until three minutes before the adjournment of the session to veto his
Black Belt rival’s approved proposal. Senator Albert Davis of Pickens County, on the fringe of the
northwestern Black Belt, proposed a statewide version of these “teacher tenure” laws, or laws that
allowed for the disregard of tenure in firing teachers suspected of endorsing integration. The statewide
measure languished, as the legislators were wary of passing statewide laws which could be more easily
assailed in court.22
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In addition to proposing anti-NAACP legislation, Senator Davis spearheaded an anti-Supreme
Court legislation drive. He introduced a resolution, which had been originally proposed at a Dallas
County White Citizens’ Council meeting, calling for the impeachment of every justice on the Supreme
Court. The resolution charged the Court with relying on “pseudo-scientific authority” in fashioning the
Brown decision and compared it to the Soviet Supreme Court and to the German body that upheld Nazi
racist laws. Without any reasonable means proposed for initiating actual impeachment proceedings
against the federal court, though, the bill was buried in committee. Engelhardt then stepped in and
proposed a similarly condemnatory resolution endorsing the call of James Eastland, U.S. Senator from
Mississippi, for an investigation into Communist Party influence on the Supreme Court and on the Brown
decision specifically. Engelhardt’s resolution maintained the denunciation without the call for
impeachment. It passed easily.23
State superintendent Meadows’ bond issue proposal was approved by both houses and awaited
general statewide referendum in December of that year. The regular session then ended that summer
without the passage of any of the Boutwell Committee’s proposals. They seemed moot and even a little
drastic in light of Brown II, the Briggs Dictum, and the successful passage of Alabama’s Pupil Placement
Law. Most segregationists felt the institution was quite secure. Others were not so sure, and the
“freedom of choice” bill continued to lurk just beneath the surface of temporarily calm waters.
Alabamians waited to see what would be the fate of segregated education, aware that any event that
upset the tranquility would rock the legislators back into action.24
That fall of 1955, the Southern Governors’ Association annual conference was held in Point
Clear, on Mobile Bay in south Alabama. The crisis set off by the School Segregation Cases decisions
seemed settled enough at the time that the governors, including Folsom, roundly agreed that race
would not be an issue in the pending 1956 elections. Folsom himself was not up for re-election, though
23
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if he had been, he might have discovered the error of such an assumption. The vigorous pursuit of
bulwarks for segregated education by the legislature that summer, and the unanimity with which the
legislators passed the placement bill, the condemnatory resolution, and the anti-NAACP teacher tenure
laws, demonstrate the effect that Brown was having and would continue to have on politics in Alabama.
Folsom acknowledged at a press conference that he and Alabama’s U.S. Senators Hill and Sparkman
constituted probably the most liberal gubernatorial-senatorial combination in the entire South.
Speaking to his vetoes of segregationist legislation, he said it was “hard to take a stand like this,”
especially when newsmen, many of them in the room, had been so hard on him. The people of Alabama
knew where he and the senators stood, Folsom said, “yet we have all been reelected. What accounts
for it,” he asked. The governor knew that there were enough voters in Alabama that did not prioritize
the defense of white supremacy to such a degree as to let it dictate their political choices. Not yet
anyway. Very soon the time would come, though, when Hill and Sparkman would have to adapt, along
with everyone else, lest they become what Folsom did in subsequent years: an afterthought. By the
time he was eligible to run again in 1962, according to one historian, Folsom’s “style of class-based
liberalism had outlived its time.”25

Folsom’s Demise, 1955-58
If Brown II and Briggs had been encouraging for segregationists in 1955, some legal
developments that fall reignited a sense of urgency in Alabama’s lawmakers. Since 1952 the NAACP had
been working with two black women from Alabama seeking admission at the state’s flagship institution
of higher learning – The University of Alabama. In August of 1955, Federal District Judge Harlan Hobart
Grooms granted an injunction to the plaintiffs, forcing the University to consider the applications of the
two young women without considering race. Grooms’ decision was subsequently upheld by the Fifth
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Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The university ultimately found a way to reasonably
deny one of the two but was forced to agree to admit Autherine Lucy. Though Lucy would not enroll
until the following spring, her admission and the federal injunction that allowed it stung segregationists
badly. They might have seen it coming. The NAACP had been having success in higher education cases
around the country for over a decade.26 But the thought of a Negro attending the educational pillar of
white supremacy – the place through which most of Alabama’s successful politicians and nearly all of its
lawyers passed before entering their professional lives – was completely anathema. And higher
education was one thing. If the Lucy decision was a blow to segregationists, it also invigorated and
encouraged those already engaged in an impassioned defense of segregated elementary and secondary
education. Indeed, it stimulated nearly everyone: segregationists in the legislature, those organizing the
Citizens Councils and other organizations, and the NAACP itself, which was already working with willing
local blacks to begin to make Brown a reality in all of Alabama’s public schools.27
As the Lucy crisis and the ongoing Montgomery bus boycott grabbed Alabama’s attention,
lawmakers quarried the fear and insecurity of whites and used it to buttress racial separation in schools
and white supremacy in general, despite the continuing resistance of Big Jim Folsom, who would find
himself completely marginalized by year’s end. The ideology of the White Citizens’ Council was the
guide lawmakers used in their work. There was no clear line separating private activists in the Citizens’
Council and the state’s lawmakers, and many, like Engelhardt and Givhan, were active in both. And
while some political leaders, like Albert Boutwell, would never formally join the Council, they continued
to pursue similar, if not identical goals. By the end of the year’s legislative sessions, Citizens’ Councilors
and many unaffiliated white Alabamians alike could applaud a legislative assertion of “states’ rights” and
a vigorous defense of segregation, as the entire South began to mobilize a region-wide political
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challenge to the Brown decisions. Other states would often take their cue from Alabama, where Big Jim
was rapidly becoming a caricature of a bygone era.
When Alabama voters roundly rejected the school bond amendment proposed by State
Superintendent of Education Austin Meadows in the scheduled December, 1955 referendum, it was
seen as more of a repudiation of Folsom than anything else. Folsom had thrown his weight behind the
proposal, aimed as it was at equalizing black school facilities to forestall actual attempts to desegregate
white schools. For Folsom it was better to first get the black children out of the “shotgun shacks” that
constituted many of their schoolhouses, and then to wait and see if further action was necessary. For
most legislators, it was clearly more popular to make a defiant stand against outside interference first
and to live up to Alabama’s motto: “we dare defend out rights.” For Meadows it was a way to ensure
that even the white schools had enough money. He continually reminded voters and legislators that
schools, in general, could not long remain open without a rush of funding. Newsmen regarded the
devastating defeat of the amendment as “a protest against Folsom, and/or a protest against additional
taxation,” noting that Folsom’s roads program had already resulted in a new gasoline tax, and that he
had burned even more political capital in securing costly old-age pensions. The fight over school funding
could not be divorced from race. And according to one editorial, Folsom had already “fritter[ed] away”
much of the “goodwill and confidence” that he had remaining. One scholar of the Folsom era concluded
that the vote represented a “massive show of no confidence” in the governor. With Meadows reeling
for a way to fund his operation, the governor and the legislature entered 1956 much as they had the
previous year: Folsom desperately wanted a constitutional convention, but nearly the entire legislative
body was much more interested in shoring up segregated education.28
Folsom called the legislature into its fourth special session of his second administration in
January with the expressed and limited mandate of considering the constitutional convention. He had
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even joked that such a convention would allow the legislators to defy the federal government and write
into the constitution all of the segregation provisions that they wanted. Big Jim was subsequently
forced to sit and watch as the lawmakers overrode his call with a two thirds vote, proved that no
convention was necessary, passed a convoluted constitutional amendment for expansion of the senate
instead (which was voted down in referendum), and proceeded to focus almost entirely on buttressing
segregated schooling. What the Atlanta Journal called “the loudest Rebel cry from Virginia to
Mississippi” emanated from the Alabama state capitol that winter when the legislature adopted the first
of the South’s so-called nullification resolutions. In nearly unanimous votes, both houses of the
legislature passed the “interposition” resolution, which declared the Supreme Court’s school
segregation rulings “null, void, and of no effect” in Alabama.29
The doctrine of nullification via interposition had been initially resurrected in Virginia. Virginia’s
U.S. Senator Harry Byrd called for “massive resistance” of the Supreme Court’s school cases decision,
while an influential Richmond newspaper editor published a series of editorials arguing for a return to
“fundamental principles” in formulating such a resistance. Both men drew upon the post-bellum
doctrine proposed by the defeated Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Davis argued that the war
had been fought, not over slavery, but in defense of “states’ rights.” A static interpretation of the
Constitution undergirded this and subsequent understandings and allowed southerners to argue that
the Union was composed of a tightly constrained federal government and the sovereign states. State
sovereignty in this confederated arrangement allowed states to “interpose” their authority between
their citizens – in this case local school officials – and a federal government which was reaching beyond
its strictly enumerated powers. Massive resistance, then, was a way to continue fighting the Civil War,
an attempt to replace crass racism and racial politics with the veneer of constitutional law, and a
legitimate effort to force the federal government to back down, just as it had during Reconstruction.
29
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Many southern lawmakers thought that if states went so far as to close their schools, for example, or to
test the will of federal judges to hold state officials in contempt, then the federal government would
acquiesce to the nullification of Brown in much the same way that it had retreated from Prohibition. By
the end of 1955, interposition had been whole-heartedly endorsed by the Citizens’ Council and was
being mulled in every southern state. And in the spring of 1956, it was Alabama which led the way, just
as it had done with pupil placement.30
Alabama’s interposition resolution, drafted by Engelhardt crony and freshman representative
Charles McKay, decried the “threats of coercion and compulsion against the sovereign states” which
constituted a “deliberate, palpable, and dangerous attempt by the [Supreme] court to prohibit to the
states certain rights and powers never surrendered by them.” The legislature rationalized that the state
of Alabama had never surrendered under the Fourteenth Amendment its right to maintain segregation,
and that only a constitutional amendment that declared as much in “plain and unequivocal language”
would force the legislature to retract its declaration that Alabama was “not bound to abide” by decisions
of the Supreme Court to the contrary. The lawmakers pledged to “take all appropriate measures
honorably and constitutionally available to us to void this illegal encroachment upon our rights, and to
urge upon our sister states their prompt and deliberate efforts to check further encroachment by the
federal government, through judicial legislation, upon the reserved powers of the states.” Alabama
thus sought to interpose its sovereign authority between the federal government and its citizens.
Folsom called the resolution a “two-bit” effort, “a bunch of hogwash,” and “claptrap” from the
“descendants of the landed gentry who are trying to maintain the antebellum way of life.” The governor
likened it to “a hound dog baying at the moon.” Folsom might have been bitter, but he knew a futile
effort when he saw one. He allowed the bill to become effective without his signature and told
reporters that he had washed his hands of the matter. He sardonically added that he was “for
30
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nullification [only] if a [constitutional] convention adopts it,” otherwise it was “simply a piece of paper.”
It was nonetheless a piece of paper that legislators understood would be widely popular among their
constituencies.31
As the legislative special session entered February, Autherine Lucy’s enrollment at the University
of Alabama sparked three days of rioting. Students were involved, but the ordeal had been prepared,
encouraged, and initiated by local factory workers and Birmingham Klansmen affiliated with Klan leader
and Citizens Councilor Ace Carter. On February 6 the disturbances reached the point where Lucy had to
be spirited away from campus as a rock-throwing mob broke windows out of the vehicle she was
travelling in. This episode gave the University an excuse to subsequently bar Lucy from classes,
supposedly for her own safety. Folsom had gone fishing in Florida to celebrate the passage of the
doomed constitutional amendment on senate expansion. He was roundly criticized for his failure to
return when news of the riots in Tuscaloosa broke. His biographers have determined that "he was so
drunk he was not capable of comprehending news even if it were conveyed to him accurately." Folsom
had escaped as much to celebrate, though, as he had to symbolically and defeatedly relinquish control
of the special session to segregationists. He had promised legislators that his administration would back
off of the Boutwell Committee proposals if they would support the senate expansion amendment. This
retreat came only after the governor’s floor leader, Speaker of the House Rankin Fite, attempted to
summarily adjourn the session, to the outrage of even some administration supporters. Fite was forced
to reconvene and issued a mea culpa. Folsom had also been feeling the heat, from legislators and
whites in general, for another of his racial gaffes. He had entertained New York congressman Adam
Clayton Powell, a black man and an activist Yankee at that, at the governor’s mansion. Powell had
enjoyed an audience with the governor, as an equal, to discuss the national publicity afforded the
31
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Montgomery bus boycott. It simply proved beyond any doubt that Jim Folsom was a lost cause for
segregationists. They agreed to give him his convoluted constitutional amendment if he would allow
them to pass the Boutwell bills, particularly the “freedom of choice” bill.32
Two days after Lucy had been rescued from the Tuscaloosa mob, the state House of
Representatives on February 8, 1956 passed the Boutwell Freedom of Choice Plan by a vote of 99-1; it
had previously passed the Senate 33-0. The Birmingham News acknowledged what was widely
understood: that this was “the second of two major legislative pieces [the first being the Pupil
Placement Law] calculated to assure racial segregation in schools.” Boutwell himself told reporters, ”We
need both the placement bill and the freedom of choice amendment, because the placement law might
not work in every case and it might not hold up in court.” As adopted the plan disestablished
compulsory public education by removing the pertinent language from the state’s organic law. It gave
the legislature the authority to abolish public schools as a last resort to avoid unwanted racial “mixing,”
while ostensibly allowing for such mixing as was desirable to those who attended the affected schools.
The plan also made school officials judicial officers, which according to Boutwell was supposed to make
them “immune from personal liability lawsuits and harassment from radical agitators.” It gave the
legislature the authority to require the state’s attorney general to defend any suits brought against the
state, county, or city boards of education. On the whole, Boutwell admitted, the plan was intended to
“give the legislature the authority to prevent the forced mixing of the races in our elementary and high
schools.” Evidently, forced race “mixing” was an outcome no one wanted, at least no white person as
represented in the legislature. The lone dissenting vote, Jefferson County’s Charles Nice, Jr., told
reporters that it was the potential for school closure alone which he considered abhorrent and “filled
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with danger.” The provision for student “choice” of racially segregated or “mixed” schools, Nice said,
was “a very commendable attempt to solve our problem.” 33
Folsom returned from Florida after a few days binging and was forced to address the late
disturbances and the Boutwell bill’s passage. On February 12 the governor belatedly condemned the
mob action at Tuscaloosa, saying he would “use every power at [his] command to prevent mob rule
from running any branch of the state government,” and “let me specify,” he said, “any branch.” He
subsequently singled out the NAACP for having encouraged the riots, arguing that “professional
agitators and outsiders” had “pushed too hard, and had “come with their own cameramen and
newsmen” for the purpose of making a spectacle. Ruby Hurley denied that the NAACP had brought any
of its own newsmen or cameramen. Folsom could not veto the Boutwell Freedom of Choice Plan even if
he had wanted to, because it was in the form of a constitutional amendment, but he did later sign an
enabling act that allowed lawmakers, who had overlooked a technicality, to make the plan functional.
Folsom knew that in light of the events at Tuscaloosa, the boycott in Montgomery, and the activity of
the NAACP, that the voters of Alabama would overwhelmingly pass the Freedom of Choice amendments
in their scheduled August referendum. Any resistance would not only be futile but would only add to
the list of political damages he had suffered over the last several months. In signing the enabling bill, he
called Boutwell’s plan “a down to earth proposition we can all work with.”34
Folsom may have conceded defeat in the legislature, but the governor continued to
communicate with the state’s few white liberal leaders in an effort to create some kind of genuinely
moderate course of official action. Folsom usually sent a representative, for example, to the meetings
of the Alabama Council on Human Relations. The ACHR in response reached out to the governor,
proposing that he create a bi-racial governor’s commission to study the issue of racial tension and to
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advise the governor on racial matters, especially crises like the Lucy enrollment riots. Folsom accepted
the proposal. He called for a special conference with 150 of the state’s newspaper editors and
publishers. It was a more moderate group than the one that normally met in the House chambers
where the parley was held, but it was certainly not a group that was roundly supportive of
desegregation. With television cameras rolling, he disarmed the potentially hostile newsmen by
announcing, “Anybody with sense knows that Negro children and white children are not going to school
together in Alabama any time in the near future . . . in fact not for a long time.” The governor then used
a segregationist parable to demonstrate the need for the biracial commission, telling the story of an old
black man “whose forebears hadn’t been too long out of the jungle.” Folsom said the man saw white
men and black men use separate bathrooms and surmised that when whites drove through a green
light, he ought to wait and proceed on the red. The newsmen were receptive to the governor’s
proposal, couched as it was as the most moderate of solutions. Folsom appointed Birmingham PostHerald editor James Mills head of a committee charged with producing a bill which could be presented
to the legislature for the creation of the commission itself. Mills accepted Folsom’s call but argued that
the work should proceed only if the committee were to “operate within the framework of traditions that
[were] deep-rooted in our state. He proceeded to nominate a known Citizens’ Councilor and a Ku Klux
Klan spokesman to the committee.35
Emory Jackson, the founder of the first Alabama State Conference of the NAACP and the editor
of the black daily the Birmingham World, was the lone black newsman invited to the governor’s
conference. Jackson told the New York Times “If [the commission] is going to be interracial, it ought to
be interracial, but it has already gotten off all wrong.” Obdurate segregationists also condemned the
effort. The editor of the Alabama Journal argued that the commission would have “no hope of getting
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anything done,” because the NAACP did not want “anything settled” and did not want “an
understanding.” The NAACP itself was not much more supportive. W.C. Patton questioned the
committee appointment process, controlled as it was by whites. Patton argued that the “best results
can be obtained when [blacks] select their own leaders,” because they would not “accept proposals
agreed on by other Negroes who have been ‘brainwashed.’” Everyone, including the ACHR, worried
whether Folsom would simply appoint his old “cronies” if and when the actual commission was created.
The Citizens’ Council and its legislative leaders mounted a concerted opposition. When the governor
called the second special legislative session of 1956, primarily to consider what to do about the
education funding crisis, the Mills committee bill was introduced and quickly abandoned by the
administration. It died amid widespread disapproval throughout the state and either staunch opposition
or indifference in the legislature itself. Mills identified the fundamental issue when he told Folsom, “If
the Negro citizens of our state can see no value in the effort if the commission accepts the reality of our
segregated society, then it cannot achieve what you had in mind.” Indeed, Mills wrote, “If this is the
attitude of a majority of Negroes in Alabama I see little hope of avoiding even greater tensions and
eventual violence.” The legislature was clearly only interested in shoring up segregation at that point,
while black activists in the press, in the NAACP, and in the vanguard of an emerging direct action
movement, were no longer willing to consider any proposals that did not seek to move beyond
segregation with “deliberate speed.”36
As Alabama’s legislative body was settling into a comfortable consensus on massive resistance,
Deep South congressional leaders in Washington were building a more tenuous region-wide consensus
of their own. In March southern congressmen, including 19 of 22 senators and 82 of 106
representatives, signed a “Declaration of Constitutional Principles” denouncing the school desegregation
decisions and pledging a legal battle to resist their enforcement. This so-called “Southern Manifesto”
36
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was, according to one historian, “a dramatic announcement of the quickening pace of resistance
politics,” but its near-unanimity had been somewhat difficult to achieve. Congressional leaders from the
states of the peripheral South forced the declaration – originally conceived by Strom Thurmond and
Harry Byrd as an endorsement of interposition – into a much milder form. Even toned down, the
manifesto called the Brown decisions “encroachments on the rights reserved to the states and to the
people, contrary to established law, and to the Constitution.” The congressmen wished to “commend
the motives of those states which have declared the intention to resist forced integration by any lawful
means.” All of the senators and representatives who refused to sign were from outside the Deep South.
Many had been compelled initially to resist but were brought into the fold through the recruitment of
Byrd, Thurmond, and other deep southern leaders. They were won over by the refashioning of the
argument to focus on states’ rights and resistance to “forced integration” and through the fear that
refusal to sign, as the neutral observer the Southern School News put it, might “put them on the side of
the [NAACP], at least in the minds of the voters back home.”37
Meanwhile in Alabama, the Lucy crisis continued to heighten awareness of segregated
education’s susceptibility to attack from the NAACP. Lucy’s attorney – prominent NAACP affiliate Arthur
Shores of Birmingham – had accused the University of Alabama’s board of trustees of conspiring to
create the mob action surrounding Lucy’s enrollment. In late February, the university expelled Lucy for
making “false, defamatory, impertinent, and scandalous charges” against the board. The trustees also
expelled one Leonard Wilson, a pre-law student from Selma who had helped organize the student wing
of the riots. Wilson was an officer in the Tuscaloosa chapter of the Citizens’ Council and had been
publically arguing that the university needed a “house-cleaning” and daring the board to expel him.
Selma Citizens’ Council leader Alston Keith called Wilson’s challenges “intemperate,” but the actions of
Councilors elsewhere indicated solidarity with the young segregationist. The Montgomery chapter of
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the Council called for an investigation into “possible subversive activities” in the state’s colleges. And
the statewide Association of Citizens’ Councils was preparing a questionnaire even then to send to all
administrators and faculty members at the state’s white colleges to determine their views on
segregation. The Citizens’ Council questionnaire was similar to one the Council had circulated among
political candidates in the state, which included questions like, “Will you give your wholehearted
support to the action which has already been taken by the legislature of Alabama toward maintaining
segregation”; “has the NAACP or any other organization dedicated to the breakdown of Alabama
policies on segregation made any financial contribution directly or indirectly to your campaign”; and “Do
you believe in the Citizens’ Council of Alabama movement?”38
At the same time, the March special session of the state legislature considered a number of
mini-manifestos denouncing anyone suspected of assaulting the pillars of white supremacy, especially
the NAACP. One proposal called for an investigation into possible Communist infiltration of the NAACP.
Another sought the delivery to the legislature of all the names on a petition delivered to the University
of Alabama in February urging Lucy’s re-admission after the riots. The legislators actually passed the
most outrageous bill of all those considered: the Black Belt’s E.O. Eddins introduced a proposal which
called on the U.S. Congress to provide federal funds to “finance apportionment of Negroes among the
several Northern and Western states.” Eddins wanted the federal government, in other words, to
sponsor the “emigration of Negroes” – the large majority of which were “untrained, unskilled, and
uneducated” – to “areas where they are wanted . . . and can be assimilated.” Folsom dismissed the
effort, arguing, “If all the Negros were moved away every one of those folks who have been raising so
much sand would starve to death.” Planters like Engelhardt had inherited vast plantations, and “a lot of
them” Folsom said, “wished they had slaves on them now.” These “untrained, unskilled, and
uneducated” blacks in the Black Belt fields were not slaves, but their removal would nonetheless ruin a
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lot of white men, who had kept those blacks untrained, unskilled, and uneducated for the planters’ own
benefit. Whether or not the legislators realized that their scheme might actually come to fruition and
bring about the downfall of the planters, they repealed the resolution towards the end of the session.
One bill that was passed and remained in effect called on the Supreme Court to modify the School
Segregation Cases decisions and gave notice to the Court that the white people of Alabama had a “deep
determination” to steadfastly resist desegregation. “No decree by any court,” the resolution reasoned,
“can change the feeling of the people of the South.” For once the legislators were absolutely right.39
If the feeling of the majority of white people of Alabama had not already been indicated by the
actions of the state’s elected representatives, then the election that May of delegates to the Democratic
National Convention made it very clear. Up for election was the sitting governor himself, Folsom.
During his first gubernatorial term, Folsom had spoken out against the Dixiecrat split, trying to argue
that the politicians leading it were depriving the people of Alabama of their rightful democratic choice in
leaving Truman electors off of the ballot. This had contributed to his defeat in the 1948 convention
delegate election. By his second term, he had been forced to come around to at least mildly endorsing
segregation, but he still refused to be fully co-opted by the hardline segregationists who had taken
control of the legislature. In refusing to sign the Citizens’ Council’s political questionnaire, Folsom said
that his views on segregation were well enough known. “I was and am for segregation,” he told the
press, but he was not about to “swear allegiance to the leadership of any group that’s trying to tear up
the Democratic party in Alabama.” He charged the Citizens’ Councilors with being the “same faces, rank
and serial number and issues that led to the Dixiecrats in 1948.” Folsom might have done well in his
convention delegate bid to either wholeheartedly endorse massive resistance like everyone else, or to at
the very least not remind the voters of his loyalist stance in 1948. Along with all but one of his slate of
candidates, Folsom was annihilated in the 1956 convention delegate election. The governor himself was
39
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defeated 3 to 1 by Citizens’ Councilor and interposition resolution author Charles McKay. It was the
worst defeat of his political career. McKay had exploited Folsom’s soft position on race, telling voters
that the governor was, despite his supposed support for segregation, “still a friend of the Negro” and
one of the “foremost supporters of the NAACP” and all of the “things it stands for.” The politics of race
had gotten the better of Jim Folsom, and he would never play a prominent role in Alabama politics
again.40
As Folsom’s star fell from the Alabama sky, so rose the stars of Albert Boutwell, Sam Engelhardt,
and a number of other young segregationists who knew how to rally Alabama voters, and how to take
advantage of the old Black Belt – Big Mule alliance that had dominated state politics for so long. Their
message of “law and order” and their absolute commitment to segregation in public education had
brought the Alabama voters two years of segregationist legislation passed by the Alabama legislature.
Most importantly, they had provided Alabama whites with their first real defenses against integrated
education: the Pupil Placement Law and the Boutwell Freedom of Choice Plan. And Alabama’s
segregationist electorate felt reasonably sure that these legislative bulwarks for segregation could be
successful, as they made clear by rewarding the segregationist bloc and repudiating Folsom in the 1956
delegate election. Despite Folsom’s attempts to provide some other rallying point for whites, his
constant struggle to veto legislation or denounce it, and his attempts at biracial cooperation, the archsegregationists shone brighter. They captured the gaze of Alabama’s white voters by emanating
defiance of outside interference, dedication to racial purity, and maintenance of the status quo at nearly
all costs, all within a legalistic constellation that appeared much more attractive than the doomed,
crude, and violent efforts of the KKK and the dim, defeatist, and disjointed efforts of the governor. As
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Folsom faded away, these men filled the void, under the leadership of a young man who made his name
by fighting for law and order – Attorney General John Patterson.41

John Patterson, Walter Jones, and the Banishment of the NAACP
Jim Folsom’s relationship with the legislature in his final two years in the governor’s office was
characterized by his “sending wayward punches whistling though the air,” as one biographer has
described it. As the governor continued his futile call for a constitutional convention and his effort to
stymie the forces of hardline-segregation, legislators continued to introduce segregationist bills at a
torrid pace, so many in fact that the two houses had to form a fourteen member "super-segregation
committee," with Boutwell at the helm, to screen the bills and weed out the more bizarre. Despite the
screening, bills such as one that necessitated a man obtaining a women's permission to sit next to her
on a public conveyance still made it to Folsom's desk, where they were often pocket vetoed. Sam
Engelhardt continued his crusade, introducing a ludicrous bill to Gerrymander the city of Tuskegee so as
to exclude from the city limits nearly all blacks; this bill would ultimately meet with federal court
invalidation in the landmark case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960). Sensing that his plan would be struck
down, Engelhardt also introduced another bill to abolish Macon County and have surrounding counties
absorb it. Almost pathetically, Folsom tried to leverage the senator’s proposals against his old stand-by,
saying, "If we are going to have something like that, then I think the other 13 [Black Belt] counties
should have the same opportunity, and we can do that by having a constitutional convention.” As
Alabama’s legislators debated the merits of this variegated segregationist legislation, Folsom simply kept

41

Michael Klarman describes this process, whereby committed segregationists muscled out would-be
moderates, in a regional context, in Webb, Massive Resistance, pp. 21-38.

101

on swinging. Even then the man who would soon unify Alabama’s government and lead it in an assault
on the forces of integration was beginning to plot his course.42
Alabama Attorney General John Patterson was as much a symbol of the future of Alabama
politics as Big Jim Folsom was of its past. Like a great many of his peers in Alabama, he was a veteran of
World War II, enlisting in the Army in 1940 and serving with an artillery unit in North Africa, Italy, France,
and Germany. He went on to receive a commission and return to fight in Korea, retiring as a major in
1949. Like many of his young colleagues in state politics, he obtained a law degree from the University
of Alabama. Upon graduation and completion of his military service, he moved to Phenix City, Alabama,
a popular playground for rowdy soldiers from the U.S. Army base at Ft. Benning, across the
Chattahoochee River in Columbus, Georgia. Patterson practiced law alongside his father, who had made
a career in the Alabama legislature out of combating organized criminal elements, especially those in
Phenix City – Alabama’s “Sin City.” The elder Patterson ran for state attorney general and was
subsequently murdered during the campaign by the very organized criminals he was pursuing. John was
thrust into the election by his father’s friends in the Democratic Party and courageously ran on the same
platform as had his father: stamping out crime. Patterson won the sympathy and admiration of
Alabamians, and their votes. He began his term as attorney general in 1955 and immediately became a
foe of Folsom’s administration, attempting to expose the rampant graft and general malfeasance that
was widely understood to characterize it by that time. Patterson was riding a rising political tide,
though, and neither organized crime nor ethics reform were to capture the passions of Alabama’s white
voters quite like the issue of race.43
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Patterson would later recall that “like everyone in politics at that time,” he knew exactly “what
was on the minds of the people.” Early in his term as attorney general, he attended a conference of
attorneys general in New Hampshire, which was national in scope but nonetheless involved much
discussion of the School Segregation Cases decisions. There Patterson befriended Lindsey Almond, the
attorney general and soon-to-be governor of Virginia. Almond imparted to Patterson his understanding
that in massive resistance lay massive rewards. As Governor Almond would lead his state in a futile fight
to close its schools to avoid integration. And as attorney general he helped lead the regional legal
crusade against the great pariah of white supremacy, the NAACP. During Patterson’s several
subsequent visits to Virginia, Almond told him how he had assailed the NAACP through the use of old
barratry and champarty laws – laws designed to curb the solicitation of litigants. The association was
practiced at litigation though, quite obviously, and was able to parry a number of these challenges.
Patterson would have to devise another strategy to thwart the NAACP’s activities in Alabama. But he
took from Almond the idea that the association was an ideal adversary for practical and political
purposes.44
In the summer of 1956, Patterson, along with assistant Gordon Madison, state Senator Albert
Boutwell, and Birmingham attorney Joe Johnston, hosted a secret meeting of southern state officials
and prominent constitutional lawyers. The group met in Birmingham to devise a possible common
strategy for massive resistance to school desegregation in the South. Patterson later admitted that the
group "knew that school integration was inevitable.” There was simply “no way the states could
preserve segregation as a way of life,” he said, ”it was the law of the land that had been reinforced too
many times in the federal courts." But the group’s consensus also included an understanding that each
state should undertake a delaying action. Patterson argued that those at the meeting "believed, to a
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man, that time would help resolve the enormous resistance to an integrated society and lessen the
probability of violent resistance."45
Certainly, men like Boutwell were concerned with preventing violence. Law and order was the
guiding light for respectable, thoughtful segregationists. A delaying action to preserve law and order
would help the state maintain a modestly progressive image and not ruin its ability to recruit new
industry. The Boutwell Committee plan and Engelhardt plan were part of such a strategy, insofar as they
decentralized decision making, making for a diffuse target in the case of litigation. This was not all,
though. A delaying action, specifically an all-out war against the NAACP, would resonate with white
voters across the state. Not only was the NAACP the primary threat to peace and order, segregation,
and white supremacy in the state of Alabama, it was an “outsider” organization, and a hated, Yankeedominated outsider organization at that. Patterson knew, as did certainly Boutwell, that showing
Alabamians that you lived the state’s motto, “we dare defend our rights,” could carry you a long way in
the new Alabama, whether or not you knew that defense was ultimately futile.46
On June 1, 1956, Patterson began his assault. He announced that the “good relations that have
traditionally existed in our state between the White and the Negro races have been jeopardized by acts
of irresponsible groups and individuals.” Alabama and the South in general were facing “grave
problems,” he said, which could only be met soundly by “right-thinking people” in the absence of
“disrupting outside forces, such as the NAACP, seeking to widen the breach.” The attorney general
declared that after a “diligent investigation,” he was “convinced that the acts of the NAACP in Alabama
[were] against the best interests of the people of this state, both Negro and white.” Accordingly he
asked Montgomery Circuit Judge Walter Jones for a permanent injunction, restraining the association
from conducting any business in Alabama on the grounds that it had not registered with the state as a
“foreign corporation.” This legal approach to destroying the NAACP was conceived in Louisiana. It was,
45
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ironically, a resurrection of an old anti-Ku Klux Klan statute which many of the southern states had
adopted when the Klan’s violent extralegal tactics had fallen out of fashion in the decades before Brown.
Not only had the NAACP “failed to meet [the] statutory requirements” to register and pay a fee, it had,
Patterson argued, “engaged actively” in acts which tended to lead to “a breach of the peace.” Patterson
alleged that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund had paid Autherine Lucy to bring suit and that the NAACP
itself organized the “illegal boycott” in Montgomery. He made no mention of the implementation
campaign, but it was understood what banning the NAACP would do. The Lucy crisis and the bus
boycott were all but decided; the possibility of school desegregation loomed. Patterson knew the voters
of Alabama could not, he said, “stand idly by and raise no hand to stay the forces of confusion.” After
all, he argued with some sense of irony, the NAACP was only “trying to capitalize upon racial factors for
private gain and advancement.”47
There was never a doubt in anyone’s mind which way Judge Walter Jones would rule. Jones was
an aging and respected jurist among Alabama’s whites. His father had been governor, and he himself
was the president of the Alabama Bar Association. He was also an ardent and outspoken segregationist,
a white supremacist of the first order, and the judicial embodiment of the ideology of the White
Citizens’ Council. He wrote a regular column that appeared in the Montgomery Advertiser under the
title “Off the Bench,” in which he praised the historical achievements of the white race, extolled the
virtues of racial separation, and condemned the U.S. Supreme Court. He used the column, generally, to
explain his understanding of how white supremacy worked and how it ought to be maintained, namely
through the preservation of states’ rights. Jones once called the notion that the Supreme Court could
interpret the Constitution an “evil idea” which could “only lead to the final destruction of what is left of
boundary lines [drawn] by the states which created the federal government.” He also argued that the
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white race was being “unjustly assailed all over the world” and subjected in Alabama to attacks by
“radical newspapers and magazines, communists and the federal judiciary.” Jones exemplified the
southern hatred of Yankee outsiders, arguing that “columnists and photographers” had been sent to the
South “to take back to the people of the North untrue and slanted tales“ as part of a “massive campaign
of super-brainwashing propaganda.” According to the judge, southern whites were also under attack
from “those who wish an impure, mixed breed that would destroy the white race by mongrelization.”
These “integrationists and mongrelizers do not deceive any person of common sense,” Jones wrote in
his column, “with their pious talk of wanting equal rights and opportunities.” Their “real and final goal,”
he argued, was “intermarriage and mongrelization of the American people.”48
Jones had quickly established himself as a solid friend of the Citizens’ Council. A prominent
Mobile attorney asked the judge in late 1954 to denounce the Citizens’ Council movement in the name
of the bar. The attorney argued that that bar would be “wanting in basic Christian duty” if it failed to
“crush” the councils by denouncing the use of economic sanctions. “Most of us favor segregation,” he
admitted, but he argued that many were nonetheless opposed to the denial of “work, credit, or basic
human needs simply because some Negro exercise his right to advocate peaceably what he thinks ought
to be done.” Jones responded by claiming that “those who oppose segregation” were using “all legal
means within their power,” including “forces of such social, political, and economic pressures as they
can mobilize,” in order to destroy segregation. This was within their rights, Jones wrote, but it was also
within the rights of those who favored segregation to do the same. “Neither side to this controversy can
expect to be unopposed by counter measure,” Jones reasoned, “so long as measures taken by either
side are within our constitutional framework.” The judge ignored the reference to Christian duty and
the moral imperative implicit in the reference to “basic human needs” and approached the matter as
strictly legal. According to Jones, the activities of the Citizens’ Council were no different than those of
48
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the NAACP, in that they were lawful exercises of Constitutional rights. By 1956 the judge had evidently
changed his legal opinion of one of those groups’ activities, and it was not the Citizens’ Council. He
obstinately refused to recuse himself from the NAACP case despite having at one point declared
publically that he intended to “deal the NAACP and its counterpart the Montgomery Improvement
Association [the civil rights organization born of the bus boycott] a blow from which they [would] never
recover.”49
Jones’ gave Patterson exactly what he wanted. He issued a decree granting a temporary
restraining order pending the NAACP’s reply. The association was restrained from “conducting any
further business of any description,” and from organizing further chapters, from soliciting membership
or contributions, and from collecting dues. Importantly, it was also restrained from “filing . . . any
application, paper or document for the purpose of qualifying to do business” in Alabama. Citizens’
Councils across the state expressed excited approval. Sam Engelhardt called it “a step forward towards
our goal of race harmony in the South” and an acknowledgment that the NAACP was “against the law as
it should have been in the past.” The NAACP’s New York office denied organizing the bus boycott and
funding Lucy’s enrollment. The board of directors also announced that the organization would “not be
intimidated” by the injunction and that it had instructed its attorneys to move for a hearing on the
merits of the complaint. According to the board, the injunction was very clearly an attempt to “ban and
destroy the NAACP” in “direct violation of the American traditional and constitutional principle of
freedom of association,” on account of the association’s ”successful and continuing campaign to
eliminate racial discrimination and segregation.” It was clear enough, the board argued, when the
injunction appeared to prevent the very action – applying for a license and paying a fee – which would
logically be required for the NAACP to resume activates, per the complaint itself.50

49

Southern School News, Jan. 6, 1955, Aug., 1958.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Race
Relations Law Reporter 1.4, Aug., 1956, p. 706; Southern School News, July, 1956.
50

107

The state NAACP complied with the order to cease operations, but the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund went to work immediately preparing a defense. The LDF filed a motion to dissolve
the injunction in addition to its answer to the complaint. These were filed by the assistant director of
the LDF, Robert Carter, along with Birmingham’s prominent, veteran black attorney, Arthur Shores ,and
the soon-to-be-famous Fred Gray, a young black attorney from Montgomery. The “Inc. Fund,” as the
LDF was often called, consisted of a small group of attorneys based out of New York, but it always
worked with local, NAACP-affiliated counsel. Shores was one of those. He was one of the first black
attorneys in the state of Alabama and a long-sticking thorn in the side of Birmingham’s white
establishment, and he had most recently served as Autherine Lucy’s counsel. Gray was 26 years old and
fresh out of law school. He had attended Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland on Alabama’s
dime. Indeed, each of the few blacks who had wished to seek a graduate or professional degree not
offered at one of the state’s three black state-supported colleges (Tuskegee Institute, Alabama A&M,
and Alabama State) received grants to study out of state, per a 1930s federal court order insisting upon
some semblance of “equal” in “separate but equal.” Perhaps fittingly, Gray returned to Alabama in 1954
vowing to “destroy everything segregated [he] could find.” He started his law practice in Montgomery
and began attending local NAACP meetings, where he became close with E.D. Nixon and youth director
Rosa Parks. These associations made him a natural choice to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in the
case that would ultimately result in the invalidation of the city’s bus segregation laws and end the
Montgomery bus boycott – Browder v. Gayle (1956). The U.S. District Court in Montgomery ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs in Browder, in fact, just days after Patterson filed his complaint in state court
against the NAACP. Gray had to thus simultaneously prepare for the inevitable appeal of Browder in the
federal court system, while preparing to defend the NAACP itself in the infinitely less-hospitable state
court system.51
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Carter, Gray, and Shores argued in a motion to dissolve and answer to the complaint that the
NAACP had been operating in the state for decades and had never been asked to pay this registration
fee. If Patterson wanted to enforce it now, they claimed, there was an adequate remedy for the state to
pursue short of filing this suit. But the attorney general had not even notified the association that it was
in violation of any law. In any case, they argued, the injunction was violative of the association’s First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The NAACP was dedicated to “help[ing] secure federal statutory
and constitutional rights and due process of law for Negroes,” and it was the clear purpose of the
injunction, the attorneys correctly asserted, to “bar these activities.” As such, the injunction
“interfere[d] with the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly of the NAACP and its members and
their right to petition for redress of grievances as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.” It was a
seemingly convincing argument that cut to the core of the attorney general’s complaint. Walter Jones
did not think so.52
Before the hearing of the case on its merits, and before Jones announced any decision on the
NAACP’s motion, Patterson asked the court to order the production of a list of NAACP records,
specifically those that would supposedly prove its illegal involvement in the Lucy case and in
Montgomery. The attorney general wanted the association to produce copies of its branch charters,
membership lists, bank records, and any correspondence relevant to the bus boycott or to Lucy’s
enrollment. Jones immediately granted the motion for production and ordered the NAACP to comply.
NAACP state Field Secretary W.C. Patton might have been willing to produce relevant correspondence,
bank records, and charters, but under no circumstances was the state NAACP willing to hand over
membership lists. Patton in fact hid the records in a small, non-descript Birmingham office not known to
be affiliated with the NAACP (a move which later appeared quite shrewd when Attorney General
Patterson illegally raided the offices of the black activist Tuskegee Civic Association). NAACP executive
1-90.
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secretary Roy Wilkins explained to the press why his field secretary refused to comply with the court’s
order and why the national organization supported him in this, telling reporters that “in too many
instances the officers of state and local governments are, to all intents and purposes, one and the same
with the leadership of the white Citizens’ Council.” Wilkins knew that NAACP members in Alabama had
already been “subjected to economic pressure and personal threats and acts of violence for no cause
other than their membership in the NAACP.” The association could not, he said, “in good conscience,
risk exposing [its] loyal members to such reprisals.” Wilkins was right. Patterson did not need the
membership lists to make his case, but he knew that their production would be a strong deterrent for
members across the state considering continuing activism, with or without the NAACP. Exposure would,
it was hoped, force the average NAACP member back into quiet submission by threatening Citizens’
Council action like that which befell the signers of the original school petitions. In Wilkins’ words, the
state of Alabama wanted to “impose unemployment, denial of credit, threats and intimidation, as well
as physical violence upon our members in that state.” He said the NAACP would thus “protect [its]
members at any cost.” The cost, it turned out, would be quite high.53
Carter, Gray, and Shores, assisted by Washington D.C. attorney and Brown veteran Frank
Reeves, offered to produce all but the membership rolls, but this was not enough. When the deadline
for production had passed, Jones held the association in “willful contempt” for its “deliberate refusal” to
abide the court’s order. The court could not, Jones wrote, “permit its orders to be flouted,” nor could it
“permit a party, however wealthy and influential, to take the law into his own hands, set himself up
above the law, and contumaciously decline to obey the orders of a duly constituted court made under
the law of the land and in the exercise of an admitted and ancient jurisdiction,” lest there be “no
government of law.” Jones fined the NAACP $10,000 and ordered the fine increased to $100,000 if it
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were not paid within five days. Contrary to the judge’s assumption that the organization was “wealthy
and influential,” it was perpetually strapped for cash and would have had a very difficult time paying
such a fine, even if it were inclined to do so. The state and local branches certainly could not come
close, and the national organization was not much better off. Carter and the other attorneys tried to
persuade Jones to half the fine and reiterated their offer to turn over all but the membership lists. Jones
was not moved, nor was the state Supreme Court, which denied the association’s request for a stay.
The fine increased to $100,000 on July 31. This was a knockout blow and a perfect example of the
impossibility of black activists finding redress in the state court system of Alabama. Two weeks later,
the state Supreme Court denied the association’s petition for a writ of certiorari, as a blackfaced effigy
was hung a few blocks away bearing the name “NAACP” alongside another one, white, emblazoned with
“I talked integration.” The organization’s attorneys knew they would have to try and find relief in
federal court, otherwise the NAACP was, indeed, finished in Alabama.54
The contempt fine officially handcuffed the NAACP in Alabama for years. Without purging the
citation, it could not litigate Patterson’s complaint on its merits, and it therefore could do nothing about
the injunction Jones had issued. The organization appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed in
May of 1957 to hear its argument. In 1958 the Court reversed and remanded the contempt citation and
fine, only to have the state’s high tribunal claim that the NAACP was in contempt for different reasons
and maintain the fine and injunction. In 1959 the federal court again ordered the state court to hear the
case on its merits, and the state court simply ignored the order. Finally, NAACP attorneys brought suit in
federal trial court seeking an injunction against Patterson’s successor, McDonald Gallion, which
ultimately resulted in yet another mandate from the U.S. Supreme Court to the Alabama Supreme Court
in 1961. The latter finally heard the NAACP’s appeal in 1962 and found in favor of the state. The NAACP
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then appealed this judgment to the U.S. Supreme Court, which in 1964 held it to be unconstitutional and
ordered the state to lift the ban. Thus, through political maneuvering, judicial foot-dragging, and outright intransigence on the part of state officials, the NAACP was kept from operating in Alabama for
eight years.55
Patterson’s attack on the NAACP was an immediate and resounding success. He had accused
the organization of soliciting and financing the Lucy litigation and with financing and directing the bus
boycott, neither of which was entirely true. The Lucy case was no more a case of barratry or solicitation
than any of the others the NAACP litigated, and it had roundly escaped censure for those. The boycott
was the result of much more than NAACP coordination, including the organizational efforts of local
teachers at Alabama State Teachers College, and the inspirational leadership, famously, of a group of
preachers which included Martin Luther King, Jr. The real and continuing threat the NAACP posed in
Alabama was in its Operation Implementation designs. The crises in Tuscaloosa and Montgomery had
raised the stakes, but the looming crisis involving the white schoolroom, according to the Citizens’
Council, led straight to the white woman’s bedroom. Patterson knew he could make his name as a bona
fide leader in the emerging super-segregationist bloc by going after the organization that posed such a
threat, and he did. He had risen to prominence by pursuing his father’s murderers. His attempt to
expose the corruption in the Folsom Administration endeared him to many conservatives and to anyone
anti-Folsom, which was a large crowd by then. But his embrace of race vaulted to him the top. He
significantly raised his profile when he assisted Sam Engelhardt in his efforts to redistrict Tuskegee by
attacking the TCA. And he finally established himself as the favorite for the governor’s chair in 1958 by
defeating and ousting the NAACP in 1956.56
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Patterson campaigned for governor on providing a vigorous defense of segregation. He
obviously had impeccable credentials. In June of 1957 he touted those credentials and conveyed his
message to the graduates of the Jones School of Law (founded by and presided over by none other than
Walter Jones, who ran classes for the night school out of his chambers and his home). He told the young
lawyers that the U.S. Supreme Court had become “a super-legislature” and had not simply interpreted
but had “amended the Constitution” with the School Segregation Cases decisions and had thus caused
more “strife between the races” than the South had seen since the Civil War. A campaign ad that ran in
state newspapers declared Patterson’s “creed” which he said he would hang on the wall of his office.
The creed listed ten points of guidance, or pledges, number three of which was to “enact strong
segregation laws – drafted by the ablest lawyers who can be found – to keep the southern way of life on
every front.” A supporter later told Patterson’s biographer that Patterson “verbalized what people were
thinking and talking about among themselves about the school integration issue. They didn't want it to
happen,” he said, “and when Patterson told them it wasn't going to happen in Alabama, they believed
him."57
In a record voter turnout, Patterson won 32 percent of the initial vote in the Democratic primary
– which was still the only real contest in the solid Democratic South – forcing a runoff with then up-andcoming state Circuit Judge George Wallace. He handily defeated Wallace in the runoff in which the
judge accused the attorney general, correctly, of successfully courting the assistance of the Ku Klux Klan.
The charge had backfired when Wallace was himself unexpectedly endorsed by the NAACP. Wallace
famously attributed his defeat to having been “out-niggered” by Patterson, and this has been seen as
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steeling Wallace’s own resolve to engage in race-baiting demagoguery. Patterson easily won the
subsequent general election, as expected, and prepared to take office in January of 1959.58

The Impact of the Little Rock Crisis, 1957-59
Patterson quickly confirmed to voters that he would engage in massive resistance to avoid any
breach of segregated education, even as the efficacy of massive resistance came into serious question
elsewhere in the region. Before taking office, Patterson was forced to respond to developments in Little
Rock, Arkansas. Litigation and demonstrations there had led to a standoff between Arkansas Governor
Orval Faubus and the federal government over the desegregation of all-white Central High School. The
crisis had become national news and had given credence to law-and-order segregationists’ claim that
integration would only lead to violence and should therefore be avoided at all costs. Patterson said, “I
don’t believe the people of this state will ever tolerate integration of the schools, and if the federal
government were ever to attempt to bring integration upon us by force, there would be chaos and
disorder” which could only lead to “the destruction of our school system as we know it today.”
Integration was simply “unthinkable.” Patterson’s former assistant, MacDonald Gallion, was waiting to
take Patterson’s place as the attorney general. Referring to a federal judge’s order to forestall the
integration at Central High, he said that he was “gratified to see a federal judge shake the mystic cloak
of dominance from Washington and the NAACP, and for a change act with some degree of common
sense in dealing with the practical aspects of the integration problem.” In light of the developments in
Arkansas, Gallion announced, it was “hardly unthinkable” that the Brown II implementation order be
suspended indefinitely. 59
The situation in Arkansas alarmed white Alabamians. The NAACP in Little Rock had secured
cooperation from the local school authorities and had nine black students prepared to desegregate
58
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Central High in the fall of 1957. Faubus called out the state’s National Guard to prevent the students’
entering the school but was forced to back down by President Dwight Eisenhower, who not only
federalized the Guard but called in the 101st Airborne Division of the United States Army. This was the
type of “disorder” that many whites thought the NAACP fostered, and it was more proof that the federal
government was again trampling upon states’ rights and forcing an unwanted social reorganization upon
the South as it had done 100 years prior. The Alabama Citizens’ Council announced a spike in
memberships, with Sam Engelhardt arguing that the episode had given the Council a “flying start.”
Newspapers across the state reported a significant rise in reports of bombings, floggings, and cross
burnings.60
Many Birmingham News readers reacted with indignation, specifically to the federal
intervention. One Birmingham man argued that Eisenhower’s response was a “sinful and shameful act”
by which he had “turned his back on his own race to protect Communist followers with Army troops and
guns and bayonets.” Another reader wrote of “perilous days of imminent danger of complete military
dictatorship.” Another reader from Birmingham lamented the “orders of a misguided president to
enforce a law which if carried to its ultimate conclusion” would ultimately result in “the destruction of
the magnificent progress which has been made in the South. If integration laws are enforced,” he
wrote, “it will make for the white people of the South a world different from anything they have
hitherto known.”61
South Alabamians reacted with similar dismay. A Linwood woman asserted that “the Southern
white people and Negroes were living very peaceably when that awful decision of the Supreme Court
disturbed the peace of the whole nation it seems.” A man from the town of Red Level was appalled that
the president, who had sworn “that he would abide by, uphold and protect the Constitution,” had
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indeed “allowed the Supreme Court to invade or take over the Constitutional work of Congress” and had
thereby become “party to the most unconstitutional act that I know anything about. Not being content
with that,” the man wrote, the president “acknowledged that the prejudice decision [sic] of the
Supreme Court was a law and proceeded to enforce it as such. When Eisenhower ordered the troops to
Little Rock,” he argued, “he did it in violation of the Constitution, which made it a criminal assault and
invasion of the sovereign state of Arkansas.” Another man made the connection with Reconstruction
that many whites in the South understood so well. All Alabamians should advise their congressman, the
man cautioned, to “take a close look at the next appropriations to our military establishment in order to
be sure that no funds so appropriated will be used to furnish federal troops with bayonets to enforce
arbitrary decisions of carpetbagger judges.” A Tallassee woman called Little Rock “the South’s Pearl
Harbor.”62
One Birmingham News reader argued that the Little Rock affair demonstrated “dramatically the
extent to which the federal government operating under a social philosophy transmuted into political
action during the past 25 years is willing to go to require conformity to that philosophy,” one “facet” of
that being “a constant and relentless drive to build up the rights of minorities.” It was unfair, the reader
urged, that the same consideration was not given to the “minority of the states of the union,” which
favored continued segregation. The reader then cut to the core of the constitutional question
presented in the immediate wake of Brown. “The integrationists contend that the action of the
Supreme Court is final and that its decision is the law of the land,” he reasoned, “on the other hand the
segregationists hold that the action of the Supreme Court is not necessarily final and that it cannot
create laws of the land in violation of the Constitution itself.” The latter was, of course, the rationale
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behind the interposition and nullification resolutions produced by the various states, including
Alabama.63
The Supreme Court attempted to shut the door on this reasoning when it decided Cooper v.
Aaron near the end of 1958. The suit was an attempt by members of the Little Rock school board to
delay desegregation in light of the “disorder” of the first year. Faubus had continued in his defiant
stance and had joined with his state’s legislature in attempting school closure in lieu of integration, in
much the same fashion as officials in Virginia soon would do. This, the Court decided, was the reason
for the disorder – the actions of state officials, not the initial good faith efforts of the school board to
implement the Brown order. The Court ordered the desegregation of Little Rock schools to proceed as
planned and took the opportunity to assert its role as arbiter of the Constitution. The justices explicitly
held that states could not interfere with that role by interposing their authority between state citizens
and the federal government. Cooper v. Aaron was thus an attempt to put interposition and nullification
to rest and to serve notice that the Brown decisions could not be ignored simply because state
governments disagreed with them. But it did not even bring an end to the crisis in Little Rock, where
schools remained closed throughout the 1958-9 school year and where Faubus remained hugely popular
for his defiant stance.64
Rather than convince white Alabamians that massive resistance was futile, the events in Little
Rock and the Cooper v. Aaron decision simply added intensity to their siege mentality. It emboldened
their calls for defiance of outside agitators and for the preservation of states’ rights. “The paratroopers
are in Little Rock,” wrote one man from Troy, “and be their stay long or short, every one that is old
enough to tote matches knows two facts: the white man will continue In Alabama,” and “’suppressed
anger’ will continue to turn to ‘tenfold hate.’” The “NAACP sharpies,” he wrote, had convinced many
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that defiance was un-Christian, but he argued that, on the contrary, “hardly a Christian tenet” existed
that had not been “preserved in the ‘brines of defiance.’ Heaven stands in the corner with defiance,” he
claimed, and so with Alabama. Another Troy man exemplified the belief that resistance remained
imminent and potentially successful when he offered some advice to his “colored friends. . . . If I were a
colored man,” he mused, “and one of my children wanted to go to a white school, I would take him
behind the house and give him or her what Patty gave the drum. And if one of those agitators came to
see me,” he claimed, “I’d give him what David gave Goliath.” Alabama’s black folks should “forget the
Supreme Court ruling and keep your way of life, and you will keep your good white friends. If you
don’t,” he warned, “you are going to lose the goose that feathered your nest.” A man from Dothan
displayed the Cold Warrior mentality of many Alabama whites when he wrote plainly that “the
statement that white and black school integration is inevitable is a communist lie designed first to
discourage and then kill opposition to it.” The events in Arkansas, a “soft” border state, “would have
never occurred,” he argued, had only “everybody who shudders at race mixing . . . presented to the
politicians of the North a solid, implacable wall of resistance to the outrage proposed.”65
In reference to the Federal District Court that approved the Little Rock school board’s intended
delay, a Birmingham man argued that, regardless of Supreme Court action in Cooper v. Aaron,
Alabamians needed to “stand firm.” The blacks of Alabama were “satisfied and [did] not want
integration,” he wrote the Birmingham News, “everybody is satisfied except the NAACP and the
Communists, the rabble rousers.” The Supreme Court’s ruling was only pandering to those groups,
according to another Birmingham man. The Court wanted to “hasten the destruction of our great white
heritage on the altar of ‘Social Equality’ between races as far apart intellectually, culturally, and socially
as black and white.” An Ensley man echoed these sentiments, declaring flatly that “a vast majority of
white people do not accept the latest decision of the Supreme Court on integration because many of our
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best judges and prominent lawyers contend there is no federal law to support such a decision.” Of
course, “another main reason” for not accepting the decision was the fact that “one of the main
objectives of the NAACP is intermarriage with white people.” Fortunately, according to yet another
Birmingham man, “more Negroes realize the suicidal course followed by the NAACP, in attacking state
sovereignty and the attempted weakening of our basic government, is also the means to their own
destruction.”66
Meanwhile, massive resistance in Virginia suffered a blow similar to that meted out by the
Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron. Lindsay Almond had been elected governor in large part on his
pledge to engage in massive resistance, and he had dutifully acted on the state’s recently passed school
closure laws by forcing the shut-down of schools in Charlottesville and Norfolk which were threatened
with desegregation. When black activists in Virginia challenged the action with a suit in federal court, a
three-judge federal panel ruled in James v. Almond, in January of 1959, that the school closures were
unconstitutional, and it ordered the schools re-opened. A Decatur man lamented to the Birmingham
News after the decision was announced that John Patterson and George Wallace had, during the recent
campaign, both “made the same promise all over this state to close schools rather than mix races in our
public schools,” and this was “the law of the land, and true to our Constitution.” But the Virginia
decision cast serious doubt on Patterson’s ability to keep that promise. Patterson himself acknowledged
the ruling, reasoning that there might need to be a “reappraisal of Alabama’s segregation laws” and that
the state “may have to enact some new laws very soon. It is going to be tough to maintain segregation,”
Patterson said, but “people must be prepared to make some sacrifices.”67
The sacrifice on everyone’s minds at the time was, as Patterson asserted, to “alter or abandon
our public schools system and establish a private system of education.” The Virginia decision shifted the
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thinking of some Alabama segregationists to this notion of doing away with public education entirely
and replacing it with segregated private schools for whites. Not every segregationist in Alabama was
open to such a course, which had received a cold reception in the legislature when Sam Engelhardt
introduced it six years prior. But the renewed dialogue represented the refusal of whites in the state to
accept that either Cooper v. Aaron or James v. Almond ought to be taken as an indication of
segregation’s impending demise in the state of Alabama or of the inevitability of Brown implementation
of any kind. After all, Alabama’s Pupil Placement Law was in place and had, indeed, been recently
upheld by a federal court. If it were to ever fall to a subsequent court challenge, Alabama could then
look seriously at a private school plan. Thus, segregationists had reason to be optimistic when John
Patterson strode into Montgomery, regardless of what had occurred in Arkansas or Virginia.68

*****
During the Little Rock crisis, an Auburn man told the Montgomery Advertiser that the will of the
southern people was strong enough to resist the designs of the NAACP and the Supreme Court and to
stand firm, and he couched that resistance in terms of the militant tradition of Confederate veterans.
Every white southerner could understand such a reference and need only look to the nearest town
square for a memorial dedicated to Confederate soldiers who fought valiantly for the Lost Cause. The
“invasion of Arkansas,” he reasoned, was a plot masterminded by U.S. Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, Vice President Richard Nixon, and “the NAACP and certain radicals,” but he argued that
“40,000,000 white people in the South will not change their way of life to suit Brownell, Nixon, [U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice, Earl] Warren, [Justice Hugo] Black, and his buddies on the Supreme Court.”
This man’s father was one of the Confederate soldiers, he wrote, “that escorted Jefferson Davis from the
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Old Exchange Hotel when he took the oath of office in Montgomery,” and that martial heritage had
continued in his family. He was ready for a fight, and so was white Alabama. Little Rock be damned.69
At John Patterson’s inaugural, the very day the Supreme Court was deciding James v. Almond,
and just four months after it had announced Cooper v. Aaron, the incoming governor stood on the star
whereon Confederate President Jefferson Davis had taken that oath of office 100 years prior. He swore
on the same Bible to uphold the 1901 Constitution of the state of Alabama. At the direction of the
incoming governor, no blacks participated in the festivities. There were no black high school marching
bands, as in years past. There was certainly no black inaugural ball. Judge Walter Jones administered
the oath of office. The incoming lieutenant governor was Albert Boutwell. The recently elected head of
the Alabama Democratic Executive Committee and Patterson’s incoming highway director was Sam
Engelhardt. Patterson protégé MacDonald Gallion stood by as the incoming attorney general. Gallion
had called his nomination to that post “a public mandate to carry on an all-out fight to maintain
segregation,” which he said he would “focus on above everything else.”70
The arch-segregationists were triumphant. Massive resistance to school desegregation was to
be the guiding principle of all three branches of the state government – the ideology of White Citizens’
Council their foundational belief. The Little Rock crisis had only made the nerves of southern whites
more sensitive to the continuing threat of integrated education, carrying with it all the baggage of war,
Reconstruction, and worst of all, miscegenation. With Patterson and the new guard in office,
segregationists could be certain that Alabama would live up to its motto and ‘defend its rights’ against
outside agitators who would disrupt the peace and good order of the state. As one Montgomery
Advertiser reader wrote, Jim Folsom “didn’t care to take part in anything toward keeping our schools,
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churches, parks, and public places segregated,” but Alabama would have “a real 100% governor after
January, 1959. Let’s give Patterson our full cooperation and support.”71
Jim Folsom’s brand of politics in Alabama was dead. The School Segregation Cases decisions had
awakened Alabama and had jolted committed integrationists and segregationists into concerted,
organized action, and politically active liberals like Folsom had been marginalized in the process. The
milquetoast integrationists in the ACHR and within the fractured white churches remained on the
periphery from whence they had come. The NAACP’s own aggressive implementation drive had
resulted in the organization’s banishment from the state. The victorious John Patterson stood alone on
the emblem of Confederate heritage and told the white people of Alabama, “Federal courts have
decreed that we must send our children to integrated schools contrary to our customs and traditions."
If this were to actually happen in Alabama, the governor declared, “turmoil, chaos, and violence would
result in the destruction of our public school system.” There was, he said, “no such thing as a little
integration,” and so there could be no compromise. “If we compromise or surrender our rights in this
fight,” Patterson told them, “they will be gone forever, never to be regained or restored.” The governor
swore an oath to the people, using the language of “mixing” that all understood carried deeper meaning
than classroom seating. “I will oppose with every ounce of energy I possess” he declared, “and will use
every power at my command to prevent any mixing of the white and Negro races in the schools of this
state.” And he did.72
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CHAPTER 3: FRED SHUTTLESWORTH, THE ACMHR, AND THE INITIATION OF LITIGATION, 1956-59

When Montgomery Circuit Judge Walter Jones granted the injunction barring the NAACP from
any activity in the state of Alabama on June 1, 1956, a Jefferson County sheriff’s deputy marched into
the Masonic Hall on Fourth Avenue North in Birmingham to inform the NAACP members meeting there
that they were thereby “outlawed.” One member asked in dismay, “then what can we do?” The deputy
smugly replied, “You can’t do nothing.” The newly tapped membership chairman of the NAACP branch
presiding over the meeting then quickly retorted, “That isn’t so. There’s never a time when a man can’t
do anything,” he said, “You aren’t going to stop people from trying to be free.” The brazen response
came from the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth – the young, fiery, and fearless pastor of Bethel Baptist
Church. It was not rhetorical. Shuttlesworth was about to embark on a direct action and litigation
campaign for civil rights in the city of Birmingham that made the old guard of the city’s NAACP look
exceedingly cautious by comparison.1
Shuttlesworth organized the creation the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights
(ACMHR) in order to keep black activism channeled in Birmingham in the aftermath of the NAACP
banishment. As part of a persistent working class movement for civil rights in which he and ACMHR
resisted middle class black calls for caution, he then pushed hard for school desegregation, meeting stiff
resistance from school and city officials, from violent segregationists, and even from the federal
judiciary. With the help of willing attorneys and determined local activists, though, he continued to
press the issue in federal court, ultimately providing the model for challenging the dual educational
system in Alabama.
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Replacing the NAACP
Birmingham attorney Arthur Shores called a meeting on June 2, 1956 to inform the city’s NAACP
activists that they were, indeed, enjoined and that all activity had to cease. Several of the city’s
established black leaders – themselves ministers and pillars of the middle class black community –
acceded to Shores’ warning. But Shuttlesworth was the emerging leader of a more urgent (some said
reckless), younger, working class element. He protested and argued that the fight must continue. A
small group of other leaders agreed with Shuttlesworth and organized themselves into the ACMHR.
They drafted a Declaration of Principles, in which they disavowed any notion that they were influenced
by “outside agitators” or that they had any intention of being “rabble rousers” intent on disrupting law
and order. They were hopeful of immediate compliance, without further litigation, with the Supreme
Court’s Brown rulings, and they wanted “a beginning Now!” The group then announced plans in the
Birmingham World to hold a mass meeting, telling the city’s blacks that “the action of the [state’s]
attorney general makes it more necessary that Negroes come together in their own interests and plan
together for the furtherance of their cause,” that is, they must seek “a way to continue the freedom
fight in Alabama” in the absence of the NAACP. Shuttlesworth himself told the press, “The only thing we
are interested in is uniting our people in seeing that the laws of the land are upheld according to the
Constitution of the United States.”2
The more cautious middle class establishment tried to talk Shuttlesworth down, but the
organizational meeting of the ACMHR was held as planned on June 5 at Sardis Baptist Church. It drew
around 1,000 enthusiastic local blacks, who shouted down calls from conservative ministers to avoid any
further action. They eagerly approved the ACMHR Declaration of Principles and gave Shuttlesworth
their devoted attention. The 160 pound reverend was practiced at the art of the mass meeting
speech/sermon. He began by calmly denying what everyone understood to be true – that the ACMHR
2
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was a successor to the NAACP in Birmingham. He then acknowledged that “the Citizens’ Council won’t
like this,” the mobilization of Birmingham’s blacks in spite of the injunction, but he said, “I don’t like a lot
of what they do” either. He reminded those gathered in the 88 degree heat of the church that it was
the desire of the “enemies of freedom to kill our hopes and keep us from fighting.” But, Shuttlesworth
said, “they can’t outlaw us all.” The black people of Birmingham were ready to go to jail if necessary, he
thought, and this meant that the time for caution was passed. He assured them, though, in a rousing
crescendo that at once revealed his courage, determination, leadership, and hubris, that “if anybody
gets arrested, it’ll be me; if anybody goes to jail, it’ll be me; if anybody suffers, it’ll be me; if anybody
gets killed, it’ll be me.” The diminutive preacher would indeed be arrested, spend plenty of time in jail,
suffer greatly, and come quite close to being killed for his subsequent actions – including his attempt to
desegregate Birmingham’s public schools.3
The 1956 school year was too near for ACMHR to mount any effective challenge that fall, but by
the summer of 1957, the organization was ready to pick up the work of the NAACP. The latter
organization had been banished in large part due to two successive years of petitioning local school
boards to implement Brown. Just as the NAACP understood the petitioning campaign to be a
preparation for likely litigation, so did ACMHR proceed.4 Anticipating a challenge in federal court to the
Alabama Pupil Placement Law, Shuttlesworth organized signatories to petition the Birmingham Board of
Education in the summer of 1957. Whereas the NAACP branches had somewhat vaguely petitioned
school boards for general compliance in 1954 and 1955, however, the ACMHR petitioned the
3
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Birmingham board for the admission of particular students to particular schools. The petitioners asked
that 13 black school children, from nine families, be assigned to the schools nearest their homes – in this
case all-white Phillips High, all-white Woodlawn High, and all-white Graymont Elementary. It was a
direct challenge to the Pupil Placement Law, which established proximity as one of the potential
determining factors in assignment of students to particular schools.5
The board of education received the nine petitions, including one signed by Shuttlesworth and
his wife on behalf of their two children, on August 20, 1957. Two families subsequently bent to pressure
and asked that theirs be withdrawn and returned. Shuttlesworth himself followed-up the petitions a
week later with a letter to the superintendent of education, asking for instructions “relative to the
enrollment of our children in school at the proper time.” We understand,” he wrote, “that the school
term begins on [September] the 4th. In the absence of board action and policy, special or otherwise,
before the date of school opening, we are compelled to ask your direction.” The petitions presented to
the board had been, the reverend argued, “valid applications to the schools named therein,” and he and
the other parents were “concerned as to whether we are to present our children at these schools on the
fourth, or whether we are to remain un-enrolled pending board action.” He added that “the urgency of
these matters would, we think, require immediate official direction.” The superintendent, Dr. Frazer
Banks, did not think so. Banks replied that it was school board policy that “when an application for
transfer is made, the child continues in the same school he has been attending or to which he has been
promoted pending a final decision on the request for transfer.” Such a decision, he wrote, would not
come before the petitions were presented formally at the next meeting of the school board, on
September 6.6
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Two days before the scheduled start of the 1957-58 school year, a group of Birmingham
Klansmen associated with Ace Carter’s local outfit kidnapped a randomly chosen black man – J. Edward
“Judge” Aaron – from a rural Jefferson County road, with the intention of sending Shuttlesworth a
message. The men took Aaron to their Klan “lair,” where they beat and interrogated him, asking if he
thought his children were good enough to go to school with their own. They told him to tell the
reverend Shuttlesworth to cease and desist in his attempt to integrate the city’s schools. Tell him to
“stop sending nigger children and white children to school together,” they said, “or we’re gonna do
them like we’re gonna do you.” Then, at the direction of “Cyclops” Joe Pritchett, Klansman Bart Floyd
set out to ritualistically prove his worthiness for Klan office by getting “nigger blood on his hands.” He
told Aaron to bow before them and asked would he prefer to die or to be castrated. Aaron evidently
chose life, as Floyd then pistol whipped him and proceeded to sever his scrotum. After pouring
turpentine into the wound, the Klansmen threw Aaron back into the car trunk, drove him into the
countryside, and left him on the side of the road. He was soon spotted by motorists, covered in blood
from waistline to ankles. After being picked up by the police and taken to the hospital, he delivered the
message.7
Three other Klansmen subsequently attended the September 6 meeting of the Birmingham
Board of Education, wearing buttons emblazoned with a lynched black person. At the meeting, the
school board began to make the first use of Alabama’s placement law, as expected. The legislature had
allowed for a tedious and potentially lengthy administrative process to take place in each case of
potential transfer, so the Birmingham board did not have to make any “final” decision on the transfer of
the petitioning students at the meeting itself. It needed only to set the wheels of evasion in motion, in
the hopes that the petitioners would either slip up on a technicality somewhere, get tired of waiting, or
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otherwise back down. They were already under frightening pressure, as evidenced by the terrorist
activity of the Klan.8
Fred Shuttlesworth was not going to wait. Rather than take his daughters to all-black Parker
High on the morning of September 9th, 1957 he decided to drive them to Phillips. This was planned
action, one more step towards litigation. Shuttlesworth had actually contacted the news media
beforehand and alerted them to his intentions. He issued a statement, arguing that the Birmingham
Board of Education had “embarked on a policy of negative evasion.” Shuttlesworth said that the
superintendent had proposed to “continue this through ‘routine’ channels [such as] interviews, studies,
tests, social factors, reports to the board, etc.” Shuttlesworth said, “[It]in effect means ‘never’ without
actually saying it.” They had no alternative, he concluded, “to presenting [their children] for immediate
enrollment” at the schools to which they had petitioned for transfer. “They need time,” he argued, but
“our children need schooling.”9 The statement continued:

From the start, official tone here, and elsewhere in the South, has been one of defiance of the
United States Constitution and judicial process, and of utter contempt for any Negroes who
would seek rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and due process of federal laws.
In their failure to recognize the law of the land and to make at least some steps towards
eventual compliance, the stage is ripe for tension, confusion, and violence, which they claim to
fear. Hence these threats and intimidations of Negroes and these brutally vicious attacks upon
innocent Negroes at night by robed white Klansmen. The seeds of mayhem are always sown
long before the act. It is gratifying that someone was apprehended at last.10 But neither official
nor blood thirsty riders can stop our quest for first class citizenship. This we seek by good will if
possible; by law if necessary.11

Media members and a crowd of angry segregationists gathered outside the school in advance of
the Shuttlesworth family’s arrival, which did not come until two hours after the school day had begun.
Shuttlesworth got out of the car and was immediately set upon by a gang of 15-20 furious whites, which
8
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proceeded to knock him down and beat him with brass knuckles and a bicycle chain. Others moved on
the Shuttlesworth car, where the reverend’s daughters, his wife, and two other children sat, horrified, as
the mob broke out a windows and tried to extricate them. Police stationed at the school were in no
hurry, but they were able to eventually pull the attackers off of Shuttlesworth long enough for him to
escape and speed off in the car. It was later revealed that incoming police commissioner Eugene “Bull”
Conner had deliberately interfered with a backup call by calling in a bogus stolen car report at the same
time. Shuttlesworth and his daughter Ruby ended up in University Hospital with what turned out,
somehow, to be only minor injuries. In his anger and frustration that night, Shuttlesworth vowed to
return to Phillips “whether they kill us or not.” But he knew that the endgame was to file a suit, and so
he obeyed the police commissioner’s order that all persons without children presently enrolled should
keep off of school property. He then resumed waiting for the superintendent to begin the “placement”
process.12
Shuttlesworth’s brazen, and some said insane, attempt to enroll his children at Phillips had
reverberations throughout Alabama. With the threat of subsequent desegregated enrollments looming,
disorder reigned at Phillips and Woodlawn High the following day. Woodlawn students held an
impromptu demonstration at the school’s flagpole and boycotted classes in protest. Some threw rocks
at passing black school busses and cars with black passengers, while others marched about the school
grounds waving Confederate battle flags. Phillips High was evacuated that morning after a woman
called in a bomb threat. Another bomb threat resulted in a lockdown at Phillips that afternoon. In the
days that followed, Attorney General John Patterson met with Superintendent Banks and the president
of the school board and promised the full support of his office to the cause of preserving segregation in
Birmingham’s schools. One of Alabama’s U.S. congressional representatives, George Andrews, called
upon the whites of the state to “call the bluff” of blacks threatening school desegregation. “There is
12
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trouble, and there will be more trouble,” Andrews said, “because the people just don’t want to integrate
their schools.” The choices, he argued, were to “integrate and have trouble and bloodshed, or close
your schools.” And if it came down to that, Andrews’ choice was clear: “close the schools.” The
Birmingham Council on Human Relations issued a typically conservative response that might as well
have come from the Citizens’ Council. The group admonished Shuttlesworth’s attackers to “pause and
consider the implications and ultimate ends of their efforts.” They should know, the ACHR reasoned,
that “violence and the threat of violence can never be justified as a method of supporting anything in a
democracy based upon law, be it segregation, desegregation, or other causes.”13
In October Banks made good on his promise to move forward with the applications of the
petitioning Birmingham students, but the ultimate outcome was a foregone conclusion. Per the Pupil
Placement Law’s suggested machinery, the remaining students were given intelligence, comprehension,
and psychology tests. The pressure from segregationists and the placement law’s tedium had driven off
all but Shuttlesworth’s daughter, Ruby, and three others. After the administration of the tests, Banks
undertook a survey of around 5,000 parents of children at all-white Graymont, Phillips, and Woodlawn,
to ascertain the parents’ views on Negroes in white schools. The impact of a prospective student’s
enrollment on the existing student body was a legitimate consideration under the placement law. Banks
knew that the vast majority of the parents queried, when asked to “answer yes or no and write any
opinion they may have” as to whether blacks should be allowed into their schools, would answer
strongly in the negative. This would collectively constitute one more reason to deny the petitions. The
specific questions were hopelessly leading, meant to touch nerves, and designed for effect. Or as
Shuttlesworth himself said, they were “suggestions of the answers the board wanted to receive and not
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an effort to begin creating community sentiment toward a non-racial school system.”14 The board
asked:
1. If these [four] Negro children should be admitted to this school would you be willing for your
child to stay? 2. Would you be willing for your child to take part in classes? Athletics, play,
recreation? Social affairs? Music groups, clubs, and similar organizations? 3. Do you believe
there would be serious disorders from the pupils in the schools? 4. Do you believe there would
be serious disorders from people not connected with the school? 5. Do you believe there would
be tension or controversy which would seriously interfere with the studies of the pupils? 6.
Would you ask that your child be transferred to another school? 7. If your transfer could not be
given, would you refuse to have him or her attend the present school?15

The school board would have ample evidence from parents themselves. It would suggest that most
parents would be unwilling to have their children attend the affected schools or participate in these
activities with Negroes, that the result of the transfer of these four children would be widespread
withdrawals of students, and that the schools and community would erupt in violence and disorder in
any case. This was how the placement law was designed to work.16

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education
Throughout the fall of 1957, some state leaders began to quietly worry about the placement
law’s ability to withstand the looming legal challenge. Placement laws had recently been struck down by
federal courts in other states – Louisiana’s in 1956 and Virginia’s that fall, 1957.17 But these were more
egregious than Alabama’s. Other, more subtly crafted placement laws had been upheld by federal
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courts elsewhere. For example, John Parker, the author of the Briggs Dictum and one of the judges who
affirmed the striking of the Virginia law, upheld North Carolina’s placement law as part of a panel of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1956.18 Albert Boutwell tried to reassure the doubters. He noted that
the Virginia statute took placement power away from local school boards and put it into the hands of a
statewide placement board, whereas Alabama’s and North Carolina’s laws assured that the power of
placement rested with the local authorities. Also, part of Virginia’s system was a statute mandating that
funds be cut-off to any integrated school; Alabama had enacted no such statute (though there had been
efforts to do so). Some privately remained apprehensive, especially since a test of Alabama’s law was
expected at any time.19
It came on December 18, 1957. Jacksonville, Florida attorney Ernest Jackson filed a class action
suit in federal district court against the Birmingham Board of Education, on behalf of Shuttlesworth, his
daughter Ruby, and the three other remaining families. The complaint alleged that the board had “not
rendered an opinion admitting or denying the request for assignment” in the August petition, “although
the petitioners [had] requested on numerous occasions for final determination of their rights to attend
schools located within the closest proximity of their homes . . . .” The plaintiffs sought an injunction
against the board’s use of the placement law and a determination that said law was unconstitutional. It
was clearly designed to “freeze” blacks in their all-black schools, they argued, and to perpetuate a
segregated system and, therefore, deprive them of their right to equal protection of the laws under the
14th Amendment. The plaintiffs offered the Alabama Interposition Resolution – which declared the
Brown decision “null, void, and of no effect” – as proof of the state legislature’s true intentions. They
also submitted a letter from State Superintendent of Education Austin Meadows, in which Meadows
asked them to withdraw their petitions, lest they “invite the abolishment of public schools.” And they
introduced a recently passed bill which gave individual school districts broad leeway to close their
18
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schools and establish “private” schools.20 It was just this sort of delegation of authority to local officials
that the Alabama lawmakers thought made the placement law legally sound.21
The plaintiffs were challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, which under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure required the designation of a three-judge trial court (complaints were generally
heard at the trial level by a single federal district judge). The three-judge court convened to hear the
case included Federal District Judges H.H. Grooms and Seybourn Lynne and Circuit Judge Richard Rives
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. This gave the plaintiffs some cause for hope. Harlan Hobart
Grooms was a Republican, in the mountain tradition of Kentucky from whence he had moved to
Alabama in the 1920s to practice law. Eisenhower appointed Grooms to the federal bench in 1953.
Alabama’s U.S. Senator John Sparkman interrupted his confirmation hearing to simply add, “I just
wanted to put in a good word for judge Grooms. He will make a fine official.” Since that time Grooms
had not disappointed Sparkman or the rest of the Democratic establishment. He quickly identified
himself as a friend to segregation, as all federal judges with enough support to get confirmed were
expected to do. He ordered the integration of the University of Alabama because he thought the
precedent was so clear and the issue so plain that such a ruling was unavoidable; he then refused to
force Autherine Lucy’s readmission after the board of trustees expelled her for making false statements.
Notably, Grooms also frustrated black plaintiffs in a suit aimed at segregated Birmingham busing,
dismissed a suit aimed at Birmingham's all-white police force, and ruled against black home owners who
were being forcibly removed to make way for white housing. He did hold a personal disdain for white
supremacy, and his devout Christianity led him to believe that, in his own words, "the moral teachings of
20
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the scriptures emphasize the worth of the individual, the protection of whose dignity is the prime
purpose of all law." But he was, nonetheless, “uncontroversial,” as described by a former Justice
Department attorney. And his mixed record in civil rights cases spoke for itself.22
If Grooms looked like a possible, if unlikely, ally for the plaintiffs, Seybourn Lynne left little room
for speculation. Lynne has been described as a white supremacist and “paternalist segregationist.” He
was appointed by Harry Truman in 1946 after attending Auburn University and serving in the Army
judge advocate general’s corps during World War II. He was the dissenter in Browder v. Gayle, in which
the majority held, on the authority of Brown, that Montgomery’s bus segregation laws were
unconstitutional. He established himself as openly hostile to plaintiffs’ causes in civil rights cases and
became infamous for letting such actions wither on his docket. He argued in his Browder dissent that
the court was ignoring recent precedent and blazing a trail that it had no business blazing. Yet in a
landmark case some years later, challenging the validity of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Lynne
himself showed a willingness to ignore recent precedent.23 Birmingham restaurateur Ollie McClung had
argued that the act exceeded Congress’ ability to legislate under the Commerce Clause, and Lynne
agreed, joined by Grooms. The Supreme Court later reversed the ruling. Lynne’s discretionary use of
precedent was not necessarily reckless, however, and he was not often reversed. Given his hostility to
civil rights litigation, this was not good news for the Shuttlesworth camp.24
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Dick Rives was a different story. Easily the elder among the three, Rives was born in Alabama,
served in World War I, and returned to his native Montgomery to practice law. He was appointed by
Truman to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1951. He wrote the majority opinion in Browder and
ended his career participating in a string of important civil rights decisions, such that he has been
counted among the “unlikely heroes” of the Fifth Circuit who, as one scholar has described, “translated
the Brown decision into a revolution for equality.” Indeed, the Browder decision, itself, set the
precedent that the judges of the Fifth Circuit followed in applying Brown to other cases. For establishing
himself on the wrong side of segregation and white supremacy, Rives was ostracized and harassed as a
traitor to his state and his race for the rest of his life. His only friends in his hometown of Montgomery
seemed to be former New Dealer and civil rights advocate attorney Clifford Durr and U.S. District Judge
Frank Johnson – who was himself enormously important to the cause of civil rights in Alabama and the
South, and who was the concurring judge in Browder. Having Rives on the panel offered the plaintiffs a
flicker of hope in an otherwise dark room.25
The three judges’ first action, in what was styled Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of
Education, was to deny a motion to dismiss the suit. While the denial was a good sign for the plaintiffs,
there was plenty of reason to worry as the court considered the case in the winter and spring of 1958.
The court could avoid controversy by simply following the lead of Judge Parker in the North Carolina
case. In upholding North Carolina’s placement law, Parker had made the distinction between the law on
its face and in its application and had given school officials the opportunity to apply it in some
semblance of good faith.26
On May 9, 1958, the court in Shuttlesworth relied upon this precedent and held that the
Alabama Pupil Placement Law “furnish[ed] the legal machinery for an orderly administration of the
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public schools in a constitutional manner.” The court added, “We must assume that it will be so
administered. . . . If not,” Rives wrote for the unanimous court, “in some future proceeding it is possible
that it may be deemed unconstitutional in its application.” The court admitted that “no intellectually
honest person would deny” that the various states’ placement laws, including Alabama’s, “were passed
to meet and solve problems presented by the School Segregation Cases.” But the judges refused to hold
that the Alabama placement law’s sole purpose was to perpetuate segregated schooling. “In dealing
with an Act of the legislature of a sovereign state,” they concluded, “we cannot lightly reach such a
conclusion, nor are we permitted to do so except upon the most weighty and compelling reasons.” The
court was allowing for more time, more “deliberate speed,” and allowing the school authorities the
opportunity to embrace some sort of tokenism.27
The Birmingham authorities had no intention of embracing tokenism until they absolutely had
to, and there was not yet any indication that they had to. Shuttlesworth and the other plaintiffs in July,
1958 appealed the court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.28 The Court agreed to hear the appeal, in
which the appellants argued that the Alabama placement law was unconstitutional on its face, that the
trial court should not have restrained itself from determining if it had been unconstitutionally applied,
and that, in any case, the school board had failed to properly act on the petitions. As the litigants
waited for the Court’s decision that summer, the September school opening in Birmingham loomed
amid renewed segregationist fears that another enrollment attempt by black students was forthcoming.
To stave off such an attempt, the Klan burned crosses at a total of 14 white schools in Jefferson County,
including Woodlawn, Phillips, and Graymont. The city’s great law-and-order moderate leader, Albert
Boutwell, spoke to a Citizens’ Council rally in Selma, having just won the nomination for lieutenant
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governor. Despite eschewing violent resistance, Boutwell spoke in a language which clearly implied a
sense of militancy. “We are winning the segregation battle,” he said, but “now is the time for us to take
the offensive” and to “take the problem to the people of the United States because the people are
disgusted by the advocates of change.” That month Shuttlesworth’s church was bombed for the second
time in two years. A crowd of 150 white men and teenagers gathered outside Phillips High to ensure
that no blacks entered. And three white men threw dynamite bombs at black homes in the transitional
Fountain Heights neighborhood, a few blocks away from the site where a city auditorium would be
erected years later bearing the name of the mayor-to-be – Albert Boutwell.29
That November, 1958, the Supreme Court issued a brief, per curiam opinion affirming the trial
court’s decision in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, though it carefully added that this
was done “upon the limited ground on which the district court rested its decision.” The decision has
been described by one legal scholar as a “strategic retreat,” a capitulation to massive resistance, and a
recognition that the court lacked strong support from the Eisenhower Administration. Historian Numan
Bartley, in his seminal study of massive resistance, described it as a compromise. When considered
alongside the court’s ruling in the Little Rock case earlier in the year, Cooper v. Aaron, it certainly looked
that way. Cooper v. Aaron was a strong reaffirmation of the principles of Brown, but Shuttlesworth
signaled the Court’s willingness to embrace tokenism in satisfying the Brown mandate and its
unwillingness to confront the southern states’ evasionary schematics, provided they were drafted with a
veneer of constitutionality. In Bartley’s words, the justices in Shuttlesworth “legitimized a tightly
controlled tokenism, permitting states to approach desegregation on an individual pupil-at-a-time basis
and bringing almost anything short of massive resistance within the bounds of the Brown decision.”
They also put the onus for desegregation back onto individual black students. Other southern states
scrambled to enact Alabama-style placement laws, which the federal courts then upheld. It was,
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according to one contemporary court observer, “the most important pro-segregation victory since
Plessy v. Ferguson.” A New York Times columnist called it the “end of the legal phase of massive
resistance,” a decision with which the “constitutional crisis over [pupil placement] statutes . . . passed
into history.” So it must have seemed at the time.30
Among segregationist leaders in Alabama, there was relief and cautious celebration. Governor
Patterson hoped the decision reflected “a new trend towards letting us handle our own domestic affairs
here without outside interference from Washington, which is the only way they can be handled without
chaos and disorder.” Boutwell said he was hopeful that the decision would “help arouse more
enthusiasm and hope that we in the South can get the Supreme Court and the people generally to apply
sound reasoning in making their decisions. . . . We must stop the federal government,” the lieutenant
governor continued, “from further usurpation of our rights guaranteed to the state and its people . . .
and regain those already taken from us.” Patterson added that despite his approval of the decision, he
did not “expect the race agitators to do anything sensible.” If by doing something “sensible,” he meant
giving up on integrating the schools, his expectations were quickly met. Fred Shuttlesworth announced,
“The case isn’t closed by any means. . . . We have no intention of backing away from the struggle. . . .
As long as any parents want to request admission to white schools near their homes,” the reverend said,
“we are going to prepare petitions for them. If the court can rule that [the placement law] can be
applied without discrimination then it is up to the Birmingham school board to apply it without
discrimination.” Reporters asked Boutwell what he thought the next step would be in light of such
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comments and the “limited grounds” on which the placement law was upheld. “I’ve made it a practice
never to speculate what the next move will be,” he replied, “but just to stand ready to meet it.”31
Insofar as state legislatures had intended placement laws to limit worst-case scenario
desegregation to the admission of a select few blacks to white schools, the Supreme Court had signaled
its approval of tokenism. But it remained to be seen if even that would occur in Alabama. State
Superintendent Meadows certainly did nothing to encourage it. He applauded the Shuttlesworth
decision by saying it was “sound basically,” in that it let local officials handle assignments. It was they
who were “close to the problems in their school and [knew] what their people want[ed] in the way of
school administration.” He then proceeded to send out a memorandum to local school boards,
reminding them how the placement law allowed them to avoid actual assignment of blacks to white
schools. “By careful assignment of pupils,” he wrote, “school officials can avoid maladjustments which
will hinder the education of our young people.” For instance, “a child who is angry or emotionally upset
in his school assignment,” he offered, “certainly is not in a suitable frame of mind to profit from his
teacher’s instruction or carry out his school work efficiently.” According to Meadows, the completely
disingenuous application of the law’s criteria was perfectly acceptable, and there were plenty of reasons
to reject all black applicants. School board members need only look at the history of the law itself.
From Engelhardt to Boutwell, its framers had openly admitted its purpose, and yet the Supreme Court
had upheld it. Why should they hold themselves to a higher standard.32
Despite the widespread assumption of the universally discriminatory application of the
placement law, some Alabamians remained worried about the future of segregated education. One
Montgomery Advertiser reader wrote the editor in December to warn that the Supreme Court’s decision
in the Shuttlesworth case was nothing to rejoice about. The ruling was “fine but the opinion [implies]
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that we must expect to have an adverse decision should the law not be administered so that integration
will follow. We have won a battle,” he wrote, “not the war, and should be prepared to meet U.S. court
orders forcing integration,” in which case, he urged, the state legislature should provide for school
closure and the establishment of a private school system. Montgomery saw itself thrown into the fire
that very month, as Martin Luther King, Jr. announced in December that the Montgomery Improvement
Association intended to encourage and organize a large number of black students to apply to white
schools in the city. In a follow-up letter to the board of education the following summer, King wrote, on
behalf of the MIA’s executive committee, requesting “some reasonable compliance with the law of the
land” and the dismantling of “a system which is injurious both to Negro children and white.” The
committee was hopeful that school integration could be “worked out through voluntary good will and
that it will not be necessary to carry it through the courts,” but King acknowledged that the MIA was
“realistic enough to know . . . this will have to end up in court.” If the applications were rejected, King
announced, then the organization would initiate litigation challenging the placement law’s
unconstitutional application. Robert Shelton, the “Grand Dragon” of the state’s Ku Klux Klan and an
unofficial advisor to the governor, responded to the threat by assuring “bloodshed” if anyone attempted
to integrate Montgomery schools. Governor Patterson himself responded by devoting a large portion of
his inaugural speech two weeks later to the threat of integrated education. He counseled Alabama’s
black people to “speak out now against the agitators of your own race whose aim is to destroy our
school system. If you do not do so,” he declared, “we will have no public education at all.”33

School Closure, Private Schools, and Persistent Pressure
For those who felt the Shuttlesworth ruling might only serve to delay the inevitable, the concept
of school closure and the establishment of segregated private schooling was becoming more and more
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popular. Before taking office, Attorney General Gallion had established the Alabama Education Fund
Foundation, with the purpose of coordinating funding to local, private white school corporations in the
event of public school closure. Gallion himself explained the rationale behind moving towards such a
system: the threat of school closure would “place the Negro in the position of sticking the dagger in his
own throat . . . every time he tried to force integration.” He and others reasoned that the black
community could not afford to provide its own schools like white communities could. Thus school
closure meant private schools for whites, and no schools at all for blacks. The attorney general-elect
clarified:

The Negro school teachers form one of the strongest groups of leadership in the Negro
community and faced with the loss of a job and the loss of an education for their Negro pupils,
they, combined with the Negro parents of school children, could be expected to exert a strong
resistance to any forced integration attempts.34

It was Citizens’ Council-style coercion, intimidation, and threat of economic reprisal, propagated by state
officials.35
Even when the Supreme Court shot down state-initiated school closures in the January, 1959
James v. Almond case, school closure by local officials remained viable. And private white schools
remained a popular topic among segregationists. Governor Patterson twice sent his top legal advisor
and his public service commissioner to Prince Edward County, Virginia to study the county’s private
school corporation, founded after it closed its own schools rather than comply with a desegregation
order. The governor was slowly revealing to the people of Alabama what he had known for some time.
They were “kidding themselves” if they thought the state could maintain completely segregated public
schools with the Supreme Court composed as it was. “The first time [the placement law] is used to
preserve segregation, Patterson admitted, “then I am sure the U.S. Supreme Court will declare it
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unconstitutional.” This did not mean that they should capitulate. Indeed, Patterson remarked at one
point, “If any school in Alabama is integrated, it will be over my dead body.” Alabamians needed to
“stop talking” and “make it plain that we will close our public schools first.” This would mean sacrifices
for white parents, but it would hurt the Negro more because, the governor said, “he cannot finance
private schools for his children.” Like the Citizens’ Council, Patterson thought that school closure ought
to be a deterrent enough to further “agitation,” but he knew there were “rumblings” of renewed civil
action. He thought the state was prepared. “If a school is ordered to be integrated,” he said, “then it
will be closed down.”36
Even before the governor’s revelations, local whites were beginning to prepare. In February a
group of 17 prominent white Montgomery residents, under the leadership of local physician Hugh
MacGuire, organized an interim committee for the establishment of a “private day school” for “students
of white parentage.” The group consulted with Virginia segregationists who were already working to
establish private, segregated schools in Norfolk. After advertising that their school would offer
“instruction of outstanding excellence” to white children, grades one through nine, the Montgomery
committee secured tuition payments from 100 families for the fall. In March a separate group of 23
parents came together at a mass meeting of the Montgomery Citizens’ Council and agreed to form the
Montgomery County Educational Foundation, which they later announced would “do all possible to
retain the public school system now used in Montgomery County,” but failing in this would “provide an
alternative system . . .to maintain separation of the races in public education.” The group of “civicminded men and women” described itself as a “sort of figurative fireman” preparing for the possible
closure of schools. Foundation president Withers Davis said they would not “go out looking for trouble,”
but would simply “be available and well prepared for all eventualities if integration threatens our
segregated system of public education.” Public schools remained open that fall, but the MacGuire group
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made good on its plans anyway and opened the state’s first private school explicitly intended “for
children of white parentage” – the Montgomery Academy. A few private, segregated schools had been
established in Alabama in the immediate wake of Brown, including the Indian Springs School just south
of Birmingham and Saint James School, a Methodist parochial school in Montgomery. But with the
opening of the admittedly and openly all-white Montgomery Academy in the old Alabama governor’s
mansion in 1959, the “segregationist academy” movement in Alabama began in earnest.37
Meanwhile, the type of pressure that Gallion had envisioned making a serious impact on the
integration drive came to bear on the middle class black community in Montgomery. In fact, statewide
pressure on blacks and white moderates, from both the Council and the Klan, kept challenges to
segregated education confined to Shuttlesworth’s ACMHR. The Montgomery Citizens’ Council in
February published a resolution that made clear the consequences for anyone who supported
desegregating the schools there. The Council condemned the “nefarious integration programs of [the
MIA’s] alien and alien-controlled masterminds” which aimed to “bring about mass integration in [the]
local schools.” It called upon the legislature to enact school closure laws and authorized its own officers
to begin preparations for city-wide private schooling for white children. The councilors then declared:

No person who now enjoys success, leadership, or acceptance in our communities will continue
to enjoy success, leadership, or acceptance, should he aid in making things more difficult for our
mission of maintaining segregation. . . . If the negroes want to communicate with the whites,
they must understand that they cannot do it now, and never can do it through the radical leader
of the present integration push [King], or anyone associated with him. Furthermore, in no
discussions between any groups or persons shall any proposal to alter or modify our segregated
pattern in the schools be a subject of consideration or discussion. Any person who violates
these standards will, in our sober opinion, be adjudged and marked by the people of these
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communities to be an enemy of the white people and a traitor to the cause of the heritage of
the white people.38

The Citizens’ Council was prepared to wage all-out war on whites and blacks alike if there was any more
talk of integrated schools in Montgomery.39
Klan activity also began to rise. Klansmen erected “welcome signs” outside at least ten cities
across the state. Typical of these was a circular saw attached to a steel rod outside Montgomery, on
which was painted a white-robed, horse-mounted Klansman with a fiery cross. The saw teeth were
painted red. A spike in cross burnings was also indicative of renewed activity, including another round
of schoolyard burnings in Birmingham before the start of the 1959 school year and a series of burnings
in the yards of moderate clergymen, most notably the Alabama Council on Human Relations’ Robert
Hughes. Additionally, a rise in reported floggings, rallies, and pamphleteering was reported.40 A New
York Times reporter interviewed law enforcement officials, newspaper editors, and others across the
state that fall and reported a consensus among them. They all felt that, despite relatively small numbers
of actual Klan members, a significant “threat lay in the attitude of tolerance and sympathy for the Klan’s
tactics shown by an increasing number of whites,” who had been “blinded by their emotional reaction to
the threat of public school desegregation.”41
The combined pressure from the Council and the Klan seemed to work. The Council’s drive for
white “unity” and the Klan’s threatened violence frightened white moderates and liberals into remaining
silent or effectively sidelined. More importantly, would-be black activists were forced into
acquiescence. Pressure on King in Montgomery, for example, from the many black teachers in his
38
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organization and in his Dexter Avenue congregation, began to take a toll. The prospect of closed schools
served to frighten enough who stood to lose their jobs in the event of school closure that they forced
MIA to back off of its litigation threat. There would be no school suit in Montgomery in 1959, nor for
the next five years. King himself left the city to return to Atlanta a year later.42
In Birmingham though, Shuttlesworth renewed his own challenge, just six weeks after the
Supreme Court’s decision in his case. Eleven students applied for transfer to white schools in January of
1959, including Shuttlesworth’s three children and several others from the initial challenge. After more
achievement tests in February, Superintendent Banks denied the applications, saying only that the
transfers were not in the best interests of the applying students. Shuttlesworth responded by
announcing that his group had “no intention of accepting this as a fair nor a final answer. The struggle is
on,” he said, “and there can be no let-up nor retreat until equality of privilege and opportunity is ours as
for others.” As a pastor, Shuttlesworth was not overly concerned about being subject to white
economic reprisal. His pastorate was a mix of middle and lower class blacks, and he never received the
sort of pressure that King did from a teachers bloc, in part because Birmingham’s black teachers were
spread across a number of congregations. And violence from Klansmen was clearly not something that
Shuttlesworth feared enough to back down. Despite these advantages, Shuttlesworth was not immune
to pressure to slow down, as the city’s black attorneys soon demonstrated.43
The next step for ACMHR would have been to initiate another lawsuit, but the onset of what the
black press called the “Birmingham Stalemate” prevented this for over a year. Judge Seybourn Lynne
had decided after the last school case to start enforcing a federal court procedural rule that required
out-of-town attorneys to “associate” with a local attorney before bringing an action. Shuttlesworth was
using Ernest Jackson, who was from Florida, but he could not get any of Birmingham’s seven black
attorneys to associate with Jackson. Led by Arthur Shores, the black attorneys had decided take a stand
42
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on the issue of filing a suit to desegregate the city’s parks. Like many in the city’s black middle class,
Shores and the others thought it would be better in the case of parks to negotiate with white moderates
for better black facilities. They had been pressured towards this by Lynne himself. There was nothing
preventing the city from shutting down the white and black parks entirely in the event of a challenge;
this had already been done in Montgomery. It was one area in which reluctant acquiescence prevailed
upon some of the city’s middle class leadership, but Shuttlesworth did not agree. His own pastorate and
his organization contained a large and more militant working class element which took from its pastor
and president a disdain for any sort of capitulation or compromise.44 With the attorney bloc steadfast
on the parks issue, however, there was nothing Shuttlesworth could do to press the school issue in the
courts, which despite his militancy, was still where ACMHR placed the most faith and hope for any kind
of change. That fall Willie Williams became Birmingham’s eighth black attorney, and he had no ties to
the established seven attorneys and no desire to join the cartel. Only then was Jackson able to finally
associate with a local and break the “stalemate.”45
Williams, Jackson, and Shuttlesworth then moved to initiate a new lawsuit, this time avoiding
the placement law altogether. They submitted a petition in November, 1959 to the board of education,
with 81 signatures, audaciously asking the board to formulate and present a plan for integrating the
school system by December 1. The new superintendent, Dr. Theo Wright, claimed that the petition did
not “constitute an appropriate request for any action which the board or the superintendent is required
to take under the Alabama Pupil Placement Act,” under which “each student must apply and be
assigned as an individual” as there was “no provision for class action.” Nor was there any action
44
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required, Wright added, by “[any] other applicable law.” Wright was correct about the placement law,
of course, and Jackson and Shuttlesworth knew this. Where the superintendent misspoke, in the minds
of the petitioners, was in dismissing the request as to action required by “other applicable law,” which
for them meant the Fourteenth Amendment. The petition was submitted solely as the basis for pending
litigation, based on just such an understanding.46
Jackson filed the suit in June, 1960 on behalf of Shuttlesworth and his children and five other
children and their parents. The complaint charged the Birmingham school board, Superintendent
Wright, and commissioner Bull Conner with maintaining a bi-racial school system. There was a “dual set
up of zone lines” which was “predicated on the theory that Negroes are inherently inferior to white
persons and, consequently, may not attend the same public schools attended by white children who are
superior.” Also, the school system assumed that Negro teachers were inferior and, therefore, “may not
teach white children.” The plaintiffs dismissed the placement law as wholly inadequate and sought a
permanent injunction against the school board or an order otherwise requiring the reorganization of the
system in an integrated fashion. The case was about to languish on Seybourn Lynne’s docket for as long
as the judge could let it, but with the filing of this complaint, the struggle over segregated education in
Alabama was in the federal courts to stay.47

“Why Not Me?”
The case was styled Armstrong v. Birmingham Board of Education, with James Armstrong – the
father of four of the children making the complaint – topping the list of plaintiffs. He had been a
plaintiff on his children’s behalf in the original suit as well. Armstrong was born in the Black Belt city of
Selma in 1923. He served in the army in World War II, and as with a great many black activists of his era,
this experience helped prepare him for a lifetime of challenging Jim Crow. He later recalled that being in
46
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the movement was “just like when I was in the army. You go through so much in the army,” he said,
“especially when I left off of Normandy Beach. Fear leave[s] you. You think about what you are trying
to do, and you just move forward with faith.” Armstrong was a founding member of ACMHR, a regular
at mass meetings, and a devoted Shuttlesworth follower. As an established barber in the black
Smithfield section of Birmingham, Armstrong was not as susceptible to economic reprisal as others,
making him an idea plaintiff in the school suit. Armstrong himself explained it this way:

When [Shuttlesworth] called for families to come forward with our attack [on] segregated
schools, ten families came forward – my family and nine others. But the other nine fell out for
various reasons. So I carried the ball. Lots of them got fired from their jobs . . . because they
signed [the] petition. Some of them left the city because they lost their job. Well, I thought it
was a thing that had to be done, and I asked myself a question: “Why not me?” I guess I said I
was self-employed – I could handle it much better, so I just stuck with it.48

Armstrong was better situated than most to make a complaint, but that did not mean that he
was immune to pressure and intimidation. Indeed, he acknowledged putting his entire family at risk and
asking them to bear the burden together. He even endangered his clientele. First there was pressure
from the superintendent, who discovered that the supervisor of the city’s black elementary schools was
a client of Armstrong. Wright instructed the supervisor to put pressure on the barber to back off his
legal challenge. The supervisor gave up when, Armstrong said, “he found out I wasn’t going to change.”
Then there was harassment at the Armstrong home from city services personnel. One night, at one
o’clock in the morning, a man came with a back hoe to fix the plumbing, which was not in need of repair.
The next night, a ladder truck from the Birmingham Fire Department came by around the same time,
shining its lights about the house. There had reportedly been a call about a fire at the Armstrong
residence. “No fire here,” Armstrong had to tell them. Another night it was an ambulance; another it
was the police. Then there were calls at all hours of the night about the Chevrolet, which Armstrong did
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not own, that had been listed for sale in the local classifieds. There were calls about an unpaid hotel bill
in Pascagoula, Mississippi, to which he had never travelled. There were the standard crank calls in which
no one would speak. “What they are doing is trying to keep you awake all of the time,” explained the
barber, “to keep your family upset.” Klansmen also watched Armstrong’s barber shop. “I had a lot of
customers stop coming,” he explained, “because they were afraid of what was going to happen at the
shop.”49
Shuttlesworth and Armstrong may not have known it at the time, but they had provided the
model for the dismantling of the state’s segregated education system. The NAACP was gone. The
Citizens’ Council and the Klan had threatened and intimidated white moderates and liberals into silence
or timidity. Councilors and local and state elected officials, some of the Councilors themselves, had
demonstrated their willingness to engage in economic reprisal against those who supported
desegregation. Klansmen had demonstrated their willingness to use violence against even random
blacks in retaliation for the same. State and local officials had also pushed many black activists into
acquiescence with their threats of school closure and privatized schooling for whites only. The state
court system had proven to be openly hostile to civil rights actions, and to civil rights organizations and
blacks in general. If there were to be any successful challenges to Jim Crow education, they would have
to be mounted by individuals like James Armstrong – black activists who had some shield from economic
reprisal and who had a will to put their families at risk and to bear intimidation and harassment.
In Birmingham it took the leadership of a Fred Shuttlesworth, and as it turned out, not just
willing black attorneys, but skilled and determined attorneys. This was not all. The federal court system
was far more likely than the state’s to provide equal justice to black plaintiffs, but the judges on the
federal bench in the southern trial courts and circuit courts were not of a unified mind on school
desegregation. As Judge Lynne’s intransigence demonstrated, the particular judge hearing a
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desegregation case could be a significant factor in its success or failure. Activist petitioners in Alabama
would find their jurists, though, and they would soon be reinforced by the majority of judges on the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. There would be help from at least two other significant sources, too. The
NAACP was prepared to mount an Alabama comeback, in the form of the Legal Defense Fund, and
control of the federal executive was about to pass to an administration that more enthusiastically, if
belatedly and sometimes timidly, demonstrated support for the cause of civil rights.
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CHAPTER 4: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND THE PROMISE OF LITIGATION, 1962

By the summer of 1962, the Armstrong v. Board of Education case had languished on the docket
of Judge Seybourn Lynne for two years with no hearing on the merits of the complaint. During that twoyear’s time the direct action wing of the civil rights movement had intensified its attack on Jim Crow in
Alabama. The 1961 Freedom Rides, in particular, had exposed the level of violence that segregationists
would unleash to ‘defend the rights’ of the whites of the state. They had also forced a confrontation
between Governor John Patterson and the Kennedy Administration, exposed the governor’s
intransigence to the nation, and necessitated an injunction from District Judge Frank Johnson to ensure
the riders’ protection. Citizens’ Councils subsequently initiated a series of “reverse freedom rides,”
paying desperate black families’ bus fare to northern cities and making a public display of their desire to
live amongst no blacks at all if segregation were to, indeed, fall.1
Alabama joined Mississippi and South Carolina in 1962 as the three states in the South to
maintain absolute segregation in education. Token desegregation had been ordered in parts of all other
southern states as a result of litigation, or in the case of North Carolina, as a result of business
moderates’ cooperation to avoid litigation. Alabama had seen nearby major cities fall to the menace,
notably Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Pensacola. Alabamians remained under the defiant leadership of
Patterson and under the watchful eyes of the Council and the Klan, though, and segregated education in
the Heart of Dixie remained unscathed. Those segregationists that had begun to accept the inevitability
of at least tokenism could also take heart that Alabama was also one of six southern states that had
passed a local-option school closure law and a tuition grant law, allowing local school officials to close
their own schools and establish a subsidized “private” white system in the event of court-ordered
1
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desegregation. Many thought that more court challenges were inevitable, but in a climate of fear of
economic and violent reprisal that summer, Birmingham was the only district threatened with a suit in
federal court, and District Judge Seybourn Lynne did not seem very eager to let even that proceed.2

Nelson v. Birmingham and Bush v. Orleans Parish
In June, 1962, black activists in Birmingham decided that they had waited on Lynne long enough
and attempted to force the issue. Attorney Orzell Billingsley filed a separate action in federal court, on
behalf of the Reverend Theodore Nelson and his children, Agnes and Oswald, seeking an injunction
against the Birmingham Board of Education for operating a racially segregated public school system.
Billingsley, a Birmingham native and graduate of Howard Law, was partner to Arthur Shores and an
emerging leader amongst the city’s black middle class moderates. He had represented the activist
Nelson in 1956 in an attempt to force the desegregation of downtown elevators, in what has been called
“Birmingham’s first step towards racial integration.” Despite being part of the anti-Shuttlesworth
moderate wing of black activism in the city, he often worked with the fiery working class leader, too,
and even represented him on occasion when he was arrested – which was often. The hope in filing the
Nelson case, with Armstrong v. Birmingham Board already pending, was that Nelson would land on the
docket of District Judge H.H. Grooms. Billingsley thought Grooms might be less evasive and that he
might provide some hope of fairer proceedings and a fairer judgment.3
Billingsley and Nelson were disappointed, however, when Grooms did indeed get the case but
then refused to hear it on account of the substantially similar pending action in Armstrong. “To save
much time and expense,” Grooms wrote, the hearing on a preliminary injunction in Nelson needed to be
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postponed until the hearing on the merits of Armstrong. Judge Lynne had assured Judge Grooms that
Nelson was “now at issue” and “would have an early trial date, very likely not later than October.” If the
attempt had failed to get another case immediately before Grooms, then, it at least finally forced
Lynne’s hand in the two-year-old Armstrong case. Not satisfied with that, Billingsley appealed to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to issue a writ of mandamus – forcing the trial court to promptly hear and
decide the motion for preliminary injunction in Nelson. Billingsley argued that still no date had been set
for a hearing on the merits of Armstrong and that the plaintiffs and the attorneys in that case were
different, even if the defendants and the core issue were the same. The appellate court obliged Grooms
to answer. The district judge argued that both suits were class actions and that his court had “a heavy
burden of work” which ought not be “multiplied by duplicate” with a “wasteful consumption of time and
effort.” A panel composed of Circuit Judges Richard Rives, John Minor Wisdom, and John Brown
unanimously agreed with Grooms on August 17. They could find no precedent for the simultaneous
consideration or adjudication of class actions seeking similar relief. They instead found that the proper
course when such actions were pending was to stay the latter proceeding as Grooms had done.4
Judge Brown issued a special concurrence, however, in which he expressed “serious misgivings,”
not because of the actions of Judge Grooms, but because of the unwarranted inaction of Judge Lynne.
The accusation that Grooms had failed to discharge his duty was “unsupported,” but the class
represented by the two actions had been, nonetheless, the victim of “impermissible delay.” Brown
declared it “simply beyond belief that this ‘very same action’ [Armstrong] should have been allowed to
pend undecided since 1960.” According to Brown, the issue was “the very, very simple one of a federal
court order to put an end to a segregated school system – a matter as to which, I gather, there is no real
dispute.” Brown continued to express incredulity. “Why it should have taken this long,” he wrote, “to
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get pleadings, motions, etc. in shape, I cannot imagine. Just what is going to be so complicated about
the trial now scheduled for October is likewise beyond my knowledge.” The judge continued to rebuke
both Judge Lynne and the Birmingham authorities for so many years of delay:

The matter is now simple: Does Birmingham have a segregated system? If – and there really is
no if – that is so, then the question is: What is being done to eradicate it? We have now made
plain by cases which are an affectation to cite that a plan of desegregation must be offered or
the district court must fashion its own plan. Here it is 1962. This is eight years after the warning
to commence with deliberate speed. More than that, the case about to be heard to consider
non-existent defenses will not take place until October. That means that for yet another year
Birmingham has put off the ‘evil’ day . . . . The case – Negro children who seek only their
constitutional rights – is now an old and ancient one. Perhaps the best proof that there is a
need for a ‘second’ class action seeking identical relief is the singular lack of success in getting
anything effectively done by those presuming to represent the class in the first case. . . . This is
a matter of clear right. It ought not to be encumbered by the embarrassing predicament of
attacking a conscientious, vigorous, energetic judge, as is Judge Grooms, for non-performance of
duty.5

It should have been fairly clear writing on the wall for segregationists in the Fifth Judicial Circuit.
By 1962, the ideological orientation of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had shifted significantly.
The Circuit Court – which at the time heard appeals from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Texas, Louisiana
and Mississippi – had been composed in the years before Brown of cautious, New Deal Democrats who
proved to be defenders of the racial status quo.6 With the elevation of the liberal Democrat Rives to the
chief judgeship, and most especially after the appointments by President Eisenhower of the prointegration Republicans Brown (1955), Wisdom (1957), and Elbert Tuttle (1954), the Fifth Circuit began
to look much different. This was around the same time the Supreme Court decided to retreat and leave
school desegregation jurisprudence up to the “fifty-eight lonely men” of the federal trial and appellate
courts in the South. After Cooper v. Aaron and Shuttlesworth, the new-look Fifth Circuit began to fill the
school desegregation void created by the mostly silent Supreme Court. Rives, Tuttle, Brown, and
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Wisdom, along with then federal District Judges Frank Johnson of Alabama and J. Skelly Wright of
Louisiana, took the ambiguous Brown and Brown II mandates and slowly gave them specificity. They
began forcing a recalcitrant South into compliance as local activists forced the issue in case after case.
The Fifth Circuit also led the way in expanding the Brown mandate to include racial equality more
broadly construed, beginning with the Browder v. Gale bus segregation decision, in which Rives and
Johnson constituted the majority and Seybourn Lynne the dissenting vote.7
If the Fifth Judicial Circuit included amongst its appellate and district judges these six, who have
been described as leading a “revolution for equality,” it also included a number of openly segregationist
jurists who routinely frustrated civil rights actions on their respective dockets. At the appellate level,
this included Ben Cameron. At the trial level it included a number of judges who would be reversed
frequently by “the four” of the Fifth Circuit appellate court. Judge Lynne was not among the most
egregiously outspoken, at least, or the most frequently reversed. But a brief survey of statements
attributable to other segregationist jurists reveals their similarity with their average southern, white,
segregationist neighbors. Mississippi's Harold Cox frequently made racist remarks from the bench and
once described Negro would-be voters as “acting like a bunch of chimpanzees.” Texas’ T. Whitfield
Davidson once lectured blacks in his courtroom at the conclusion of a hearing in a Dallas school suit,
offering as proof of his non-racist credentials that he had "received [his] first nourishment from a black
woman's breast." Davidson went on to argue that "the southern white gentleman does not feel
unkindly towards the Negro," but he still has "a right to maintain his racial integrity, and it can't be done
so easily in integrated schools." E. Gordon West of Louisiana called Brown "one of the truly regrettable
decisions of all times," whose “only real accomplishment to date has been to bring discontent and chaos
to many previously peaceful communities, without bringing any real attendant benefits to anyone."
Georgia's J. Robert Elliott remarked that he did not want “pinks, radicals and black voters to outvote
7
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those who are trying to preserve our segregation laws and traditions.” The former head of the NAACP’s
Legal Defense Fund, Jack Greenberg, later recalled, “Apart from Tuttle, Wisdom, Brown, Johnson, and
just a few others, southern federal judges were indistinguishable from state judges in racial attitude.”8
Judge Brown’s rebuke of Judge Lynne was a sign of the hardline that the Fifth Circuit appellate
court was developing in school desegregation cases in spite of obvious judicial resistance. It gave hope
to black activists in Alabama that, perhaps, there could be significant cracks in the wall of segregated
education developing, after all. Taken together with the ruling the Fifth Circuit handed down in the New
Orleans case, Bush v. Orleans Parish, just days before the Nelson mandamus ruling, it was clear that the
time provided for by “all deliberate speed” was up, at least for Birmingham. The Bush case, brought by
blacks in New Orleans in 1952, predated even the Brown ruling. Its history reveals parallels between
past and future developments in Louisiana and Alabama. After the Brown decisions, District Judge Skelly
Wright ordered the Orleans Parish school board to desegregate “with all deliberate speed,” whereupon
the Louisiana state legislature enacted a large body of segregationist legislation designed to preserve
Jim Crow schools, including an Alabama-style pupil placement law. In 1959 Wright ordered the school
board to submit a desegregation plan, which never came, and finally ordered the board to implement
the court’s own plan, a one-grade-a-year, stepladder desegregation program utilizing the placement act.
The state legislature, governor, and state court system then launched a combined assault that gave the
governor authority over the Orleans Parish school system, but the three-judge panel then hearing the
case struck or enjoined all of these actions in the fall of 1960. This back and forth between state officials
and the district court continued through November, when two black girls were admitted to previously
all-white schools. Whites in New Orleans responded with demonstrations, acts of violence, and a near
total withdrawal of white children from the affected schools. These disturbances could not affect the
8
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court, since the Supreme Court had ruled in Cooper v. Aaron that the threat of violence or “white flight”
could not prevent compliance, especially since it was often manufactured by the very state officials
trying to hide behind it.9
In the fall of 1961, the number of black students in formerly all-white schools in New Orleans
increased to 12, all of whom were in the first or second grade. That spring a group of black parents
intervened and challenged the placement system itself, arguing that the parish board operated a dual
system of assignment based on over-lapping racial zones and only used the placement law when dealing
with potential black transfers. This was the same challenge made in Armstrong and Nelson, and it was a
logical way of challenging a perfectly disingenuous and obviously unconstitutional system. In April, the
court enjoined the parish school board from using the placement law so long as it operated a dual
system in such a fashion. Wright then accelerated the district’s desegregation plan to apply to the first
six grades, which were found to have been disproportionately affected by racial discrimination in pupilteacher ratios, classroom sizes, and facilities provisions. Wright was subsequently appointed to the
Washington D.C. Court of Appeals, and the case fell to Judge Frank Ellis, who relaxed Wright’s last order
by reapplying the grade-a-year plan upon the motion of the parish school board. The school board,
nonetheless, appealed this order because Ellis let the injunction against its use of the placement law
stand. The plaintiffs appealed Ellis’ slowdown of the desegregation plan. Thus did the Bush case come
before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the summer of 1962.10
The Fifth Circuit court had ruled just a few weeks earlier, in a Pensacola, Florida case, that
placement laws were unconstitutionally applied when they were clearly “administered . . . in a manner
to maintain complete segregation in fact.” This signaled the court’s willingness to then take the next
step hinted at in Shuttlesworth, wherein Alabama’s placement law had been upheld only “on its face.”
In the Bush ruling in August, a panel including Judges Rives, Brown, and Wisdom (the same trio that
9
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heard the Nelson mandamus appeal) joined in Judge Ellis’s contention that “to believe that
desegregation [could] be effected [in Orleans Parish] with all deliberate speed through application of the
placement law,” without the disestablishment of dual school assignment zones based on race, was “no
more than a ‘speculative possibility wrapped in dissuasive qualification.’” Judge Wisdom wrote further:

When a statute has a state-wide discriminatory effect or when a School Board maintains a
parish-wide discriminatory policy or system, the discrimination is against Negroes as a class.
Here, for example, it is the Orleans Parish dual system of segregated school districts, affecting all
school children in the Parish by race, that, first, was a discriminatory classification and, second,
established the predicate making it possible for the Pupil Placement Act to fulfill its behind-theface function of preserving segregation.11

Wisdom further condemned Louisiana’s placement act because it had been, “with a fanfare of trumpets,
. . . hailed as the instrument for carrying out a desegregation plan while all the time the entire public
knows that in fact it is being used to maintain segregation by allowing a little token desegregation.”
Citing a recent Sixth Circuit opinion in which the court declared that there could no longer be “Negro
schools” and “white schools” but “only schools,” the court upheld the injunction against the
discriminatory use of the placement law. It ordered the adoption of a compromise desegregation plan,
along the lines of grade-a-year type plans in place in Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, and Nashville.12
The Louisiana and Alabama placement laws were so similar, and the legal challenges in Bush and
Armstrong and Nelson were so similar, that anyone attuned to the activity of the appellate courts could
have drawn the reasonable conclusion from the Fifth Circuit’s handling of this New Orleans appeal that
Birmingham was next. The Birmingham News, whose publisher Clarence Hanson placed it squarely in
the camp of the white business moderates, certainly saw the sign. Upon publication of the Bush ruling,
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the Birmingham daily acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit had “thus in effect [given] warning of
Alabama’s placement act,” especially in light of the focus on a dual zone system. The complaint in the
Nelson case, the News observed, had placed a “heavy emphasis on [the] charge that Birmingham
operates a dual zone system.” Regardless of Judge Lynne’s pending ruling, the News concluded that
“appeals court judgment [was] largely predictable.” All of Birmingham’s citizens “best be looking
ahead,” it wrote, because “the problem is in the [near] future.” When the court issued its ruling days
later on the mandamus petition in Nelson, Judge Brown’s strongly worded concurrence made it even
more clear. “It seems obvious, if this opinion is read correctly,” the News surmised, that Judge Brown
“does see an almost certain desegregation order by the fall of 1963.” It was “folly for city officials,
school people, or [the] public to refuse to face the record. . . . Birmingham probably has one year of
grace between next month and the following September.”13 A week later, when Chattanooga was forced
to implement a desegregation plan that put 100 black students into formerly all-white schools, the News
again urged some thoughtful action. “Thus far,” it wrote, “there seems only assumption that [similar]
action will be resisted. But ‘how’ is something not much if at all discussed.”14

Ole Miss and the Election of Wallace
Events in Mississippi the following month ensured that any discussion of the “how” to which the
News referred would include still more denunciation of the federal government trampling upon states’
rights. A full-scale riot erupted in Oxford when James Meredith attempted to enroll at the University of
Mississippi per a federal court order, prompting President Kennedy to send in U.S. Marshalls, and after a
shoot-out, federalized National Guard and U.S. Army military police. The News tried to use the failed
resistance of Mississippi segregationists as another example of why more Alabamians should get behind
the law-and-order moderate line and accept the inevitable. A reader from Mountain Brook, a quiet and
13
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wealthy community to which whites had been escaping the inevitable in Birmingham for over a decade,
accused the News of hiding “behind a screen of platitudes” and by “retreating to the line that it is really
pointless to oppose federal power because it is more forceful, thereby implicitly accepting the notion
that might is right.” He advocated continued defiance of “judicial trespass” by any and all who “who
have a meaningful commitment to constitutional government.” Another reader wondered whether
Alabamians could continue to “stand silently by while federal troops . . . whip into submission a state in
their own country. God bless Mississippians,” she wrote, “for their firm stand.” A Dora woman was
moved to question whether the Brown decision was even settled law. Perhaps the News could “point
[her] to an amendment to the Constitution that gives the Supreme Court at least some of the legislative
powers formerly vested in a Congress.” She asked, “Shall we be governed by laws or by men? Shall we
be free or slaves?” A self-proclaimed moderate cautioned that “new measures of resistance must be
made because, at all costs, . . . bloodshed must be avoided.” He concluded, however, that the “invasion
of Mississippi” would “only serve to consolidate and harden Alabama’s resistance” and that all
Alabamians “must remember always the arrogant, almost tyrannical, crushing power of the federal
government of these ‘United States.’” After all the federal government had not only violated
Mississippi, it had “stained her honor [and] humbled her before the world”15
Alabama’s segregationists were not prepared to concede the inevitability of school
desegregation, particularly as it looked to become reality only via federal compulsion. They had elected
John Patterson governor in order to prevent it, and he had done so. They would probably have elected
him again were it not for the state’s constitutional ban on successive gubernatorial terms. Instead they
elected state Circuit Judge George Wallace, who had vowed never to be “out-niggered” again when he
lost to Patterson. This time around, Wallace had run the most segregationist campaign of all, in an
election in which every campaign was segregationist, including that of the hapless and irrelevant Big Jim
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Folsom. Wallace had won the Democratic primary that spring by crushing attorney Ryan DeGraffenried.
Though he was unopposed in the general election, he continued to publically declare that he would defy
any attempt to desegregate anything. He proclaimed his willingness to “stand up to those lousy, noaccount judges that are trying to take over our school system.” He frequently, though ironically, touted
his unsuccessful defiance of Frank Johnson on the matter of turning over voter registration rolls to the
recently created U.S. Civil Rights Commission. Johnson and Wallace had been friends and classmates in
law school at the University of Alabama. Wallace had subsequently used his position as a circuit judge
to grandstand and campaign. He orchestrated a controversy over the voter rolls so that he could claim
to be protecting them from the hated federal government. Wallace backed down when Johnson
threatened to jail him for contempt, but Johnson still rebuked him for “attempt[ing] to give the
impression that he was defying this court’s order,” and for using “devious methods” and “means of
subterfuge” in dealing with the Civil Rights Commission. Johnson refused to let the court, as he put it,
“be swayed by . . . politically-generated whirlwinds.”16
Wallace dramatized the brief and anti-climactic showdown as one in which he had "risked his
freedom" in order to prevent "a second Sherman's March to the Sea.” He later publically called Johnson
an "integratin, scalawagin, carpetbaggin, no-good, bald-faced liar," and privately called him a "no-good,
goddamn, lying, son-of-a-bitching, race-mixing bastard." He used the incident to establish his defiant
credentials and subsequently claimed that he would “stand in the schoolhouse door” if he had to do so
to prevent school desegregation. After the Ole Miss riots, he reiterated his pledge. He told reporters
that he would request permission to administer the state’s placement law and that he would then
refuse to administer it in such a fashion as to desegregate, even if that meant defying court orders. He
was prepared to dare Frank Johnson to jail, not just a lowly state circuit judge, but a sitting governor, for
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contempt, as a federal court had recently done in the Ole Miss case.17 Alabama’s most defiant
segregationists once again had their man.18
If segregationists stood poised to continue in their defiance, and if the implementation effort
initiated by the banished NAACP were to have any chance of success, then there would have to be more
concerted efforts from activist blacks across the state, not just in Birmingham. Such efforts came slowly
and with understandable caution, but they began to come. That fall, as Ernest Jackson and Willie
Williams prepared for the Armstrong trial, activists in two Alabama cities attempted to enroll in white
schools. In Gadsden, less than an hour’s drive northeast of Birmingham, six black students attempted to
enroll at all-white Gadsden High. The six walked the few blocks from their West Gadsden neighborhood
to the white facility, where they entered the school during an assembly and sought registration.
Flabbergasted staff sequestered the six and summoned the principal and superintendent as a mob of
white students quickly gathered in the hall outside. The students told the superintendent, I.J. Browder,
that they wanted to attend the school blocks away from their homes, rather than have to attend the
Negro high school across town – Carver. They also mentioned that Gadsden High had a nice, new
science facility, while Carver had no such facilities. Browder told them that the school system had tried
“to give the Negro schools the type of instruction that will best train them in courses that they both
need and want.” By this he meant courses like cosmetology, industrial arts, and “diversified
occupations,” not chemistry and physics. Browder told them the registration period had ended the
week prior, and he dismissed their effort as a “publicity stunt.” A larger group returned to the school
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the following day, only to be turned away at the door. They settled for a formal presentation of their
grievances to Browder.19
The Gadsden students could at least rest assured that the city’s activist blacks had already filed
suit to desegregate Gadsden High. The challenge came as part of an omnibus desegregation suit filed in
federal district court in May. The plaintiffs audaciously sought the desegregation of every public facility
in the City of Gadsden, including the high school, the city hall, the city auditorium, the swimming pool,
and the tennis courts. They named as defendants the city itself and a host of city officials that included
the heads of nearly every department under city supervision. As the fate of Birmingham’s schools hung
in the balance, few paid attention to what many thought was a doomed litigious effort, but the pending
suit was the result of a growing effort to re-challenge segregated education in the federal courts.20

Huntsville, the Department of Justice, and “Impacted Areas” Litigation
In Huntsville, a similar challenge illuminated a new threat to segregated education that came
from the federal administrative bureaucracy. Mrs. Marvin Burnett brought her daughter, Ladonna, to
Huntsville’s all-white Madison Pike Elementary to register on September 4, the same day as the
Gadsden attempt. The principal referred her to the superintendent, who blithely told her that her child
had been assigned to Cavalry Hills School for Negroes and dismissed her with a vague promise for a
hearing. What made this attempt significant was the fact that Mrs. Burnett’s husband was a sergeant in
the United States Army, and he was stationed at nearby Redstone Arsenal. The NAACP had alerted
officials at the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) as early as 1959 to the fact that Huntsville school officials
planned to use 31 acres of land donated by the federal government to build a segregated elementary
school. Not only did the school district use the land as such, it used federally allocated funds with which
to build the school itself. The government made such funds available to so-called “impacted areas,” or
19
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school districts which enrolled a large number of children of federal personnel. This was the case in
Huntsville, where the Army and NASA each had a large presence. This only became a problem for
segregated school systems when the Department of Justice’s recently created Civil Rights Division (CRD),
on behalf of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), began to investigate
whether or not these federal funds were being used in furtherance of segregation. The Madison Pike
school was found to be one of four off-base schools whose segregated student body was entirely
composed of the dependents of federal personnel. The children of black personnel at Redstone, like
Ladonna Burnett, were of course forced to attend local Negro schools.21
The investigation of impacted areas funds use in Huntsville marked the first involvement of the
Justice Department in school desegregation in Alabama. The department soon became a key ally for
black activists. The Civil Rights Division, like the United States Commission on Civil Rights, was a product
of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which was, itself, the recommendation of President Truman’s Committee
on Civil Rights. The CRD was initially staffed with around a dozen young, idealistic, energetic attorneys
who were given a broad mandate:

Enforcement of federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in voting, public schools and facilities,
places of public accommodation, employment and housing; (2) prosecuting persons who
interfere with the exercise of federal civil rights on account of race, religion, or national origin;
(3) coordinating enforcement of the prohibition against discrimination in activities receiving
federal financial assistance from federal departments and agencies; (4) intervening in significant
cases brought by private individuals involving denials of the equal protection of the laws on
account of race; (5) preparing amicus curiae briefs in significant private civil rights cases,
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primarily in the United States Supreme Court; (6) and preparing legislative proposals in the civil
rights area.22

In its earliest years the CRD focused on voting rights, using the power vested in it by the 1957
act and, subsequently, by the 1960 Civil Rights Act (which also made it a crime to defy federal court
orders, codifying the principal established in Cooper v. Aaron). Since the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) was often suspicious of the civil rights movement, if not openly hostile to it, enforcing civil rights
law generally fell to the CRD alone. Its attorneys worked long hours in the field and filed dozens of civil
actions in cases of racially discriminatory voting practices. Its involvement in school desegregation
began when it participated as amicus curie in several cases in the late 1950s, including the Orleans
Parish suit. The Justice Department’s participation in school desegregation cases actually dated back
slightly farther, to the landmark NAACP higher education cases of the late 1940s and early 1950s –
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents and Sweatt v. Painter. The department had also filed amicus briefs
in Brown I and Brown II. The Eisenhower Administration, though, despite its cautious embrace of the
Truman legacy through the Committee on Civil Rights and the desegregation of the military, softened
the DOJ’s position on implementation. Thus, it was not until the Kennedy Administration came to power
that the department, by way of the Civil Rights Division, began to vigorously pursue school
desegregation implementation.23
The Kennedy Administration’s policy on civil rights has been described as cautious and reactive
overall, but as a result of that same policy, the CRD began to play a much bigger role in civil rights
22
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enforcement generally, and in school desegregation specifically. Former CRD attorney and legal scholar
Brian Landsberg has provided a compelling and insightful analysis of the Kennedy Justice Department,
arguing that it was as proactive as it could have been within its mandate. Landsberg has maintained
that DOJ was “not a free agent to roam at will among policies that seem[ed] attractive or even morally
compelling.” Given that limitation, the CRD “set an appropriate standard for enforcement of civil rights”
which has “largely prevailed ever since,” according to Landsberg. During the Kennedy administration,
that standard came into clear focus. In 1961, in one of his first official actions, the newly tapped
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, Burke Marshall, went before the House
of Representatives and testified against legislation that would have withheld federal funds from
segregating school districts. Marshall argued against such punitive measures in favor, naturally, of
litigation. Marshall thought that cooperation with local officials should at least be attempted first, and
civil actions brought if possible and necessary. The following year, both approaches began to became
reality. HEW secretary Abraham Ribicoff announced that his department would soon begin withholding
federal funding from school districts with segregated schools in impacted areas. At the same time, DOJ
began to consider how and where it might initiate negotiations with and, if necessary, litigation against
impacted areas districts. Thus did the CRD discover that Huntsville was one of around 100 impacted
areas districts which used federal funds to maintain a dual system, and one of the aforementioned four
that had on-base or near-base segregated schools populated solely with U.S. personnel.24
In early July, 1962, Marshall and Second Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, St. John
Barrett, began to formulate a specific policy on impacted area school districts and to reach out to those
districts, including Huntsville. A native of California, where he had briefly been an assistant district
attorney, Barrett had been with the CRD since its inception. He had worked on the Little Rock cases and
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the Prince Edward County Virginia case, and he had most recently accompanied James Meredith in his
attempt to register at Ole Miss. He was already an elder statesman in the CRD at just 39. CRD attorney
John Doar later remembered that he had “such confidence in [Barrett]” because “[he] had a much
better grasp of civil rights law than I did.” Barrett worked with Marshall to establish some sort of plan
for the CRD effecting school desegregation on its own, rather than having to join in cases brought by
private individuals. After focusing on impacted areas, the two decided to approach only impacted areas
districts which had received federal dollars for construction, because each such district had recently
agreed, upon accepting these funds, to educate federal dependents on the “same basis” as other
children in their system and in accordance with the laws of the state. This was to be the rationale
behind initiating litigation. The department was prepared to formally demand that impacted areas
districts completely eliminate the dual system of pupil assignment district-wide, not just in the schools
built with federal money or in the schools enrolling the children of federal personnel. The CRD was
keenly aware of recent developments in school desegregation jurisprudence and formulated its specific
demands accordingly: no overlapping racial zone lines, no discriminatory application of pupil placement
laws, no default assignment to the school last attended. Privately, though, the department was willing
to accept less, provided that local officials negotiated in good faith.25
Marshall decided to personally fly to Huntsville later that month to assess the situation,
especially as to the possibility of negotiating a plan with local officials. He met with the Superintendent
of Huntsville City Schools, Raymond Christian, and several of the city’s leading white business
moderates, including the editor of the Huntsville Times. The businessmen had participated in biracial
negotiations and were responsible for what had been, up to that point, a comparatively reasonable
approach to voluntary desegregation. Huntsville was in extreme north Alabama, near the Piedmont and
25
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far from the Black Belt. Racial tension there had been somewhat mitigated over the years by the city’s
geography, by the presence of a relatively progressive, upper-middle-class white community associated
with the federal facilities, and most of all by the simple fact that the city had fewer blacks than any other
major city in the state. The Huntsville business moderates were alone in Alabama in recognizing that
some sort of start to desegregation ought to come voluntarily, or at least without the sort of massive
resistance that characterized all other official action in the state. They acknowledged to Marshall that
the threat of massive resistance from Patterson was such that they doubted an attempt to desegregate
the schools could or should be made that fall. Marshal countered that Wallace’s campaign did not seem
to give any indication that he would react any differently. One of the men claimed to have spoken with
Wallace personally and that the judge had conveyed to him that “he did not really mean his campaign
speeches.” Undoubtedly aware of Wallace’s earlier episode with Judge Johnson, Marshal surmised that
Wallace would probably promise very little privately, that he would “have to make a lot of noise,” but
will he would “give in at the end.” The group as a whole also noted that segregationist resistance in the
city probably meant that the school board would privately invite a court order to initiate
desegregation.26
This understanding revealed one of the fundamental dynamics of the next ten years of school
desegregation in the state. Demagogic state officials, namely Wallace, would resist as stringently and
for as long as possible. Any moderate local officials who personally thought progressive action to be
necessary would resist such action either on account of said state officials or because of the risk of a
massive local segregationist backlash. This would create a leadership void into which the federal
government would have to step, usually by way of court orders. School officials in many cases, like
26
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Huntsville, welcomed such orders because they could then blame desegregation on the federal
government, which simultaneously played right into the popular gubernatorial line about outside
interference and states’ rights.
Marshall left the meeting with the Huntsville business moderates and Superintendent Christian
with the understanding that desegregation would have to come via litigation and federal court order,
but that the school officials would be privately amenable and would comply with any such orders in
good faith. Marshall also knew that the case for litigation in Huntsville was a good one. The CRD had
ascertained that not only the city of Huntsville school system, but the Madison County school system as
well, were educating a large number of federal dependents: specifically, 103 on-base children and 1,934
off-base children in the county system and 742 on-base and 9,671 off-base children in the city system.
Of these, nearly 1,000 were black children. And the two systems had received several millions of dollars
in federal funds. St. John Barrett began drafting a complaint immediately. The division also prepared
similar complaints for Montgomery, which received impacted areas funds for schools educating children
from nearby Maxwell and Gunter Air Force Bases.27
Marshall and Barrett might have felt that the CRD had good cause to bring a strong suit against
Huntsville, Madison, and Montgomery, but the division was concerned about the impact of filing a
school desegregation suit where not only schools, but all public facilities, were still fully segregated. It
seemed more logical to initiate an action where there were already cracks in the wall of segregated
education, which at that time was anywhere but Mississippi, South Carolina, or Alabama. The CRD filed
suit the next month, September, against the Prince George County, Virginia school system. It marked
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the first time the Justice Department initiated a school desegregation case. It would certainly not be the
last.28

The Armstrong/Nelson Trial
The state of Alabama remained temporarily safe from an impacted areas suit that fall, but it
could not escape black activists’ suits attacking Birmingham’s system, which finally came to trial in
October. The trial itself revealed the tattered and doomed logic of segregation to which its practitioners
clung. They needed sympathetic jurists to maintain their grip, and of these there were plenty. But could
they mount a challenge that would stand up to the test of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals? Judge
Lynne had allowed the two suits to be consolidated for hearings that month. Billingsley, Williams, and
Jackson tried to establish first that the city operated a dual school system, an obvious fact outside the
courtroom but nonetheless one requiring some sort of evidentiary proof. One school board member
admitted freely that the city operated a dual system and that this was, indeed, what the placement act
was meant to preserve. Another denied any knowledge of a dual system. Superintendent Wright
admitted that if a black child showed up to register at a white school, he would not be registered, but he
called this a “matter of custom” and argued that schools were simply designated “white” or “black” on
account of their location. “They get their name from the area they’re in,” he protested, “generally,
Negroes go to the Negro schools in their area and white students do the same.”29
Governor Patterson and Attorney General MacDonald Gallion had been preparing the state’s
case for several years, for just such an occasion. It hardly mattered that it came in defense, technically,
of only the city of Birmingham’s school officials. The school board’s attorneys of record included
28
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Birmingham lawyers Joseph Johnston (another architect of the state’s defense), Ormond Somerville, and
Reid Barnes, and all had connections to Patterson and Gallion. They followed the lead the current and
former attorneys general had provided. In addition to clearly disingenuous efforts to claim the dual
system was a “matter of custom,” the defense tried to establish that desegregation would ruin
education in the city. The fundamental premise of this argument was that blacks were inferior
intellectually. To establish this, the city officials called the head of the school system’s guidance
program, who testified that tests given to children entering the first grade revealed that 67 percent of
black children were of a mental age less than 6 years, while only 30 percent of white children were
deemed the same. The head guidance counselor also testified that other assessments showed white
students in the school system in grades four through eight were above the national average in academic
ability, while black students in the same demographic were below average. Superintendent Wright
testified that introducing such inferior pupils into classes with superior ones would create “educational
chaos.” The defense also introduced the deposition of a psychology professor at the University of
Virginia, who testified that “general findings” showed that black students across the country, i.e. in
integrated districts of the North as well as those of the South, scored significantly and roundly lower
than their white counterparts on intelligence quotient tests. Billingsley tried to remind the court of the
findings presented in Brown: that segregation itself – separate and inherently unequal education –
produced this scholastic retardation in black pupils, not only through universally discriminatory funding
but also by creating a psychological inferiority complex in the black student.30
The defense ignored Billingsley’s reminder and instead stuck to biological racism, attempting to
provide an academically-supported case for innate inferiority. Its’ coup de grace was a study
undertaken and presented by Dr. Wesley Critz, a former anatomy professor from the University of
North Carolina’s School of Medicine. The study, entitled “The Biology of the Race Problem,” had
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actually been commissioned some years prior by Governor Patterson himself, who arranged payment of
$3,000 to Critz for the effort. Critz testified that human beings were “not born equal in the biological
sense,” nor did they “have equal endowments.” The Negro was, according to the doctor, 200,000 years
behind the white man, anthropologically speaking. “Through all recorded time,” he argued, “the Negro
never invented the wheel, the sail, the plow or a system of writing . . . never produced a great religious
leader or philosopher [and] remained a relative savage through the ages in which the Caucasian and the
Mongol were building their civilizations.” Desegregation could supposedly not rectify this iniquity.
Indeed, Critz’s study concluded, “large and significant differences do not disappear when social and
economic factors are equated.” Therefore, integration was not only “evil,” it was “not Christian.” It
would lead inevitably to intermarriage between whites and Negroes, which itself would result in the
“invariable deterioration” of the white race’s genetic pool. Had Alabama White Citizens’ Councilors Sam
Engelhardt, Walter Givhan, or Alston Keith been on the stand, they would have testified that integration
of the schools was unthinkable, leading as it inevitably would to miscegenation and mongrelization,
because “the nigger” was “a separate individual altogether,” perpetually inferior and pitiable. Critz’s
study and testimony were the exact same argument cloaked in discredited science.31
The city officials’ final line of defense was also the invocation of a favored Citizens’ Council
tactic: pointing the finger northward. The defense called Congressional representative George
Huddleston, Jr., who as a member of a special congressional committee supervising administrative
activities in Washington D.C.’s recently desegregated schools testified about the “substantially
increased” discipline problems in those schools. Huddleston also testified that there had been a
“substantial migration” of white families out of the city into burgeoning suburbs as a direct result of
desegregation. The cry of northern racism and discrimination had been popular for decades amongst
segregationists in the South; it was part of the irrationally lingering animosity of the Civil War and the
31
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over-sensitivity to northern interference. It was the equivalent of a child’s arguing upon being caught
engaging in bad behavior that a sibling or friend had also been engaged in the same behavior,
supposedly absolving the child himself. The problem for southern whites seemed to be that the other
offender, the accuser, and the punisher were all the same, insofar as the federal government was still
equated with the Yankee North anytime there was a question of “outside interference.” Fortunately for
the defense in Armstrong and Nelson, Judge Lynne was of a similar disposition, and as a paternalist
segregationist, he was sympathetic to the school officials’ line of reasoning. When the hearings ended
on October 26, Lynne gave the parties until December 1 to file summary briefs and until December 31 to
file reply briefs, thereby delaying a ruling until January 1 at the earliest date, and until mid-winter or
later at the most realistically possible date. Billingsley and Jackson protested the delay to no avail.
“School doesn’t open here until September,” Judge Lynne reminded them, “[and] nobody’s in any hurry
here.”32
John LeFlore, Vernon Crawford, and Mobile
The problem was that Alabama’s black activists were, in fact, in a hurry. Almost nine years after
the original School Segregation Cases decision, though, only so many were in a position to mount
effective challenges to the status quo. Outside of the pending Birmingham cases, the Gadsden effort,
and the potential for federal administrative intervention, activism aimed at segregated education had
been effectively stymied. Slowly, though, the progress of Armstrong and Nelson, in light of the Fifth
Circuit ruling in the New Orleans case and along with the possibility of CRD action, inspired others to
take action of their own. In November a group of black activists in the port city of Mobile, a few hours’
drive east of New Orleans on Alabama’s Gulf Coast, attended a meeting of the Mobile City-County
School Board. The activists petitioned the school officials to plan for the “reorganization of the biracial
school system of this county into a unitary, non-racial system” and to “present to the community, within
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the next 60 days, a plan for such desegregation which will include a prompt and reasonable start.” This
was no simple request for tokenism under the placement act. The group requested that the board
“provide for the elimination of all racial distinctions and discriminations from the public school system,
including,” it continued, “the assignment of pupils and professional school personnel on a non-racial
basis, with all deliberate speed.” Just as in Birmingham, and just as with the NAACP petitions of the
1950s, this was intended to set up a civil action in federal court.33
A letter accompanied the petition. The signatories reiterated their desire that the school board
finally provide an answer to the Mobile NAACP’s original petition of 1955. They tried to appeal to
business moderates by admitting that theirs was a “challenge to probity” in the state of Alabama and
that they simply wanted “citizens of good will and all who have respect for law and order [to] defend
with their moral support a course of action which will bring to our city and county another instance of a
high standard in race relations.” “Moral support” meant support which did not necessitate action, not
support for a cause one thought was morally just. The petitioners knew that white business moderates
were beginning to see the value of “law and order,” not just as a differentiation from the Klan, but as a
genuine appeal to avoid disturbances such as those at Tuscaloosa during the Lucy crisis, in Birmingham
and Montgomery during the Freedom Rides, and at Ole Miss. Blacks did not have to get segregationists
to agree that segregated education was morally wrong, only that dogged and defiant persistence in it
encouraged violence, which itself was bad for the state’s image and bad, then, for industrial recruitment
and business in general.34
Behind this appeal to white business moderates in Mobile was John L. LeFlore. LeFlore had
resurrected the Mobile chapter of the NAACP in the 1920s and had been an active leader in the city ever
since. He had worked with aggrieved black stevedores during World War II and had since been mostly
concerned with voter registration. In the wake of the NAACP’s banishment, he had become director of
33
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casework for the Non-Partisan Voters League and had begun recruiting former NAACP members. He
remained attuned to the progress of school desegregation litigation and saw in the early 1960s a chance
to file a meaningful suit. LeFlore was not a preacher or a teacher, nor was he an attorney. He was, thus,
quite unlike a number of black activist leaders of his time. He worked for the United States Post Office
in Mobile, and his father-in-law was a substantially well-off physician and prominent member of the
city’s black upper-middle class. He was therefore shielded from many of the standard forms of
economic reprisal and was, in that regard, very much like most sponsors of school desegregation
litigation. In time his relative prosperity and preference for biracial cooperation with business
moderates earned him charges of Uncle-Tom-ism – a derogatory characterization for those deemed to
be conciliatory to paternalist-inclined whites. But in the early 1960s, he was in position to lead the city’s
willing and able black activists in the second major challenge to Jim Crow education in the state of
Alabama.35
LeFlore secured local attorney Vernon Crawford for the task. Crawford was not unlike the other
young black attorneys in the state, so few in number though they were. He had served in the merchant
marine in the war and returned to attend Alabama State College in Montgomery. The state of Alabama
paid for his out-of-state law training, of course – in Crawford’s case at Brooklyn Law School, from
whence he returned to Alabama to practice law in his hometown in 1956. He was the only black lawyer
in Mobile and, like Fred Gray in Montgomery and Willie Williams and Orzell Billingsley in Birmingham, he
was eager to take advantage of the cracks he saw potentially developing in the wall of segregation. All
Crawford and LeFlore needed were people like James Armstrong and his family to ask, “why not me?”
Each of the 27 signatories to the petition to the Mobile school board had asked and answered that
question. Some of them were soon to become litigants in a case that would change the city of Mobile in
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fundamental and enduring ways, and which remained on the docket of the federal district court there
for more than 30 years.36

******
As 1962 wound to a close, the prospect of school desegregation in Alabama looked more
realistic than at any other time in the state’s history. The Birmingham suits were pending Judge Lynne’s
ruling. Lynne himself had proven to be obstructionist in civil rights litigation, where he could, and the
ruling was far from guaranteed one way or the other. But the Bush case and Judge Brown’s concurrence
in the Nelson mandamus proceedings, along with desegregation orders in Atlanta, Chattanooga,
Pensacola, and elsewhere, made it clear that the majority of judges of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
were beginning to force the issue in reluctant district courts. Birmingham looked to have only its “one
year of grace” before desegregation became some sort of reality. John LeFlore and Vernon Crawford
were cognizant of this possibility and prepared to force Mobile into compliance in the same fashion.
Then there was the matter of the “impacted areas” across the state. The Civil Rights Division had quietly
signaled its intention to coerce these districts into compliance, and it had begun to initiate litigation
elsewhere in the South. HEW underscored this federal threat in December when it issued letters to
superintendents in all impacted area systems, advising them that they could not rely on federal
assistance the following year lest they “proceed to arrange for the provision of desegregated schools in
accord with [federal] policy.”37
Business moderates in Huntsville were prepared to work behind the scenes with the CRD to
effectuate peaceful desegregation but had made it clear that they, and especially the school board itself,
needed a federal court order to get it done. Hardline segregationists in Huntsville would ostracize the
36
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board members or worse were they seen to be on the “integrationist” side of the fence. Segregationists
across the state had demonstrated in their reactions to the Ole Miss crisis that they were not prepared
to capitulate to black activists and the federal government, no matter how eminent others thought
school desegregation to be. The voters of Alabama made their support of continued defiance clear
when they elected George Wallace in a landslide. Wallace “out-segged” every other candidate in
Alabama through repeated rhetorical flourishes of resistance and by touting his own defiant credentials.
The state was, thus, on a collision course: persistent activism was fast approaching determined
resistance, and in the middle stood a growing number of “moderate” segregationists who seemed
willing to do only the bare minimum to avoid a catastrophe.
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CHAPTER 5: THE LITIGIOUS BREAKTHROUGH BEGINS, SPRING, 1963

“Our Most Historical Moment”
On a bitterly cold Monday morning, January 14, 1963, George Wallace stood atop the same
Confederate star upon which John Patterson had taken the oath of office four years prior. Like
Patterson before him, Wallace did not let the assembled crowd forget that it was the same spot from
which Jeff Davis had taken the oath of office as the first and only president of the Confederacy. True to
the segregationist one-upsmanship of his campaign, Wallace saw fit to also invoke Confederate General
Robert E. Lee – the quintessential southern hero who fought valiantly to the bitterest of ends against
insurmountable odds. Wallace’s inaugural speech that day – the magnum opus of Klansman and
Citizens’ Councilor Asa Carter – was made famous by one line. It was a pithy encapsulation of southern
white defiance and, incidentally, a barometer of southern white insecurity, like a final and forlorn battle
cry before a hopeless siege: “In the name of the greatest people who ever trod this earth, I draw the line
in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation today, segregation
tomorrow, segregation forever!” Wallace had vowed in his campaign to “stand up for Alabama,” and he
promised the electorate that if they stood with him, they could defy the tyrannical federal government,
especially the judiciary, and the communist black activists, especially the NAACP, just as the Confederate
rebels had resisted Yankee aggression and carpetbagger invasion 100 years prior. And they elected him
overwhelmingly for it.1
The less famous, or infamous, lines of the speech read like a Citizens’ Council broadsheet, and
they revealed the deepening sense of panic and dread that segregationists were trying to suppress.
Wallace wanted to exploit their fears, to help them suppress that panic and dread, and to promise them
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that he could keep the wolves of desegregation at bay indefinitely, when everyone, including Wallace
himself, was beginning to feel that this might be impossible. Wallace has been called a weathervane by
one of his biographers, and his inaugural speech that day functioned in much the same way. He made
sure to include all of the fundamental segregationist fears, and he dressed them with recent events that
made them seem all the more palpable. All of this was delivered with a marshal language intended to
rile segregationists and steel them for the fight to defend Alabama’s rights and the integrity of the white
race. It was everything that they wanted to hear.2
Before Wallace delivered the “segregation forever” line, he said “I have stood where Jefferson
Davis stood, and took an oath to my people. It is very appropriate, then, that from this Cradle of the
Confederacy, this very heart of the great Anglo-Saxon Southland, that today we sound the drum for
freedom as have our generations of forebears before us done . . . .” He spoke passionately about their
“freedom-loving blood” and called them to “send an answer to the tyranny that clanks its chains upon
the South.” There was, then, the threat of enslavement by the federal government, the purity of the
white race at stake, the upturning of southern society making white slave and black dominant, and the
duty to “sound the drum” and go to battle to prevent this. Then he went immediately to school
desegregation. Speaking of reports of disturbances in recently desegregated Washington, D.C. public
schools, Wallace declared that the people of Alabama would never “sacrifice our children to any such
type school system.” The reports, he said, were “disgusting and revealing.” The federal troops sent into
Mississippi during the Ole Miss crisis would have been better served, he suggested, guarding the citizens
of the nation’s capital. All white people had to do to avoid this fate, he argued, was to send the
message to the integrationists in the federal government that “we give the word of a race of honor that
we will tolerate their boot in our face no longer.” He then reminded them who the nearest
manifestations of that government were: “let those certain judges put that in their opium pipes of
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power and smoke it for all its worth.” There was no misunderstanding that Wallace meant especially his
old friend and recent nemesis, Judge Frank Johnson, who was known to enjoy a tobacco pipe in his
chambers, just down the street from the inaugural site.3
All segregationists knew that the most real and immediate threat to their society were the black
activists themselves. Wallace tried to paint them as communist revolutionaries, even comparing the
white race to the Jews of Nazi Germany and arguing that the activists were part of a global communist
conspiracy to persecute the “international white minority.” The “Afro-Asian bloc” would not rest until
the white race was “footballed about according to [its] favor.” Referring to ongoing African postcolonial liberation movements and to the Cuban socialist revolution, he then added, “The Belgian
survivors of the Congo cannot present their case to a war crimes commission, nor the Portuguese of
Angola, nor the survivors of Castro,” nor, he said emphatically, bringing the rhetorical flourish back
around to the real issue, could “the citizens of Oxford, Mississippi.” Beneath it all lay the threat of
miscegenation and mongrelization. Carter allowed Wallace to bring this in at the conclusion of the
speech, just as he returned to the language of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and Redemption: the great
Lost Cause. The governor issued a warning to “those of any group who would follow the false doctrine
of communistic amalgamation,” that the white people of Alabama would not “surrender our system of
government, our freedom of race and religion” under any circumstances. When the South was “set
upon by the vulturous carpetbagger and federal troops, all loyal Southerners were denied the vote at
the point of a bayonet, so that the infamous, illegal 14th Amendment might be passed.” Southerners did
not accept this fate, of course; they “did not even consider the easy way of federal dictatorship and
amalgamation in return for fat bellies.” No, “they fought,” Wallace said, “and they won.” Then Wallace
concluded by calling out the business moderates, the liberals of the ACHR, and anyone else not behind
the line of defiant resistance. “I stand ashamed,” he said with disgust, “of the fat, well-fed whimperers
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who say that it is inevitable, that our cause it lost. They do not represent,” he said, “the great people of
the Southland,” who would soon “grasp the hand of destiny and walk out of the shadow of fear and fill
our divine destination. Let us not simply defend,” he urged, “but let us assume leadership of the fight
. . . . God has placed us here in this crisis. Let us not fail in this, our most historical moment.”4

The Evolving Tenor of Law and Order
As the moment of which Wallace spoke fast approached, most segregationists were supportive
of the maintenance of “law and order.” No one came out “for” violence. Violence happened, of course,
whether it was the product of ritualistic and sadistic Klan operations, as in the case of Edward “Judge”
Aaron’s mutilation, or of a mob frenzy, as at Tuscaloosa and Oxford. Klansmen had been engaged in a
terrorist bombing campaign in Birmingham for years; the first wave of Freedom Riders was assaulted no
less than three times; floggings were commonplace. Business moderates came out against these violent
responses, not because they were less supportive of segregation, but because they feared the
repercussions for the state’s image, for its ability to recruit new industries, and for their companies’
bottom lines. Some public officials, even Wallace at times, came out against violence and “for” law and
order, because it was their public duty. Wallace’s moderate, incoming attorney general, Richmond
Flowers, would quickly break with the administration. Flowers told voters during his election campaign
that “law and order and the rights so secured under the constitution . . . will not be turned over to the
passions of mob hysteria so long as I am attorney general.” In his own inaugural speech, Flowers
warned that continued defiance would only “bring disgrace to our state, military law upon our people,
and political demagoguery to the leaders responsible.” He nonetheless pledged to “do battle for our
southern traditions,” including segregation. No one wanted another Ole Miss, of course, and no one
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wanted to be New Orleans, but these were the sole grounds upon which support for possible
compliance was based. Almost no one who was white wanted desegregation.5
Even the Council on Human Relations took the law-and-order tack. It was an easy way to appeal
to segregationists to accept, on some level, the inevitable: that complete segregation in Alabama’s
public schools would have to end at some point. The ACHR essentially adopted the business moderate
line, announcing on the front of a recruiting pamphlet its desire to “Keep our schools open and
accredited,” to “Keep industries expanding,” and to “Create more and better jobs for our people.”
Among the Council’s stated purposes were to promote channels of communication, to foster “an
atmosphere of human dignity and decency,” and to “encourage and support government agencies
dedicated to the maintenance of law and order in the implementation of the decisions of the courts.”
One ACHR member broke the message down into a succinct summation of the business moderates’
foundational argument: “Reasonable people know that violence hurts everybody, and also hurts the
pocketbook, scares off payrolls, and chokes economic growth.” On the completely opposite side of the
issue, the Citizens Councilors were arguing for defiance, but theirs continued to be a message of law and
order as well, for defiant resistance need not be violent. Top George Wallace aid Seymore Trammell
told a Dallas County Council meeting just before the governor’s inauguration, “The white children of the
South are being held literally as hostages with the ransom being – forced to mix with the black.” The
answer was not to engage in violence, however. These men could remain within the bounds of the law
and still stand up to the “black and malignant heart[ed]” federal judges who were “seeking to destroy
the South.” These district judges “should be scorned and they and their families and their friends
ostracized by responsible southerners,” as indeed were Frank Johnson and Richard Rives.6
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When the specter of desegregation returned to threaten the University of Alabama, seven years
after Autherine Lucy’s failed attempt, business moderates and state and school officials used a law-andorder message to stave off what many thought would be another Oxford-type riot. Vivian Malone, a
Mobile native and a student at unaccredited all-black Alabama A&M, announced in November of 1962
that she was among several students who had submitted applications to the university. The university,
which was technically still under injunction from the Lucy case, tried to claim that the registration period
for the semester beginning in February, 1963 had ended. Malone made clear that she was going to
press the issue, securing the assistance of John LeFlore and the Mobile Citizens Committee. University
president Frank Rose called for law and order. The Board of Trustees unanimously approved a
resolution expressing “determination that law and order must be maintained at all times.” The Alumni
Council applauded Wallace for his lip service to law and order. But when the editor of the school’s
student newspaper, the Crimson White, went so far as to suggest that Malone was “entitled” to attend
the university, a cross was burned on his fraternity house lawn, and he received so many threatening
phone calls that he began to employ a security detail.7
State Democratic Chairman Roy Mayhall perhaps best expressed the business moderates’ stance
on law and order when he went before the state Young Men’s Business Club and announced that “if
integration comes to Alabama – by court order or what – I favor enforcing the law.” He argued that the
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and the Kennedy White House could all be expected to uphold
and enforce the law, and that Alabamians should accept this and move on, rather than “kicking a tree
because you’ve run your car into it.” Mayhall later wrote a guest editorial in a local newspaper revealing
the “voluminous” response to his published remarks, the majority of which he said was supportive.
However, he wrote that he was “shocked to find that there are so many people in Alabama who seem to
be against law and order,” as evidenced by the letters he had received “condemning [him] in the most
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insulting terms.” As an example he cited a letter from one man who accused Mayhall of being “afraid to
stand up for the white race . . . just plain NAACP scared.” The chairman wrote that he had, as a “man
who tries to walk the road of lawful adjustment,” simply “resign[ed] himself to searing criticism and
even worse.” He admitted that “we may dislike some of our laws” and that “keeping the law may not be
easy sometimes,” but he urged still that Alabamians avoid the “ugly, moronic violence of mob hysteria”
and the expression of “dislike with bloodshed and anarchy.” Even in offering Biblical scripture, Mayhall
found the same message, for “’he that keepeth the law, happy be he.’” Maintaining law and order amid
forced, unpalatable changes seemed so fundamentally necessary and so simple that Mayhall was
incredulous that “so many people in Alabama” could possibly be “against it.” But there they were:
those who understood George Wallace’s “stand” for Alabama and his impending “stand in the
schoolhouse door” to be synonymous with “stand[ing] up for the white race.” On this issue, for many,
there could be no compromise.8
One group of white people in Alabama which might have been expected to support
desegregation from a morally defensible position were the leaders of the white churches in the state.
But the issue had already fractured denominations and congregations in which there were a select few
clergymen who spoke out in favor of integration. In the white Baptist Church, for example, rare topdown initiatives were almost always met with resistance from congregants, some of whom were
blatantly racist, but many of whom were what historian Wayne Flynt has called “passive” racists,
suffering from “structural blindness to racist elements of society.” When it came to integrating the
Baptist churches themselves, there were “too few prophetic voices to even hold a serious debate” on
the matter. Certainly some Catholic clergy, and occasionally other protestant denominational clergy,
were willing to speak out, but the number of prophetic voices increased only slightly when it came to
school desegregation. For the most part, the closest the white clergy in Alabama would come to
8

Southern School News, Dec., 1962, Jan., 1963; Wayne Flynt, Alabama Baptists: Southern Baptists in the
Heart of Dixie (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), pp. 517-20.

184

supporting integrated education, save for the very few individuals who joined the ACHR, was to come
out reluctantly for “law and order.” Two days after Wallace’s inaugural, 12 clergymen representing the
Baptist, Methodist, Roman Catholic, Episcopal, Jewish, Presbyterian, and Greek Orthodox churches
issued a joint statement entitled “An Appeal for Law and Order and Commonsense.” The leaders argued
that “there may be disagreement concerning laws and social change without advocating defiance,
anarchy and subversion,” and that “laws may be tested in the courts or changed by legislatures . . .
constitutions amended or judges impeached by proper action. But the “American way of life,” they
urged, “depend[ed] upon obedience to the decisions of competent jurisdiction in the meantime.” The
group admitted that it did not “pretend to know all of the answers,” but it insisted that defiance would
only lead to “violence, discord, confusion, and disgrace.”9
The widespread reliance on a message of law and order in fostering both resistance and
reluctant acceptance influenced how and when school desegregation would come to Alabama. Almost
no one outside of the black activists themselves came forward to argue that ending segregated
education in Alabama was the morally proper course of action or, outside of the ACHR, even that it was
the decent and dignified thing to do. Occasionally it was couched as constitutionally sound, as the “law
of the land,” but as evidenced by Wallace’s characterization of the 14th Amendment as “illegal” and by
widespread denunciation of Brown as the same, this was not often. Those few recognitions of
constitutional reality were, themselves, generally in the form of compulsory, reluctant resignations to
the unfortunately inevitable. Some of the most vehement defiance slowly became this sort of
begrudged acquiescence to only the absolute bare minimum compliance necessary, and gradually it
morphed into myriad forms of successful evasion. In short, some segregationists began to accept school
desegregation, not because it was right, only because according to some it was the law and because
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further resistance only fostered violence, which most everyone could agree was undesirable for one
reason or another.10

Litigious Beginnings in Mobile and Huntsville
The 60 days John LeFlore and Vernon Crawford had asked the Mobile school board to take to
consider their petition expired the day George Wallace took the oath of office. On Tuesday the board
issued a statement, telling the petitioners the board felt that “in light of [its’] obligations, including [a]
tremendous building program, that it would be ill-advised and not in the best interest of your people for
us to attempt to present a formula for integration of the public schools at this time.” The “building
program” was an effort to modernize black school facilities in the hopes that ‘separate and more
genuinely equal’ might dissuade black activists from pressing the issue of desegregation. The board was
prepared to spend $7 million on black schools, with the decidedly modest immediate goal of ending
double sessions necessitated by extreme overcrowding. “Frankly,” the board added, “we do not know
and would hesitate to say what effect an integration program by the board, or forced integration, would
have in the shift of public load from one area to another or whether or not there would be some serious
incidents such as have occurred in other places.” The response concluded with a thinly veiled threat: “if
[the board was] faced with forced integration, it would seriously delay and possibly completely stop the
. . . plans for carrying out [the] building program as it is scheduled now.” LeFlore’s response was swift.
He announced that night his plans to file a suit in federal court “as soon as possible,” in light of the fact
that the school authorities had left blacks “no choice.”11
LeFlore was prepared to bring in a powerful ally, too. He called attorney Constance Baker
Motley, veteran of the original School Segregation Cases, and began to arrange for the NAACP’s Legal
10
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Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (LDF) to participate as counsel. The LDF was, by then, a separate
entity from the NAACP proper. It consisted only of attorneys and operated on a separate budget and
under a separate charter. The Fund had recently responded to Leflore’s request to assist Vivian Malone
in her attempt to enroll at Alabama, and Motley had agreed. The NAACP’s return to Alabama was thus
to come via the so-called “Inc. Fund,” seven years after the parent organization had been banished by
John Patterson. Over the next decade, the LDF would participate in the majority of major school
desegregation suits in the state, often with attorney’s from the LDF’s New York offices – including
Motley and Jack Greenberg – assisting in litigating cases themselves. Much of the preparatory work was
done, though, by attorneys like Crawford, Fred Gray, and Orzell Billingsley, who became NAACP-LDF
“associated” counsel, receiving modest financial support for their efforts and carrying at the least the
badge of the organization. The meager and occasional financial support was important when Crawford,
Gray, Billingsley, and others had to work pro bono, or for free, as was the case in a number of civil rights
actions. Occasionally the attorneys could secure court orders for defendants to pay attorney’s fees, but
this was always a fight and never a guarantee. Therefore, LDF assistance was important even if local
attorney’s carried much of the workload.12
Before LeFlore, Crawford, and Motley could set in motion their announced suit against the
Mobile school board, the Justice Department filed its own suit. Just four days after Wallace’s inaugural,
the Civil Rights Division filed its impacted areas suits against school officials in not only Huntsville and
surrounding Madison County but Mobile as well, where the children of nearly 1,000 military personnel
and roughly 15,000 civilians stationed at the U.S. Air Force’s Brookley Field attended federally
supported, segregated schools. Combined with children of members of the U.S. Engineers, the Coast
Guard, and those employed at the Dauphin Island Air Warning Station, the federal dependents
constituted almost 20 percent of the Mobile City-County School System’s enrollment. In Huntsville it
12
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was closer to 4,000 service members and 20,000 civilians, all at Redstone Arsenal, which included Army
missile command, support, and school facilities as well as NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center. The
Mobile City-County school system had received nearly $12 million in federal aid since 1950, according to
the CRD, and Huntsville and Madison almost $10 million.13
In their final form, the complaints against the three school systems focused on the provision in
the United States Code that authorized the impacted areas funding, under which the local school
officials had agreed to educate federal dependents on the same basis as other children and “in
accordance with the laws of the State.” Marshall and Barrett knew, however, that this was far from a
guaranteed victory in federal district court. The authority of the U.S. to bring the suits was questionable,
to begin with. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was already monitoring compliance,
and Justice Department action might be deemed superfluous. The few school desegregation cases in
which the U.S. had participated as amicus curie were actions brought by private individuals, and there
was no legislation giving the attorney general the expressed authority to bring suits himself.
Additionally, the “laws of the State” in Alabama included the placement law, which had not yet been
declared unconstitutional on its face or in its application. There was also some concern that Congress
had recently declined to attach desegregation riders to proposed school aid legislation, a potentially
damning indication that the legislative branch was not fully behind efforts at federal compulsion.
Finally, there was the matter of the judge. The action fell on the docket of Judge Grooms, and it was,
therefore, anyone’s guess what sort of ruling the U.S. might receive.14
Reaction to the suits among state officials was unsurprising. In announcing the filings, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy had tried to soften the reaction amongst segregationists by cautioning that the
Justice Department was “not saying to the school districts, desegregate or the government will take its
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money away.” George Wallace, of course, disagreed and called the action “blackmail,” which would be
“resisted in every way by the state of Alabama.” Wallace called it but “another example of a destructive
blow at the liberty and freedom to which Americans are entitled” and an attempt to bring the South into
the “socialist-liberal pattern of integration.” The governor called on, not only the state’s congressional
delegation, but “all officials and every citizen of this state to oppose this suit which will destroy not only
our southern traditions and customs, but will further restrict the liberty and freedom we enjoy.”
Wallace never openly counseled violent resistance. These references to “liberty and freedom” and
“traditions and customs” were ways to appeal to a wider range of people, including those who deeply
valued “law and order.” It was partly for this purpose that Wallace created a Committee on
Constitutional Law and State Sovereignty of the Alabama Bar Association, a group of skilled attorneys,
including Birmingham’s Joe Johnston, which was tasked with coordinating a statewide defense of
segregated education. The quickly-convened Committee advised the governor upon meeting that the
complaints should be “vigorously defended” and that it was confident the suits could not, ultimately, be
“properly or legally maintained.” 15
The mere existence of the committee was an affront to Attorney General Flowers, whom
Wallace had all but written off after Flowers’ less-than-completely-defiant inaugural speech. Flowers
had denounced demagoguery in the law-and-order flavored speech, and the governor had considered
that a direct shot at himself. Wallace never forgave the attorney general and effectively excluded him
from any meaningful role in administration affairs which did not legally require or call for his
involvement. Flowers nonetheless reacted to the suits’ filings in much the same way as Wallace. He
agreed with the Sovereignty Committee’s findings and announced that “every legal means possible will
be taken to maintain the present segregated status of these schools.” Even the liberal, law-and-order
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moderate U.S. Senators Lister Hill and John Sparkman denounced the litigation, with Sparkman saying
that “as a lawyer and legislator” he could “find no legal basis” for them.16
The Alabama state legislature had clarified its defiant position on school desegregation before
the federal suits were even filed. The day after the Wallace inaugural, the legislators adopted a
resolution pledging, “At no time will we in Alabama voluntarily submit to integration of our schools.”
They called the U.S. Supreme Court “a national oligarchy,” which had, along with the lower courts,
repudiated the “the very foundational concepts of Constitutional government.” The legislators argued
that the United States’ “unique and most significant contribution to the concept of public education,”
was the “method of control of public schools and policies by local state authorities.” The federal courts
had “invaded this sacred area of our lives” and created a crisis unequaled in urgency “since the perilous
days of the War Between the States.” This sort of “encroachment,” the resolution read, “must be faced.
This problem is upon us. It is here. The solution will require vision, dedication to principle and a firm
resolve.” Both houses of the legislature unanimously approved the resolution, although a few
legislators quietly recognized that it was little more than a recitation of an already clear position. It was,
though, also a test of individual legislators’ positions. In the polarized political climate occasioned by the
real threat of school desegregation, no one was willing to vote against such a resolution, lest they be
branded an integrationist or even an NAACP-sympathizing communist. One legislator who downplayed
the resolution’s impact admitted, “We are all segregationists” in the legislature, and everyone knew
that.17
The U.S. Attorney in Mobile, V.R. Jansen, Jr. called the Justice Department’s filing of the
impacted areas suits “an embarrassing situation.” U.S. Attorneys, like federal district court judges, were
residents of the states they served and often locals in the cities in which they served. Jansen was no
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exception, and his reaction reflected that of a number of Mobilians. He complained to the press, “Two
days after LeFlore announces he’s going to take the segregation issue to court, the Justice Department
files suit.” It gave the impression, Jansen, said, “that the Justice Department [was] reacting to the will of
the NAACP.” He noted that up to that point all school desegregation suits had been the result of the
actions of private individuals, while the impacted areas suits represented a new phase in which the
federal government was the sole plaintiff. Jansen signed the Mobile complaint, he said, “only because
the law requires it.” The Justice Department did not have to work closely with the U.S. Attorney’s office,
and in many cases a begrudging signature was as far as the cooperation went.18
Because the Justice Department suits applied only to impacted areas, and because everyone
knew the suits to be significantly vulnerable to failure, LeFlore went through with his planned action in
Mobile, two weeks after the CRD actions were filed. He and the Reverend Calvin Houston secured the
cooperation of four black students in the Hillsdale Heights neighborhood in West Mobile. The four
attended St. Elmo High School for Negroes and had to travel 34 miles round trip to school each day,
while bypassing each time the all-white Baker High in a much more sensible and convenient location,
only four miles away. Houston accompanied the four to Baker on January 31, while LeFlore sent the
Mobile City-County Board of Education a registered letter that day, along with formal requests for the
students’ transfer signed by their parents the next day. The school officials issued letters of rejection a
week later to each of the four students, arguing that the school board’s policy was “to consider transfers
during the school year only under emergency circumstances which do not exist in this instance.” LeFlore
responded by announcing the group’s plan to move forward, finally, with litigation. He expressed
“regret” for the “unfair action of the school board” in denying what he called “the basic human rights of
these children to transfer to a school near to their homes. To us,” he said, “and we believe to all other
Americans who adhere to the principles respecting the dignity of the individual and the noblest

18

Southern School News, Feb., 1963.

191

traditions of our country, this is an important question which transcends the so-called race issue.”
Therefore, the group would attempt to “have this matter resolved in a manner to afford [these] children
equal educational opportunity” and would soon “institute court action with the hope that all deserving
school children may pursue their school work at the best school available.”19
In March LeFlore made good on the promise. The LDF’s Motley, Greenberg, and Derrick Bell,
along with local associated counsel Vernon Crawford and Clarence Moses, filed a complaint in Mobile’s
federal district court on the 27th on behalf of black students and their parents. At the top of the list of
plaintiffs was Birdie Mae Davis, thus the case was styled Birdie Mae Davis v. Board of School
Commissioners of Mobile County. The plaintiffs’ class action complaint sought a permanent injunction
against the school board, its individual members, and the superintendent, which they charged with
“operating a dual school system in Mobile County based wholly on the race or color” of students. The
operation of a dual system included a variety of activities the plaintiffs sought to immediately enjoin:
initial assignment of students to racially identifiable schools; assignment of teachers, administrators, and
staff on the basis of race; dual and discriminatory funds appropriation; construction of segregated
facilities; the racially-based approval of curricula; and the segregation of all extra-curricular activities.
The plaintiffs sought an order from the federal court directing the defendants to completely reorganize
the school system “into a unitary non-racial system” by, in part, providing a plan for the reassignment of
all pupils in the system. The complaint documented all of the recent efforts of LeFlore and the black
activists of the city to effectuate school desegregation, including the November, 1962 petition and the
more recent enrollment attempt and transfer requests, which had gone unanswered. Announcing the
filing, LeFlore lamented that such action was necessary. “We were hopeful,” he said, “that public
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schools here may have been voluntarily desegregated as has already happened in at least 20 other
southern cities,” but the school authorities had again given the activists “no choice.”20
That same month, activists in Huntsville filed a similar action. Two local doctors and activist
members of the black middle class organized the effort: Sonnie Hereford III, a general practitioner, and
John Cashin, a dentist. Hereford was the son of sharecroppers who had paid his own way through
Alabama A&M and had left the state for medical school in Tennessee, returning to practice in 1956.
Cashin was born into an activist middle-class family. His father had also been a dentist, his mother a
teacher and school administrator. He briefly attended Fisk University in Tennessee before transferring
to Tennessee State and then matriculating to Meharry Medical School, where he met Hereford.21 Both
Cashin and Hereford had been inspired to energize the movement in Huntsville by activists from the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) who came to the city in early 1962 to organize sit-in
protests. Hereford became involved by volunteering bond money for the arrested students. He and
Cashin were soon joining in demonstrations themselves, and by 1963 they had struck at the heart of the
business moderates’ deepest fears by picketing the New York Stock Exchange with signs reading “Don’t
Invest in Huntsville – It’s Bad for Business.” The two doctors’ actions were partly responsible for the
concessions that business moderates had made in Huntsville to that point, most notably the
desegregation of downtown lunch counters. But they were aware, through negotiations with the white
leaders, that litigation would be necessary to bring about any movement on the school desegregation
front. Skeptical of the successful potential of the CRD suits, they decided to file their own. Thus did
Hereford v. Huntsville Board of Education fall on the docket of Judge Grooms on March 11, 1963. The
complaint was filed by five parents on behalf of their children, as a class action seeking much the same
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relief as in the Mobile case, with the only difference being that the Huntsville plaintiffs specifically cited
the unconstitutional application of the Alabama placement law.22

The “Very Heart of Our Defenses”: Tuskegee and Lee v. Macon
Before 1962, there had been one elementary/secondary school desegregation suit filed in the
state of Alabama: Shuttlesworth. In 1962 there were two pending: Nelson and Armstrong. By the spring
of 1963, there were eight, including the Hereford case and two impacted areas suits in Huntsville and
the Davis case and one impacted areas suit in Mobile. The one other school desegregation suit on the
dockets of the federal courts in Alabama that spring would turn out to be the most far-reaching among
them, the most jurisprudentially significant, and the most meaningful for the largest number of black
school children. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it grew from one of the great seedbeds of Alabama grassroots
activism – the city of Tuskegee. The NAACP-LDF’s Constance Baker Motley, LDF associated counsel Fred
Gray, and Gray’s partner Solomon Seay, Jr. prepared the complaint, which Gray filed on January 28 in
the federal district court in Montgomery. There it landed on the docket of Frank Johnson, giving it the
best chance of any of the eight to provide relief without the necessity of appeal.23
Gray filed the class action complaint on behalf of 16 black students in Tuskegee and their
parents, seeking a permanent injunction against the Macon County Board of Education, its individual
members, and the superintendent. Like the Birmingham challenge, Gray’s petition focused on the use
of dual attendance zones for initial assignment of students, teachers, administrators, and personnel.
The plaintiffs acknowledged having failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the placement
law, arguing that this was because “the remedy there provided is inadequate to provide the relief
sought.” In other words, they wished to have the court acknowledge what everyone knew – that the
22
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placement law would never be used to bring about that which it was designed to thwart. The placement
law had been upheld on its face in Shuttlesworth, but it had been, Gray charged, “uniformly
administered and applied to the plaintiffs in such a way as to discriminate against them with respect to
their constitutional rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment not to be denied admission to the
public schools of Macon County, Alabama on the ground of race or color.” Gray also seized the issue
raised by the Justice Department and argued that the Macon County school officials had used nearly
$100,000 in impacted areas funding allocated for the dependents of employees at the federal Veterans’
Administration Hospital in Tuskegee. In lieu of a decree enjoining the defendants from operating the
dual system, Gray prayed that the court would demand that the school board submit a desegregation
plan, which the court could then monitor.24
The case was styled Lee v. Macon County Board of Education. The lead plaintiff was Anthony
Lee, whose father Detroit Lee had urged Gray to file the complaint in the first place. The elder Lee had
come to Alabama from Texas in the New Deal era and had become involved with the Civilian
Conservation Corps, later deciding he wanted to attend the city’s famed Tuskegee Institute and emulate
his heroes, Booker T. Washington and George Washington Carver. After a brief stint at the Institute, he
had worked as a civilian at the air base in Tuskegee during the war and remained in the city afterwards,
helping to organize its first NAACP chapter in the meantime, despite what has been described as the
Institute’s “historical antipathy” to the organization. He had also quickly became involved with the
existing activist organization in the city, the Tuskegee Civic Association (TCA), during its long-running
campaign to register the city’s black voters. Tuskegee and Macon County were overwhelming black, and
as Sam Engelhardt understood, black voter registration could mean real political power. Lee had been a
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plaintiff in the landmark gerrymandering case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in which Gray and the TCA had
secured a favorable ruling from Judge Johnson, thwarting Engelhardt’s efforts to draw blacks out of the
city limits and overcoming Attorney General John Patterson’s illegal raid of the TCA offices. The TCA
continued to prioritize voting rights activism into the late Fifties, but Lee had other plans. He had come
to Fred Gray at that time and asked him to take on the county’s segregated school system, offering his
eldest son as the initial “test case.” Lee had five children, some of whom were attending the county’s
all-black Catholic parochial school. As a clerk at the VA hospital, the burden of private school tuition was
difficult to bear for Lee, but his position as a federal employee also facilitated his brazen activism, which
was a driving force in all that he did. Gray and TCA president Charles Gomillion asked Lee to wait until
their voting rights cases were settled, when they could all devote more time to school litigation. Gray
offered to make the Lees lead plaintiffs in the case when he filed it. When the complaint was finally
filed in January, 1963, Lee’s eldest son had graduated. And so his next oldest son, Anthony, appeared at
the top of the list of plaintiffs.25
Detroit Lee had sent a letter and an accompanying petition the previous September to the
county school authorities to set up the litigation. The Macon County Superintendent, C.A. Pruitt, was a
former Auburn football player known affectionately as “Hardboy.” He acknowledged receipt of the
letter and petition but took no action on them, nor did he act on a follow-up letter Lee sent that
October. The TCA worked the remainder of the fall to put together a list of willing and appropriate
plaintiffs. This was a complicated and serious process that attorneys and activist leaders in each case
had to undertake. In this case the effort was organized by Lee, Gomillion, and the Reverend K.L. Buford,
who would soon spearhead the reorganization of the NAACP in Tuskegee. The group approached
families that they thought would be interested or willing and invited them to meetings, at which the
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leaders would tell the parents what to expect. Of course, they had to consider which students would
not only be willing to endure what might come, but which would also be scholastically appropriate to be
the so-called “test cases.” Generally this meant outgoing students who were also near the top of their
respective classes academically, but who at the same time did not mind giving up whatever extracurricular activities that they were engaged in. The brightest students were not considered appropriate
by some, lest they outshine the white students and draw the additional ire of the white community.
Anthony Lee was a natural choice as a bright, though not top, student and a rising senior interested in
politics and law who had been exposed to the movement at the dinner table with his father. Willie
Wyatt was similarly situated. His father was an electrician at the VA hospital, so his family was shielded
from economic reprisal. He was also bright and interested in the movement. His parents, he later
recalled, “never hid politics from us” children, and so throughout the voting rights struggle in Tuskegee,
Wyatt had been exposed to the goals of the movement, the dangers and the intricacies. “I had seen
James Meredith go through this,” he remembered, “and my dad talked about Autherine Lucy a lot.” So,
he thought simply “that might be something to do.” For each student who agreed to become a “test
case,” there had to be, perhaps above all, a measure of courage. As both Wyatt and Anthony Lee later
recalled, for all of the selection process’s attention to scholastics and character and even internal
squabbles between Tuskegee’s middle and working class leaders, it often came down ultimately to “who
was brave enough.” “You don’t think about living and dying at that age,” Wyatt said, “and I had no
fear.” At the time, he said, “I didn’t know what fear was.” The gravity of the situation for which they
had signed up would become clear enough that fall.26
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By March of 1963, when Hereford and Davis joined Lee v. Macon, Armstrong and Nelson, and
the impacted areas suits on the federal trial court dockets, the reality of a litigious onslaught began to
set in for some Alabama state officials. The federal government had additionally flustered
segregationists that month by announcing its intention to operate integrated on-base schools for federal
dependents in impacted areas for which it had not yet filed suit, including Montgomery (home to
Maxwell and Gunter Air Force Bases), Dothan (home of the Army’s Ft. Rucker), and Anniston (home of
the Army’s Ft. McClellan). State Superintendent of Education Austin Meadows, a died-in-the-wool
segregationist with a penchant for outrageous bloviation, told the Alabama Education Association that it
was time for the white race to “outwit the forces that would destroy us or delay us in our date with
destiny.” It was up to the assembled educators, he argued, to teach “racial pride,” lest white racial
integrity be “doomed.” They could obviously no longer look to Washington for federal aid, he said,
“unless we get the Constitution of the United States amended to outlaw federal control of education.”
The state stood to lose millions, Meadows continued, “because there is no Judas Iscariot among us who
will sell our racial integrity for the proverbial 30 pieces of silver.” At the same time Attorney General
Flowers, more realistic in his outlook but just as apocalyptic in his rhetoric, complained to the press that
he did not have the manpower to combat so many suits as his office had been tasked with defending,
particularly those filed by the Justice Department. In addition to the impacted areas suits, these
included a number of voting rights cases seeking records inspection in Black Belt counties. Flowers
called the impacted areas complaints the “suits to supersede all suits.” If they were successful, he
frankly predicted, “it’s all over.” But he then singled out Lee v. Macon, calling it the “most deadly” of all
the actions pending. In Lee, unlike the impacted areas cases, there were private individuals who had
made complaints. The attorney general knew that Lee thus had a higher probability of success than the
DOJ suits. Of course, there were private plaintiffs in the other pending cases in the state and across the
South as well, but only Lee v. Macon was filed in Frank Johnson’s court, and Flowers knew that too. It
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was a case, he worriedly acknowledged, that could constitute the beginning of the end, because it
struck, he said, right “at the very heart of our defenses.”27

Birmingham, The “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door,” and the Federal Commitment
At the behest of Fred Shuttlesworth and the ACMHR, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference began a direct action campaign in Birmingham in late March in an attempt to force business
moderates’ into significant concessions. The suppression of the protests garnered international
attention and widespread condemnation. During the upheaval, Police Commissioner Eugene “Bull”
Conner and the rest of the incumbent city administration refused to give way to the duly elected,
incoming administration. Birmingham voters, encouraged by the business moderates, had
overwhelmingly approved a change from a mayor-commission to a mayor-council form of government
and had subsequently elected Albert Boutwell mayor, but sitting mayor Albert Hanes and Commissioner
Conner refused to leave office. Litigation soon forced them to relent, but not before Conner ordered
the city fire department to use fire hoses and high-pressure water cannons on peacefully protesting
children and ordered the police to use the canine squad to intimidate protestors in the city’s Kelly
Ingram Park. Images of the seemingly excessive, violent crackdown were broadcast and printed across
the country as hundreds of marchers and picketers, including Shuttlesworth, Ralph Abernathy, and
famously Martin Luther King, Jr. were hauled off to the Birmingham jail.28
The city’s business moderate cadre was a relatively small group, led by real estate executive and
Chamber of Commerce president Sydney Smyer. It included a number of downtown store owners and a
few leading industrialists. They spoke for only a very small percentage of the city’s whites, but they had
the power and the desire to negotiate a settlement with the leaders of SCLC, namely King and
27
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Abernathy, in late April and early May. Smyer summed up the group’s position when he remarked
during the negotiations, "I'm no integrationist, but I'm not a goddamn fool, either." Only a fool would
have failed to realize that racial unrest, boycotts, and national and international press coverage of police
brutality was bad for business, and so Smyer and the others were willing to meet some of the
protestors’ demands. Shuttlesworth was in the hospital when the group negotiated and subsequently
announced an agreement, and he immediately made clear that he felt betrayed by the establishment
black middle class moderates who allowed SCLC to accept far less than what ACMHR had initially set out
to achieve. The agreement allowed for the desegregation of downtown lunch counters, the gradual
removal of “white” and “colored” signs from department store waiting rooms, and a promise to
promote and gradually enforce the hiring of black store clerks. Shuttlesworth had his eyes set on much
more, including school desegregation. The activist leader dragged himself from his hospital bed and
begrudgingly announced the terms of the settlement to the press before collapsing from exhaustion. It
was a difficult end for Shuttlesworth, but he could take some solace in the fact that, even then, the
Armstrong and Nelson cases were sitting on Judge Lynne’s docket, likely to be decided that summer.29
Klansmen almost immediately attempted to assassinate King by bombing his brother’s home in
the Ensley neighborhood as well as the A.G. Gaston Hotel downtown, where King always stayed and
from whence the settlement had been announced. King had left earlier that day to make it back to
Atlanta to preach the next morning and thus escaped the fate the Klansmen intended. Blacks in nearby
homes in Ensley, and those brought out from downtown stores and bars by the sound of the Gaston
Hotel blast, nonetheless responded by assaulting arriving police at both locations and by engaging in
what quickly became the first full-scale urban riot of the 1960s. President Kennedy authorized the
mobilization of the Second Infantry Division and the Eighty-Second Airborne. At the same time, the
Alabama State Troopers, along with a posse led by Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark, established their
29
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newfound role as the governor’s personal shock troops by descending upon the city at Wallace’s order.
The troopers and the Dallas posse assisted the Birmingham Police, against that unit’s will, in quelling the
unrest in short order. King subsequently disengaged from the campaign entirely and left Shuttlesworth
to continue to pursue his own, more lofty goals. Shuttlesworth was left to deal with not only the black
establishment leaders whom the Birmingham minister blamed for the watered-down agreement, but
also a community of black people who were obviously frustrated enough to riot, settlement or not. In
May the city itself settled into a fragile peace that almost no one was fully content with. Meanwhile, the
plaintiffs in the two Birmingham school cases filed a motion to force Lynne to finally issue a ruling, and
Vivian Malone filed a motion before Judge Grooms to consolidate her case with the Lucy case and force
the University of Alabama to admit her for the summer semester.30
As the events in Birmingham were reaching a critical stage late that April, U.S. Attorney General
Robert Kennedy had secured an audience with Wallace in Montgomery. During the meeting, Kennedy
tried to get Wallace to privately assure that he could maintain law and order in the event of school
desegregation. Wallace and Seymour Trammell tried to get Kennedy to use his influence to force the
NAACP to back off its support for the various desegregation lawsuits. Neither one had budged, and
Wallace had announced to the press, “My stand has not changed” on the issue of defiance of school
desegregation. In the governor’s opinion, Kennedy “did not change in this regard either.” The attorney
general wanted to avoid the use of federal troops or federalized guardsmen, to avoid another Little Rock
or Ole Miss. Wallace wanted precisely the opposite. The presence of federal troops in Alabama would
make all of his denunciations of federal tyranny and outside agitation and interference real for the white
voters of Alabama.31
The violence in Birmingham had caught the governor off guard. Once it had subsided, he began
to consider how to exploit tensions surrounding the potential desegregation of the University of
30
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Alabama in Tuscaloosa. Wallace was confident he could use Klan contacts like Grand Dragon Robert
Shelton to contain violence there if the ultimate payoff would be political triumph in forcing the
Kennedys to use federal troops to desegregate the university. In a subsequent meeting with Tuscaloosa
banker George LaMaistre, Wallace revealed which of the two outcomes was more important to him.
LaMaistre was a business moderate and one of a precious few whites in Alabama who believed
segregation was morally wrong. He approached the governor with an appeal to maintain law and order
in the event of either elementary and secondary school desegregation that fall, or the seemingly
inevitable and more immediately threatening desegregation of the university at Tuscaloosa. The two
engaged in a shouting match in the governor's office during which LaMaistre stressed that the Brown
decision was the "law of the land" and that to disobey it was pointless. Wallace retorted that “law and
order” was a "communist term” and that "every time the communists take over, they clamp down with
law and order."32
In May Judge Grooms granted Vivian Malone’s motion to consolidate her case with Lucy’s and
held that the 1956 injunction still applied to the University of Alabama’s dean of admissions. He denied
a motion for delay filed by university officials, who cited the Birmingham unrest and argued that it
would be “extremely unwise” for Malone to enroll that summer semester. Grooms announced that he
had taken “judicial notice of the condition that exists in this state,” but he argued that the governor had
“said that he would maintain law and order.” Granting the motion for delay, he argued, “would be
tantamount to saying that law and order has broken down.” The judge reminded the parties that when
he and Judge Rives had allowed for delay in the Lucy case years earlier, the Supreme Court had
“promptly slapped both of us down. . . . I don’t see,” he said, “that I have any alternative about the
matter. The court . . . is not a free agent in the matter of school segregation or integration.” The
university board of trustees declared similar resignation when announcing Malone’s acceptance, arguing
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that it was “faced with the choice between the admission of some of the applicants or the outright
disobedience of the order of the federal court with consequent prison sentences and other severe
penalties for the dean of admissions and any successor appointed for him, and everyone else officially
connected with the university – which punishment would not prevent the admission.”33
Wallace immediately declared his intention to make good on his campaign pledges and to block
“any Negro who attempts to enroll at the university.” He vowed to use the state’s police power “to see
that the laws are faithfully executed” and to “safeguard the health, safety and welfare of the state. . . . I
embody the sovereignty of this state,” Wallace said. Thus it was up to him, and him alone, to engage in
“legal resistance and legal defiance.” The Justice Department filed for a temporary restraining order
against the governor, which Judge Lynne granted, writing that “thoughtful people, if they can free
themselves from tensions produced by established principles with which they vehemently disagree,
must concede that the governor of a sovereign state has no authority to obstruct or prevent the
execution of the lawful orders of a court of the United States.” Lynne proceeded to use the personal
pronoun for the first time ever in a written opinion. “I love the people of Alabama,” he wrote, “I know
that people of both races are troubled and, like Jonah of old, are ‘angry even unto death’ . . . .” But it
was his personal prayer, Lynne continued, “that all of our people, in keeping with our finest traditions,
will join in this resolution that law and order will be maintained . . . .” Lynne was a segregationist, but
even he understood that Wallace’s brand of outright defiance was beyond the scope of reasonable
resistance under the rule of law and within the federal system. “In the final analysis,” he wrote, “the
concept of law and order, the very essence of republican government, embraces the notion that when
the judicial process of a state or federal court . . . has been exhausted and has resulted in a final
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judgment, all persons affected thereby are obliged to obey it.” Wallace had no intention of going to jail
for contempt, but he did intend to milk the situation for all of its political worth.34
For these reasons, Wallace orchestrated the carefully planned charade that – because of his
campaign pledge to this effect – became known as the “stand in the schoolhouse door.” The governor
prearranged to stand in front of the Foster Auditorium admissions building, seemingly blocking Malone’s
path, until confronted by Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, who had been authorized by
executive order of President Kennedy to take “all appropriate steps to enforce the laws of the United
States.” Wallace, flanked by the shortest state troopers that could be found to make him appear taller
for the anxiously assembled press corps, read from a podium a prepared statement decrying and
“forbid[ing]” the “illegal act” of enrolling Malone and James Hood. When the governor refused to step
aside, a seemingly frustrated Katzenbach walked away and had DOJ officials and U.S. Marshals take
Malone and Hood to the dormitories; the two students had actually already registered earlier and had
been kept in the car to avoid having to arrest Wallace for contempt. With Wallace still defiantly
posturing, though, President Kennedy issued an order federalizing the Alabama National Guard, which
was then dispatched to the scene. The general in command of the unit reported to Wallace that it was
his “sad duty” to order the governor, again in the doorway of Foster Auditorium, to step aside. Only
then did Wallace give way, calling it a “bitter pill” to swallow and part of a “trend towards military
dictatorship.” Wallace had gotten most of what he wanted: he had used the state and local police as
well as his Citizens’ Council and Klan contacts to ensure there were no riots and no violence of any kind.
Yet he had forced the Kennedy Administration to federalize the Guard anyway. So he could the next day
lament the federal “military occupation” when conceding the enrollment of a third black student, David
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McGlathery, at the University of Alabama’s Huntsville Center. Attorney General Flowers later called the
it “the greatest production since Cleopatra.”35
The civil rights movement had already begun to push the Kennedy Administration into a firmer
commitment. The events in Birmingham had confirmed in the President’s mind the need for new civil
rights legislation, and the showdown over Vivian Malone’s enrollment gave him the opportunity to
announce its proposal. Kennedy had already in February requested legislation from Congress with the
aim of making the CRD's job of enforcing voting rights law easier, giving HEW the ability to provide
technical and financial assistance to desegregating school systems, and extending and enhancing the life
of the Civil Rights Commission. In proposing that legislation, the President had appealed to business
moderates by arguing that racial discrimination was detrimental to economic growth, to America's
international image and prestige, and to the cost of public welfare. Even then he also tried to also make
the appeal that so few in Alabama were willing to make. He told the American people flatly that
segregation, "above all," was simply “wrong." It should be "clear," in "hearts and minds," he argued,
that the fundamental reason for enacting such legislation was "because it [was] right." After the spring
protests and suppression in Birmingham, Kennedy had tasked Burke Marshall and DOJ with formulating
a new, sweeping civil rights bill aimed at segregated public accommodations and segregated education,
and in proposing this, his angle would be the same.36
Wallace’s defiant spectacle at Tuscaloosa gave the President occasion to go before the nation
and announce the proposed legislation, and again he used an appeal to morality that would remain
difficult, if not impossible, to find in the state of Alabama. In his partly ad-libbed speech, Kennedy first
lamented that “the presence of Alabama National Guardsmen was required on the University of
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Alabama to carry out the final and unequivocal order of the United States District Court of the Northern
District of Alabama,” which had ordered the admission of two “clearly qualified young Alabama
residents who happened to have been born Negro.” He then called for Americans to “examine [their]
conscience” about “this and related incidents.” The nation was facing, he said, a “moral crisis,” and
those who saw fit to “do nothing” were not only inviting violence but also “shame.” Those who chose to
“act boldly” were “recognizing right.” Kennedy said he was calling for legislation that would outlaw
discrimination in public accommodations and that would “authorize the federal government to
participate more fully in lawsuits designed to end segregation in public education.” The “orderly
implementation of the Supreme Court decision [in Brown]” could no longer be “left solely to those who
may not have the economic resources to carry the legal action or who may be subject to harassment.”
The issue, the President emphasized, was not sectional, nor was it partisan. It was, of course, legal and
legislative, but he argued that “law alone cannot make men see right.” In closing, Kennedy
acknowledged that the country was “confronted primarily with a moral issue” which was “as old as the
scriptures and as clear as the Constitution.” When NAACP Field Secretary Medgar Evers was shot dead
the following night in Mississippi, the country could see that many violent segregationists’ ears were to
remain deaf to such constitutional, biblical, and moral appeals.37

*****
The civil rights movement in Alabama had thus pushed the President of the United States into
making the connection that the majority of white Alabamians could or would not make. Most
segregationists in Alabama were more easily swayed to George Wallace’s martial appeals to defiant
resistance than to seemingly weak-kneed appeals to moral conscience and racial equality. One hundred
37
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years of Lost Cause history teaching had convinced them that the federal government could be a
tyrannical force, and recent events in Little Rock and Oxford and Tuscaloosa had confirmed that they
were witnessing a present-day manifestation of this force. They were prepared to “give the word of a
race of honor” that they would “tolerate their boot in [their] face no longer” and to eschew “the easy
way of federal dictatorship and amalgamation in return for fat bellies.” But black activists had forced
the issue not only onto the streets, as in Birmingham that spring, but also squarely into the federal
courts, the one and only place where many among them thought the struggle to end segregated
education could be effective.
During the summer of 1963, the eight school desegregation actions pending against Huntsville,
Madison County, Mobile, Birmingham, and Macon County were waiting to be adjudicated, and the Fifth
Circuit appellate court was no longer willing to delay Brown’s implementation. It was clear to many that
these activists, their newfound allies in the Kennedy Administration, and certain members of the federal
judiciary were going to make the fall of 1963 that “most historical moment” which Wallace had
portended in his inaugural speech. Though few segregationists were swayed by Kennedy’s impassioned
imploration, many were being won over to the cause of “law and order” and were beginning to, as the
moment approached, reluctantly accept that absolutely segregated education might be about to meet
some sort of end. As these moderates prepared to foster non-violence and compliance, some among
them began to channel absolute defiance into peaceful and seemingly compliant evasion. At the same
time, some of those who had been rallied to the fight by Wallace’s call to arms prepared to turn his
words into violent actions that even the governor would have to abhor.
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CHAPTER 6: “THE LAST GRAIN OF SALT FROM THE LEGAL HOURGLASS,” SUMMER, 1963

Just two weeks after the “stand in the schoolhouse door” at Tuscaloosa, George Wallace saw an
even greater opportunity to make good on his defiant campaign pledges. He announced on June 28,
1963 his intention to “take appropriate action in keeping with the dignity of [the] state” if pending court
action brought the threat of desegregated public elementary and secondary schools to fruition. “At the
moment,” Wallace announced, “there is no court order telling us to admit Negroes to our high schools.”
But, “whenever the time comes,” the governor said, he would make a “forceful stand” to “prevent
tampering” with the state’s “school system.” It was anyone’s guess at that point what sort of force
Wallace had in mind, but it was increasingly clear with each passing day that summer that “the time”
was coming very soon.1
Five school desegregation suits were pending adjudication at that point, including five brought
by black activists: Hereford in Huntsville, Armstrong and Nelson in Birmingham, Lee in Macon County,
and Davis in Mobile. In addition the U.S. Department of Justice had filed impacted areas suits against
Huntsville and surrounding Madison County. Given the willingness of federal judges on the bench in
Alabama to thwart or delay civil rights proceedings, it was no surprise that the first judicial rulings in
1963 on these challenges to segregated education were setbacks for the plaintiffs. Blacks pressed the
issue, though, with the assistance of not only the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division (CRD), but
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF). If some federal trial court judges were unwilling to
grant relief, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was by then comprised of a majority of justices, backed by
recent decisions of the Supreme Court, who felt that the time for delay and intransigence had run out.
And in the Macon County case, Judge Frank Johnson proved willing to grant relief without the necessity
of appeal. By the summer’s end, time would run out on defending Jim Crow schools from any breach of
1
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the color line. Not everyone was willing to accept the federal courts as the final arbiters of segregation’s
fate, however. And the ever-looming specter of George Wallace reminded them that they were not
alone. With the state still on edge from the recent events in Birmingham, they watched as the drama
moved from the streets to the courtroom.
When the first desegregation injunctions were handed down that summer, the reaction
amongst whites in Alabama was mostly predictable. Law-and-order moderates began to search for
some way to effect minimal compliance without violence or school closure. Other segregationists
simply decried the court orders, and lamented black activism, the interference of outside “agitators,”
and the latest encroachment of the federal government on states’ rights. Hardline segregationists in the
Ku Klux Klan, the White Citizens’ Councils, and other groups planned to frustrate the efforts of the lawand-order moderates. Wallace himself publically called for law and order, but behind the scenes he
encouraged the efforts of the hardline segregationists and sought to dissuade the law-and-order
moderates from complying. The governor’s campaign had been the pinnacle of racial defiance, and his
gubernatorial record was about to be marred by more desegregation than had ever occurred in
Alabama, and more than had occurred in such a short period of time in any other state in the Deep
South. Already, his restless ambitions were turning to creating a national profile for himself. He felt
that in order to remain a viable candidate, both within Alabama and beyond, he had to prove that his
pledges had not been empty. Fearful of the effect of the governor’s potential actions on more militant
segregationists, the moderates prepared with a sense of urgency and foreboding for that “most
historical moment” of which the governor had spoken only moths before.

The Fifth Circuit Four and Armstrong v. Birmingham, U.S. v. Madison, and Davis v. Mobile
In May 1963, Judge Seybourn Lynne provided the first blow to black activist litigants when he
refused to order the Birmingham school authorities to desegregate or even to formulate a
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desegregation plan. Lynne dismissed the Nelson case altogether. The Nelson children had moved to
Michigan, had been living there for the duration of the trial, were attending schools there, and were
apparently not coming back. Lynne ruled that Rev. Nelson, therefore, had no standing to sue on their
behalf. Fred Shuttlesworth’s children had also moved to Cleveland, where Shuttlesworth himself would
soon move and pastor a church until his death many years later. Lynne dismissed the Shuttlesworth
children as plaintiffs in the Armstrong case, leaving only the four children of James Armstrong: Dwight,
Denise, James, Jr., and Floyd. The judge concluded that it was “graphically” apparent from
Superintendent Wright’s testimony that the Birmingham Board of Education had “operated a
segregated school system based upon race in the past” and that it was “doing so now” with “no plans to
discontinue such an operation.” He also rejected “out of hand” certain evidence offered by the defense.
Lynne was particularly unimpressed with the state-sponsored sociological and anthropological studies
on segregation which attacked the major premise of Brown – that separate educational facilities were
inherently unequal and that their maintenance was a deprivation of equal protection as provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Lynne’s rejection said more about the ambitious defense than about his own
views on desegregation, though.2
The judge was swayed by the testimony of a number of defense witnesses who predicted
“chaotic” or even “catastrophic” results from “indiscriminate mixing.” Following the path of delay
opened by the Shuttlesworth ruling, Lynne agreed with the defense’s claim that the plaintiffs had not
properly exhausted their administrative remedies as provided by the Pupil Placement Law. He
acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had become “especially alert to strike down
deviations by district courts from the constitutional norm of Brown in sometimes trenchant opinions
delivered by able judges.” But he argued that the appellate court had not yet been able to rule on the
Alabama Placement Law’s application. The Fourth Circuit had done so relative to the North Carolina
2
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placement law in the Carson v. Warlick case, he noted, and it had upheld that law’s application. Lynne
could not “sanction discrimination” designed to perpetuate segregation “in the name of the placement
law,” but he was still not prepared to grant injunctive relief until the school officials’ “good faith [had]
been tested.” Thus the burden of initiating desegregation was, once again, said to be on the black
students themselves.3
The Birmingham school board’s good faith had, in actuality, been tested for nine years running,
and everyone involved knew this. The ruling was intended as a compromise measure, to allow the
school board the opportunity to implement some measure of token integration under the placement
law and without the necessity of an injunction. Admitting the four Armstrong children that fall, and
perhaps a few more here and there in subsequent years, was what Lynne called “discreet
desegregation.” He and other moderate segregationists considered it far more feasible and palatable
than the wholesale reorganization, or “massive integration,” that the plaintiffs were seeking. Even if the
Fifth Circuit reversed him, Lynne could at least say he had made a valiant attempt to delay and had
maintained his judicial integrity.4
Attorneys Willie Williams and Ernest Jackson quickly announced the plaintiffs’ intention to
appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Williams said that he had been “hoping to provide evidence that would
satisfy the judge that he had to issue an injunction for massive desegregation at this time, not go on a
student-by-student basis.” Shuttlesworth was more candid in his reaction, characterizing the decision as
generally “against what America promised,” adding, “[It] must be appealed at once.” He criticized the
decision more specifically, saying, “Evidently Judge Lynne has not read the Memphis case in which the
U.S. Supreme Court indicated that it is tired of delays in school desegregation.” The Birmingham
3
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reverend referred to a decision issued just days before in a public accommodations case, in which the
Court applied Brown via Gayle v. Browder and held that “deliberate speed” could not “countenance
indefinite delay.” Williams and Jackson, and Lynne too, were of course fully aware of the Memphis case,
as they were of the more immediately important June 3 decision of the Supreme Court in a combined
Nashville and Knoxville school case. In that case, the Court held that pupil transfer programs clearly
based on race were “one-way ticket[s] leading to but one destination . . . continued segregation.” The
Court held that state administrative remedies no longer needed to be exhausted for courts to provide
relief, a position it bolstered with a decision in an Illinois school case handed down the same day. In
light of these developments, Williams and Jackson had good reason to not only appeal Lynne’s decision
but to also enter a motion for a preliminary injunction pending a ruling on the merits of the appeal.5
Both the plaintiffs’ and the school board’s attorneys wanted the Fifth Circuit to hear the appeal
en banc, or with all nine circuit judges sitting. But Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle assigned only a three-judge
court consisting of himself, Judges Richard Rives, and newly appointed Judge Walter Gewin. The
outlook was not good in either case for the school board, despite the presence on the panel of Gewin.
Gewin was a native and resident of Tuscaloosa. Prior to his appointment, he had been a prominent trial
lawyer in Birmingham and in West Alabama’s Hale County, which he also represented for a term in the
state legislature in the late 1930s and early 1940s. He briefly served in the judge advocate general’s
corps in the final year of World War II, after which he served as a county and state prosecutor. The 1961
Kennedy appointee was generally considered to be a strident segregationist, though he was less
doggedly so than, for example, Mississippi’s Ben Cameron. He would later soften his position in school
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desegregation cases and civil rights cases in general, but at the time he could be reasonably expected to
side with the school board.6
Tuttle and Rives, though, were half of the “Fifth Circuit Four” and were almost sure to side with
the plaintiff-appellants. Tuttle himself had issued a ruling just days before strongly rebuking District
Judge Clarence Allgood for upholding the Birmingham School Board’s suspension of hundreds of
students who had been arrested for their participation in demonstrations in the spring. Tuttle called the
arrests “illegal” and the subsequent actions of the school board “shocking.” He agreed to hear the
appeal – argued by NAACP-LDF attorney Constance Baker Motley – the very night of the district court’s
decision. Williams, Jackson, and Motley were optimistic, then, about the Armstrong appeal. In addition
to Tuttle’s suspensions ruling, they were aware of several other instances in which the Fifth Circuit court
had issued injunctive relief prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. They cited seven of
these in their brief to the court. In one such case – involving Savannah’s city-county school system –the
appellate court overturned the school board’s use of the state of Georgia’s placement law.7
The federal district courts continued to frustrate black activists in Alabama, however. A rapid
back-and-forth between the trial courts and the appellate court developed that summer of 1963, prior
to the opening of schools in the fall. The day after Lynne’s Armstrong ruling, Judge Hobart Grooms
issued a ruling dismissing the Justice Department’s impacted areas suits against Huntsville and Madison
County. According to Grooms, the cases illustrated “the rule that the hand that extends the benefaction
may also attempt to control its use.” He agreed with the defendant school boards and state officials
that not only did the United States lack the authority to bring the suit in the first place, but it failed to
state in its complaint a claim upon which relief could be granted. Grooms noted that the Fifth Circuit
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had recently reaffirmed its refusal to consider the U.S. a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment.
He also pointed out, as Burke Marshall and the CRD’s St. John Barrett had feared, that the Congress had
not only repeatedly refused to usurp local school systems’ authority, but it had refused to attach
desegregation riders to federal education funding bills. Nor had Congress granted the attorney general
the authority to bring civil rights suits in any area other than voting rights; indeed, Congress had
“deliberately failed” and “deliberately refused” to do so. Grooms argued that the state’s placement law
was still constitutionally sound and that no black students in the districts in question had brought
complaints arguing discriminatory application of it (although the plaintiffs in the Hereford case were
seeking injunctive relief against the Huntsville school authorities, which Grooms footnoted without
further comment). Finally, Grooms cited a U.S. district judge’s recent dismissal of a DOJ impacted areas
suit in Mississippi. He granted the motion to dismiss and suggested that relief for the federal
government rested not with the courts but with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
“Our cries to Washington have been so loud,” Grooms wrote, “that they muted the claims to local
control and states’ rights.” The Justice Department indicated its intent to appeal to the Fifth Circuit.8
Plaintiffs in the Davis case in Mobile found no easier route to relief than the Justice Department
or the Armstrong plaintiffs in Birmingham. Sitting on the federal bench in the state’s port city was
District Judge Daniel Thomas. A Truman appointee, Thomas had previously been a state circuit solicitor
and Mobile County solicitor before serving in the Navy during World War II. He moved to the bench
after six years of successful private practice with one of Mobile’s most prominent firms, and he very
quickly established himself as a foe of civil rights litigation. By all accounts a very personable, friendly,
and likeable judge, Thomas had facilitated some measure of cooperation between business moderates
and black activists, namely John LeFlore, in desegregating some of Mobile’s public accommodations. He
was nonetheless clearly on the side of the segregationists when the law allowed it, and he routinely
8
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frustrated civil rights litigation if he thought things were moving too fast. Justice Department attorneys
who litigated before Thomas variously described the judge as “weak” and “reluctant.” One DOJ
attorney who tried a voting rights case in the Southern District later concluded that Thomas “found civil
rights cases distasteful” and that he believed delay in such cases was “a legitimate judicial technique,”
particularly if it could be justified as reducing the likelihood of violence. According to the attorney, he
was “always careful to follow the minimum of what the law required”; he “repeatedly placed an
artificially narrow construction on the law and on higher court decisions”; and he was ultimately “unable
to act as a neutral judge.”9
Motley later recalled that, in 1963, “everyone in Mobile was ready for desegregation except the
federal district judge [Thomas].” The LDF attorney plainly exaggerated – not “everyone” else was ready
for desegregation. But she was spot on about Judge Thomas. On April 25, during a hearing at which he
refused Motley’s request that the court hear oral arguments, Thomas also refused to rule on the
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the Mobile school board to submit a
desegregation plan within 30 days. Thomas instead gave each side that same amount of time to file
briefs and two more weeks to file reply briefs. By the time the matter was adjudicated, then, it would
be too late to order any sort of desegregation for the 1963-64 school year. Thomas knew this.10
Williams, Jackson, and Motley appealed Thomas’s refusal to rule on the preliminary injunction
to the Fifth Circuit. They argued that it was, in effect, a denial of the request, and that this was an abuse
of the judge’s discretionary authority. He should have actually ruled on the request for a preliminary
injunction promptly, they contended, in light of the fact that the Mobile school system was, without
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question, unconstitutionally segregated. The three judge court appointed to hear the appeal consisted
of Judges Tuttle, Rives, and Griffin Bell. Bell was a Kennedy appointee from Georgia who was set to
emerge as the leader of the court’s conservative bloc. He was generally on the other side of the aisle
from “The Four” on matters of civil rights and school desegregation. He has also been described,
though, as a moderate with “a masterful ability to accommodate competing interests.” Bell joined in a
per curiam opinion denying the plaintiffs’ petition and refusing to cite Judge Thomas for abuse of
discretionary authority. The ruling carried a “caveat,” however. The court held that it was the “duty of
Judge Thomas to promptly rule on this motion for preliminary injunction.” It added, “The amount of
time available for the transition from segregated to desegregated schools becomes more sharply limited
with the passage of years since the first and second Brown decisions.” Therefore, it was the appellate
court’s duty to “require prompt and reasonable starts, even displacing District Court discretion, where
local control is not desired, or is abdicated by failure to promptly act.”11
Thusly bound and mildly admonished by the appellate court, Thomas prepared for a quick ruling
upon the submission of briefs. In a brief prepared by local defense attorneys and Birmingham’s
segregation law specialist Joe Johnston, the defendant Mobile school authorities argued that it was not
“practicable as an administrative matter” for the school board to submit a plan for desegregation for
that fall, as enrollments for particular schools had already been set. The board maintained that
“wholesale reshuffling” would undoubtedly result in “chaotic conditions jeopardizing the education of
all the pupils, were it to be required on a hurried or ‘crash’ basis.” Judge Thomas agreed and issued an
order to that effect on June 24. The plaintiffs’ motion could not be granted “as a practical matter,
independent of other considerations.” Thomas held, “Radical revision of school attendance areas and
other far-reaching administrative changes simply cannot be managed within the time available.”
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Indeed, “no plan or basis for general rearrangement of an entire local school system,” the judge
asserted, “should be required by this or any court without affording to both the school authorities and
the public ample time for consideration and discussion of alternatives.” The imposition of a plan for that
fall would be “arbitrary, hasty, and premature,” would “defeat the intended purpose,” and would
“create confusion and impair the educational process for all pupils.” Thomas made clear the sort of
“alternatives” the court had in mind by citing Judge Lynne’s recent decision in the Armstrong case,
which was not controlling in Thomas’s court, but which nonetheless did “furnish a sound and
appropriate basis for rejecting the notion that the sweeping reorganization proposed by the motion is
necessary for plaintiffs’ protection.”12
In the same order, Thomas responded directly to the Fifth Circuit’s order requiring his hasty
judgment. He argued that time and patience by his court, and cooperation between moderates in the
community, had led to the orderly desegregation of the city of Mobile’s public golf course, airport, bus
lines, and libraries without the necessity of court orders. “Mobile is perhaps the most desegregated city
in the South,” the judge wrote, “with no unfortunate incidents.” Thomas wondered if it would be “too
much to ask that [the Fifth Circuit judges] be mindful of ‘that area of discretion in the desegregation
process in the District Courts’ left by the Supreme Court in the second Brown case . . . .” If they would,
Thomas was certain that “the mandate of the court will be honestly, conscientiously, and fairly carried
out with the least possible, if not complete absence of, unfortunate incidents.” In other words, Thomas
was suggesting that if desegregation were limited to delayed token transfers approved via the
placement law, then he could ensure the maintenance of law and order in Mobile. If not, there might
be “unfortunate incidents.” He set the case for trial on the merits in November and gave the school
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board until then to submit a desegregation plan for 1964-65. Motley and Vernon Crawford quickly
announced their intent to appeal.13
Just two days later, the Armstrong appeal came before the assigned three-judge panel of the
Fifth Circuit, sitting in emergency session in Montgomery rather than in the Circuit’s home city of New
Orleans. Constance Baker Motley, as the far more experienced and nationally prominent attorney
among the plaintiffs’ counsel, had agreed to argue it before the panel. The plaintiffs were asking for an
injunction that would force the Birmingham school officials to desegregate the entire first grade that
fall. Motley and her LDF colleagues were seeking similar relief in other cases in the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits. Motley was a native of Connecticut and a graduate of New York University and Columbia
Law who had been with the LDF since 1945 and had worked with Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter
on the original School Desegregation Cases. Her keen intellect, sharp wit, and professionalism had
earned her widespread respect from the men of the federal judiciary, whom she would, herself, join just
three years later, as the first African-American woman to be appointed to the federal bench. At the
Armstrong hearing, Motley confidently called Lynne’s recent ruling in the case a “clear abuse of judicial
discretion” and emphasized that the Alabama Placement Law was a “subterfuge” and “obviously a
device for retarding desegregation.” She maintained that the burden for desegregation should not be
on the individual black students but on the school authorities, and she argued that courts were going to
get “bogged down” if school boards were given a chance to use placement laws. Gewin predictably
pointed out that Judge Lynne’s ruling had not actually denied anyone access to a desegregated
education. Tuttle suggested that Lynne might have at least enjoined the board from the use of the
placement law as a means to perpetuate segregation. The lines were clearly drawn even before the

13

Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, Race Relations Law Reporter, pp. 483-5, see also at
219 F.Supp. 542 (SD, AL, 1963); Southern School News, July, 1963; Birmingham News, June 10, 25, 29, 1963;
Montgomery Advertiser, June 11, 25, 1963.

218

hearing. It was fairly clear that Tuttle and Rives were set to reverse Lynne’s decision and order some
sort of relief be granted, and they did not need Gewin to do it.14
As the panel of Tuttle, Rives, and Gewin took the Armstrong appeal under advisement, the
appeal of Judge Thomas’s actual denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction in Davis came up for a
hearing two weeks later, on July 8. It came before a panel of Judges John Brown, John Minor Wisdom,
and Bell. Brown and Wisdom quickly joined to reverse Thomas’s decision and grant the injunction
against the Mobile school board. The court cited the recent Memphis and Knoxville Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court had ruled that “deliberate speed” could not “countenance indefinite delay”
and that the context of “deliberate speed” had been “significantly altered” by the passage of time. The
judges also cited the recent decision in the Savannah school case, in which the appellate court had ruled
against the necessary exhaustion of placement-law-type administrative remedies. They rejected both
Thomas’ argument that desegregation that fall was administratively impossible and his contention that,
as they put it, “if . . . action [was] not too hastily taken, the problem [would] work itself out with no
strife or similar consequences.” The administrative problem was “not one created by the Plaintiffs,” but
was indeed one of the school officials’ own making, insofar as they had ignored the petitioners’ request
for a desegregation plan for over a year. The school board had not even presented an answer to the
original complaint, having only filed a motion to dismiss. With the trial date set for November, this
meant that at the very least, the plaintiffs would be denied their constitutional rights for yet another
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year, and even then Brown and Wisdom doubted whether the outcome would be anything more than
“the reaffirmation of the teaching of the Brown decision.”15
The court thus ordered Thomas to enter an order pending the trial of the case on the merits.
Thomas was directed to preliminarily enjoin the Mobile school board from failing to make an
“immediate start” towards desegregation, including the formulation and submission of a plan by August
1. The court then dictated the parameters of such a plan, mandating the desegregation of the first
grade that year and at least one other grade each successive year: the grade-a-year, step-ladder type
plan which was becoming increasingly common throughout the circuit. Bell dissented, to no one’s
surprise. He argued that the “chance of the disruption of the educational process in Mobile likely to be
encountered in planning and effecting the necessary changes on such short notice outweigh[ed] the
damage which [might] be incurred by the Plaintiffs waiting another year.” Bell suggested that the “lost
year” could be made up by increasing the initial ante to two grades the first year instead of just one.16
Three days later, on June 12, the panel hearing the Armstrong appeal issued its ruling. Judge
Rives wrote the majority opinion granting the plaintiffs the injunctive relief they sought against the
Birmingham school officials, with Judge Tuttle concurring separately and Judge Gewin strongly
dissenting. Judge Lynne’s assertion that the plaintiffs should have exhausted their administrative
remedies was, Rives wrote, “directly contrary to the decisions of this court,” including the recent Bush v.
Orleans ruling. Lynne had relied on a string of Fourth Circuit decisions, which Rives noted were made
irrelevant since the June 3 rulings of the Supreme Court in the Tennessee and Illinois cases. Lynne had
also argued that no black child had “taken the initiative” to bring about desegregation in Birmingham.
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Rives argued that, in addition to being simply untrue, this was also irrelevant. The Supreme Court had
declared in Brown itself, “School authorities have the primary responsibility” for initiating
desegregation, not black pupils. When school authorities abdicated this responsibility, failing to show
any kind of “good faith” start to desegregation, then the responsibility fell to the district courts, then the
appellate courts. At no time was it upon the black students and their families. As for “deliberate
speed,” Rives noted again the Memphis and Knoxville Supreme Court rulings, along with the Fifth
Circuit’s own May ruling in Davis and a June 17 ruling in an Atlanta case, and reiterated that “’the time
available for the transition from segregated to desegregated school systems’” was becoming “’more
sharply limited with the passage of years.’” The plaintiffs had filed their complaint three years prior and
were entitled to immediate injunctive relief. However, the court noted its own decision the previous
summer in a Pensacola case, in which it held that July was too late to issue an order to desegregate an
entire grade in the fall “’without any undue confusion.’” Accordingly, Rives instead ordered the trail
court to require the Birmingham board to submit a plan for the use of the Alabama Placement Law to
effectuate desegregation by student choice that fall.17
Tuttle concurred and agreed “wholeheartedly” with everything that was said in Rives’ opinion,
except for the provision for relief. Tuttle argued that the desegregation of an entire grade should have
been ordered. He maintained that the Birmingham authorities had “completely failed” to make any
start at desegregation. Rather than “accept the excuse” that the board had not “made the necessary
preparation,” he suggested, the court ought to required even more. Tuttle wrote, “[When], fortuitously
or otherwise, the first applicable order of a district court comes so late in the school year that the Board
17
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then attempts to say it is too late to do anything by the following year, I think it is the duty of the
appellate court to require a maximum effort by the Board.” Tuttle’s strong concurrence signaled that
three of The Four were prepared to order grade-level desegregation if school boards continued to
ignore their obligations. Rives was more cautious. In both Armstrong and Davis, the Alabamian’s
mitigation ultimately prevailed. Upon the issuance of the Armstrong ruling, Wisdom and Brown
modified their own order in Davis, writing, “At this initial stage in the travail of desegregating the public
schools in Alabama, the School Boards of Mobile and Birmingham face substantially the same social,
legal, and administrative difficulties.” At that “early point in the legal proceedings,” when, they
concluded, “no school board in Alabama has formulated any plan for desegregation, there should not be
one law for Birmingham and another for Mobile.” The Mobile board was thus granted a reprieve, in
effect, thanks to Rives’ influence and preference for a more cautious approach. Token desegregation in
Alabama would be as token as possible.18
Judge Gewin was nonetheless compelled to come to the defense of his fellow Alabamian, Judge
Lynne. In a sharply-worded 27-page dissent in the Armstrong decision, Gewin observed that Judges
Tuttle and Rives had “spoken in such inaccurate and disapproving terms with reference to the opinion
and order of the distinguished trial judge.” Gewin found it “not only impossible to agree with them,”
but necessary to write such a dissent to “inform those who may be interested of my opinion of the
actual holding of the District Court.” He asserted that Lynne’s order and opinion, if read properly,
“destroy[ed] every reason asserted in the majority opinion for the unusual action taken . . . .” The
issuance of an injunction pending appeal on the merits, Gewin maintained, was a remedy only to be
used “in exceptional and extreme cases where there is a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of
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judicial power.” There had been no such abuse, Gewin claimed.19 Judge Bell dissented just as
vehemently from the modification of Davis. He concurred in it insofar as the modification might have
served to “alleviate disruption of the educational process.” But he strongly dissented from the
unusually hasty procedural handling of the case, which he said was “done at the expense of the judicial
process.” It was not the Court of Appeals’ place to act like a trial court and to “mold and enter an
equitable decree affecting an entire school system in a metropolitan community without hearing from
the parties on the nature of the decree, and without facts before it to serve as a basis for the decree.”
Bell concluded, “More constitutional rights will be lost than gained in the long run” as a result of the
court’s action.20
Judge Gewin called for an en banc rehearing of the Armstrong injunction appeal, as did the
appellee school board. Both requests were denied by a 5-4 vote of the entire appellate court. Judge
Ben Cameron saw fit to enter a blistering dissent to the denials for rehearing. The conservative judge
fully concurred with Gewin’s dissent and, more importantly, lashed out at his fellow circuit judges.
Cameron argued that the recent decisions of the court involved “questions of procedure” which had
been “plaguing the court . . . for some weeks.” He quoted at length from a recent newspaper piece on
the court, noting several passages with undisguised disgust. He lamented the perception that a “’hard
core’ majority’” of the Fifth Circuit court had “’blazed new trials for nearly a decade in the deep south in
the civil rights struggle’” and had “’moved at every opportunity’” to implement Brown, even moving
“’ahead of the Supreme Court’” to use Brown “’as a guideline to order desegregation of other facilities.’”
Cameron also noted the paper’s assertion that the court had “’repeatedly overruled, and often sharply
rebuked, Southern district judges who [had] refused to accept or carry out the Supreme Court’s
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rulings.’” The four judges who had “’stood together consistently’” in these decisions were, of course,
Tuttle, Rives, Brown, and Wisdom. Cameron added, “These four judges will sometimes hereafter be
referred to as “The Four.” Cameron then went so far as to accuse Tuttle of gross impropriety, most
especially in purposely naming some combination of The Four to all civil rights case panels. He also
lambasted Tuttle’s inclusion of only the Armstrong panel judges in considering the appellees’ request for
an en banc rehearing, as well as his agreeing to hear the appeal in the Birmingham student suspensions
case by himself. The segregationist judge decried the “crusading spirit” of The Four in general and
suggested that the court as a whole had lost the “stature” that it had once enjoyed prior to Tuttle’s chief
judgeship. The blistering, personal, and highly unusual dissent was published by West Publishing and
leaked to the press in advance. The entire court convened days later to iron out some sort of
compromise. Bell and several others were particularly disturbed by the charges against Tuttle. The
court agreed to some procedural changes, and Cameron agreed to ask segregationist Mississippi Senator
James Eastland to call off an investigation into the court. Cameron had succeeded in tarnishing Tuttle’s
image, if not the entire court’s, but The Four were apparently undeterred.21
As the historian and former journalist Jack Bass has argued, neither Cameron, nor the other
conservatives on the appellate court, nor the reluctant district court judges, could not stop The Four in
their drive to “win the battle against delay” of Brown implementation. Nor could they stop Tuttle and
his three colleagues from transforming the Fifth Circuit into “a powerful force” which, itself,
“transformed the legal process by implementing a concept of federalism that finally recognized the full
force of federal courts as the primary guardians of constitutional rights.” They were able to weather
storms like Cameron’s assault because the law was clear. The segregationist jurists faced a tougher task
because the law as the Supreme Court had decided it favored implementation. Delay and intransigence
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required jurisprudential gymnastics. Once the circuit court’s rulings came down in Alabama, there was
little that district judges could do, either. As legal scholars Frank Read and Lisa McGough have observed,
Lynne and Thomas were typical of southern trial court judges in that they “were deeply concerned
about Brown II, anxious to delay whenever possible to avoid local upheaval, but nonetheless ready to
enforce direct court orders.” This was especially so when those orders had been, themselves, the result
of orders of the appellate court.22
Lynne entered an order in Armstrong on July 19, as directed, enjoining the Birmingham school
officials from operating a segregated school system, including an order to begin desegregating using the
Alabama Placement Law. Thomas entered an order in Davis on July 26 enjoining the Mobile school
board and directing the same. Both the Mobile and Birmingham authorities were ordered to present
desegregation plans to the court no later than August 19 in preparation for commencing desegregation
in September. The defendant officials in Davis appealed for a stay of the order after Cameron, despite
not being on the original panel, entered another dissent and request an en banc rehearing. The
appellate court denied both Cameron’s request and the appellees’ request, upon which the defendants
appealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Hugo Black, a one-time Klansman from Alabama, considered
the appeal. Black had already begun to make devout Christian whites in the South wonder if he was a
traitor to his region and religion by writing the majority opinion in a landmark case the previous year
striking down state-sponsored school prayer. He affirmed to segregationists that he was, at the very
least, a traitor to his race, when he summarily denied the Mobile officials’ request for a stay on August
16. Just three days prior, Judge Hobart Grooms had been compelled to issue a desegregation order for
Huntsville’s city schools when the Hereford case came before his court on motion for preliminary
injunction. Grooms was bound by Armstrong, but it was late enough at that point to avoid a
requirement for substantial desegregation for the fall. Accordingly, Grooms ordered the school board to
22
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admit the four plaintiffs, including Sonnie Hereford IV, and to submit by January 1 a plan for
desegregation that spring using the placement law. Thanks to the persistent litigation of black activists
and the determination of the Fifth Circuit Four, school desegregation, it seemed, was coming at last to
Alabama. But the “battle against delay” was far from won. It had only just begun.23

Frank Johnson and Lee v. Macon County
From the time it was filed, the Lee case was adjudicated differently than the other school
desegregation suits brought in Alabama, simply because it fell on the docket of Frank Johnson. Johnson
was the sole federal judge at the time in Alabama’s Middle District. By 1963 he had already proven
himself willing to grant relief in civil rights cases when the law was clear, and sometimes when it was
not. While he had little tolerance for civil disobedience, he was always sympathetic to the legal struggle
to secure constitutional rights. The Lee case demonstrated that Johnson was willing to use the full
power of the court, even in innovative ways, to ensure that petitioners were able to secure those rights.
Johnson was born and raised in northwest Alabama’s Winston County, where a staunchly
independent mountain Republicanism had driven the county’s forebears during the Civil War to
seceded, not from the Union, but from the state of Alabama. His father had been a probate judge and,
at one point, the lone Republican in the state legislature. The younger Johnson attended law school at
the University of Alabama with George Wallace, when a close friendship preceded a lifelong and very
public adversarial relationship. He served as an officer in the Army infantry during World War II, saw
combat in France and Germany, and was awarded a Purple Heart with an oak leaf cluster and the Bronze
Star. He later served in the judge advocate general’s (JAG) corps. He returned to practice law in
northwest Alabama and was appointed United States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama in
23
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1953. Eisenhower appointed Johnson to the bench two years later. Johnson’s political values and
cultural heritage undoubtedly contributed to his judicial commitment to individual rights. But his
biographers have recently attributed this obligation more to an “overriding deference to the supremacy
of the law” and “an overriding faith in fundamental fairness.” These values, they argue, were acquired
from family, especially Johnson’s father, and reinforced through a learned belief that “fairness could
prevail over prejudice,” fostered during the judge’s time in the JAG corps and as a U.S. Attorney.24
Johnson was a thin, athletic man who invariably sported a pressed, dark blue suit, an
understated tie, and an understanding of the issues at law in his courtroom which demanding the
respect of all who stood before him. His severe gaze, dangling wire-rim glasses, and deadly serious
demeanor intimidated many a young and inexperienced attorney. All who litigated before Johnson,
including attorneys for the state, understood him to be a “stern and strict but fair” jurist. Former Civil
Rights Division attorney Brian Landsberg described Johnson as a judge who "held attorneys to high
expectations, who tolerated no nonsense from either side, and who imparted a sense of dignity and
control." He “strictly enforced the laws against discrimination and displayed understanding of the
profound effect of racial discrimination on Alabama's African Americans.” And he “commanded
respect” through his “attire under his black robe, his ramrod posture, his demeanor, his attentiveness,
and his familiarity with the issues.” Alabama Civil Rights attorney Solomon Seay, Jr. recalled similarly, “If
you had a case before Judge Johnson, at the very first hearing, you’d better know everything there is to
know about your case, because if you don’t, then he’s going to know more about it than you. And
you’re going to be embarrassed.” Johnson famously concurred in Rives’ opinion in the Browder bus
boycott case, one of his first. He also wrote the order enjoining interference with the Freedom Rides in
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U.S. v. U.S. Klans, despite his skepticism of civil disobedience and his strong disagreement with the
riders’ strategy. He forced Wallace to produce voter rolls for the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and
threatened to jail the then circuit judge. He refused to grant injunctive relief in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
the Tuskegee gerrymandering case, arguing that precedent would not allow it. The High Court reversed,
and the relief was granted. When Lee v. Macon came before the court, Johnson was the only trial judge
in Alabama who had demonstrated that he was sympathetic to rights claims to the point of consistently,
if not universally, granting relief in the face of massive public backlash, massive resistance, and near
total ostracization for he and his family. His handling of Lee v. Macon would show that, when the law
was clear and when the injustice was profound, Johnson was willing to stretch the limits of the court’s
authority to grant meaningful relief.25
Johnson’s first innovative action in the Lee case came just days after attorney Fred Gray filed, on
July 7, a motion for a preliminary injunction. In a highly unusual but not unprecedented move, Johnson
ordered the United States to appear in the case, citing similar action in the cases against governors Orval
Faubus in Arkansas and Ross Barnett in Mississippi as well as the Bush case in New Orleans. Johnson
designated the U.S. in this case to appear not just as an amicus curie, or friend of the court, “to accord
[the] court the benefit of its views and recommendations,” but as a “litigating amicus,” with the “right to
submit pleadings, evidence, arguments and briefs, and to participate actively as a party in every phase of
said proceedings, including the right [to petition for] such further proceedings for injunctive relief and
for contempt of court that may be necessary and appropriate in order to maintain and preserve the due
administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial authority of the United States of America.” This
in effect gave the court the resources of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, whose attorneys
Johnson greatly respected and trusted. It also meant that Johnson had the additional resources of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, later, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
25
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(HEW). The support of the federal executive branch was doubly important at a time when the
intervention of Governor Wallace seemed inevitable.26
Lee v. Macon was set for trial on the merits in the fall, but it came up for hearing on the motion
for a preliminary injunction on August 13, after such motions had been granted in Armstrong and in
Bush. Johnson would need no unusual maneuvers to grant the injunction, but Fred Gray still had to
make his case for desegregation to commence immediately. The hearing was held at the satellite
federal courthouse in Opelika, just 25 miles from Tuskegee. Gray represented the plaintiffs, while
Assistant Attorney General Gordon Madison represented the defendant school officials. The Civil Rights
Division’s David Norman represented the United States. Gray called Superintendent “Hardboy” Pruitt
and the chairman of the Macon County Board of Education, Harry Raymon, to establish that the
Tuskegee Civic Association (TCA) had sent petitions to the board in 1954 and again in 1962. Both men
acknowledged that, other than taking the initial petition to the state superintendent for advice, no
action had been taken. Gray then introduced records and questioned two of the plaintiff-parents in
order to provide an overview of segregated education in Macon County. There were 970 white students
in 3 all-white schools and 5,317 black students in 17 all-black schools. The pupil-teacher ratios were
generally higher at the black schools. Each white school had indoor toilets, central heating, and hot
lunches provided, whereas a good number of black schools still had outhouses, no heat, and no
lunchrooms. Black and white children were picked up at the same bus stops, by segregated busses, and
blacks were often transported past white schools and taken long distances to black schools. This was
particularly relevant for those black students who had to pass two white high schools on the outer edges
of the county to come to all-black Tuskegee Institute High in town. The school board’s meeting minutes
clearly established assignment of teachers by race. Gray also established that the school system
received federal funds as part of the impacted areas program and that it put that money into its general
26
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fund, from whence it financed hundreds of thousands in construction of segregated schools. It was
impossible not to acknowledge that the Macon County system was a compulsory biracial, or “dual,”
school system.27
Johnson knew this to be the case, and his ruling was probably a forgone conclusion considering
his record and the recent rulings of the Fifth Circuit. Madison had filed a motion to dismiss prior to the
Armstrong and Davis rulings, arguing that the state’s placement law could be applied if black students
actually applied under it. Johnson was unmoved. He had, in fact, carefully read the Armstrong opinion
and probably would have ordered more demanding relief had that decision not been limited to
enjoining placement law application pending a full hearing of the case on the merits. At the end of the
Lee hearing, Johnson turned to Pruitt and Raymon with his characteristically stern and intimidating gaze,
through the ever-present wire rim glasses resting on the end of his nose, and he asked if the school
system had a plan for effecting desegregation. It did not, of course, but the two officials said they were
willing to formulate one. Were they willing to assign students through the placement act, to notify
administrators, teachers, and pupils of this possibility, and to generally cease any practice or policy that
was designed to require the separation of races? They assured him that they would abide, fully and in
good faith, by any order of the court. Pruitt and Raymon had no intention of defying a federal court
order, but they would have to have such an order before they would acquiesce to any desegregation.
This would prove to be the preferred position of a number of school boards across the state. As Johnson
later remembered, school officials would meet with Johnson after proceedings had been initiated and
say, “’Now judge, we know we are going to have to desegregate our school, but we have to have a court
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order to do it. We can’t live in the community without a court order.’” Johnson recalled that the court
would then “give them a court order, get cussed for it,” and “they would go back and implement it.”28
Johnson obliged the Macon officials on August 22. He found that the board was clearly
operating a compulsory bi-racial school system and had taken no steps to desegregate. He also found
that Raymon and Pruitt had “recognize[d] and candidly “acknowledge[d] that under the law they [had]
the primary responsibility of taking the initiative in bringing to an end the operation of a school system
that violates the constitutional rights of a large majority of the citizens in Macon County.” They had
further assured the judge that they would submit by December 1 a plan for desegregation and that they
would immediately, that September, begin to admit black students to white schools using the placement
law. Johnson cautioned, “Needless to say, the failure on the part of the Board to administer the
Alabama Placement Law without regard to race or color will result in the law’s being struck down on the
basis of unconstitutionality,” per the Shuttlesworth decision. Finally, the CRD’s Norman asked Johnson
to require the defendant officials to report to the court on any transfer applications it received, with
explanations as to the action taken thereon. Johnson agreed to modify the order to require the
reporting, allowing the court to monitor compliance with the assistance of the Justice Department.
Macon County thus joined Huntsville, Birmingham, and Mobile as the sites where school desegregation
would become a reality in Alabama’s public schools for the first time, in only a few weeks’ time.29
Joining those school systems would be a number of schools on federal military bases in the
state. The Huntsville impacted areas suit awaited appeal of Judge Grooms’ dismissal, but in the
meantime, HEW had begun to construct on-base schools at several federal installations where impacted

28

Frank Johnson, Handwritten Notes from Aug. 13, 1963 Hearing in Lee v. Macon County Board of
Education, in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 20, Folder 9; Brief in Support of Defendants’
Motion to Strike and Dismiss, May 24, 1963, in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 20, Folder
10; Frank Johnson, Handwritten Notes on Armstrong v. Board of Education Opinion, in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee
Macon Case File, Container 20, Folder 10; Bass, Taming the Storm, see for “cussed” quotation, p.231.
29
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, Order of August 22, 1963, Race Relations Law Reporter 8.3,
Fall, 1963, pp. 909-12, see also at 221 F.Supp. 297.

231

areas suits were not pending. As August drew to a close, new facilities at Ft. Rucker (near Dothan in the
Wiregrass region), Ft. McClellan (outside Anniston), and Maxwell Air Force Base (in Montgomery) all
prepared for desegregated openings.30 When schools were on-base and educated only the children of
federal personnel, there was very little that local officials could do about it. Federal dependents
attending off-base public schools were another matter, and in those cases resistance was significant, as
at Huntsville and Mobile. Segregationist alarm was thus increased by a letter sent to school officials
earlier that month. The Department of Defense (DOD), by way of Secretary Robert McNamara himself,
wrote superintendents in impacted areas and informed them that DOD was ordering its base
commanders in Alabama to assist interested black service personnel in enrolling their children in local
white schools for the coming fall term. The letter from McNamara also asked that the school authorities
provide DOD with information regarding their systems’ racial policies and transfer procedures. The
affected school boards – including Selma, Dothan, and Montgomery – were, in the words of the
superintendent of the Selma system, “very non-committal about the whole thing.” They generally hid
behind the placement law and turned the letters over to their respective attorneys.31
Most whites in Alabama prepared to enter the fall of 1963 with their school systems securely
segregated. For segregationists in Huntsville, Birmingham, Tuskegee, and Mobile that August, though,
time had run out. Black activists had been forced to carry their rights claims to the federal courts of
Alabama. Even there it took the commitment of a group of appellate judges and one trial court judge to
grant them the relief they sought. There was no mistaking that desegregation was coming, and coming
very quickly. The Birmingham News acknowledged as much when it wrote that these cities were about
to experience what a number of cities across the South had experienced over the years since Brown:
“the trickling of the last grain of sand from the legal hour glass.” But the federal courts could not see
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white students through the doors of white schools. It was left for the school boards, city officials,
plaintiffs’ attorneys, community leaders, and most especially the students themselves, to make the
court orders something meaningful. Standing against them were sure to be defiant segregationists who
refused to accept the decisions of a bunch of “integratin’, scalawagin’” federal judges. As the sand
settled, there was precious little time for reaction and preparation before a small contingent of black
students breached the walls of segregated education.32

Segregationists React
When the Armstrong and Davis injunctions came down, law-and-order moderates in
Birmingham and Mobile formed community organizations to meet the looming challenges within the
confines of the law. One such group, dubbed the Community Affairs Committee (CAC), was created by
Birmingham mayor Albert Boutwell and the newly installed city council. The group of community
leaders boasted over 200 members, 20 of which were black, and it was headed by Southern Bell
Telephone vice president Frank Newton. The committee was intended to be a biracial advisory board
for the mayor, much like a similar committee that had long existed in Mobile. Boutwell urged the
members at an inaugural meeting in July to look to the past only to “learn its lessons and avoid its
mistakes” and to seek “knowledge and understanding on both sides.” The mayor’s eloquent words
faintly masked the begrudged acceptance that characterized ardent segregationists in the aftermath of
the federal court rulings that summer. “Here tonight,” the once defiant segregationist told the
committee, “a dream begins to unfold” which could be the beginning of Birmingham’s “finest hour.” It
was, Boutwell said, a “solemn . . . hopeful and historic occasion.” Newton cut more closely to the chase
when he told the audience, “The time has come when we must take a position and stand on it . . .
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united.” According to Newton, the point of departure for everyone ought to be the law. They might not
all agree on the law as presently construed, he argued, but in the meantime, the law had to be obeyed.33
Just outside Birmingham’s City Hall, where the CAC meeting was being held, Robert Shelton
gathered with a group of pickets drawn from his statewide United Klans of the Confederacy. When the
Klansmen were removed by police, they moved to another meeting of white moderates at the city
courthouse, dubbed “Public Education Peacefully.” A group was meeting there to discuss ways to keep
schools open amid widespread and longstanding threats of closure. Shelton’s men heckled the
attendees, took to the floor themselves, and repeatedly shouted down the meeting’s organizers,
disrupting the proceedings to the point that the meeting broke up in futility. Moderates in Mobile at the
same time formed a group they called Alabamians Behind Local Education (ABLE). The committee’s
president, a Mobile pediatrician’s wife, expressed the sentiment that indicated what little space stood
between the state’s moderate segregationists and Shelton’s pickets. “We don’t want to argue the
relative merits of segregation or desegregation,” she maintained, “but we believe that each of us has an
individual responsibility to let official local leadership and our fellow citizens know that we stand on the
side of law, order, and public schools.”34
A number of the state’s newspaper editors – generally among the more educated and moderate
segregationists in the state – urged compliance and the maintenance of law and order. Among these
was the editor of the Birmingham News, who encouraged the city’s leadership to “face up to the reality,
finally, of such a decision [in Armstrong] affecting this community” and to negotiate with black leaders
as to “what shall be done in search of an arrangement to satisfy the court.” The News also advised
Boutwell and the city council to “deal frankly with the citizenry generally as to the necessity of a
concrete compliance if Birmingham schools are to be kept open as they must.” The most fundamental
task was to “develop further a full public will to maintenance of order as this new application of law,
33
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however regrettable [to] most, is met [with] a responsible citizen’s awareness that compliant action is
unavoidable.” The News later expressed gratitude that the CAC was prepared to meet the challenge
head on, as were the city’s new police authorities. These people had reaffirmed their “intent to uphold
law and order.” These were “not tired terms,” it argued, “but the basis for our civilization.” It was
particularly agreeable that “personal feelings . . . not affect obligations to the law.” The Huntsville Times
agreed, admitting that the decision in Hereford was “a surprise to no one.” It was a decision that,
“however popular or unpopular,” would have to be “enforced.” The Huntsville school authorities had
“taken every legal road” possible to avoid desegregating, “in keeping with the wishes of a majority of
people” in the city. But “the end of that road [had] been reached.” The Times urged the city to be
“sensible” and to “decide firmly on a course of maturity and dignity.” The “law,” it wrote, “unpalatable
though it may be, must be obeyed.” The state’s white clergy chimed in as well. The Alabama Baptist
reported on a meeting of some 800 preachers called by the Birmingham police chief and the Jefferson
County sheriff. The lawmen urged the preachers to counsel their congregations on the maintenance of
law and order. The Baptist applauded the meeting, at which “the merits or demerits of the segregation
or integration problem were not discussed.” The Christian weekly maintained that “all Christian people
should carry out the directions in the Bible to respect those who have authority over them (the state),”
which simply meant that Alabamians should “be law abiding citizens,” nothing more or less.35
In a letter to the editor of the Birmingham News, a Birmingham woman decried this continued
reliance on a message of law and order and moderation for sheer lawful compliance’s sake. She was
among a decided minority willing to say what not even some members of the Council on Human
Relations would say publically: that segregation was simply wrong. After attending the “Public
Education Peacefully” meeting, she rapped both the state’s clergy and its moderates for failing to act as
forcefully as the “rabble rousers” like Shelton and his men who incited “mob violence” and gave “lip
35

Birmingham News, Jul 15, Aug. 10, 17, 1963, reprinting on Aug. 17 an editorial from the Huntsville
Times; Alabama Baptist, Sept. 5, 1963.

235

service” to their religion. Ending school segregation was a “moral issue,” and “the clergy should years
ago have been taking a united stand and preparing their congregations for this.” She also argued that
Alabamians should “let the moderates and those who have shut their eyes to what has been happening
also take some of the blame.” Someone needed to, she said, because the state was “surely due for
great trouble ahead.”36
As some had predicted, law and order appeared to break down even before the scheduled
opening of school in Birmingham that fall, and moderates redoubled their calls for reluctant compliance.
In August Klansmen bombed the home of black attorney Arthur Shores. Someone teargased a
downtown department store. And Mayor Boutwell himself began to receive threats of the same
happening to his home, prompting an around-the-clock watch of the property. The News wrote that
Birmingham could not “tolerate any one of these” things, and it especially could not expect a nonviolent opening of schools in just days if people continued to “imperil” the same by “flout[ing] law and
order.” It was counter-productive, the paper held, for “loud mouths” to continue “whipping people up,”
shouting “’Communist!’” and “’resist, resist, resist!’” Everyone knew that “the best constitutional
lawyers in the state [had] fought to hold fast to Southern customs and tradition” only to “come to the
end of the rope.” If Birmingham were to “have a community where men, women, and children [could]
walk in safety,” then it “must have law and order.” If the city did not stop the “misguided zealots” and
maintain some sense of “decency and respect for law,” then it could only “expect more trouble as
school desegregation forcibly [came] to Birmingham” in only two weeks.37
One week later, as civil rights activists descended on the nation’s capital for the March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom, the CAC began final preparations for the opening of school. The
News lauded these efforts and praised the group for trying to meet the “painful school order imposed
upon the city by the federal courts.” It captured the mood of the city’s whites, writing that “few, if any
36
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. . . view the court requirement other than with great concern,” but “equally few” stood for school
closure. It was imperative that all work together to uphold the law, “regardless of what any individual
may feel about the court’s directive.” It was time, according to the News, to “face fact” and to commit
to token desegregation rather than to court violence or to listen to the “’close ‘em!’ people.” School
officials had studied the problem carefully for years and had “fought a tough fight to keep desegregation
from coming,” the News maintained, and they had done it with the help of Joe Johnston and Reid
Barnes, two of the best constitutional lawyers in the state. But now there was “nothing to do but to
keep schools open and do what the court says has to be done.” And desegregation had to “be done,”
even if everyone knew that “almost no whites see this as other than harmful to both races.”38
Whites in Alabama continued to express nuanced positions in frequent letters to the editors of
the state’s major newspapers. While some counseled law and order and support for open schools,
many urged continued defiance and evasion. The clear majority was in agreement that school
desegregation was wholly undesirable. An Albertville man indicated as much when he wrote the editor
of the Birmingham News to argue that his “racial position” was “very simple.” He did not remember
having “ever mistreated a Negro,” and he hoped that God would “continue to give [him] the good
judgment not to want to.” But rather than condemn segregation, he chose to condemn black
“agitators.” After invoking the Lost Cause and denouncing President Kennedy as a “Northern President
who is an arch enemy of the South, bent on destroying us with every means at his command,” he
declared, “God bless the colored people who have not been involved in the recent Alabama racial
disturbances because they recognized it was wrong [to demonstrate].” A Birmingham man reacted with
similar ire, only he directed his at federal judges and the News itself. “It seems to me,” he wrote, “that
Gov. Wallace speaks for the people of Alabama when he calls the federal judiciary ‘infamous.’” He
wondered rhetorically, for whom did the federal judges speak? The answer was clearly not “the people”
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of Alabama. Insofar as the News had opposed Wallace’s stance, it ought to have been ashamed for
treating “such an issue and such a man [Wallace] with callous indignity.” It was “unforgivable.” Another
Birmingham man pointed the finger to integrated schools in Washington D.C., wherein “attempted rape,
assaults, chasing girls and even teachers, and innumerable sex affronts” were commonplace. How could
anyone, he wondered, “dare say that integration here will and can work?” A Birmingham woman
condemned the assertion of inevitability. “’Inevitability,’” she argued, “states that we know it isn’t
desirable, but wrong is going to prevail anyway, so let’s just make the best of it.” The acceptance of this
line of reasoning, and therefore of token integration that fall, would only delay the “amalgamation” of
the next generation, and so she could “not accept the fact that anything as wrong as integration is
inevitable.”39
By far the most favored and effective method of denunciation was to attack law-and-order
moderates, particularly those who openly opposed Wallace. State officials who had the audacity to
clash with the governor publically were an especially popular target. Lieutenant Governor James Allen
had broken with Wallace even before their respective inaugurations and had counseled moderation.
Allen in July told a meeting of the Alabama Circuit Solicitors Association that despite the “unholy alliance
between the executive and judicial departments,” the attorneys of the state needed to stand “foursquare against the day of the demagogue” and mold public opinion along “constructive lines.” A former
Allen campaigner told the lieutenant governor in a letter that he was “distressed” by his “disparaging
remarks about our governor.” Allen should have been Wallace’s “good right arm in his stand for
segregation,” not his critic. “The people gave you a mandate,” he wrote , “to halt the destruction of the
white race. History proves that racial integration destroys civilization.” Therefore, “when a white man
fails to stand for segregation, he is destroying his own children and grandchildren.” The former
supporter thought that Allen would do well to remember that his “greatest heritage” was his “white
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face,” and that “it should mean more than money or political expediency.” Birmingham’s business
moderates received similar censure. One Montgomery Advertiser reader observed that the city to the
north was “about to be betrayed into the hands of the enemy.’” In this man’s opinion, “the first step
down the road to destruction was in replacing men with courage and a desire to fight for freedom [Bull
Conner and Arthur Hanes] with a group of moderates, who [were] too weak to govern Birmingham.”
The people should let their elected officials know that Alabamians had “no intention of turning their city
over to the Kennedy brothers or to a howling lawless mob of agitators who show no respect for law and
order or the rights of others.”40
A Lowndes County man captured the core of the defiant segregationists’ fear of the law-andorder moderate segregationists. Lowndes, in the central Black Belt, was home to a large black
population that significantly outnumber the county’s whites. Ray Bass was a die-hard Lowndes
segregationist and a man keenly aware of the dangerous situation in his hometown of Hayneville. The
threat of desegregation would soon allow him to emerge as a county leader by haranguing moderates,
organizing resistance, and ultimately courting the favor of Governor Wallace. He told the Advertiser that
“the situation [was] much more involved than little white children sitting in classrooms with little Negro
children,” although that was deplorable enough. “This is merely an initial step,” he wrote, “in the
undermining and deterioration of our American system and the complete takeover of our economy and
government.” Bass argued, “Once you start giving, you can’t stop till it’s all gone. There will be no
compromise.” Birmingham’s Edward Fields, Information Director for the National States’ Rights Party
(NSRP), echoed Bass’s sentiments and offered the solution much preferred by many segregationists.
The NSRP was an Indiana-born neo-Nazi organization headed by one J.B. Stoner, a local attorney who,
by the estimatation of one historian, had engaged in more racially motivated bombings than perhaps
any other individual in the South. Fields was a chiropractor who ran the NSRP’s headquarters in
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Bessemer, from which he disseminated its organ, the Thunderbolt, in which he variously called for the
execution of the justices of the Supreme Court, the expulsion of blacks to Africa, and the expulsion of
Jews to Madagascar. He simultaneously headed his own Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Fields
and a group of 200 followers delivered a petition bearing 30,000 signatures to Governor Wallace late
that summer, asking that he “close every school that mixes races and help us provide education for
students in private schools.” From the capitol steps, Fields cited the great hope of segregationists who
favored school closure: Prince Edward County, Virginia, where the local authorities had closed their
schools. The private schools in Prince Edward, according to Fields, were “the finest schools the county
ever had.” Of course the county’s black children had no such private schools because, in Fields’
understanding, the black community was unwilling to support them. Drawing heavy applause when he
derisively referenced “Martin Luther Koon,” Fields argued that “somewhere along the line we must
draw the line.” Token integration, he said, would only result in 20 times as many black students in white
schools shortly thereafter. The only sensible answer was school closure. Wallace’s close advisor
Seymore Trammell quietly assured Fields that the governor was prepared to support action along those
lines.41
In the face of such vehement condemnation, defiant rhetoric, and angry activism, even average
law-and-order moderates often felt stifled. A Montgomery woman lamented all of the “emotional
ranting and raving” and argued that “nowhere is there an outlet for expression here in Montgomery for
the moderate, the liberal, or simply the average man-in-the-street who is thoroughly confused by this
problem.” The moderate, she felt, “was not free to discuss the problem with his political or social
leaders, his minister, or even friends, relatives and neighbors.” The climate was “so fraught with
emotion and hysteria” that the moderate “finds lifelong relationships (even his livelihood) at stake.”
Political leaders who were simply “willing to consider both sides of the situation are publically
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humiliated and denounced as cowards, even though they make their stand at tremendous odds. It takes
far more courage to stand up against your own kind than against outsiders.” In closing she offered the
words of the great southern novelist William Faulkner, who had recently counseled moderation, saying,
“Segregation is going whether we like it or not. We no longer have a choice between segregation and
desegregation. The only choice we have is, how, by what means.”42
A group of white parents in Birmingham petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for a stay
of the injunction in Armstrong v. Board of Education, claiming that their children were in imminent
danger. The situation in Birmingham was tense. Many simply assumed that violence would erupt if
schools were desegregated. How could the court subject their children to the threat of physical or
emotional harm just to satisfy a group of agitators? Ironically, it was Walter Gewin who wrote the order
denying the petition. Gewin had dissented from the appellate court’s initial Armstrong desegregation
order to the effect that he thought District Judge Lynne’s order was perfectly acceptable. But even he
knew the value of law and order. “The issues here have long been settled by decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court,” he wrote, namely by Cooper v. Aaron. “Law and order cannot be preserved,” he
continued, “by yielding to violence and disorder, nor by depriving individuals of constitutional rights
decreed to be vested in them by the Supreme Court.” To even the cautious jurists of the Fifth Circuit, it
seemed that certain issues had been settled. Neither parents nor officials could hide behind the threat
of violence when the courts had ordered desegregation. Many segregationists accepted, then, that
desegregation of certain of Alabama’s public schools that fall was inevitable. George Wallace pretended
not to be one of them.43
Wallace and the members of the Alabama state legislature continued to operate as if the
question was not settled. Wallace condemned the recent Fifth Circuit rulings in Armstrong and Davis,
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saying he resented “three judges in their ivory towers who care nothing about the people they govern.”
They were, he said, “trying to destroy the freedom of everything that lives within the boundary of this
nation except Communists and Socialists and agitators.” The governor praised a bill which had passed
the state House earlier that August and which would require classroom segregation by sex in integrated
schools. “Should we be faced with integrated classrooms,” Wallace argued, the preferred solution
would be that “boys and girls go to separate schools.” There was also a bill pending in the legislature
which would throw that roadblock before the forces of miscegenation. But George Wallace had bigger
plans for defying the impending court orders than another round of segregationist legislation. As
September crept ever closer, and as moderate local officials prepared to implement the courts’ orders in
Huntsville, Birmingham, Tuskegee, and Mobile, Wallace began to plot some sort of defiant gesture
which might dwarf his first “stand in the schoolhouse door.”44

Last Minute Preparations
Preparations underway in all four affected cities in the final week of August illustrated that lawand-order moderates were ready to comply, but only to the extent necessary. In Huntsville the school
board had balked at submitting any sort of desegregation plan that proposed any more than the court
required. Superintendent Raymond Christian testified at a hearing before Judge Lynne that “mass
desegregation would completely disrupt our school system.” He and the school board had gotten the
injunction that they required. They could safely go back and face other segregationists in the white
community. They were prepared to work to ensure that Sonnie Herford IV, John Andrew Lewis, and
David Piggie were peacefully admitted to local all-white elementary schools and that Veronica Person
was admitted to a local junior high. Since vehement and defiant opposition to desegregation was less
prevalent in the relatively progressive north Alabama city than, essentially, everywhere else in the state,
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Christian was not overly concerned that, come the scheduled opening of schools there on Tuesday,
September 3, the students could not be successfully enrolled.45
Developments in all but Huntsville revealed that defiant segregationists were just as active as
law-and-order moderates. And the defiant segregationists had the support and encouragement of the
governor. Preparations in Tuskegee, in particular, demonstrated both the frenzied preparations of lawand-order city and school officials and the doggedly defiant resistance of the majority of segregationists.
Sam Engelhardt, the former state senator, White Citizens’ Council director, and state highway director,
had fallen on hard times. His highway department administration had been marred by charges of
malfeasance, and the U.S. Civil Service Commission had charged him with violating the Hatch Act. As
head of a state agency which operated largely on federal loans and grants, Engelhardt had violated the
act by simultaneously serving as the head of the state’s Democratic Party. With the once-towering
figure of all-out defiance thus forced to the margins, law-and-order moderation began to prevail upon
many of Tuskegee’s officials. The Macon County school board and superintendent were chief among
them.46
Just days after Judge Johnson’s August 22 order in Lee v. Macon, the Macon County school
board received nearly 50 applications for transfer from black students. The board members and
Superintendent C.A. Pruitt had accepted the force of the federal court order and were ready to move
forward in good faith and, as Pruitt himself said, to try to bring “mature thinking into the community.”
The school board brought the applicant students in and administered standardized tests of mental
maturity, of personality, and of scholastic aptitude, and began to whittle down the applicant pool to a
number it thought the white community could accept. The school authorities and an observer from the
Justice Department combed through the results of the tests, along with those of past standardized
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examinations and observations of the students’ behavior during the week’s round of testing. Anthony
Lee found himself among those accepted, as he showed observers “an ability to adjust with a normal
degree of ease” and gave indications that “with the proper motivation [he] would succeed.” Twelve
others joined Lee on the accepted list, representing grades eight through twelve; they would transfer
from all-black Tuskegee Institute High to all-white Tuskegee Public High. Thirty-five other students were
denied on account of low test scores or damaging observations. The Justice Department passed
recommendation to Judge Johnson on Thursday, August 29 that the board had faithfully executed a
reasonable selection process, and the students and the board began to prepare in earnest for the state
of Alabama’s first desegregated school day less than a week away. Schools were scheduled to open in
Tuskegee on Labor Day, Monday, September 2, earlier than anywhere else.47
The Tuskegee Civic Association (TCA) quickly organized a meeting for the accepted students and
their parents, held that Thursday night at Reverend K.L. Buford’s Butler Street Methodist Church. In
addition to dispensing with logistical practicalities – such as where the children should gather for the bus
in the morning – Buford, Fred Gray, and Detroit Lee all spoke to the families about what to expect, what
to do, and what not to do. They could expect to be yelled at, to be spat upon, to be generally harassed,
but they were to take no retaliatory action whatsoever. After impressing this upon the students, Buford
opened the meeting up to questions. The first raised hand was white. Seated in the very back of the
church was John Doar, the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division
(CRD). Doar was a Wisconsin Republican who had been with the CRD since the Eisenhower
administration. He was instrumental in igniting the division’s more active enforcement under the
Kennedy Administration, and he had quickly became a fixture on the southern civil rights front. He had
come to Alabama to ensure that the United States’ interest in Lee v. Macon was protected, and this
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included the protection of the black school children who were about to enter the belly of the
segregationist beast. Doar was flanked that night by U.S. Marshals and other attorneys from the CRD.
He rose to assure the children and their families that the Justice Department and the Marshals were
there, and would remain there, to ensure their safety, even if that meant following the school bus every
day – and it would. Doar also reinforced what Buford and the others had said: that despite what may
happen, this should be a non-violent undertaking on the students’ end. Whether it would be so on the
other end remained to be seen.48
Across town that same night, the Tuskegee High Parent Teachers Association (PTA) hosted an
informational meeting in the high school auditorium to inform white parents about impending
desegregation and to answer what questions they might have. Like the school board, the PTA was
prepared to foster peaceful compliance despite disapproval. Local Methodist minister and PTA
president Ennis Sellers had told the city’s whites after the ruling was handed down that it might be “a
dose we don’t like,” but he argued, “let’s go ahead and make the most of it.” A great many of the 400
white Tuskegeans who attended the meeting that night vehemently rejected this suggestion.
Nonetheless, Sellers, Superintendent Pruitt, school board president Harry Raymon, and Tuskegee High
principal Ed Wadsworth all tried to make the case for desegregation’s inevitability and the need for
peaceful and full compliance. When Sellers turned the meeting over to questions, it became
immediately clear that such a case had not been convincingly made. Woodrow Ruff, a clerk at the local
state-run liquor store, rose to suggest that the school board postpone the opening of school and contact
Governor Wallace to see what he could do in intervention. An accountant named David Jenkins and his
wife had personally been to see the governor. They told the crowd that Wallace had assured them he
could provide bus transportation for white students to attend other schools and that he could call a
special session of the state legislature to have the county’s schools closed, if that was what the white
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people of Tuskegee wanted. A local salesman named Tip Morgan suggested that the school board had
let the Justice Department and the FBI dictate which black students were accepted and all but accused
the board members of ignoring Wallace’s offer for assistance. Pruitt tried to defend the school
authorities by saying that he and Raymon had indeed met with the governor and heard his offers but
that there was nothing, they believed, that he could do in the face of a federal court order.49
A man in the back stood to assure the group that something could be done, and was indeed
being done already. He was Hugh Adams – neither an educator, nor a parent of a Tuskegee student, nor
even a resident Tuskegee. He was the assistant director of the State Building Commission and a
member of the Montgomery Private School Commission. He told them that Wallace was already
planning to close any desegregated schools and to assist in opening private white schools in their stead.
Whites in Prince Edward County, Virginia were still operating under such a scheme with impunity. In
fact, both the Montgomery Private School Commission and the governor had been in contact with
school officials in Prince Edward in the hopes of learning any lessons they might have to offer. The
commission had even sent observers to Virginia. Adams urged the Macon school board, in front of 400
angry white residents, to postpone the opening of school until arrangements for private schooling could
be made. He offered a direct line to the governor for anyone who wanted reassurance.50
A number of moderate local officials rose in defense of the school board and in opposition to
postponement and private schooling, including the Macon County commissioner, a city councilman, and
the county’s state representative. Two teachers also rose in defense of the board and stated their
commitment to remain at Tuskegee Public despite desegregation. One of the teachers tried to assure
the crowd that the 13 black students were of above average intelligence and could conceivably get along
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very well at the white school. Desegregation was working fine in other places, he argued, could it not
work in Tuskegee as well? The most impassioned defense of compliance was then made by local
banker, Chamber of Commerce president, and law-and-order moderate Allen Parker. Parker asked, if
Orval Faubus had failed to prevent desegregation in Arkansas; if Ross Barnett had failed to prevent it in
Mississippi; if even George Wallace himself had failed to prevent it in Tuscaloosa; then what made
anyone think Wallace could prevent it now? He could stand in the schoolhouse door at Tuskegee just as
he had at the University of Alabama, and the result would be the same. The white school would still be
desegregated upon the arrival of federal troops, or perhaps even after an Ole-Miss-style riot.
Immediately after Parker sat down, a postal worker rose to demand that the community take a stand
against any form of desegregation of the schools, even if the inevitable result was bloodshed. The
communists, NAACP, and federal government would not stop until the white race was destroyed, he
argued, and so they must not stop in their fight in resistance. Parker and others began to wonder if a
reasoned defense of law and order was futile.51
Unbeknownst to many of those present, there were Alabama State Troopers in the crowd that
night at Tuskegee Public. Two officers from the Investigative and Identification Division of the Highway
Patrol, Captain R.W. Godwin and Lieutenant E.J. Dixon, had been sent that day to Tuskegee on a fact
finding mission, with the directive to “obtain as much information as possible concerning the integration
of Tuskegee public schools.” Wallace had recently renamed the Alabama Highway Patrol the “State
Troopers,” which revealed the manner in which the governor used the department in matters of civil
rights “agitation” – as a personal paramilitary unit. And so it was that the two investigators ended up in
Tuskegee interviewing white residents on the morning of August 29, gathering information for the
governor. They generally found that whites in the overwhelmingly black city were apprehensive and
that “integration of the school did not sit well with the residents of Macon County.” Many were afraid
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of losing black business and resentful of what they felt was a federal “show of force.” The lawmen
claimed that someone invited the two to the PTA meeting that night. They attended and took detailed
notes on what each speaker had to say and reported back to their commander, who relayed the
information to Colonel Al Lingo, director of the Department of Public Safety and head of the troopers.
Two local state troopers were at the meeting as well and relayed information to the investigators after
the meeting about “staunch segregationists” in the community who were planning to take action.
Action, they said, might mean parents pulling their children from school or officials making a Wallaceesque stand in the door. One man had claimed he and others were ready to “start killing . . . some
Niggers.’”52
Lingo reported what he had learned to Governor Wallace. The urgent comments from defiant
segregationists were exactly what Wallace wanted to hear and what he had hoped to find when he
ordered the investigation. This might have affected what the state policemen had reported, but they
also faithfully reported the few comments they received and overheard from law-and-order moderates
as well as those from defiant segregationists. In any case, the governor and his advisors had been
formulating some sort of response to school desegregation that would allow the governor to make good
on his many defiant pledges in the short term, to initiate the establishment of private white schools in
the long term, and to accomplish all of this without inviting a contempt citation. The consensus was that
the administration should use its many segregationist contacts to encourage disorder, so that the
governor could then order the closure of the affected school systems under the guise of maintaining law
and order. Thus had word filtered down to Hugh Adams, who went to Tuskegee and unofficially spoke
for the governor at the PTA meeting, suggesting school closure and contacting the governor for help.53
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A similar process of gubernatorial encouragement was occurring at the same time in
Birmingham. Albert Boutwell had committed his administration to fostering reluctant compliance and
opposing any sort of school closure. He made a number of public admonitions to maintain law and
order, obey the directives of the court, and accept the good faith efforts of the Birmingham school
board. In addition to creating the biracial Community Affairs Committee, the mayor organized the
creation of a biracial subcommittee of the CAC on schools, chaired by local Methodist minister H. Frank
Ledford. It was Ledford who had encouraged police chief Jamie Moore and sheriff Melvin Baily to
exhort the city’s white minsters to preach law and order. But the forces of defiance were more active.
The court’s acceptance of the Birmingham school board’s desegregation plan on August 19 had brought
about the Klan bombing of Shores’ home. In the days that followed, Edward Fields and the National
States’ Rights Party held a series of rallies in support of continued segregation and began to encourage
Birmingham’s white high school students to boycott classes in any desegregated schools. The week of
rallies culminated in the presentation of the petition at the state capitol building in Montgomery. A
similar petition was presented to the governor by the white supremacist Birmingham Regional
Association for Information and Needs (BRAIN), which also held a rally at Birmingham City Hall. Ku Klux
Klan Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton held a rally at Graymont National Guard Armory, across from
Graymont Elementary, slated for desegregation. Yet another white supremacist group, The United
Americans, began to lobby for school closure. Bull Conner and former mayor Art Hanes continued to
complain about their ouster and to encourage resistance to anything the Boutwell Administration did.
Wallace and his advisors actively encouraged such efforts and even privately assured Fields and Shelton
that any physical disruption of the desegregation of schools would not be hindered by the state
troopers. Fields himself later recalled that Al Lingo personally told him that if he “waged a boisterous
campaign against the integration of schools and petitioned the governor for the closing of such schools
and held demonstrations in front of those schools on opening day, that this would give Governor
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Wallace reason enough to close mixed schools." Then Seymore Trammel reiterated the governor’s
encouragement when Fields and his company marched on the capitol on Saturday, August 31.54
When Fields returned from Montgomery to Birmingham on Sunday, September 1, the NSRP set
up a command center of sorts a few blocks from Graymont Elementary and Ramsey High School. The
Birmingham school board had revealed that it had accepted the applications of Dwight and Floyd
Armstrong to attend Graymont, that of Richard Walker to attend Ramsey, as well as those of Patricia
Marcus and Josephine Powell to attend West End High. Fields planned to lead flying columns of white
supremacist volunteers through police lines and onto the school grounds where they would proceed to
destroy the schools rather than allow them to be desegregated. Birmingham schools were set to open
on Wednesday. Wallace himself spoke to a crowd of anxious and angry working-class whites in the city
that Sunday night and told them he “had a few secrets for Birmingham,” where schools were scheduled
to open on Wednesday, September 4. The governor said that he had plans for “other places” too.
Those “other places” were obviously Tuskegee, Huntsville, and Mobile, where schools were set to open
on Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, respectively.55
In Mobile the school board had accepted the force of federal court orders and was moving to
comply, albeit as minimally as possible. The plan the board’s authorities had submitted to Judge
Thomas was just as limited as the others. The board had rejected “any general or arbitrary
reassignment of pupils . . . according to any rigid rule of proximity to school or solely by request on the
part of parents of pupils” because this would be “impractical and a disservice to the system, to the local
schools, and to the pupils transferred.” The Mobile officials accepted only two transfer requests, those
of Henry Hobdy and Dorothy Davis, who had applied to attend Murphy High. When Judge Thomas’s
approval of the plan became public and Mobile braced for desegregation, a few voices of moderation
could be heard. The city’s lone moderate on the city commission, former Folsomite state senator
54
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Joseph Langan, called for law and order and peaceful compliance. Langan had long been willing to court
the city’s growing black vote and was becoming a go-between for the city’s white power structure and
its black leaders like John LeFlore. His cautious moderation had made him popular among the city’s
liberal population. At the same time, a group of 26 of the city’s more liberal Protestant ministers issued
a mild statement calling for prayer and “clear thought,” saying “defiance of laws and of court orders is
neither the right answer nor the solution to our problems.” All but two of the ministers who signed the
statement were Episcopal or Presbyterian. The city’s Methodist ministers approved the statement by a
majority vote but refused to publish the names of those who voted. All but one of the city’s Baptist
ministers refused to have anything to do with the statement. Finally, the city’s newly formed citizens’
group calling itself Alabamians Behind Local Education (ABLE) sprang into action. ABLE affiliated itself
with the Council on Human Relations and boasted 200 or so upper middle class members, all white, who
published pamphlets, organized informational meetings, and produced a brief television spot. The
group’s professed goals were modest and decidedly law and order: “open schools instead of no schools
and a peaceful community instead of racial violence.”56
Defiant segregationists in Mobile were equally active in their preparations for and reactions to
the Davis decision. The city was home to an active chapter of the ultra-conservative political advocacy
group, the John Birch Society, whose wealthy and influential members had been expressing opposition
to desegregation for some time. Fields and his National States Rights party were also active in the city.
Fields himself sent thousands of printed petition forms for local NSRP operatives to pass out on
downtown streets and at shopping centers. The petition read, “We the undersigned white citizens of
Alabama petition you [Governor Wallace] to close every school that mixes races and help us provide an
education for students in private schools.” Local segregationists also joined forces with Citizens’ Council
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leaders across the state to successfully organize the city’s first active Council. A few days after Judge
Thomas’s approval of the Mobile school board’s plan, on Friday, August 30, 1,000 whites gathered at a
Mobile National Guard armory to hear Birmingham’s Art Hanes and newly installed state Citizens’
Council executive director Leonard Wilson speak against desegregation. The Mobilians might have
remembered that Wilson had organized the student wing of the Autherine Lucy riots as an officer in the
Tuscaloosa Council and a pre-law student from Selma. The accomplished young segregationist assured
them that Alabama law allowed parents the freedom to choose to attend all-white schools and that the
Council would appeal for some adherence to that law. The Council was also in the process, he told
them, of encouraging a student boycott along the same lines as that being planned in Birmingham, in
addition to trying to promote the harassment and intimidation of Hobdy and Davis. Wilson told them
flatly, “You don’t’ have to send your children to an integrated school.” Hanes’ speech was lighter on
substance but hit the right nerves for the segregationist audience. The former mayor attacked the
Kennedy Administration as soft on communism and encouraging to racial “agitators” bent on
“fomenting a race war.” The South, he said, was “the last bastion of race pride,” and it was “the
stronghold of true nationalistic feeling.” This is why it was the target of “left-wing abuse. They say the
Civil War was fought one hundred years ago,” he said, “but I tell you that the Civil War is just starting.”57

The Second Stand in the Schoolhouse Door
At dawn on the morning of Monday, September 2, George Wallace issued Executive Order
Number Nine of the Governor of Alabama. The “threat of forced and unwarranted integration of the
public schools of this state,” it read, had created “conditions calculated to result in a disruption of the
peace and tranquility of this state and to occasion peril to the lives and property of the citizens thereof.”
The governor had been convinced that there was “reasonable cause to apprehend breaches of the
57
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peace by force and violence throughout this state which cannot be speedily suppressed or effectively
prevented by law enforcement agencies . . . if the source of trouble is allowed to exist in several
localities at the same time.” On these grounds, Wallace ordered the Macon County Board of Education
to postpone the opening of Tuskegee High School until the following Monday, “for the sole and express
purpose of allowing the Governor . . . to preserve the peace, maintain domestic tranquility and to
protect the lives and property of all citizens of the State of Alabama.” He simultaneously issued
Executive Order Number Ten, which directed that the Tuskegee Police and Macon County Sheriffs be
“organized as a unified force under the control and direction of the governor acting through the Director
of the Department of Public Safety,” Al Lingo.58
Thus began the opening act of Wallace’s second “stand in the schoolhouse door,” even as
schools in Charleston, Baton Rouge, and Memphis were desegregated without such interference.
Having built his political image on defiance of federal intervention and outside “agitators,” and a dogged
defense of the racial status quo, Wallace could not allow the peaceful desegregation of several of the
state’s school systems to pass without some sort of challenge. The New York Times wrote that the
governor was “trapped by his own words” and could “find no avenue of escape when opposition to
massive resistance began to manifest itself across the state.” He desperately wanted to force the
Kennedy Administration to make a show of federal force. He just as badly wanted to prevent law-andorder moderates, whom he knew decried desegregation, from complying. He had set up the coming
drama by reaching out to the more defiant segregationists, by fomenting that defiance and even
violence, and by sending in investigators to confirm the seemingly imminent eruption of the same things
he was even then encouraging. The climate he had helped create, therefore, became the legal rationale
for his intervention into a local situation in which the local authorities had made no pleas for outside
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assistance. But Wallace felt vindicated by those defiant segregationists who had spoken up at the PTA
meeting in Tuskegee, by a petition he had received from Tuskegee residents urging him to intervene,
and by a number of other petitions and phone calls he had received. It may have been simply all part of
Wallace’s latest political chicanery, and the local authorities might have bristled at his interference. But
a great many whites in Tuskegee welcomed the arrival of the state police that morning.59
A state trooper delivered the governor’s order to Superintendent Pruitt at his home as a cadre
of just over 100 troopers began to encircle Tuskegee High School. The steel-helmeted police prevented
angry parents, including Ennis Sellers, from pushing through the lines with their children as others
denounced the governor’s intervention. The county solicitor called it the “invasion of Macon County.”
Allen Parker was also particularly critical, arguing that in foiling the well-laid plans of the law-and-order
moderates, Wallace had “alienated his own supporters.” Pruitt and the school board summoned the
advice of state Attorney General Richmond Flowers, who rushed to Tuskegee that night and told them
that not only did Wallace lack the authority to do what he was doing, but allowing him to close the
school could result in their being held in contempt. Accordingly, Pruitt announced that he and the
others had “determined [that] their primary duty [was] to operate the schools of Macon County.” Any
other course, he argued, “would bring troops into our county.” Wallace sent advisors to Tuskegee to try
and persuade the board to ignore Flowers and obey the order, but the officials balked. The governor
immediately responded by issuing a statement confirming that Executive Order Number Nine had been
issued based upon “clear and convincing evidence gathered by extensive investigation of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety.” The “erroneous interpretation” of the order by Attorney General Flowers
was “unfortunate” and “a pity,” the governor said. Wallace surmised that Flowers had probably been
intimidated by the Justice Department officials, who had been at the Macon school board offices
“constantly.” Nonetheless, the governor reaffirmed that it was his duty to “maintain peace and order,”
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and that Tuskegee High absolutely “[would] not open before” Monday, September 9. He told the press
that he was no Neville Chamberlain; he would indeed “fight like Churchill.” That night he successfully
pressured school officials in Huntsville to postpone the next day’s scheduled opening of school there.
Wallace was digging in.60
Completely lost in the whirlwind surrounding the governor’s charade was the enrollment that
Tuesday morning of 12 white students at previously all-black (albeit with all-white instructors) St.
Joseph’s Catholic School in Huntsville. Catholic Spring Hill College in Mobile had long been the first
integrated institution of higher learning in the state, since admitting blacks for the first time in 1954.
But St. Joseph’s became the first private elementary or secondary institution to desegregate when these
12 enrolled. The former director of child development at Huntsville’s Alabama A&M University, Elnora
Lanier, remembered that “hardly any of the white families who integrated St. Joseph’s were natives of
Huntsville.” NASA and the Army drew migrants to the “Rocket City” from all over the world. Many of
these families were able to accept desegregated education on some level or another. The same could
not be said for the majority of Tuskegee’s white families, of course.61
Meanwhile, that Tuesday morning, Wallace had Al Lingo reduce the trooper force at Tuskegee
to supplement the larger force being assembled in Birmingham, the next school system set to open and
desegregate. The governor’s first choice was to persuade the school board to postpone the opening of
schools, but he was prepared to repeat his actions at Tuskegee if necessary. Wallace tried to pressure
the longtime segregationist Boutwell into convincing the board to leave the schools closed. Boutwell
resisted until Wallace questioned his commitment to white supremacy and reminded him that even one
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black student in a white school was too many. Boutwell agreed to at least ask the board to join in filing
a motion for preliminary injunction on behalf of petitioning parents of white children. The school
board’s attorney was the segregationist Reid Barnes, who had fought against the Alexander and Nelson
suits. Barnes knew the danger of taunting the court with defiance. He urged the school board not to
give in to Wallace, and they did not. That evening the school authorities and the city council presented
a united front to the Wallace Administration, arguing that Birmingham did not need state troopers or
gubernatorial orders. It could handle desegregation and maintain law and order just fine itself. The
school board decided to try and limit the potential danger area to one school the following day. It
postponed the enrollments at Ramsey High and West End High and prepared to go ahead only with
enrolling Floyd and Dwight Armstrong at Graymont Elementary. Wallace reluctantly ordered the
troopers to remain on standby in area hotels. The governor knew that Edward Fields and company, to
say nothing of the Klan, were prepared to disrupt the process and prove him right. Burke Marshal flew
to Birmingham to assess the situation and quickly returned to Washington to confer with Attorney
General Robert Kennedy. Both men knew Wallace wanted a federal intervention. That night the Justice
Department released a statement arguing, “Gov. Wallace knows [that] the schools will be opened and
the Negro students will attend them in accord with the orders of the courts. We hope it will be
accomplished swiftly by the people of Alabama and their officials.”62
On Wednesday morning, Birmingham schools opened, and the Armstrong boys registered at
Graymont: the first black students to be successfully enrolled at public white elementary or secondary
schools in the history of the state of Alabama. Unfortunately for Fields and his posse of 65 volunteers
from the NSRP, they started their disruption parade at West End, where there was a strong contingent
of Birmingham Police but no black students. When they moved on by motorcade to Graymont, they
recruited a number of onlookers and attempted to rush the police line around the school, only to be
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repulsed. One protestor was arrested for throwing a rock. After an unexpected and bothersome rain
shower, the frustrated motorcade continued to Ramsey, where four more people were arrested for
taunting and assaulting the police, who once again held their ground to the horror of the NSRP
contingent. Fields retired to his hotel room, ominously accompanied by Klan leader Robert Shelton and
Klansman Robert “Dynamite Bob” Chambliss. Mayor Boutwell that afternoon praised the police for
maintaining law and order. That night Klansmen again bombed Arthur Shores home, which was still
under repair from the August bombing. Shores and his wife escaped serious harm, but blacks took to
the streets in Smithfield in larger, angrier numbers than ever before, assaulting responding police and
passing whites. When the riot had been successfully quelled, four policemen, six white passers-by, and
eleven blacks had been injured, and John Coley, an unarmed black onlooker, had been shot to death by
police. Wallace went to work trying to convince Barnes and Superintendent Theo Wright that the board
must cancel all classes. Barnes broke first and polled the board, which voted to postpone school
indefinitely and to join in the parents’ petition for an injunction, which had already been submitted to
the court. Wallace had already resolved to call out the troopers to surround the schools, and he finally
had the school board’s backing and could muscle out the city police to enforce the board’s order. Just
after 4 o’clock in the morning, Wallace announced that “the Birmingham Board of Education has
acceded my request to close temporarily the three schools scheduled to integrate.”63
Wallace was also able to convince the school board in Mobile to postpone at least the scheduled
attendance that Thursday of Hobdy and Davis, though schools opened for everyone else there, and state
troopers remained on standby. The Mobile school board president publically denied being pressured by
Wallace. Privately, officials admitted that the governor had used legislative influence as a bargaining
chip, in addition to ordering the uninvited state troopers to the city. The Huntsville authorities were
proving to be more of a problem for Wallace. The school board flatly rejected another request for delay,
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with one member saying the board wanted “the governor and his troopers to stay out of here.” The
mayor of Huntsville said that his city neither needed nor wanted state police assistance. A number of
other city officials publically criticized the governor for his interference. One city councilman called
Wallace “the dictator of Alabama,” while another shrewdly asserted that the governor was “doing the
very thing he [was] accusing Kennedy of doing.” Meanwhile, with schools closed in Birmingham, a large
portion of the state trooper contingent there moved on to Huntsville. Wallace again invoked the police
power vested in him as governor, for the avowed purpose of maintaining “peace and tranquility.” On
Friday morning, the troopers in Huntsville failed to stop a group of 25 angry white mothers who told
them they “should be ashamed of [themselves]” and who marched through their lines to enter one
school and register. Other parents jeered the troopers, shouting “go home where you belong!” and “I
think it’s ridiculous!” Revealing the diversity of the city’s population, a Redstone Arsenal employee
wondered in a thick German accent, “Is this America,” because “this reminds me of East Berlin.” The
troopers blocked Sonnie Hereford and the three other black students, accompanied by agents from the
FBI, from entering the schools to which they were assigned.64
The Kennedy Administration was biding its time, knowing that Wallace wanted a federal show of
force. A spokesman for the attorney general acknowledged the governor’s actions, saying, “Wallace is
trying to provoke us to open the schools by force.” The Justice Department “would rather not
accommodate him if it can be avoided.” The federal courts, however, were forced into action that
Friday by motions for injunctions against Wallace in Armstrong and Hereford. The parents’ petition in
intervention in Armstrong had been submitted directly to the Fifth Circuit. In his designation of a threejudge panel to hear it, Chief Judge Tuttle was perhaps cognizant of the recent public criticism of Judge
Cameron. Tuttle designated only Judge Wisdom of The Four, along with Judges Gewin and Bell. Despite
the presence of the conservatives, Gewin and Bell, the panel denied the petition. Gewin himself wrote
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the opinion, in which he felt compelled to reiterate his personal opinion that the original order of Judge
Lynne should have been affirmed. Nonetheless, Gewin wrote, “The issues here have long been settled
by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Law and order cannot be preserved by yielding to violence and
disorder, nor by depriving individuals of constitutional rights decreed to be vested in them by the
Supreme Court.” Gewin even added an eloquent admonition. “The howling winds of hate and prejudice
always make it difficult to hear the voices of the humble, the just, the fair, the wise, the reasonable, and
the prudent,” he wrote, but “we must not permit their voices to be silenced by those who would incite
mob violence.” On the same day, Judge Lynne responded to Ernest Jackson’s motion for the plaintiffs in
Armstrong and issued an order for the governor to show cause at a hearing the following week why he
should not be enjoined from further interference in desegregation in Birmingham.65
Entering the weekend, the immediate prospects for a successful and peaceful beginning to
school desegregation looked grim, as law-and-order moderates wondered incredulously what exactly
had just happened. The Anniston Star concluded that “the planned admission of a handful of Negroes”
was an already “touchy situation” which had been “made far worse by [Wallace’s] ranting and raving of
the last several months.” His actions of the past week were especially and “entirely uncalled for.” Even
the pro-Wallace Grover Hall of the Montgomery Advertiser lamented that Alabama was “not a banana
republic” and that the Advertiser was left no choice but to “sorrowfully [conclude] that, in this instance,
its friend has gone wild.” On Saturday night, an undeterred Wallace spoke at a meeting in Birmingham
of the segregationist United Americans for Conservative Government. The governor was joined on the
podium by Bull Conner and Edward Fields, and he was introduced by Art Hanes. He told the crowd of
500 that he was “willing to take any risk” and ready to “go the last mile” with them in preventing
desegregation of the schools. He did not elaborate on what risks he would take, except to say “I shall
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continue to resist for you within the law. . . . Every action I’ve taken,” he claimed, “has been in the
interest of peace and safety.” On Sunday night, the governor appeared in a statewide, televised “report
to the people,” in which he began to sound even more like a law-and-order moderate himself, despite
his behind-the-scenes efforts to promote obstruction. He argued that his “resistance as a constitutional
officer” was “legal and lawful,” and he reminded Alabamians, “We cannot win this fight if we resort to
violence. If you stand with me in this fight,” he said, “you will observe law and order and avoid
violence.” The governor assured the state that closed schools would open the following day. He then
paraded a cadre of the attorneys before the camera. They proceeded to defend the legality of the
governor’s intervention and to revive arguments like, “The 1954 Supreme Court ruling is not the law of
the land.” One of them cited the Savannah school case, in which the district judge had thrown out a
black student’s complaint. They failed to mention that the dismissal had been overturned by the Fifth
Circuit, and that the case was bound to result in the desegregation of Savannah’s schools.66

*****
That night Klansmen attempted to firebomb the home of Birmingham’s black millionaire
businessman, A.G. Gaston. Gaston sat reading in the living room, while his wife lay reading in the bed.
One ill-thrown bomb landed on the lawn, while another broke through a window and set a lamp and
some Venetian blinds on fire. The attack caused only minor damage to the home and none to the
Gastons, who had just returned from a state dinner at the White House. George Wallace was calling
publically for law and order while not only defiantly grandstanding for the voters but privately
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encouraging the most dangerous segregationist elements in the state of Alabama to defy along with
him. He was playing with fire himself, dancing around in the wiregrass with a burning piece of kindling.
For many of Alabama’s segregationists, it was just the sort of stand they expected. They loved him for it:
for standing up to the Kennedys; for fighting the NAACP and the other “agitators”; for defying the
Supreme Court and all the other “scalawagin’” federal judges; for defending Alabama’s rights. For
moderate segregationists who reluctantly accepted that desegregation was imminent, it seemed at
times like all they could do was sit back and watch George Wallace and his supporters set the state
aflame.67
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CHAPTER 7: “THE PURSUIT OF ALABAMA’S HAPPINESS”

After his Sunday night televised address aired, in the early morning hours of Monday,
September 9, George Wallace signed three more gubernatorial executive orders. Schools were again
scheduled to open that morning. “Integration of the public schools,” he wrote, “will totally disrupt and
effectively destroy the educational process.” According to the governor, it would constitute “an
abridgement of civil rights of other children attending the schools, and [deprive] them of the equal
protection of the laws,” and “their rights, liberty, and property without due process of law.” Wallace
directed in identical orders that “no student shall be permitted to integrate the public schools” of
Tuskegee, Birmingham, and Mobile. He had conceded Huntsville, where so many law-and-order
moderates had voiced their complaints and where Judge Seybourn Lynne had set a hearing that day for
Wallace to show cause why he should not be enjoined from interfering. Later that morning, Dr. Sonnie
Hereford took his son to Fifth Avenue Elementary, where he became just the third black student to
attend public school with whites in Alabama history – the Armstrong boys in Birmingham having done
so, for a day, the previous week. The other plaintiff-students in Huntsville soon desegregated Rison
Junior High, Terry Heights Elementary, and East Clinton Elementary Schools.1
Wallace’s “most historical moment” had arrived. He was making his second stand, and this time
he was making a much bigger show of it. It would have much bigger consequences. His defiant actions
and gestures continued into the second week of scheduled classes, but he was ultimately forced to back
down, again, by the Kennedy Administration. The Kennedys managed to achieve this without giving
Wallace everything he wanted; most especially they avoided sending in federal troops to Alabama. As
the governor made the most of his showdown with the federal government, defiant segregationists took
their own stands against desegregation, at least in Birmingham, Tuskegee, and Mobile. The governor
1

Executive Orders Numbers Eleven and Twelve of the Governor of Alabama, in Governor’s Administrative
Assistant Files, SG 19974, ADAH; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1963; New York Times, Sept. 10, 1963.

262

quietly continued to encourage these disruptions. Law-and-order moderates on the affected school
boards and in those city governments – who were fearful of contempt citations – tried to comply with
court orders despite Wallace’s interference. Their efforts were applauded by law-and-order moderates
around the state. Many more segregationists continued in their defiance. In Tuskegee a total boycott of
desegregated Tuskegee Public was buoyed by the establishment of a private white academy. In
Birmingham an attempted boycott and a week of angry demonstrations gave way to the eruption of
defiance and hatred on church goers at Sunday worship.
With these events, the law and order creed began to bifurcate. Everyone in Alabama
denounced the bombing of 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham. But no one seemed to take from it
the lesson that perhaps segregation was, indeed, wrong somehow and ought to be abandoned, or that
the societal pillars of white privilege might ought to be examined. As fingers pointed in all directions,
more defiant segregationists took up the law and order narrative and channeled it into a move towards
private schools. For these people, law and order came to mean anything short of violent resistance. In
addition to this “law, order, and private schools” camp, there was a “law, order, and public schools”
camp. It included those school and city officials in the four areas affected by desegregation orders,
along with other segregationists who saw school closure and the establishment of private schools as an
ominous and unfavorable development. Many of these people, like Albert Boutwell, understood that
new industry would be awfully hard to recruit with no public schools. Others simply foresaw legal,
financial, or logistical problems developing in the establishment of private white schools. While most
segregationists fell into either the law-and-order-compliance or the law-and-order-evasion camps, only
a very select few across Alabama counseled anything more than abiding the rule of law. As events in the
streets caused many to recoil, the battle over schools continued in the courts, where blacks were
beginning to realize some measure of success and where the forces of resistance were already beginning
to learn from their enemies.
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The Fall
At dawn on Monday morning, September 9, 1963, 125 state troopers under the command of
Major Joe Smelley, chief of the Alabama State Troopers’ Uniformed Division, amassed on the eastern
shore of Mobile Bay. They were joined by a contingent of deputized law enforcement officials from
various parts of south Alabama. From there the massive motorcade crossed the bay’s causeway,
entered the city, and surrounded Murphy High School, where two black students – Henry Hobdy and
Dorothy Davis –were set to attend. The Mobile police had already barricaded and secured the area.
They had not requested assistance, but they were powerless to turn away the state police. When the
two students arrived at 7:15, they were accompanied by Rev. Calvin Houston, John LeFlore, and
attorneys Vernon Crawford and Clarence Moses. Smelley blocked their path, read a short statement,
and handed them a copy of the governor’s executive order relative to Mobile. The group reluctantly
departed but not before LeFlore and Crawford indicated their intention to notify the Justice
Department. LeFlore told reporters that Wallace had “no more right to violate federal law than he [had]
to violate state law.” Nonetheless, the governor had “forced this upon us,” LeFlore said, “and it is now
up to the federal government.” He added, “Our only alternative is to go into the federal district court
here in Mobile and seek compliance with the federal order and to restrain Governor Wallace from
further interference . . . . We must bring a stop to this sort of thing that we saw just a while ago.”
Vernon Crawford went immediately to draft a motion for a restraining order and a preliminary
injunction, which he then took straight to the clerk at the federal courthouse.2
Mobile Mayor Charles Trimmier issued a statement after witnessing the morning’s events
himself. The mayor lauded the city for the “progress” it had made in “basic race relationships without
violence, hatred, or fear.” He said, “It is unfortunate that the courts have forced the integration of our
schools, and their action is disapproved by a majority of our citizens.” These citizens, he argued, were
2
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nevertheless “respectors of the law” and ought to be congratulated for their “desire to discipline
themselves without resorting to violence, which solves nothing.” Trimmier expressed hope that Mobile
would be allowed to “work out this and other problems . . . without interference from any quarter
whatsoever. No help is needed from Governor Wallace or anyone else.”3
Two hundred miles to the north, Anthony Lee and the twelve other black students scheduled to
attend Tuskegee Public gathered at Superintendent C.A. Pruitt’s office to board a bus together. As they
approached around 7:30, they saw state troopers lining the school, just as they had the previous week.
The 52 troopers had permitted faculty and staff and white students to enter the school for the first time.
But when the bus carrying the 13 entered the school grounds at 8:30, a trooper stopped it immediately.
The commanding officer on the scene boarded it, along with two other troopers. He identified himself
as “Captain C.S. Prier, a peace officer for the state of Alabama” and read a statement similar to that read
at Murphy in Mobile: “It is my duty to inform you that by order of the governor of the state of Alabama,
you will be prohibited from entering the school.” Prier saw C.A. Pruitt approach the bus, and he stepped
off to hand the superintendent a copy of Wallace’s executive order. He returned to the bus, handed
each student a copy and instructed the black driver to “take ‘em away.” Prier accompanied the bus back
to Pruitt’s office, where the students got back into their parents’ cars and returned home. It was not
long before Fred Gray called to inform them that he was already in discussions with the Justice
Department about the next step. John Doar was, indeed, back in Tuskegee and had observed the action
himself.4
Meanwhile, in Birmingham, Patricia Marcus and Josephine Powell approached West End High
School with attorneys Ernest Jackson and Oscar Adams. The school had been ringed by twenty carloads
of state troopers, who had recently replaced the city and county police already there. Al Lingo himself
3
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blocked the girls’ entry, holding up two hands and saying flatly, “You will not be allowed to enter; leave
the campus.” Lingo repeated his order as the group debated its next move: “You will leave
immediately,” he barked, “leave the premises!” Jackson undoubtedly infuriated Lingo by asking, “Do I
understand you are asking me to leave?” Lingo replied, “I’m telling you to leave immediately.” When
Jackson, Adams, and the girls retreated, white students jeered them from the schools’ open windows.
As troopers blocked Richard Walker from entering Ramsey High on the other side of town, white
students yelled “Nigger go home!” Lingo moved the few blocks from West End to Graymont Elementary
where troopers were barring the Armstrong boys, who were accompanied by Jackson, Adams, and the
Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth. Lingo told them, “Governor Wallace’s orders are that you will not be
allowed to enter.” Jackson asked if the trooper commander might consider obeying the federal court
order which allowed for the student’s attendance. “No, I will not,” Lingo said coldly. He then turned to
U.S. Assistant Deputy Attorney General Joe Dolan, whom he had served with Wallace’s order at West
End earlier: “Have you called the White House?” Dolan offered a wry smile and simply said, “No.”5
When the White House was subsequently informed of the morning’s events in Alabama,
President Kennedy issued a statement acknowledging that Wallace had “refused to respect either the
law or the authority of local officials.” The president surmised that “for personal and political reasons,”
Wallace was “desperately anxious to have the Federal Government intervene” in a situation in which it
had “no desire to intervene.” Wallace issued a statement in reply, claiming that he was “completely
willing to leave it to local communities in this state if President Kennedy, the Justice Department, and
the Federal Courts will do likewise.” If the administration was still clearly reluctant to give in to Wallace,
the federal district court judges in the state had, themselves, had enough. Vernon Crawford requested a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the governor in Davis for his
interference at Murphy in Mobile. Judge Thomas immediately granted the restraining order, with which
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Justice Department officials then flew to Montgomery that afternoon. Jackson had already filed a
similar motion in Armstrong, but Judge Lynne refused to rule on it until a hearing later in the week. John
Doar had set off for Montgomery as well, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction in Lee v. Macon. Prior to his arrival at the state capitol, though, Doar talked to Attorney
General Kennedy, and the two decided to instead file a separate action against Wallace, Lingo, and the
other state trooper officers who had barred black students from entering schools that day. Johnson
called each federal district judge in the state that afternoon – Allgood, Lynne, and Grooms in the
Northern District, Johnson in the Middle District, and Thomas in the Southern District – all of whom had
adjudicated proceedings in the four desegregation cases. The five judges concurred in the issuance of a
temporary restraining order in what was styled United States v. Wallace, along with an order to show
cause as to why it should not be enlarged into a preliminary injunction.6
Johnson wrote the order, in which he recounted how the governor had issued the various
executive orders. Wallace had “purported to order and direct” the various school authorities to forestall
desegregation, despite the fact that all such authorities were under court orders themselves in the
various cases. The court enjoined the governor, along with Lingo, Prier, Smelley, and the other
participating state trooper officers, from “implementing or giving force or effect to the executive
order[s] of September 9, 1963”; from “physically preventing or interfering with students, teachers, or
other persons” entering or leaving the affected schools; from “interfering with or obstructing” the three
boards of education; and from “failing to maintain peace and order within and around” the various
schools. Johnson signed the order at 5:15 p.m. on behalf of all five judges.7
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U.S. Marshalls in Birmingham, Montgomery, and Mobile immediately set out to serve the
governor, Lingo, and the named troopers with the restraining order. Lingo and the troopers were all
served that night, but Wallace proceeded to engage in what the Birmingham News called a “taut game
of hide and seek.“ Lingo had telephoned the governor’s office to warn him of the impending service,
and a Wallace staffer had answered a subsequent telephone call from the White House that had been
accidentally misdirected to the state capitol. The Kennedys were trying to phone state Attorney General
Flowers’ office, where they hoped to find John Doar, who had been shuffling between there and the
city’s Federal Building most of the day. Duly alerted to the impending service and irate at Flowers for
cavorting with the enemy, the governor then retreated to his office and surrounded it with his state
trooper bodyguard. Just after 9 p.m. marshals arrived at the capitol, entered, and knocked on the outer
door to the governor’s offices. One of Wallace’s trooper-bodyguards told the marshals that the
governor was not in. In fact, Wallace was in and was drafting yet another executive order, in which he
declared that he was “unwilling . . . to subject . . . faithful and courageous men” such as the state
troopers to “fine and imprisonment at the hands of the federal judiciary.” Wallace activated the
Alabama National Guard in order to “cope with circumstances and actions reasonably calculated to
result in a breach of the peace and in public disorder.” These circumstances and actions had been
created by the federal courts’ efforts to “admit certain students not entitled to attend” the affected
schools. He ordered National Guard units to move into Mobile, Tuskegee, and Birmingham and to
replace the state troopers.8
As Wallace’s order went out, U.S. Marshals lingered outside the capitol waiting for the governor
to leave. A crowd began to gather as a larger contingent of troopers arrived and assembled in front of
the building. One trooper claimed to the press that if the marshals wanted to “get [Wallace], they
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would “have to come over” him. “I love that little man,” he said, “he means a lot to me.” After
Guardsmen arrived at the building to supplement the troopers, Wallace’s finance director and close
advisor Seymore Trammell walked out and read a statement from the sacred Jefferson-Davis-tread
Confederate Star. He told the press, “Governor Wallace is working in the office tonight.” Trammell said
that they had received word that U.S. Marshals were preparing to “besiege” the capitol building.
Governor Wallace, he urged, “wants peace, and you cannot have it in this type of condition. . . . This is
intimidation.” Knowing that three marshals were standing nearby, Trammell asked “unauthorized
persons” to leave the grounds. If they did not leave, he added, the National Guard would “make them.”
When Trammell directly confronted the marshals, one attempted to enter the capitol building,
whereupon the guardsmen collectively funneled him back to the street. Another marshal who had
clandestinely wandered off was subsequently flushed out from behind a bush by troopers. Finally
satisfied that the federal officers had been dispersed, and that the Guard was mobilizing for the
following morning’s school openings, Wallace emerged under heavy guard at 1:30 a.m., got in a car with
Trammell, and went home.9
The governor evidently thought that his actions would buy him at least one more day of
successful defiance – one more feather to put in his cap of defiance, as proof that George Wallace
meant what he said. He had “stood up for Alabama,” and he could continue to do so. Unfortunately for
Wallace, word of the National Guard’s mobilization had very quickly spread to the Pentagon. The
Defense Department alerted the Attorney General, who then woke the President in the early morning
hours. From his White House bedroom, the president signed a Presidential Proclamation commanding
“all persons engaged in . . . unlawful obstructions of justice, assemblies, combinations, and conspiracies”
to “cease and desist therefrom and to retire peaceably forthwith.” Knowing that such an order would
not be obeyed, the President also issued an executive order authorizing Secretary of Defense Robert
9
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McNamara to take “all appropriate steps,” including the use of federal troops or the federalization of
the Alabama National Guard, to “remove obstructions of justice in the State of Alabama.” Just after
dawn, McNamara ordered the National Guard units back to their respective armories and thereby
returned control of the various campuses to local police.10
That morning, court-ordered desegregation was finally allowed to proceed in all of the affected
schools. This occurred without violence, but not without incident. The beginnings of a continuing
defiant resistance were evident in all three cities even from the very start. At Murphy, Henry Hobdy and
Dorothy Davis entered the school for the first time flanked by over 20 local law enforcement officers and
were welcomed by the school’s principal, Bruce Taylor. Hundreds of additional sheriff’s deputies and
local police officers were stationed around the campus. Taylor had sent letters to parents the previous
week in the hopes that they might counsel their children on avoiding disruption when the inevitable
became a reality. He announced the black students’ presence over the schools public addressing
system, urging the 2,777 member student body not to do anything “to embarrass our school.” Taylor’s
efforts appeared to be successful as he escorted the two students to their homeroom. After this the
two attended their first class, which was aptly entitled “Problems in Democracy.” They were
accompanied the remainder of the day, and over the coming weeks, by faculty members acting as
“observers.” They encountered little direct hostility. The efforts of the Mobile Citizens’ Council soon
began to reap rewards, however. The day after the initial desegregation, students held demonstrations
outside the school, chanting and urging students to boycott classes. What began as a small
demonstration on Wednesday turned into a throng of 300 rowdy whites on Thursday. The students
marched about the campus, chanting “two, four, six, eight, we don’t want to integrate!” One smaller
group eventually took to the streets of Mobile. When 54 of the demonstrators were arrested,
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commissioner Joe Langan turned up at the jail to admonish them. The Citizens’ Council bailed them out.
The students were charged with violating a city-wide anti-demonstration measure which had been
recently put in place in anticipation of school desegregation-related disturbances. The arrests, the
disciplining of 12 of the demonstrators by the school, and the placement of teachers and police around
the campus kept Friday’s demonstrations at around 20 students. This was quickly brought under
control. Isolated incidents the following week were similarly snuffed out, even as the Citizens Council
frustrated compliance-minded moderates by holding a large rally and explicitly inviting students.11
In Birmingham the initial results were mixed, but the week became more tumultuous by the
day. Richard Walker desegregated Ramsey High without significant fanfare. This was not the case at
Graymont and West End, on the working-class side of town. The Armstrong boys returned to Graymont
to find attendance there down by about 60 percent. But their day was decidedly uneventful compared
to that of Patricia Marcus and Josephine Powell. When the two girls arrived at West End at 7:45, they
were escorted in through a side door where few students saw them. A few of those who did see them
began crying. As news of their arrival spread, students began filing out of the school. Some left with
parents who had heard news of the developing walkout. Others were happy to stay on campus, as a
group of 300 students lingering on the lawn outside grew to over 1,000 within the hour. The chanting
began: “two, four, six, eight, we don’t want to integrate!” “Two, four, six, eight, who do we appreciate?
Wallace!” “We hate niggers!” Then “We hate Kennedy!,” followed by “We want Wallace!” A frightened
Marcus and Powell could overhear as the chanting shifted to a sustained “Get the niggers out! Get the
niggers out!” Teachers could be seen looking on approvingly from the windows. Similarly situated
student onlookers found themselves the targets of the demonstrators’ scorn as they were subjected to
cries of “nigger lover!” and admonitions to join the growing horde. Students and teachers answered the
call to the delight of the crowd. Before long a march about the campus ensued as students began
11
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waving Confederate battle flags and singing the school’s alma mater. One student repeatedly played
the great anthem of the Lost Cause, “Dixie,” on his trumpet. A crowd of 200 or so adults, including
members of Edward Field’s National States’ Rights Party, gathered on the lawn in front of the school and
began cheering the demonstrators and urging those still in the school to leave. Black residents down
the street began to gather at a distance and observe. By 8:45 the majority of the school’s 1500 students
had left the building and joined the demonstrations. A Birmingham Police captain then attempted to
diffuse the situation, telling the students by bullhorn to either go back to class or go home. He told the
adults to either move away from the school or be moved away. Some of the adults took umbrage to
this, and the ensuing disagreement resulted in ten arrests. The students were forced away from the
front of the building only to reconvene on a football field around back and then charge back to the front
of the school. The arrival of busloads of police in riot gear finally resulted in the dispersal of the crowd
before lunch. Meanwhile, in Montgomery, Wallace finally accepted service of the five-judge restraining
order, while grumbling that the president was trying to jail him for contempt because he was a potential
political opponent. “I don’t know what anyone can do but observe the [federal court] orders,” Wallace
said, “I can’t fight bayonets with my bare hands.”12
The next day NSRP leaders, KKK leaders, and their student recruits organized a motorcade that
rode from high school to high school and encouraged students to join in a city-wide student boycott in
preparation for a move to private schools. What began as a small group swelled on Thursday and
became an angry, roving mob. More than 100 carloads of segregationists gathered in West End, running
with their lights on, honking their horns, and waving Confederate flags. Many carried placards and
bumper stickers that read, “Keep your children out of integrated schools”; “Kan the Kennedy Klan”;
“We’ve been betrayed”; “We want private schools”; “Close mixed schools”; “We want a white school”;
and “Obey little, resist much.” One pickup truck carried two caskets in its bed and drug an effigy of a
12
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black person from its trailer hitch. Birmingham police followed the motorcade about town as it
descended upon not just Ramsey High, but still-segregated Ensley High on the west side of town and
Woodlawn High and Phillips High further east. Police had to break up a fight that ensued when teachers
and student leaders at Woodlawn tried to turn the group away. The police tried to avoid the same at
Phillips, only to see the group storm the football stadium and begin chanting “Eight, seven, six, two, we
don’t want a jigaboo!” One group even drove over Red Mountain on the city’s southern edge to
suburban Shades Valley High, where several students lowered the American flag and replaced it with a
Confederate one.13
Students from each high school joined the demonstrators, and many simply stayed home on
Friday. Eight adults were arrested as a result of the week’s disturbances, including Fields and the NSRP’s
attorney, J.B. Stoner. But no total boycott materialized, despite cajoling and threatening phone calls
from students to influential cheerleaders and football players. Attendance at West End had leveled off
at around 30 percent by Friday. That day a group of 500 students gathered to protest outside City Hall,
led by representatives from BRAIN and the United Americans. At one point, the group turned its ire on
mayor Albert Boutwell, who happened to be at lunch at the time. It might have seemed incredibly ironic
for the one-time arch-segregationist and devout Christian to discover that white students protesting
desegregation stood outside his office yelling, “Eight, six, four, two, Albert Boutwell is a Jew!” Some of
the contingent decided that chanting was not enough and stormed the mayor’s office, where they put
out cigarette butts in his carpet and climbed atop his desk to wave the battle flag. Boutwell returned
from lunch to find the group still there. He assured them that he, too, was opposed to integration, but
that federal court orders simply had to be obeyed. He importuned them to continue to observe law and
order.14
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Days later, students at Woodlawn High heeded Boutwell’s advice and initiated a challenge to
desegregation in what they thought was “the ‘only legal way.’” Woodlawn senior David Littleton had
been among those who had resisted the calls to leave when the motorcade had visited his school.
Littleton “deeply sympathize[d] with the students of all integrated schools throughout Alabama.” Like
many of his fellow students, he had wanted to ride with the protestors. He had thought better of it,
though, and had seen fit to instead initiate a petitioning campaign. Littleton was perhaps unaware that
he was mimicking the technique employed by the first black activists to challenge segregated education
in the state when he called on students to “use one of [the] most important privileges given to us by our
forefathers in the Bill of Rights.” He circulated a petition at Woodlawn and took out an ad in the city
paper begging students across the state to circulate similar documents. His read, “We the undersigned
. . . protest forced integration of Birmingham schools and the schools of Alabama. We . . . pledge
ourselves to the American ideal of self-government” and “believe the Almighty God has given each of us
the responsibility and the duty to choose between what we feel is right and wrong.” No “governing
body” had the right to “infringe a wrong on the majority just because a minority demands such.” The
signatories pledged their “full support to Gov. George Wallace and the sovereign state of Alabama to
protect and defend our age-old traditions for the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of Alabama’s
happiness.” They also gave their “moral support” to Wallace and “any and all judgments” which he
might make “to help protect [their] liberties in the American way.” The law and order creed was a
versatile one. Even as it undergirded reluctant efforts at compliance, it began to sanction defiance in
the name of all that was sacred: the Constitution, states’ rights, Christianity, self-government,
liberalism.15
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Exodus, Tuskegee
If defiant segregationists in Birmingham had a hard time marshaling all of the city’s thousands of
white high school students for a boycott, segregationist leaders in Tuskegee did not. On Tuesday when
Anthony Lee and the 12 other black students first attended Tuskegee Public, 167 white students showed
up for classes. The vast majority of these were students at the campus’s elementary school. Only 32
white high school students showed up. Expected attendance that day for both schools was nearly 600.
On Wednesday around 20 white high school students arrived at school that morning, only to leave by
the end of the day. By Thursday, Tuskegee Public High School was under a total white boycott; only the
13 black students remained. The Macon County school board acquiesced in some of the white Tuskegee
students attending other schools in the county. One hundred-thirty of the 400 or so boycotting students
transferred to Shorter High School on Macon’s western border with Montgomery County. Thirty-four
others transferred to Macon County High at Notasulga in the county’s northeastern corner. Peer
pressure and fear undoubtedly helped the boycott develop. The Tuskegee High football team voted to
disband on Tuesday, and a number of its members transferred to Notasulga. The team’s captain
announced that “an overwhelming majority” of the team had voted “not to play another game as
representatives” of the school, because they said, “We object to the forced integration of our school.”
The team’s fall schedule was cancelled, followed by the basketball team’s. By Wednesday afternoon,
even law-and-order moderates who had spoken out against defiance, like Allen Parker, had allowed
their children to withdraw. Some parents were genuinely concerned for their children’s welfare in the
midst of all the angry segregationist rhetoric that had been thrown about. A few of these parents were
holding their children out until the perceived crisis had passed. Others simply believed that their kids
should be allowed to follow their friends. Many more who had allowed their children to withdraw on
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Monday or Tuesday simply could not stand the thought of their children going to school with not one,
not two, but thirteen black students.16
For all of those families whose children withdrew with no intention of returning, the rapid
establishment of a segregated private school provided immediate motivation and encouragement. A
group of 20 or so staunch segregationists had begun to organize the previous week, while Tuskegee
Public was closed by order of the governor. The group had been encouraged by the advice of Hugh
Adams at the informational meeting over the weekend. Adams and other officials from the
Montgomery Private School Association also attended the midweek meeting and told the Macon
Countians that the Montgomery organization was alive and well and ready for desegregation, should it
come to Montgomery. The Montgomery group had patterned its efforts after those of Virginians in
Prince Edward County, where the school board had elected to close schools and allow locals to establish
a vibrant private white school system in its place. The federal courts had yet to strike down such localoption school closure, Adams assured the Macon association’s president, Mrs. W.T. Wadsworth.
Another of the Montgomery officials told the group that the state’s liberal newspapers and local school
officials were hiding the fact that Alabama law allowed for student and teacher financial assistance in
such cases.17
Earlier that day, Wallace himself had telegrammed Wadsworth his assurance that stateprovided grants-in-aid to private schools could follow upon school closure and private school
establishment. Wadsworth had telegrammed the governor on Adams’ advice the day before, advising
him that “due to the friction, danger, and ill will generated by the threat of forced public school
integration, a private, non-denominational, accredited freedom-of-choice school [was] being established
in Macon County.” She requested from the governor “clarification of methods by which the Macon
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County school board or other officials may request grants-in-aid for eligible students under existing
law.” Alabama had, of course, passed laws providing for such grants, Wallace assured her. “It is my
hope,” Wallace wired, “that the Macon County Board of Education will not refuse to make
arrangements for you to receive these grants-in-aid of which you inquire.” Similar grant laws had
already been struck down in federal courts at that point, notably in Louisiana. Alabama had patterned
its own law after Louisiana’s, but in the culture of defiance that had developed, such signs of potential
futility were rarely heeded.18
After the initial, informal organizational meeting of the Macon County private school
organization, Wadsworth issued a statement. She wanted to ensure that no one took the law-and-order
style moderation of the school board, Pruitt, and Parker as an indication of how most whites in
Tuskegee felt about desegregation. “The picture has been painted all over the country that Macon
County is ready and willing to accept integration in their schools [sic],” she wrote, but “there are a lot of
people here who do not agree with the statements that have been made.” She assured Tuskegee’s
white parents that her group was “planning ways and means for providing a school that parents may
choose in lieu of an integrated school as prescribed by Alabama law. . . . We believe that we are acting
in the interest of all people,” she concluded. In a separate statement, Wadsworth reiterated, “we have
no hatred; we just believe this is right.” She told a reporter not to “underestimate our strength. We
want to put a private school within reach (financially) of everybody as an alternative to an integrated
school.” Whites in Tuskegee listened. On Thursday, September 12, the second organizational meeting
of the private school association drew over 700 people to the local Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW)
post. The group named itself the Macon County Private School Foundation and tapped local postmaster
John Fletcher Segrest as president. The World War II veteran and former prisoner of war told the crowd
that it would be “a tough fight,” but he added, “We have the power and the forces to win this battle.”
18
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Segregationist attorney Hugh Locke was also on hand to share his observations of Washington, D.C.’s
integrated public schools. Locke argued that desegregation “not only ruins the school but ruins the
community” and was usually “followed by migration of the white people from the area.”19
The foundation chose an unoccupied mansion across the street from Tuskegee Public as the site
of the future Macon Academy. It chose former state Attorney General MacDonald Gallion as legal
counsel and resolved to send Gallion, Segrest, and Tuskegee’s mayor and state representative to Prince
Edward to observe private schools there. The foundation members nominated committees to oversee
any building that might be necessary and to begin organizing fund-raising efforts. Students were already
registering by the dozens, and contributions were pouring in. Wallace himself made a $100
contribution. He also pledged the “full resources” of his office to assist the foundation and encouraged
Alabamians to do the same. The governor even requested donations from state employees, who
donated over $2,000. His office maintained a list of contributors and maintained a file of letters from
citizens interested in establishing similar schools. One woman told the governor she wished to make a
$7,000 donation towards the improvement of education in the state and asked him where she should
send it. Wallace advised, “You may wish to contact the Macon Academy in Tuskegee . . . a private school
which was set up by individuals in Macon County who were not satisfied with the Federal Court order
which did away with their rights to run the schools in that County as they saw fit.” Gallion told Wallace
that Tuskegee could be the shining example of segregation’s future in Alabama, and the governor
agreed. It soon became evident that many others in Alabama agreed, as well.20
By week’s end, a group of white parents in Birmingham had set up a West End Parents for
Private Schools in light of the Macon Countians’ efforts. With Wallace’s encouragement, this group
soon founded Jefferson Academy and Hoover Academy – the latter being named for William Hoover,
19
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formerly of the American States’ Rights organization. A Tuscaloosa man gave further credence to
Gallion’s suggestion when he wrote the Tuskegee News days later to express his approval of efforts in
Macon. “Hats off to the brave people of Tuskegee and Macon County,” he wrote, “who are going
forward with plans for a private school instead of bowing to the tyrannical race-mixers of Washington or
heeding the advice of Alabama’s big city scalawag newspapers, which have tried for so long to
brainwash us into acceptance.” The success of Macon Academy, he argued, would “come as the
bitterest gall to the enemies of the South” and would simultaneously “serve as an inspiration and a
guidepost to all who are inclined and willing to follow the example.” Tuskegee’s whites had displayed
“courage, attachment to principle, and sacrifice.” This was, he wrote, “the fighting South at its very
best.”21

“Bitter Fruit”
In the early morning hours of Sunday, September 15, a group of Klansmen led by “Dynamite
Bob” Chambliss planted a bomb underneath the side steps of Birmingham’s 16th Street Baptist Church –
one of the epicenters of that spring’s civil rights demonstrations. The bomb detonated at 10:22 that
morning as 200 people filled the church for services. Preparing for Sunday school in a basement
bathroom were Cynthia Wesley, 14, Addie Mae Collins, 14, Carole Robertson, 14, and Denise McNair,
11. They were crushed to death when the blast destroyed a large portion of the church structure.
Enraged blacks began rioting downtown in the immediate aftermath of the killings, setting at least two
major fires and assaulting passing whites, many of whom had descended upon the area around the
church to gawk, honk, and shout in celebration. A Birmingham police officer responded to one
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disturbance and ordered Johnnie Robinson, a 16 year-old black youth, to stop. When Robinson turned
to run, officer Jack Parker shot him in the back, killing him.22
The NSRP had planned a large rally in the industrial western suburb of Midfield in preparation
for yet another motorcade that afternoon through the west side to downtown Birmingham. The
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department prevailed upon the NSRP leadership to cancel the parade.
Birmingham Police Chief Jamie Moore similarly convinced the West End Parents for Private Schools to
cancel its planned participation in the demonstrations (a Baptist minister leading the parents simply
mounted a stationary protest behind city hall). Two Phillips High School students who had planned on
joining the mass motorcade, 16 year-old Eagle Scouts Michael Farley and Larry Joe Sims, resolved to ride
their scooter to NSRP headquarters and retrieve a Confederate flag for their own motorcade. As they
prepared to parade the flag through the streets of a black neighborhood, friends warned them of two
black children throwing rocks around the corner. Brothers James and Virgil Ware – 16 and 13
respectively – were in fact riding their bicycle up the street, returning from a junkyard in search of spare
parts for a second bicycle which they hoped to use for a paper route. Farley had told his friends that he
and Sims would “get them.” When the two white youths motored towards the two pedaling black
youths, Farley handed a .22 pistol to Sims, who then shot Virgil Ware twice, killing him.23 State troopers
and national guardsmen returned yet again to Birmingham that night to quell the rioting, as periodic
gunfire continued and fires burned.24
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Everyone in Alabama denounced the bombing. The killing of Wesley, Collins, Robinson, and
McNair – thereafter universally referred to as the murder of “four little girls” – was something no one
could condone, even if most said little about the subsequent killings of Robinson and Ware. Albert
Boutwell burst into tears when he learned of the bombing. He called the act “inconceivable” and
“shocking.” He went on television that night and urged the residents of Birmingham not to compound
the “tragedy of this Sunday morning” by creating “more senseless trouble tonight.” He asked them to
stay home that night and to “pray and think.” Boutwell implored, “I urge as strongly as I know how for
the children of Birmingham to get about the business of their education and leave this fearful task to the
School Board and their attorneys, and to our law enforcement officers.”25
If everyone could agree that the killings were unfortunate, the question of where to place the
blame was something to disagree about. Dallas County Citizens’ Council founder Walter Givhan blamed
the church bombing on black “agitators” themselves, arguing that they had planted the bomb in order
to blame whites and had simply mistimed the blast. Historian Dan Carter has argued persuasively that
“a distinct minority,” if not “a majority,” of Alabama’s whites sincerely believed this to be the case.
When the Talladega Daily Home asked God’s forgiveness and wrote, “The guilt and the shame are ours
in common,” it saw fit to single out “the agitators who have cried for trouble even as they have
pretended to counsel for love and peace.” Even the Alabama Baptist, which called the act “deplorable,”
speculated that the perpetrators “could be radical Negroes who seek to stir up trouble.” Governor
Wallace denounced the bombing as a “dastardly act” undertaken by someone with “hatred in his heart,”
but he and many others throughout the state blamed the situation in general on President Kennedy and
the Supreme Court. The Cullman Times echoed these sentiments, and even incorporated the belief that
black “agitators” were themselves to blame: “There can be no doubt that the Kennedys, Martin Luther
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King, and numerous others have promoted the issue for their own personal gain.” Those who had done
so, it concluded, had “blood on [their] hands.” Some people blamed Wallace. National condemnation
certainly centered on the governor, when it did not indict all of southern white society. Time magazine
ran a picture of a bombed out, stained glass church window with a picture of a defiant-looking Wallace
superimposed upon it, suggesting the governor’s culpability. The Huntsville Times condemned “leaders
who made political hay of promises they knew they couldn’t keep.” The Talladega Daily Home pleaded,
“May God forgive the politicians who have wittingly or unwittingly set man against man and race against
race.” The Tuscaloosa County Graphic perhaps most clearly implicated the governor when it suggested
that Wallace “had better face the facts and settle down to being governor, the office to which he was
elected,” because his “charade of meaningless defiance” and his “political demagoguery” were “costing
Alabama support every day.”26
The editorial from the Graphic demonstrated a disturbingly familiar trend in the statewide
reaction among whites to the bombing: the foremost lesson to be learned from the terrible tragedy was
that Alabamians must double down on law and order. It was not to examine the righteousness of
segregation and white supremacy. The Graphic was “saddened and sickened” by the act, but the most
significant outcome was that it was “costing Alabama support every day.” Federal District Judge
Clarence Allgood ordered a specially-called federal grand jury to indict anyone who had obstructed
school desegregation or who had participated in any way in the bombing, lambasting the unknown
perpetrators in a 15-minute charge. Allgood said that the court was “sickened as a court of law” and
that he was saddened “as a native Alabamian.” He argued that there was “nothing ‘traditional’ in this
country that says a person may murder, or intimidate, or mock the judgment of the law, or curse those
who have chosen to respect a law – no matter how distasteful or unpopular that law may be.” If the
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bombers thought that they were “serving the cause of segregation,” then they were “traitors to their
cause” and were doing “the South a disservice.” Albert Boutwell had sent the same message when he
went on television the night of the bombing: Birmingham did not need yet another stain on its image.
With this latest and tragic stain, Boutwell argued, “we are all victims.” Similarly, the Montgomery
Advertiser was certain that whoever was responsible for the bombing “hates Alabama and its people,
black and white,” because they had given Alabama “an injury that will not heal in a long time and which
is almost certain to generate evil consequences.” In Birmingham, 53 lawyers joined in a statement to
the city’s citizens, in which they argued that the “rule of law is essential to our way of life. . . . Each of
us,” they added, “has on occasion felt that a particular case should have been decided differently, but
whether we agree or disagree with the result in any case, the court’s decision is the law and must be
obeyed.”27
The Alabama Baptist admitted that it had “never endorsed integration,” but that it was
“certainly for law and order.” It thus commended Governor Wallace for denouncing the violence.
Moderates across the state approached the tragedy in the same way. The Tuscaloosa News insisted that
“pleas for law and order” needed to be “backed up with more than empty words,” because it was
“lawless disregard for duly constituted law and its enforcement” which bred “disorder.” The Northwest
Alabamian argued that “we must return to law and order, for only then will we have an atmosphere
conducive to reasonable solutions of the problems which will be with us for a long time.” The Selma
Times-Journal carried this a step farther when it maintained that there were “decent, civilized people”
who could no longer easily “express what is in their hearts” because of “the situation that exists in
Birmingham today.” What was in those hearts was a need to defend segregation. This was a matter of
principle to so many whites, even if they only inherently understood it to be a need, above all, to
27
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maintain white supremacy. “Nobody has to abandon principle,” the Selma editor wrote, “to take and
maintain a stand for law and order.”28
Even in the wake of the cold-blooded murder of church-going teenagers, precious few
Alabamians could find the strength, or even the desire, to hasten any sort of moral awakening. Murder
was, of course, reprehensible, but it was the work of a lawless few. Recognition of such acts as wrong
did not necessitate any sort of admission that segregation was wrong, or that white supremacy should
be abandoned. Compliance with court-ordered token desegregation was a “bitter pill” – one that
moderates were willing to swallow only to abide by the law and to avoid violence, either because
violence was wrong, because it was harmful to the state’s prospects for progress, or both. In other
words, no one swallowed the pill because they realized that segregation and white supremacy were
wrong. Very few were the white people like Mrs. William Linn of Birmingham. Linn wrote to the
Birmingham News to argue that while “the great majority of Birmingham’s white citizens were quick to
admit that they found the bombing of a church and the willful murder of children appalling,” they were
“even quicker to attempt to excuse those acts with accusations hurled at the Supreme Court, the
NAACP, the Kennedy brothers, etc. How can responsible, clear-thinking white people,” she wrote,
“possibly believe that there is any excusing such acts or for that matter any excusing their own prejudice
against their own race?”
Fewer still were those like Charles Morgan, a young Birmingham attorney who went before the
city’s Young Men’s Business Club shortly after the bombing and delivered a tirade against politicians,
preachers, business leaders, and everyone else white in Birmingham who had failed to provide moral
leadership. Morgan would go on to open the first office of the American Civil Liberties Union in Atlanta.
He had the appearance, some thought, of a rural Alabama sheriff, because he “was overweight, smoked
two packs of cigarettes a day, and his voice carried the sound of the Deep South.” At the podium before
28
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the business club, he indicted white Alabama society in general. "We are a mass of intolerance and
bigotry, and stand indicted before our young," he argued, and “ we are cursed by the failure of each of
us to accept responsibility, by our defense of an already dead institution.” He pointed the finger at
“every person in this community who has in any way contributed during the past several years to the
popularity of hatred.” They were “at least as guilty as the demented fool who threw the bomb.” He
asked flatly, "Who did it? Who threw that bomb?” And he answered, “We all did it,” through hypocrisy
and inaction. No one clapped when he sat down. When the New York Times ran a piece quoting
Morgan’s speech, someone asked Governor Wallace to comment. Wallace called the remarks “asinine”
and reminded the reporter that Morgan represented the NAACP and was, therefore, himself partly to
blame. Morgan – who had indeed begun to represent black clients in civil rights cases – soon had
crosses burned on his lawn, began to receive death threats, and was subsequently ostracized by the
white community. Even rhetorical attempts to indict whites as a whole for their moral failings were met
with this kind of reaction.29
Birmingham businessmen James Head and Charles Zukoski understood this. Like Morgan, they
spoke out anyway, framing the problem in traditional business moderate terms, but adding that rare
moral imploration. In exasperation they penned a letter to the white people of the city via the
Birmingham News, which was later reprinted and disseminated by the Southern Regional Council. Head
and Zukoski rebuked the city’s segregationists for failing to face up to certain ”basic truths,” even as the
name of Birmingham was festooned across newspapers mastheads the world over, above the broken
glass of a church and the broken lives of innocent youngsters. First, they insisted the city’s whites must
acknowledge that “the Negro is a human being, with all of the feelings, the hopes, the aspirations of his
white fellow man.” Whites knew “in their hearts” that segregation was their way “of keeping the Negro
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in his place.” In light of this, the notion that nearly every white person held fast to – that there could be
Constitutional equality of the races under segregation – was “just a self-serving denial of fact.” The
Supreme Court, they argued, had not “violated our system of law.” And the federal government was
not “attempting to order all of our affairs”; it was attempting to enforce Constitutional law. There was
“no rational hope” that Brown would be overturned in the foreseeable future, and yet, whites in
Birmingham were squandering their “opportunity” to take advantage of the deliberate speed afforded
by the Brown II implementation decree. The “community’s bitter-end resistance” had “threatened [its
own] economy with destruction.” And why? Whites had listened to “misguided prophets” like John
Patterson, Albert Boutwell, and George Wallace, of course. But there was more to blame than the
obvious. “Ever since the school cases,” Head and Zukoski wrote:

We have been told, day in and day out, that the Supreme Court has been guilty of
unconstitutional violation of our rights, and the federal government is some kind of alien power
seeking to deprive us of our liberty, and that if we would hold fast, we could in the end maintain
our traditional way of life. Even when, as the pressure grew, some few wise citizens were
bold enough to face the inevitable and come out with a plea for law and order, there was no
heart in their voices and their words were unaccompanied by any moral conviction.30

They concluded, “Unless Birmingham begins to face up to the great moral issue involved, and to
recognize the rightness as well as the inevitability of change, it will indeed be dead.”31

*****
In the wake of the tragedy, Alabama came to what seemed like an exhausting end to a decadelong struggle. The FBI quickly identified Robert Chambliss as the lead perpetrator of the 16th Street
church bombing and set about surveilling him and building a case against him. Sensing this, Al Lingo
arrested Chambliss and his accomplices to ensure that their case would remain in state court, where
30
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they were sure to be acquitted of the murders. They plead guilty to a misdemeanor instead and served
no jail time. The FBI eventually abandoned its case. In the days just after the bombing, the school-front
demonstrations and motorcades in Birmingham died down. Students in the city settled into the first
desegregated school year in Alabama history, just as students did in Huntsville and Mobile. In Tuskegee
the white exodus continued. The five-judge court enlarged the restraining order against Wallace into a
preliminary injunction, after hearing testimony from John Doar, who argued that the governor was
trying to use state police power “to paralyze the supreme law of the land.” State and local officials, the
plaintiffs’ attorneys, and the Justice Department prepared to litigate the Wallace case on its merits in
the coming months. Litigation in all four school cases also remained to be fully adjudicated.32
It was no end, really. The tempestuous events of the fall of 1963 were simply the early
rumblings of a gathering storm. As the state entered the winter of 1964, the defiant path blazed in the
1950s and extended by Wallace remained open to those who refused to accept desegregation. Only
then, defiant segregationists no longer had to rely on Montgomery. They still looked to the governor
and the legislature for support, of course, but Macon County had shown the way towards maintaining
segregated education, and others looked to follow. There were those by that fall who had capitulated
on massive resistance, only when federal court orders threatened local officials with fines or jail time.
These law-and-order moderates were a surging force in the areas affected by injunctions, but they
confined their compliance efforts to doing only that which the courts required, and doing that only very
reluctantly. And what of those school systems not yet threatened with litigation? Only four school
systems in the state were under court order in the fall of 1963. None of the others was prepared to
desegregate on its own accord. Black activists were ready, however, to follow the example set by
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activists in Huntsville, Birmingham, Tuskegee, and Mobile, and to force the issue in court. And so new
battles loomed all over the state.
When swept up in those battles, many segregationists would reluctantly give in to the force of
the federal courts, agreeing with the Northwest Alabamian that there was a need to maintain “law and
order” for the sake of an “atmosphere conducive to reasonable solutions.” Some would seek out
defiant solutions within the law, arguing like the Selma Times-Journal that there was no need to
“abandon principle” in order to “take and maintain a stand for law and order.” Most ominous of all
were those moderates who gave lip service to black activists’ goal of “equal treatment,” but chaffed and
recoiled when the movement’s leaders moved “too quickly.” The Union Springs Herald admitted that
there were “moral overtones” to the movement in Alabama that “[could] not be denied.” But the
“means which [were] being employed” to achieve the movement’s goals were disturbing to the Black
Belt paper. More “senseless slaughter” ought to be avoided, of course, but if the movement’s leaders
continued to act “irresponsibly,” then the “tree of civil rights” would “bear a bitter fruit indeed.”33
One Birmingham man could see the coming harvest, growing as it was from the seeds planted
that turbulent year. H.H. Perritt was a PhD, a veteran of World Wars I and II, and a career U.S. naval
officer from the upscale Cottondale section. His grandfathers, like so many southerners’ ancestors, had
fought for the Confederacy. He wrote the Birmingham News after the 16th Street bombing and
wondered “have [the murders] shocked us enough? Have they shocked us,” he asked, “into speaking
out for freedom of the oppressed, opportunity for the deprived, and love for the despised among us,”
especially those “who by accident of birth have darker skin” than whites? “Hatred will continue,” he
predicted, “murder will continue, unless we admit our mistakes and undertake positive action to
eliminate from our laws and customs the wrongs we have committed against our fellow Americans for
generations.” He concluded:
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We cannot have respect for “law and order” while at the same time using every available means
short of violence to circumvent or defy the law of the land as interpreted by the courts. Only by
positive steps, beginning with admission of our sins, can we begin to purge our society of the
sickness in its soul.34
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PART II: THE LITIGIOUS ASSAULT AND THE REARTICULATION OF RESISTANCE, 1964-73

They have laid down their lives on the bloody battle field.
Shout, shout the battle cry of Freedom!
Their motto is resistance – "To the tyrants never yield!"
Shout, shout the battle cry of Freedom!35

CHAPTER 8: “NOW A SINGLE SHOT CAN DO IT”: LEE V. MACON AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE
STATEWIDE INJUNCTION, SPRING, 1964

On January 23, 1964, Governor George Wallace stopped by Macon Academy in Tuskegee to
address the 140-member student body in the school’s newly dedicated assembly hall. The all-white
private school had been formed the previous fall to avoid the court-ordered desegregation of Tuskegee
High. Segregationists across the state monitored the situation closely. Could whites build private
schools from the ground up on short notice and adequately support them? When segregationists in
Tuskegee looked to Montgomery for help, Wallace was eager to do everything he could to foster
defiance of desegregation and to vilify the NAACP and the federal government for bringing it upon
Alabama. After visiting classrooms and passing out inaugural day coins – which he told the students
were Confederate money that “might be worth something someday” – the governor addressed the
school’s first assembly in its new hall. He told the students that their high school had been “taken by
unwarranted and illegal action from people who [had] no interest in education in this state, black or
white.” The federal government, he argued, was not interested in their sacrifice; it was more interested
in passing the civil rights bill pending before Congress. Wallace said the bill would “take away . . . a basic
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human right”: their right to own property. Returning to the issue of schools, he said the key question
they were faced with was whether “people in Washington, a thousand miles away, [could] take over and
run a local school system.” He assured them that help from state officials was on the way. “We can’t
win all of the battles,” he said, “but we can awaken the American citizens to the dangers of an
omnipotent federal centralized government.” The ambitious Wallace said “we,” and some of those
gathered might have believed he meant more than “I” when he added “we are going to make our mark
yet on the American scene.”36
Just over a week before the governor spoke to the Macon Academy students, on January 14,
1964, Macon County Superintendent C.A. Pruitt had appeared in Judge Frank Johnson’s courtroom in
Montgomery to answer questions from attorney Fred Gray regarding Macon’s forthcoming
desegregation plan. Gray had asked for a subpoena so he could ascertain what progress the school
board had made in formulating the plan, due to the court in March. The short answer Pruitt freely gave
to that primary question was ‘none.’ In fact, Pruitt told the court, “we are asked to work out a plan that
would preserve the public school system in the county, but under the circumstances that exist today I
can conceive of no plan at this time that would be submitted that would be accepted by the white
people.” Pruitt argued that a comprehensive plan such as that requested by the plaintiffs would “end
the public school system in the county as far as white people are concerned.”37
The circumstances in Macon County seemed to support Pruitt’s conclusion. When Judge
Johnson had the previous fall granted the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction and ordered the
desegregation of Tuskegee High, all the white students had eventually left the school. Anthony Lee and
his 12 colleagues (minus one who was expelled before the exodus for allegedly whistling at a white girl),
attended classes all fall by themselves, under instruction from a few loyal teachers who stayed behind.
Most of the whites had scattered to Shorter High and Macon County High at Notasulga on the western
36
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and eastern edges of the county, respectively, or to Macon Academy. Some had enrolled in white
schools in neighboring counties. In Macon – where blacks outnumbered whites almost five-to-one –
even token desegregation was unacceptable. Of course, Macon had been ordered to transfer
significantly more black students in its first desegregated year than the other systems then under
injunction: Mobile, Birmingham, or Huntsville. Pruitt argued that whites in Tuskegee seemed to have no
appreciation for the pressure he and the school board members had been under in these circumstances.
They had been ostracized for their minimal compliance efforts. Under friendly cross-examination by
Assistant State Attorney General Gordon Madison, Pruitt said that he and his wife had stopped
attending the local Methodist Church because the harassment he received for his compliant stance
made it “unbearable.” A school board member, he added, had seen his local business boycotted the
entire fall for the same reason.38
Pruitt’s contention that the school authorities could not conceive of a workable plan was not a
revelation, then. What the superintendent admitted regarding the pressure the school officials had
received from Montgomery, however, revealed an undercurrent which would soon sweep the Lee v.
Macon case up into a statewide storm. “We have been placed in the position,” Pruitt told the court, “of
complying with a court order and being charged with defying a very popular governor, but we have done
it.” Initially, the Macon County school board had defied the governor by acquiescing to the court and
allowing Tuskegee High to open. Wallace had sent his closest advisors to Tuskegee to urge Pruitt to
keep the school closed despite the injunction. The advisors, including Wallace’s right-hand-man
Seymore Trammel, had interrupted a meeting between the superintendent and State Attorney General
Richmond Flowers to convince Pruitt to publically back the governor’s executive orders. Under
questioning from Gray, Pruitt also revealed that shortly after school opened, state Superintendent
Austin Meadows had ordered the board to provide bus transportation to the white students who had
38
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fled to Shorter and Notasulga. Pruitt produced a letter from Meadows, in which the state
superintendent wrote, “In order to provide educational opportunity to the maximum extent possible,
the Macon County Board of Education is to extend county school bus transportation service to all
children who live two miles or more from the public school they are attending.” The Macon officials
reluctantly complied with Meadows’ directive until Gray alerted the court to the situation. Johnson told
the school board in October to phase out the county bussing by the end of the year. In January, when
the board refused Wallace’s request to resume the transportation, the governor arranged to have the
students taken over to Shorter and Notasulga in state trooper patrol cars. This lasted until mid-month,
when the governor then offered state trade school busses for the task. Fred Gray began to wonder who
was effectively running the Macon County school system. Wallace liked to demonize the federal
government “a thousand miles away” for making decisions which affected local school systems, but
what about Montgomery, 30 miles away?39
Answering that question would soon become the central concern of the district court, the
plaintiffs, the defendants, and the U.S. Justice Department. It would eventually make Lee v. Macon the
most far-reaching post-Brown school desegregation case in the United States. By the summer of 1964, it
was clear to everyone in the Alabama that the state was facing more than the desegregation of a few
select school systems. Statewide desegregation became the goal of Fred Gray, the NAACP-LDF, the state
NAACP, and the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. White resistance remained as strong as it had
ever been, within and outside the courtroom walls. The governor and the legislature continued on the
same path of defiance upon which they had embarked years before, courting the law-and-order
moderates who looked to school closure and private school establishment as a lawful and sensible
means of avoiding desegregation. Meanwhile, those law-and-order moderates like Pruitt who were
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threatened with contempt citations continued to try and satisfy the demands of the court. There, in the
courtroom, the plaintiffs pressed on for desegregation in the face of nearly universal resistance of one
form or another.

The State of Desegregated Education, Early 1964
Desegregated education had been an isolated experience for Anthony Lee and the students who
attended Tuskegee High in fall and early winter of 1963-4. Students desegregating schools in
Birmingham, Huntsville, and Mobile experienced something quite different. They sometimes met with
cautious attempts at friendship. More often than that, they endured outright hostility. But most often
of all, they were met with general indifference and neglect. The litigation that allowed them to
desegregate their respective schools continued to wind through the courts, chipping away so very slowly
at the edifice of the Jim Crow schoolhouse. Meanwhile, they learned to adapt. Floyd and Dwight
Armstrong at Graymont Elementary in Birmingham began to stand behind one another to get water at
the white water fountain to avoid getting punched by white students, or to stand behind a white boy
during baseball games to avoid getting hit by a flying bat. Most students simply ignored them. Patricia
Marcus and Josephine Powell at West End High in Birmingham started a collection of hairpins, paper
clips, chalk, erasers, and pencils thrown at them by white students (they chose not to save the rotten
eggs). The two girls struggled in classes: Patricia got an F in math, and Josephine a D in English. If the
petty harassment was not enough of a distraction, the education they had received at their former
school had apparently not prepared them to compete at a high level in a better-funded school with
more highly trained teachers and a more strenuous curriculum. Richard Walker, though, did well at
Ramsey High in Birmingham. An honor student at his former school, Walker got Bs and Cs in challenging
classes like Physics, Economics, and French. He would have liked to have played basketball but knew
this to be impossible at the white school. The Birmingham students met some kind acquaintances, but
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made few if any friends. One white girl at West End captured the mood of most white students towards
Powell and Marcus, telling a reporter, “I forget they are even here; then when I see them in the hall, I’m
startled. By far the most of us just leave them alone,” she said, “and act as if they weren’t here.” It was
easy enough to do. The plaintiffs in Armstrong petitioned the court for mid-year further desegregation,
but Judge Seybourn Lynne denied the request. Powell, Marcus, Walker, and the Armstrongs were alone
at least until the fall of 1964.40
In Huntsville ten children of federal personnel at the Marshal Space Flight Center and Redstone
Arsenal joined Sonnie Hereford and the three others in white schools late in January. Per Judge Hobart
Grooms’ order, the Huntsville school board had submitted a plan at the first of the year. It called for the
desegregation of the 12th grade at several schools that semester and the system-wide desegregation of
the 11th and 12th grades the following fall.41 The board proposed a grade-a-year stair-step plan
thereafter. Judge Grooms approved it over the objection of the plaintiffs. The ten students applied and
were accepted under the placement law. The Huntsville authorities managed to pull off the additional
desegregation without any special difficulties. Nonetheless, Governor Wallace used the situation to
grandstand, demanding “strong resistance, opposition, and indignation on the part of local people” to
the efforts of these “nonresident” federal personnel who were trying to “destroy the policies, customs,
and traditions of this state.” He argued that “where resistance is low, federal authorities and
incendiaries follow a steady course of intimidation that ultimately will destroy our entire educational
structure.” If the Huntsville local officials had expressed a desire to comply with court orders, the
governor maintained that it was because of this “intimidation.” He offered “additional state assistance
40
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and further courses to be followed in attempting to save the Huntsville school system.” Those “further
courses” were blueprints for private school creation, which Wallace’s administration shared with anyone
who requested it, and with some who did not. For its part, the state board of education passed a
resolution which necessitated the approval of local boards and the state board for the admission of
“non-resident” students. These students’ families, the reasoning went, shopped at the post exchange
on base, and therefore paid no Alabama sales taxes. They ought not to have access to public schools
without some sort of approval. Everyone understood the actual thrust of the move. Meanwhile, most
segregationists in the “Rocket City” accepted the inevitable and adjusted without fanfare to the courtordered presence of the now 14 black students in white schools. Also, in the nearby small cities of
Sheffield and Florence, in the state’s northwestern corner, schools were voluntarily token desegregated.
Since tiny Spring Hill College in Mobile had done so a decade before, these were the lone instances of
school systems’ voluntarily desegregating. So it would remain.42
Both Huntsville’s city school board and the Madison County school board were sure to receive
more requests to transfer that spring and summer under the placement law. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals that month upheld Judge Grooms’ ruling in the “impacted areas” case. The appellate court
dismissed the Justice Department’s contention that segregated public schools were a burden upon the
United States’ exercise of the war power. Nor was the court convinced that the states had implicitly
agreed to assign the children of federal personnel to schools on a non-racial basis. The Justice
Department had argued that the states were contractually bound to do so by virtue of agreeing to
educate those students on the same basis as others in the state when they agreed to accept impacted
areas money from the federal government. The three-judge court – also considering two cases in
Mississippi – included Circuit Judges Richard Rives and Dick Cameron and District Judge Edwin Ford
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Hunter, Jr. Rives wrote for the unanimous court, observing that “no one would be so rash as to claim
that a local school board in either of the ‘hard core’ states of Alabama or Mississippi would intentionally
enter into a contract which it understood to provide for even partial desegregation of the races in the
public schools under its jurisdiction.” The Justice Department attorneys could not argue the veracity of
this point; still they maintained that the contracts provided for the children to be educated “in
accordance with the laws of the state,” which ought to be, themselves, bound by the Brown decision.
Rives argued that this was a question for the Office of Education to probe, not the Justice Department.
The not-altogether unexpected defeat for the plaintiffs allowed the individual families to focus on
working through the other two suits brought by private individuals (blacks had initiated a private suit
against Madison County, in addition to Hereford v. Huntsville). It also allowed the Civil Rights Division to
focus on supporting the cases in which it was an amicus, including Lee v. Macon.43
Mobile was affected by the impacted areas ruling as well. The Justice Department had sought to
force the desegregation of schools serving the children of federal personnel at the Air Force’s Brookley
Field. Blacks seeking transfer to white schools could then theoretically apply for transfer under the
placement law, assuming litigation would bring a permanent injunction against the Mobile school board.
The Birdie Mae Davis case was awaiting a ruling by Judge Daniel Thomas on the merits of such an
injunction, while a preliminary injunction provided for the desegregated education of only Henry Hobdy
and Dorothy Davis. The hearing on the merits had been held in November of 1963, the week before
President John Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. Legal Defense and Education Fund attorney Derrick
Bell had argued forcefully in favor of the plaintiffs’ desegregation plan, which would have desegregated
the entire Mobile City-County system in three years. The Mobile Board of School Commissioners had
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proposed a much more drawn-out plan. The board had argued that there was a “distinct and educable
difference” between black and white children which was “genetic in origin,” and that this was a
perfectly good reason to segregate them in initial school assignments. The defendant school officials
had called psychologists and guidance counselors from the Mobile and Birmingham school systems to
testify to these differences. The school board had also called Dr. Wesley Critz – the former anatomy
professor from the University of North Carolina whom Governor John Patterson had enlisted to craft the
state of Alabama’s initial courtroom defense several years prior. Critz testified that the “the Negro” had
a smaller brain than that of the white man and that he was “less capable of abstract reasoning and hard
intellectual functions.”44
All of this had occurred over the objection of Derrick Bell. Despite Judge Thomas’ policy of
maximum delay and antipathy to civil rights actions, Bell was still dumbfounded that the judge allowed
the testimony to be presented, since it seemed to fly in the face of the original Brown ruling of nearly
ten years prior. After the hearing, Thomas sat on the case for several more months, as Hobdy and Davis
carried their lonely sojourn into 1964. The Fifth Circuit would again have to rule in the case before any
other black students joined them in white schools in Mobile.45
Blacks in the northeastern Alabama city of Gadsden had also brought a suit in late 1963.
Gadsden was a satellite of Birmingham, just a 45 minute drive to the east. It had been the site of an
active protest movement for months. Activists in the city sought the admission of 12 students to allwhite schools as soon as the rulings in Armstrong, Davis, Hereford, and Lee indicated that relief could be
found in the federal trial courts. Judge Grooms ruled in their favor in December but allowed the school
44
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board until the following fall to initiate desegregation. This brought the number of Alabama school
districts facing desegregation to six. There were 114 districts in the state.46
The prospect of desegregating each and every one of those 114 districts was grim, and it would
fall to local activists, the NAACP, the LDF, and the Civil Rights Division to get it done. Across the South,
Alabama trailed only Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi in the fewest number of desegregated
school districts (“hard core” Mississippi had managed to avoid any desegregation altogether). The City
of New Orleans had over 100 black students in white schools, so in terms of the fewest number of black
pupils in white schools, Alabama trailed only South Carolina and Mississippi. Region-wide the
percentage of black pupils attending school with whites was just above one percent. Dismal as this was
for black reformers and their allies, the state of Alabama’s .004 percent put into perspective the lengths
to which segregationists would go in the Deep South to avoid undermining segregated education and
threatening white supremacy. Developments in Tuskegee that year began to reveal both the
increasingly alarming tenacity of that resistance and the promise of continuing litigation.47

Moses and the Burning Bush in Tuskegee
For the Tuskegee students, the situation was fundamentally dissimilar from that of the students
in Huntsville, Birmingham, and Mobile. The Macon County litigation itself would soon become unique
among the state’s cases as well. There were no white students to assault Anthony Lee and the others –
no white students to compete with in class, no white students to verbally harass them, no whites to
pretend that they were not there – because there were no white students there at all. Each morning
the 12 would arrive on the Tuskegee Public campus and see white students milling around. It never
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occurred to one of them, Willie Wyatt, exactly what the whites were doing there, unless they were
waiting to go across the street to Macon Academy. Many of them were, in fact, going to the new
private school, but eventually Wyatt realized that the busses leaving the campus in the morning were
taking some of the white students to Shorter and Notasulga, per the state superintendent of education’s
order. Wyatt, Lee, and their ten comrades attended a re-segregated Tuskegee Public the remainder of
the fall just that way. Since they were spread out among different grades, a typical class included two or
three students and a white teacher who had opted not to quit or join Macon Academy’s growing faculty.
The largest “class” Willy Wyatt attended had three students: himself, Lee, and fellow senior Robert
Judkins.48
This situation became even more absurd in January, when the county chose to stop transporting
the white students across the county from Tuskegee to Shorter and Notasulga. Wallace ordered state
trooper patrol cars and, later, state trade school busses to take up the task. Then, seeing the continuing
white exodus as way to force the black students back to all-black Tuskegee Institute High, the state
board of education simply ordered the closing of Tuskegee Public High on January 30. The state board
was composed entirely of Patterson and Wallace appointees who were happy to frustrate the efforts of
the black plaintiffs in Lee by invoking a state board policy of closing schools “where the teacher load is
insufficient to justify paying teachers.” The state board also ordered the Macon County school board to
resume providing “school bus transportation to the students attending the Shorter-Notasulga schools in
Macon County.” Lest anyone think this meant the 12 black students from Tuskegee, the state board
directed that they be transferred to “other schools in the Tuskegee area,” that is, to all-black Tuskegee
Institute High. C.A. Pruitt and the Macon school board consulted state Attorney General Flowers, who
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advised them that the state board was acting on appropriate authority, and on January 31, the Macon
officials issued a statement announcing the closure of Tuskegee Public.49
Fred Gray said that at that point the realization hit him “like the burning bush speaking to
Moses.” If the governor and the state board of education had the authority to close Tuskegee Public
High School and to order the transportation of white students to other schools in the county, and if they
could order the black students back to Tuskegee Institute High, then surely they had shown that they
had “general control and supervision over all of the public schools in the various counties in the state of
Alabama.” This was language taken directly from Alabama law delineating the state board’s
responsibilities, and Gray was prepared to use it against the state officials. And this was to say nothing
of the governor’s actions the previous fall, when he had directed the various temporary school closures
by executive order, inviting the Justice Department’s action in U.S. v. Wallace. In that case, Wallace was
theoretically using the state’s police power and his authority as governor to maintain “law and order.”
In this case, Wallace could be brought into the Lee suit for his influence as ex officio president of the
Alabama State Board of Education, which was, itself, clearly obstructing desegregation orders. Gray
recalled that he “saw the opportunity to do more with this one lawsuit . . . than had been done in any
other single [desegregation] lawsuit.” The public school systems of Alabama were supposed to be
autonomous, which was why the NAACP had prepared years before to file petitions and lawsuits in
every single one. The state legislature had gone to great pains at times to make sure that the situation
remained diffuse. But there was the state school board not only preventing court-ordered
desegregation, but doing so in a way which clearly demonstrated that it, in fact, controlled local boards
of education across the state. The blunder Wallace and the state officials had made was not lost on
others. An unidentified source in the state government admitted to the Montgomery Advertiser after
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the Tuskegee closure order that the state authorities had made “a tactical error.” Since the Brown
decision, the source said, “the theory . . . has been to spread this out as much as possible, so any court
action taken is a scattergun action. Now,” he said, “a single shot can do it.”50
On Monday, February 3, Fred Gray took aim. He had the full support of the Justice Department,
which had again dispatched John Doar to Tuskegee. Doar pledged every resource at DOJ’s command to
ensuring that the United States’ interests in the case were protected. Shortly after the 12 students
arrived at Tuskegee Public to find that the doors had been locked and the school was indeed closed,
Gray filed an amended and supplemental complaint in Lee v. Macon recounting the interference of the
governor and state board of education – from the initial school closure and state trooper blockade, to
the state-ordered bussing of whites to Shorter and Notasulga, to the more recent closure of Tuskegee
and the order to resume busing. He argued that the state clearly controlled local boards of education
and was pursuing a policy “of operating the public school system in each of the various counties of the
state of Alabama on a racially segregated basis.” Using the line of reasoning in Armstrong, Gray
maintained that the defendant state officials operated a “bi-racial” school system in which initial
assignments were made based on dual racial attendance zones. This went around the logic of the
Alabama Pupil Placement Law. The Macon County authorities could even claim they had transferred the
12 black students back to the black school by virtue of the placement law. And the state board might
even have had reasonable justification for ordering the closing of a school with 12 students in it. But the
combination of the two moves, along with the history of state interference and obstruction, clearly
demonstrated that the whole charade was intended to “circumvent and evade the Order of this Court
dated August 22, 1963,” according to Gray. He therefore asked that the state board of education, its
individual members, and the governor as its president, be added as parties defendant in the case. Gray
and DOJ asked for a temporary restraining order and an injunction against the board and governor,
50
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barring them from any further interference in Macon County, either by voiding the closure of Tuskegee
High or by ordering the transfer of the 12 black students to Shorter and Notasulga. Gray also dropped a
bombshell, asking the court to consider entering an order directing the state board to desegregate all of
the school systems in the state not already under court order.51
Frank Johnson immediately issued a limited temporary restraining order. He refused to restrain
the closing of Tuskegee High, the operation of which had become “unfeasible,” but he added the state
board, its members, and Wallace (in his capacity as president of the board) as parties defendant in the
case and restrained them from any further interference in Macon County. This included interference in
the transfer of the 12 students to Shorter and Notasulga. Fred Gray had worked out an arrangement
with the students to have 6 apply to one school and 6 to the other. Johnson ordered the local school
board to admit the students to Shorter and Notasulga and to see that they had access to transportation
to the two schools on the same basis as the white students. The judge set a date of February 13 for a
hearing on the merits of enlarging the restraining order into a preliminary injunction, but with a caveat.
At that hearing, the court would only consider the issue of state interference in Macon County and the
transfer of the 12 students to the two remaining white schools. “The Court specifically leaves for a later
hearing,” Johnson wrote, “the other relief sought by the motion for preliminary injunction – particularly
the part of the complaint and motion seeking the desegregation of all public schools and public school
systems in the State of Alabama . . . .” Johnson knew that such a statewide school desegregation order
aimed at a southern state government would not only be unprecedented, it would generate an
unprecedented revolt from segregationists. Such an issue deserved a full trial on the merits before any
relief could be entered.52 The issue of restraining interference in the transfer of petitioning black
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students in a clearly “dual” school system was clear cut enough to grant immediate relief pending a
hearing and trial.53
George Wallace bitterly denounced the restraining order and pledged the resistance of the
people of Alabama. At an emergency meeting, called and presided over by Wallace, the state board of
education followed suit, adopting a resolution in which it held:
The State Board of Education deplores the Order of Judge Johnson and pledges every resource
at our command [sic] to defend the people of our State against said Order and will defend the
people of our state against every Order of the Federal courts in attempting to integrate the
public schools of this State and will use every legal means at our command to defeat said
integration Orders and pledges our full support to the local boards of education in supporting
public school systems as now constituted within the law, and will give every assistance possible
to support every effort to maintain our way of life and high educational standards for all citizens
of the State.54

At the same meeting, the state board adopted a resolution directing the Macon County school board “to
forthwith, February 4, 1964, provide financial assistance to parents or guardians of students under the
grant-in-aid law of the state of Alabama.”55
Caught up in the tug of war again, the Macon County school officials turned to their counsel –
state Attorney General Flowers. Flowers advised the board to petition the court for instructions before
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doing anything else. The board then advised Johnson that it “desire[d] to comply with the lawful orders
of the State Board of Education and to grant aid if proper and legal.” But it was “in doubt as to the
action which [it] as a board may take,” specifically as to whether complying with the state board would
mean that it had “violated any of the orders and decrees of [the] court.” The attorney general also
advised Macon Academy not to take “a penny” of grant money from the state until the matter had come
before the court. Flowers understood that the state board and the governor had made a terrible
mistake. They had gone against his will and behind his back, obtained their own private counsel, and
created what the attorney general told the press was a potential “catastrophe” which would probably
mean “total integration for Alabama.” He called the issuing of the grant-in-aid and school closure
orders, collectively, “the biggest blunder that has ever been pulled in our fight against integration,”
adding that it was “foolish,” “ill-planned,” and worst of all, “outside the law.” He vowed, therefore, to
“resist it forever.” Meanwhile, upon the request of Notasulga Mayor James “Kayo” Rea, Wallace once
again prepared to send the Alabama State Troopers into Macon County. This action Flowers defended,
saying, “That’s the most explosive situation I ever saw.”56
After Johnson issued the order to desegregate Shorter and Notasulga, the two towns began to
prepare for the arrival of the 12 black students from Tuskegee on the morning of Wednesday, February
5. Violent trouble was not necessarily expected from the Black Belt planter community of Shorter, but
Notasulga was a hill country town home to mostly poor farmers and textile workers. It was more
volatile. Late on the night of Monday, February 3, Notasulga’s Mayor Rea, a lawyer, arranged the hasty
passage of two city ordinances: a “Civil Disturbance Ordinance” and a “Safety Ordinance.” The former
gave the mayor the authority to “close any public facility, including but not restricted to churches,
schools, lodge halls, taverns, dance halls, and factories,” whenever “[their] continued operation . . .
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would result in riots, violence or physical injury to persons or property . . . .” The “safety” ordinance
created the “Office of Safety and Fire Prevention Inspector” and gave this officer the authority to set
maximum capacities at all public facilities. Rea was immediately appointed by the town council to said
office. He then had the town clerk contact the high school’s principal to ascertain the school’s average
daily attendance, which he was told was 174, including teachers. Rea then acted in his capacity as the
town’s “Fire Prevention Inspector” and established a maximum capacity for the school of 175. The
following night, three buildings on a Macon County school board member’s farm went up in flames (a
tenant farmhouse and two barns, one containing ten tons of ammonia). The county fire department
quickly determined the incident was the result of arson. That weekend Klansmen had burned crosses on
the lawns of three other school board members. The new fire prevention chief seemed unconcerned.57
At both Shorter and Notasulga, some segregationists pushed for a full boycott of classes.
Despite resolutions signed by the senior classes urging students to remain, a number of students began
to announce their intention to leave. Macon Academy started receiving enrollment requests from
Shorter and Notasulga parents as soon as the order came down. Some parents and students simply
would not allow any breach of the color line in which they played a passive role. Other parents feared
what might happen if violent segregationists decided to challenge the effort. The rumblings about town
seemed to give credence to their fears. Outside Macon County High School at Notasulga on the
afternoon of the 5th, a man sat in his car fingering the blade of a knife. He told passing reporters, “This
all could have ended at Oxford (Mississippi) if it had been bloody enough.” Many segregationists in
Notasulga evidently shared this sentiment. He said he doubted if the 6 black students would even make
it to the school the next morning. State trooper chief Al Lingo called the town a “powder keg” and
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“worse” than Tuscaloosa or Birmingham. Mayor Rea told reporters, “We believe in law and order, but it
may be touch and go at times.”58
Yet another public showdown over desegregated education occurred that Wednesday morning.
It did not receive the same publicity as Little Rock, Oxford, Tuscaloosa, or even Wallace’s second stand in
the schoolhouse doors the previous fall. But it revealed the same intransigence. Coming as it did after
all of these previously unsuccessful showdowns, it demonstrated – more than any other to its date – the
doggedness of segregationists at the state and local level in the Deep South. The Alabama State
Troopers showed up in Macon that morning and cordoned off the area around each school at dawn – 65
of them at Shorter and 75, plus Colonel Al Lingo and Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark, at Notasulga. Clark
had no business being there (the Dallas County seat of Selma was 90 miles away), but he had a knack for
showing up anytime there was racial trouble afoot. James Rea would later claim to have invited him. A
little over half the white student body showed up to Shorter (75 of 125), where Heloise Billes, Carmen
Judkins, Janice Carter, Ellen Henderson, Harvey Jackson, and Wilmer Jones were successfully enrolled,
accompanied by U.S. Marshals and Justice Department officials. Fourteen white students left upon the
black students’ arrival. It was at Notasulga, though, that the real commotion took place. A few
Notasulga residents lined the streets of the tiny town to watch the bus arrive carrying Anthony Lee,
Willie Wyatt, Robert Judkins, Patricia Jones, Martha Sullins, and Shirley Chambliss. One man raised a
shotgun from behind the window of his hardware store as the bus passed, temporarily putting a shock
into the U.S. Marshals following the bus, and a few of the students on it, who happened to see him. A
cold rain kept many townspeople away from the school itself, as did advance knowledge of Mayor Rea’s
planned mini-stand in the schoolhouse door. Journalists and an angry crowd of about 30 white men,
though, gathered across the street from where Lingo and the troopers had surrounded the school. They
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watched intently as the bus drove onto the school grounds and past a flagpole bearing only the Alabama
state flag and the Confederate battle flag.59
Notasulga policeman E.A. Harris flagged the bus down just inside the driveway at the entrance
to the school grounds. Lingo had gotten word somehow that a white photographer had snuck aboard
the bus and accompanied the children the nine miles from Tuskegee into town. Harris and Clark,
especially, were eager to make him pay. Vernon Merritt, a University of Alabama student working for
the Black Star Agency of Birmingham, had indeed snuck aboard the bus. Unknown outside of Alabama
at the time, the 23-year-old Montgomery native would go on to distinguish himself covering the
Vietnam war and as a staff photographer for Life magazine. There was much about Merritt for white
Alabamians to dislike: he was a southern liberal journalist flouting law enforcement’s maintenance of
law and order while seeking to, they would have argued, paint the South in a negative light. He was a
white traitor and the ultimate persona non grata. Harris was the first to board the bus and flush Merritt
out. Clark, who had no jurisdiction in Macon County but who had an increasingly infamous horsemounted posse of angry segregationists, followed Harris onto the bus. The two lawmen proceeded to
assault Merritt, who was crouched in the aisle trying to hide. Harris began beating Merritt with a long
cane. After smashing his camera against the side of the bus, Clark proceeded to repeatedly beat the
photographer with his electric cattle prod, dragging him off the bus, screaming at Merritt the entire
time, for effect, “Don’t you strike me!”60
State troopers held other journalists back across the street, obstructed their view, and ordered
them not to take pictures. The U.S. Marshals and the Justice Department officials remained in their
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vehicles behind the state trooper line. Lee, Wyatt, and the others sat silent and horrified on the school
bus as Merritt lie bleeding and moaning on the sidewalk. As Merritt began to gingerly walk away from
the school, the angry whites across the street began to jeer at him and threaten him, shouting “Nigger
lover!” and “Come on over here, and we’ll fix you!” Lingo ordered two troopers to pick him up and
whisk him away before the crowd could have its way. The angry whites then turned on the journalists in
their midst, prompting the troopers to redouble their efforts to prevent a melee. Meanwhile, the bus
pulled further down the u-shaped driveway to the front door of the school, where Rea met it. The
mayor stood like Wallace at Tuscaloosa and announced to the students that the town’s recently passed
fire safety ordinance prevented their entry into the school. “I have determined,” he said, “that the
maximum safe capacity of Notasulga High School is the present enrollment. The school cannot safely
accommodate any more pupils.” Gathered outside the school, a group of students cheered as the bus
turned back for Tuskegee.61
Attorneys from the Civil Rights Division immediately drove to Montgomery to draft and file a
complaint against James Rea, seeking a preliminary injunction against the use of the bogus town
ordinances and against any further interference. Fred Gray began preparing another amendment to his
recently amended complaint in Lee v. Macon. Meanwhile, in the days after the Notasulga incident and
the successful enrollment at Shorter, the white exodus began anew. Mayor Rea briefly closed
Notasulga’s schools because a suspicious fire at the town’s water treatment plant had created a
“shortage” of water, which he deemed a fire hazard. When the schools were reopened, those students
who elected to return began to feel the peer pressure from those who had left. And Macon Academy,
already overcrowded and underfunded, announced that it would accept all comers (white ones
anyway). Aware of the continuing departure of whites for the segregationist academy, Gray asked the
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court to void the tuition grant-in-aid statute which the state board had recently invoked. He sought a
preliminary injunction against the use of the law and against any school closure efforts in Macon, or any
other action which frustrated or circumvented the prior orders of the court. As Gray filed the amended
complaint on Monday, February 10, someone called in a bomb threat to Shorter High School, shutting it
down. A near-100 percent boycott was then underway at Notasulga, where mayor Rea had publically
conceded the black students’ admission. Gray was not prepared to send the children to the school,
however, until the U.S. secured its injunction against the mayor.62
Just three days prior, a three-judge court had been appointed to hear Lee v. Macon. Johnson
had approached Montgomery’s resident circuit judge, his good friend Dick Rives, shortly after Gray filed
the initial complaint in January, 1963, about the possibility of requesting a three-judge court to hear the
case. Rives then submitted the query to Fifth Circuit Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle, admitting that it was a
“close question” and that neither he nor Judge Johnson were “convinced either way.” The plaintiffs had
not asked for a three-judge court. Neither had they asked for an injunction against the discriminatory
application of the placement law; thus, they had not challenged the constitutionality of a state statute,
the usual grounds for assigning a three-judge court to a case such as this. But the Fifth Circuit had
granted relief in that way in Armstrong and Davis – by enjoining unconstitutional application of the
placement law – and the circumstances were quite different a year later, in any case. At the time of
Johnson’s initial query, Tuttle had advised Rives that it did “not seem . . . that a three-judge court [was]
indicated” based on recent Fifth Circuit rulings. But the Chief Judge told Rives that “if Judge Johnson
requests such a court because he feels it is appropriate, or because he would prefer it,” then Tuttle
would “be glad to give every consideration to such a request.” When Fred Gray filed the amended
complaint in February of 1964, Johnson made the request. On February 7, Tuttle granted it. The Fifth
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Circuit chief appointed Judges Rives and Grooms to join Judge Johnson on the Lee v. Macon panel. It
was a promising court for the plaintiffs and the CRD.63
Wallace had begun to realize the colossal mistake that he had made. His administration
initiated a clumsy backtracking maneuver. Wallace first made a show of requesting an advisory opinion
of the Alabama Supreme Court. The governor wanted to know whether or not the state board of
education had the authority to assign and transfer pupils and teachers, to close schools, to direct local
boards to provide transportation, and to require local boards to provide grants-in-aid. These were all of
the things that the state board had, of course, already very recently done. The state Supreme Court
dutifully reported to Wallace on February 18 that the state board had no authority under the state
constitution to do any of these things, and that in fact all such powers rested with the local boards of
education, by way of powers conferred by the state legislature. “However broad may be the powers of
the State Board of Education,” the court wrote, “we think it clear that the authority to exercise general
control and supervision over the county and city boards of education does not include the authority to
exercise powers and authority which the Legislature has specifically conferred upon such local boards.”
On the same day, the state board of education met in an emergency session called by Wallace. It issued
a resolution “in accordance with the Opinion of the Justices” which resolved to “expressly rescind and
repeal” the resolutions ordering the closure of Tuskegee High, the transfer of the students back to
Tuskegee Public, the transportation of students to Shorter and Notasulga, and the order directing
payment of grants-in-aid. The board had earlier amended the resolution requiring local and state board
approval for the admission of “non-resident” students, eliminating the state requirement. These were
obvious attempts to shield the board from a potential statewide injunction. Even as Superintendent
Meadows chaired the emergency meeting of the state board (Wallace himself did not attend), Fred Gray
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and attorneys from the Civil Rights Division were down the hall inspecting the board’s records in
advance of the approaching hearing in Lee v. Macon. State Attorney General Flowers, ostracized by the
Wallace-ite board, announced that the rescinding actions would “possibly enable [him] to save them
from the [their] blunder.” Fred Gray and John Doar certainly hoped not.64
Even before the hearing in Lee v. Macon, in the case the Justice Department had brought against
James Rea, Judge Johnson enjoined the mayor from interfering in the admission of the Lee, Wyatt, and
the others to Macon County High School at Notasulga. Johnson held that Rea had clearly orchestrated
the passage of the safety and civil disturbance ordinances for the purpose of “using [them] as a devious
means of interfering with this Court's order of February 3, 1964.” More specifically, he explained, “the
passage and the use of these ordinances . . . was a subterfuge [designed] to interfere with and obstruct
the admission of the six Negro children in the Macon County High School, which admission was ordered
and required by this Court's order of February 3, 1964.” It was not even necessary to examine the laws
under strict scrutiny, for Johnson held that the laws clearly “had no rational basis” to begin with.
Accordingly, he ordered Rea to stay out of any and all further attempts to carry out the court’s orders,
except insofar as he ought to maintain peace and order.65
The six students were soon enrolled in the school, accompanied by Doar, other Justice
Department officials, and U.S. Marshals, and under the supervision of the Alabama State Troopers and
local police. James Rea watched from across the street as the six entered the school for the first time.
The white students were already gone, many making plans even then to attend Macon Academy or
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nearby white schools in other counties.66 The president of the Macon County Private School
Foundation, which ran Macon Academy, observed that the injunctions forcing the admission of the
students at Shorter and, especially, at Notasulga, “gave us Macon County.” He reported that the school
had enough applications from Shorter and Notasulga students, just under 200, to double its enrollment.
Hastily-approved state accreditation assured many parents, and by spring the private school’s
enrollment of 375 students made it the largest white high school in the county’s history. The academy
hired additional teachers and began preparations for double-shift class days, with half the student body
coming in the morning, the other half in the afternoon. Parents in Shorter worked with the school’s
organizers to establish a “branch” elementary school in a former residence in Shorter, in anticipation of
the desegregation of the elementary school at Tuskegee Public. If parents or students wanted to avoid
desegregation, the private school officials demonstrated a remarkable willingness and ability to provide
them with an escape hatch at every turn.67
Meanwhile, Wallace unsurprisingly lobbed denunciations at the federal court, arguing that it
had succeeded in “destroying schools for the white people in Macon County” by “transporting Negroes
16 miles to a white, non-accredited school instead of the Negro school, which is the only remaining
accredited school in the County.” In a prepared statement, he called his old friend Frank Johnson a
“judicial tyrant” and a “rash, headstrong, and vindictive” man whose actions were “unstable and erratic”
and aimed at sowing “strife and discord.” The order of the court was “based on no evidence, only on
the affidavit of a Negro attorney, which is the same as the NAACP.” Johnson’s order was, he said, a
“judicial tantrum” which would be “resisted by the people of Alabama and Macon County.” Wallace
figured that the judge was trying to “run this state by usurpation of authority and the threat of
bayonets.” He no doubt got the attention of the CRD and the LDF when he added, “We are charged
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with the running of the schools of this state, and this we shall continue to do.” The governor closed his
statement by recommending that Johnson be impeached. In another address days later, Wallace said
the governor’s office would use the semi-personal governor’s “mansion fund” and “spend whatever
money we have to help” Macon’s whites, especially to help white students enroll in other schools. He
exhorted all other white Alabamians to support the fledgling Macon Academy in any way they could. He
suggested that the two remaining public high schools might have to be closed, just as Tuskegee Public
had been – for “economic reasons” – since there were only six students in each school. That was
precisely what he and the state board wanted.68

Lee v. Macon before the Three-Judge Court
With the 12 students making the most of a once again isolated existence, Lee v. Macon came
before the newly tapped three-judge panel in Montgomery on February 21 for an initial hearing. As
Judge Johnson had announced weeks before, the court was not prepared to rule on the issue of a
statewide desegregation order; the main order of business was the potential enlargement of the
temporary restraining order, relative to Macon County, into a preliminary injunction. Nonetheless,
recent events had only underscored the centrality of alleged state interference to all future proceedings,
and the court began to hear evidence which would be used to support the plaintiffs’ and the United
States’ arguments for statewide relief. Fred Gray represented the plaintiffs along with NAACP-LDF
General Counsel Jack Greenberg and LDF attorney Charles Jones, who had flown in from New York for
the proceedings. The Civil Rights Division’s St. John Barrett and Robert Owens represented the United
States. Attorney General Flowers represented the Macon County school board and made an attempt to
represent the state by entering a motion to dismiss the issue of a statewide injunction. Dismayed by
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the recklessness of Wallace, Flowers made a half-hearted, obligatory challenge which rested on the
assumption that the state board’s repudiation of its prior acts would be enough for the court to let it off
the hook. Assistant Attorney General Gordon Madison attempted to deflect scrutiny away from the
Macon County officials and towards state Superintendent Meadows and the state board, both of whom
had, of course, publically denounced Flowers for his lack of sufficient defiance.69
Representing Wallace and the state board were a number of top Alabama attorneys, most
notably Montgomery’s Maury Smith and Joe Goodwyn and Birmingham’s Joe Johnston. The state
officials’ team entered a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and to dismiss the
complaint. They argued that the board members had “misapprehended their powers of closing schools
and ordering transportation to be furnished to students.” The state officials also claimed to have
mistakenly acted in directing the payment of tuition grants. Those orders had been rescinded, they
argued, as soon as the Alabama Supreme Court had issued its “Opinion of the Justices.” In any case, the
state board had supposedly “not pursued, and [did] not intend to pursue a policy, and are not
authorized by law, to operate a public school system of Alabama in any of the counties of the state on a
racially segregated basis.” The state board, according to its attorneys, had exercised the “general
powers” afforded it by Alabama law strictly “in a consolatory and advisory capacity and not
administratively.” The defendants were forced to admit to the veracity of state Superintendent
Meadows’ September, 1963 memorandum to the Macon County school board in which Meadows
directed the board to provide bus transportation to the white students at Shorter and Notasulga and to
reassign teachers and pupils. But they focused on the language of Meadows’ opening paragraph in
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which he “recommended that the just and proper disposition of the matters was” to see that these
things were done.”70
Fred Gray called a number of witnesses, including C.A. Pruitt, Meadows (who was also deposed
before the hearing), the headmaster and the treasurer of Macon Academy, the principals at Shorter and
Notasulga, a bus driver, a few of the black student-plaintiffs, and even the former captain of the
Tuskegee High football team who read Wallace’s letter pledging assistance. Meadows himself was on
the stand for much of the hearing, reading the various resolutions of the state board into the record. At
one point the no-nonsense Johnson admonished a clearly annoyed and flustered Meadows for reading
too quickly. “Read it right,” Johnson instructed. Meadows slowed down. Gray was trying to establish
that the state board did, indeed, have control over local systems, that it was trying to exercise that
control, and that the state, furthermore, was directly contributing to the success of Macon Academy.
The evidence clearly indicated that the state officials had ordered the closure of Tuskegee High, the
transportation of white students to the other two schools, and the payment of tuition grants. Gray also
showed clearly that state employees had contributed nearly $7,000 financially to Macon Academy,
along with Hoover and West End Academies in Birmingham, at Wallace’s behest, and that the state had
facilitated the Tuskegee academy’s dubious accreditation proceedings. Even more damning were the
string of public statements, introduced at the hearing by members of the press, in which Wallace and
the state board pledged defiance of the court and of desegregation in general.71
From Frank Johnson’s perspective, though, it was the United States which presented the most
intriguing evidence. St. John Barrett called a former employee of the state department of education,
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State Senator George Yarbrough, who had consulted with the state board on matters of desegregation.
He testified that when the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had
contacted local school boards in Alabama the previous fall regarding federal “impacted areas” students,
the state board had replied for those boards, rather than allowing the local boards to reply themselves.
Yarbrough admitted that he had sent a memorandum to all the impacted areas districts, in which he
wrote that they “should refer the Washington Office [of Education] to the Alabama State Board of
Education since there are at present no independent school districts operating in the state of Alabama.”
On friendly cross examination, Goodwyn tried to allow Yarbrough to equivocate on the phrase
“independent school district.” Yarbrough claimed he meant a district established within a county that is
completely independent of the county school system’s administration. While the distinction, given the
benefit of the doubt, might have lessened the blow of such a bold statement, the fact remained that the
state board had assumed the responsibility of the local school authorities in what should have been
bilateral communications.72
Despite the strong evidence offered by the plaintiffs and the United States, the court moved
cautiously after the hearing. It called for briefs to be filed within 50 days on six issues: should the
temporary restraining order be enlarged into a preliminary injunction; should the Alabama grant-in-aid
statute be declared unconstitutional; should the governor, state superintendent, and the state board be
enjoined from interfering in desegregation throughout the state; should the court enter an order
desegregating all of the schools in the state “based upon the assumption or usurpation of [local]
authority” by the defendant state officials; had the use of “public funds, public interference, and public
services” been to such an extent that Macon Academy ought to appear as a party defendant in the case
and be given an opportunity to be heard as to whether it was effectively a public institution; and finally,
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whether the court should declare the Alabama Pupil Placement Law unconstitutional in its statewide
application.73
In March the Civil Rights Division filed a 104-page brief, signed by Burke Marshall, St. John
Barrett, several other CRD attorneys, and Alabama’s Middle District U.S. attorney, Ben Hardeman.
Much of it was devoted to summarizing the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing. The brief
filed by Fred Gray and joined in by Greenberg, Jones, and Constance Baker Motley, was remarkably
similar in its presentation of facts, arguments, marshaling of precedent, and recommendations. Judge
Johnson ultimately used the United States brief as a model for his opinion and decree, as was his
custom. Everyone knew that the state of Alabama had an official policy favoring racial segregation in
schools and was presently operating a dual school system based upon race. This was not difficult to
illustrate. Nor was the fact that the Alabama Placement Law was being applied unconstitutionally really
in doubt. It was only being applied to black students after an initial racially segregated pupil assignment
based on dual racial zones, and this policy was actively encouraged by the state. The Fifth Circuit ruling
in the Bush v. Orleans Parish case, along with similar judgments in other circuits as well as the recent
Armstrong and Davis rulings, made this judgment easy to make.74 Nor was it difficult to show that the
state was assisting Macon Academy in fundraising and promoting the payment of tuition grants for
whites to attend it. It was similarly clear beyond any doubt that the state had interfered with the
carrying out of court-ordered desegregation in Macon County.75
Where it began to get interesting for the court was the CRD’s presentation of evidence that the
state board of education and the state superintendent were exercising general control and supervision
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over local school systems. The U.S. argued that the state exercised its greatest measure of control via
the “purse strings,” that is, through the allocation of funding to local systems based on “teacher units.”
State funds accounted for the overwhelming majority of local systems’ budgets, and the state controlled
how much they got by assigning teacher unit numbers (an indicator of how many teachers a school
system needed). This was a process in which the state officials had broad leeway. The Justice
Department attorneys uncovered a memorandum in the state department of education files in which
Meadows himself told state board members, “This Board of Education has control of the elementary
and high schools of this state” through its control of state funding. The CRD attorneys also argued that
the state board had demonstrated statewide control through instructing systems to unconstitutionally
apply the pupil placement law; Meadows suggested at one point that they apply it “for all it is worth.”
The state board was also responsible for the approval of all local construction contracts, the approval of
certain local transportation procedures, the purchasing and approval of textbooks, the demand that
“the Holy Bible [be] read in each and every public school at least once a day” (after the Supreme Court
had declared such practice unconstitutional), and even the demand that schools teach the dangers of
cigarette smoking.76
The U.S. argued that, in light of Cooper v. Aaron, the court could not “permit the conditions that
the state has here created to be used as an excuse for returning the Negro plaintiffs to” segregated
Tuskegee Institute High. In other words, white boycott or not, Shorter and Notasulga could not be
allowed to close like Tuskegee Public. Furthermore, the Macon County school board’s plan to
desegregate only the 12th grade the next year would be ”a step back” in light of the diverse grades
represented by the 12 students already transferred. Additionally, the Supreme Court had held in
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Watson v. City of Memphis and Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville that “deliberate
speed” could not “countenance indefinite delay.” Barrett and his team called the state school board’s
recision of its prior resolutions a sham and argued that the state’s ex post facto claims to inculpability
had “no foundation in fact or in law.” More specifically, the U.S. argued that:

All of the rescinding action was not only initiated after the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint
against unlawful interference, but was initiated after the filing of the amended complaint
asserting that the defendant state officials were exercising control over local school districts and
that they should be required to desegregate on a state-wide basis.77

There could not have been a more clear and concise statement of the state’s blatant disingenuousness,
and its inclusion was one of the reason’s Frank Johnson valued the DOJ attorneys. There was strong and
long-standing precedent in the law for holding defendants accountable despite the “voluntary
abandonment of unlawful conduct after suit has been filed.” In any case, the state board had not
rescinded its statements decrying the order of the court and pledging defiance generally, only those
resolutions ordering the specific measures already targeted by the plaintiffs.78
As to the constitutionality of the Alabama grant-in-aid statute, the CRD team located the origins
of the most recent tuition grant statute in the flurry of post-Brown segregationist legislation. It then
argued that the law was intended to be used in places where public education had become
“unavailable,” which in Alabama inevitably meant in places where schools had been closed to avoid
desegregation. And it was meant to apply to students in private, non-sectarian schools which in reality
functioned as substitutes for the closed public system. Citing a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit in a
case involving hospitals in North Carolina (in which both the LDF’s Jack Greenberg and the CRD’s St. John
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Barrett had participated), the CRD argued that if these private schools were to be considered
constitutional substitutes for the closed public system, they could not segregate on the basis of race.
The U.S. asked the court to enjoin the payment of tuition grants to such schools that did. The court
need not enjoin the private schools’ own discrimination, only the transferal of state support from closed
public schools to such private schools – a “transparent effort at evasion” which had also been struck
down in proceedings in Cooper v. Aaron. The U.S. did not know it at the time, but local school closure
and transparent public support for private schools was about to be struck down by the Supreme Court
even more clearly in a case involving the national pioneer in locally-initiated school closure, Prince
Edward County, Virginia. The case was argued just two weeks after the U.S. submitted its brief in Lee v.
Macon and decided in May. The Lee court would have to consider it when making its judgment.79
Finally, the DOJ attorneys addressed the ability of the plaintiffs to seek statewide relief and the
possible issuance of a statewide desegregation order. They argued that regardless of the plaintiffs’
standing to seek relief statewide, the United States was entitled to statewide injunctive relief based on
the state board’s and the governor’s repeated statements pledging to “stand against every order of the
federal courts in attempting to integrate the public schools.” A statewide desegregation order was
warranted in addition to enjoining the state officials from interference because, the U.S. argued, “by
asserting plenary authority over the Macon County School Board, the state officials have practically
demonstrated their plenary authority over all local school boards.” The brief suggested that, therefore,
“the Court may order [the state officials] to exercise that authority to abolish Alabama’s segregated
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school system.” This is what Fred Gray had argued and what more cautious segregationists like Flowers
had feared.80
The federal attorneys added another wrinkle, however. Regardless of the obvious interference
in Macon County, they wrote, “we believe that [the state authorities] possess, and have always
possessed, sufficient authority under state law to require local boards to protect the constitutional
rights of Negro children by abolishing racially segregated systems.” A decree to that effect was entirely
appropriate, they argued, “based on the State Board’s authorized involvement in practically every
aspect of local public school education and the State Board’s continuous participation in the operation
of segregated schools [throughout] Alabama.” Indeed it was “through the exercise of a statewide
power” that the defendants had “participated in the perpetuation of segregated schools in Macon
County”; therefore, it was “that power and not some lesser power involving only Macon County, that
must be exercised to provide the relief sought by the plaintiffs.” The Fifth Circuit had found in a case
involving Ft. Worth schools that any time a court grants relief based on an unconstitutional practice, it
must grant relief to all who suffer from that practice. Therefore, if the court found that Alabama had an
official policy favoring segregated education, that it was operating a dual school system, and most
importantly, that the defendant state officials possessed supervisory authority, it necessarily followed
that the court not only could, but ought to, grant statewide relief. The defendants had “in the name of
the state . . . done whatever they felt was necessary to insure maintenance of the segregated system
within each school district”; therefore, they were the “appropriate state officials to undo in behalf of the
state what they have actually accomplished in the name of the state.”81
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Wallace responded to news of the Justice Department’s brief in customary fashion, telling the
people of Alabama, “It is just a brief that they filed,” and “We are going to continue to have segregation
in the public schools of Alabama just as they do in most states of the union.” The state board of
education’s brief in answer was similarly unsurprising. The state’s team argued that state code and case
law placed authority in the hands of local boards of education. “We must candidly admit,” they wrote,
that “the actions of the State Board upon which the Temporary Restraining Order was issued were taken
improvidently and contrary to law.” But as the defense had argued at the hearing, these actions had
been rescinded upon the issuance of the Opinion of the Justices. The brief included testimony from the
hearing from the principal of Shorter High School and from Superintendent Pruitt, to the effect that the
administration of the Macon County school system was a function entirely carried out by the county
school board and county superintendent. Neither the local nor state officials, though, could prevent the
white withdrawal from desegregated schools. The United States and the plaintiffs, it seemed, were
“obviously seeking forced integration and not simply cessation of state activities which may be
discriminatory on account of race.” Grants-in-aid, they argued, had not at that point actually been
issued to anyone, and so this was not a question that could be properly decided. They noted significant
distinctions between Alabama’s situation and the Prince Edward case then pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court: the Prince Edward officials had provided grants-in-aid as well as tax credits for
charitable donations to the school foundation; they had leased public school buildings; and they had
allowed teachers at the private school to retain their public school pensions. Alabama officials had
supposedly done none of this. The defense further argued that the United States was trying to make
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“strange law indeed” in that its aim was to have the court respond to the defendant’s admittedly
unlawful seizure of authority by having the court “not only . . . allow him to keep that [power] which he
has unlawfully usurped, but [to] actually compel him to do so.” Finally, they argued that the plaintiffs
had no standing to represent a statewide class, and that the U.S. did not have standing to represent
rights which went beyond those of the plaintiffs. Flowers filed a separate brief as attorney general in
which he presented a substantially argument.82
In its reply brief, the United States stated simply, “The answering briefs of the defendants have
failed to present any reason, either in fact or in law, why the conclusions urged by the United States and
by the plaintiffs in their opening briefs should not be adopted by the court.” The CRD attorneys
proceeded to eviscerate most of the potentially effective claims of the defense. For example, the state
board’s team had cited several decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court in support of its contention that
local school boards had the ultimate authority over local schools. Upon actually reading these decisions,
the U.S. was able to demonstrate that “none of them support the position of the defendants” because
none of them “involve the disposition of authority as between the State Board of Education and the
various local boards of education.” Barrett and company similarly dismissed precedent cited in support
of the state board’s claim that it ought not be enjoined from interference statewide. To this point the
state officials had argued that the state did not have the legal authority to do that which the U.S. and
plaintiffs petitioned the court to order. The U.S. replied that “whatever the limit on the legal authority
of the State Board of Education, these limitations did not inhibit it from effectively interfering with
desegregation in Macon County.” The court could not simply take the state authorities at their word
that they would not repeat such actions. Nor in the case of the pupil placement law could the court
“despite the evidence on the record . . . somehow remain ignorant of what every other person in
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Alabama must know.” In closing, the CRD attorneys offered a simple statistic taken from the files of the
state board itself: for the 1961-62 school year, all 527,075 white students in the state attended “white”
schools, while all 280,012 Negro students were in “Negro” schools.83

*****
As the court took the briefs under advisement in April and mulled the question of a statewide
desegregation order, segregationists in Macon County made clear their intention to continue in
resistance locally. Someone hung life-sized effigies in downtown Tuskegee of desegregation pioneer
Detroit Lee – represented by a blackfaced, minstrelsy-style effigy with the name “Lee” – and moderate
county sheriff Preston Hornsby – represented by a white effigy with toy gun and holster and the name
“Preston”. The two were set to run for probate judge in the local upcoming Democratic primary. A
number of Tuskegee’s blacks were set to test the increased voting strength of blacks in the election,
giving some segregationists an even greater cause for alarm, perhaps, than the school case. The
continuing threat to the county’s schools was not lost in the anxiety over the coming election, however.
Segregationists in Notasulga made sure of that. At two o’clock on the morning of April 18, arsonists set
fire to Macon County High, effectively destroying a large section of the school, including the cafeteria,
before volunteer firefighters arrived to put out the blaze. The adjoining all-white elementary school was
unfazed. Less than 24 hours prior to the arson, Anthony Lee and his fellow students had been greeted
at the school with graffiti painted on the outer walls reading, “Nigger,” in three-foot-tall letters, along
with “Go to Hell,” “Judge Johnson’s and Bobby Kennedy’s School,” “Step by Step One More Day Nigger,”
“Detroit Lee S.O.B.,” “Go Home, Damn Nigger, Damn Nigger, Damn Nigger,” “You Have Been Told Once
– and That’s All,” and “Godfathers of all Niggers.” These messages had been painted on white paint
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used to cover similar signs painted a month earlier, which had read, “Nigger go home” and “Nigger you
had better leave while the leaving is good.” Meanwhile, a few days after the fire, two white teenagers
were arrested for stealing thousands of dollars-worth of science, music, and athletic equipment from
Tuskegee Public. The boys were never indicted, as it seemed a number of white parents in the city felt
the equipment belonged at Macon Academy anyway. It had been purchased, they reasoned, with their
tax money.84
Macon’s segregationists enjoyed a brief triumph. The county school board, on the advice of
Flowers, transferred the 6 Notasulga students back to Tuskegee Institute High, effectively declining to
reopen Tuskegee Public or to send them to Shorter with the other six. Fred Gray filed a motion for
additional relief, asking the court to order the school board to provide facilities at the partially destroyed
Notasulga school or to enroll the six “in some other school in the said County other than those restricted
to attendance for Negro children.” After a brief hearing, the court issued such an injunction four days
later. The Macon authorities elected to make room for the six among the ashes at Notasulga. There
Anthony Lee, Willy Wyatt, and Robert Judkins finished out their senior year of high school, “brownbagging it” every day since there was no cafeteria anymore. The Thursday before their last scheduled
day, principal Clements called the six into his the auditorium, where he presented the three seniors with
their diplomas. A ceremony scheduled for Friday never took place.85
In contrast, Macon Academy held a graduation ceremony a few weeks later. Fifty-three seniors
were able to receive their diplomas with all of the pomp that would have accompanied Tuskegee Public,
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or Shorter, or Notasulga graduation in years past. The school’s foundation ran a full page ad in the local
newspaper congratulating the class:

The entire county hails you, first graduates of a splendid new school that symbolizes the
characteristics of the spirit that gave this nation its beginnings. The manner in which you, with
your instructors, have created such a fine educational institution cannot help but give you added
strength of character for the battles you will face as you go forth into the future. We know that
the problems that you have overcome at Macon Academy will be a vital factor in molding you
into the leaders of tomorrow.86

James Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News-Leader, gave the commencement address. Kilpatrick had
favorably covered the efforts of segregationists in Virginia to pioneer school closure and private school
establishment. He chose to speak to the Macon students about the world in which they might find
themselves in 1984, a nod to George Orwell’s novel. The students would be shaping policy in a
“strangely different world,” he said, one in which people lived crammed into “high-rise hives” in the
cities, and in which old city boundaries did not have the same meaning anymore. The government
would be regulating more and more, including water consumption and air pollution. He asked “can
individual freedom survive in such a world?” These were, indeed, the very people who would be leading
the state into the 1970s and 80s, asking that very same question, from that same point of departure.87
The Tuskegee Civic Association held a ceremony at Tuskegee Institute the following day for the
12 black students who had braved the county’s first desegregated schools. The featured speaker there
was Margaret Anderson, a teacher and guidance counselor from Clinton, Tennessee, one of the first
school systems in the South to be desegregated. Anderson urged the 12 to remain committed to their
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education and to the struggle for equality, to continue trying to “break this cycle of ignorance, poverty,
and prejudice.” “Boys and girls,” she said, “there are many roads to the top of the mountain, but once
you reach the top, the view is the same.88
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CHAPTER 9: RUSSIAN ROULETTE, ALABAMA STYLE: LEE V. MACON, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, AND THE HEW
GUIDELINES, 1964-65

May 17, 1964 marked the tenth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education. John Leflore in
Mobile was hosting a commemoration event through the local black longshoremen’s union. As
president of the union, Leflore had invited the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s (LDF) Jack Greenberg to be
the keynote speaker. Greenberg spoke to the crowd of 1,000 about continuing to “press hard for
integration” and for equal rights for all Americans. “The very root of all our cases,” he said, “is the
conception of human dignity.” He joked about members of the National States’ Rights Party (NSRP),
who always referred to the LDF lawyer as “Jew Jack”; even then they were picketing outside the union
hall and outside the hotel where they thought he had stayed.1
In fact Greenberg had not stayed at the Sheraton as the NSRP suspected. He had flown in that
morning and had been ushered to a waiting Mobile police car on the tarmac. Two of the city’s newly
hired black officers drove Greenberg to the house of attorney Vernon Crawford, where the group shared
drinks before driving over to the union hall. There Greenberg was quickly shuffled through a back door
and up to the podium. He left on a charter flight minutes after delivering the speech. The unusual
arrangements were the result of a report the Federal Bureau of Investigation had given the Department
of Justice days before the scheduled speech. Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall had informed
the LDF that segregationists in Alabama planned to assassinate Greenberg in Mobile. The New York
lawyer insisted on going to give the speech anyway. The LDF notified the Mobile police, and Greenberg
himself had an associate scour the hall before the rally.2
No attempt on Greenberg’s life ever materialized, but the threats against him underscore not
only the unwillingness of many segregationists to accept the implementation of the Brown decision, but
1
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the lengths to which some would consider going to avoid that fate. In 1964 and 1965, pressure on
segregated education from local activists, the LDF, the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division (CRD),
and the federal courts increased. The most significant increase in such pressure came, though, through
the threat of federal funding cut-offs authorized by the U.S. Congress. This pressure brought many local
officials over to the side of law, order, and minimal compliance. But at the state and local level, lawand-order style defiance continued. If state officials, in particular, were playing a deadly game with the
future of Alabama school children’s in their hands, it was not the first time. Only in 1964, in the wake of
the injunction in Lee v. Macon, they were endangering their own cause as much as anything else.

“It’s Only a Matter of Time”
To Jack Greenberg and Fred Gray, some of the issues before the court in Lee v. Macon in the
summer of 1964 seemed clear-cut enough, especially given the composition of the court. Gray and his
partners with the LDF were confident that the court would grant at least some of the relief the plaintiffs
sought. The issue of statewide injunctive relief in the form of a desegregation order, however, was
another matter. Gray and Greenberg realized that the court might not be prepared to take the
necessary leaps: that the plaintiffs could represent a statewide class, that the state board had effectively
demonstrated statewide control, and most especially, that the state board was well-placed to enforce
what would be an unprecedented order. In that state of uncertainty, the LDF attorneys resolved to
continue bringing suits against individual Alabama school districts where parents and students were
willing and able to come forward. In May Gray filed Harris v. Bullock County Board of Education and Carr
v. Montgomery Board of Education. Bullock was a predominantly black county in the southeastern Black
Belt, just below Macon County. Montgomery was, of course, the state capital and site of the first
attempt to desegregate an Alabama school, ten years earlier. That both of these were in the state’s
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Middle District was no coincidence. The LDF wanted to file suits in Judge Frank Johnson’s court, where
they knew they would get fair and efficient proceedings.3
The legal context in which Johnson, Rives, and Grooms would decide upon the six issues pending
in Lee v. Macon, meanwhile, was significantly altered by decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in May and June. In May the Supreme Court issued its most significant
desegregation rulings since the 1963 Watson v. City of Memphis and Goss v. Board of Education of the
City of Knoxville decisions. Like those decisions, these were intended to belatedly emphasize the
“speed” in “deliberate speed.” In both Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County and
Calhoun v. Lattimer, the Justice Department “piggy-backed,” as Greenberg put it, on LDF-initiated
litigation and appeared as an amicus curiae. Not until the Civil Rights Act was passed later that year
could the Justice Department bring school desegregation suits itself, so “piggy-backing” was necessary.
In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, the Court addressed a direct affront not
unlike it had in Cooper v. Aaron. As legal scholar Harvie Wilkinson has explained, "Here was [Prince
Edward County], a party to the original Brown decision, back in Court a decade later, with its private
schools segregated and public schools shut down,” and there was “the entire federal judiciary,
seemingly unable after ten years to help." On May 25, 1964, the Court held in Griffin that the
maintenance of private schools with public funds, where public schools had been closed, was a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court determined that local closure itself was a violation of equal
protection when other schools in the state were allowed to remain open. The district court was ordered
to enjoin the payment of tuition grants to segregated private schools, to enjoin the granting of tax
credits on donations to such schools, and to order the school district to reopen the public schools on a
non-segregated basis.4
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The Court’s decision in Calhoun v. Lattimer was a similar "expression of exasperation," as
Wilkinson has characterized it. It was issued on the same day as Griffin. The Court in Calhoun vacated
the district court’s approval of Atlanta’s grade-a-year, reverse stair-step desegregation plan. In a brief
per curiam opinion, the Court said that the Atlanta school board had made a “commendable effort to
effect desegregation,” but that the district court was nonetheless obligated to “test the entire Atlanta
plan” by the considerations in Watson, Goss, and now Griffin. In other words, it agreed with the LDF,
the United States, and the plaintiffs that the plan was too slow, now that the context was “significantly
altered” by the passage of a decade since the original Brown decisions.5
On June 18 the Fifth Circuit issued its first school desegregation rulings in that context, as
altered by the Griffin and Calhoun decisions themselves. In a joint ruling affecting four school systems
directly, including Mobile via Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile and Birmingham via
Armstrong v. Birmingham Board of Education, the appellate court held that grade-a-year plans were too
slow.6 Davis and Armstrong were finally on appeal on the merits; the Fifth Circuit’s previous rulings in
the two cases had come upon appeal only of the trial court’s denials of preliminary injunctive relief. The
three-judge panel hearing both cases included Judges Gewin and Bell, two of the more reluctant jurists
on the circuit when sitting on desegregation panels (it also included Judge Albert Maris of the Third
Circuit). One year prior, such a panel might have upheld the trial court’s approval of the school systems’
plans. But Judge Gewin was obliged to cite Watson, Goss, Griffin, and especially Calhoun – the latter
being within the Fifth Judicial Circuit. The court ordered the four school systems to desegregate four
grades (the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 1st) that fall, followed by two more grades each successive year. The
court also ordered the systems to place newly incoming students into initial school assignments without
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regard to previously established dual racial zones. The same panel rejected evidence presented by the
defendants in the Stell v. Savannah case, and subsequently in the Davis and Armstrong cases, that blacks
were genetically inferior to whites and that their lack of achievement constituted a reasonable reason to
segregate them in initial assignment. The court held that it did not “read the Brown decisions as relating
only to the facts presented therein but instead as flatly proscribing segregation in the public education
process on the stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races were inherently unequal.”
Gewin added:

The real fallacy, Constitution-wise, of the classification theory is that many of the Negro pupils
overlap many of the white pupils in achievement and aptitude but are nevertheless to be
segregated on the basis of race. They are to be separated, regardless of how great their ability
as individuals, into schools with members of their own race because of the differences in test
averages as between the races. Therein is the discrimination. The individual Negro student is
not to be treated as an individual and allowed to proceed along with other individuals on the
basis of ability alone without regard to race.”7

The effect of the Supreme Court and appellate court rulings upon district court proceedings that
summer was immediate. Judges Thomas and Lynne ordered the Mobile and Birmingham school boards
to submit revised plans as ordered. Interpreting the Fifth Circuit decisions as a call for uniformity within
the circuit, Judge Grooms then applied the new standards to the Huntsville, Madison County, and
Gadsden cases. In the Huntsville case, this led Grooms to dismiss a separate case brought by parents
employed by Marshal Space Flight Center and Redstone Arsenal in the wake of the dismissal of the
Justice Department’s impacted areas suit. Grooms demanded a specific amendment that allowed for
the federal dependents’ inclusion in any desegregation plan – a response to the efforts of the governor
and state legislature to exclude them. A few weeks later, Judge Johnson heard the Montgomery and
Bullock County cases and issued orders similar to those of Judge Grooms. In each case, school officials
7
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were ordered to prepare to desegregate four grades that fall, to present plans to carry out further
desegregation the following year, and to notify the public of the possibility of transfer within a specified
window. The addition of Madison County, Gadsden, Bullock County, and Montgomery to the list of
enjoined school districts doubled the number of systems under court-ordered desegregation plans in
Alabama that fall. But by far the most important decision rendered that summer was that of the threejudge court in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education.8
The court issued its opinion in Lee v. Macon on July 13, accepting much of the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs and following very closely the arguments presented in the United States’
brief. Judge Johnson wrote for the court, meticulously recounting the history of state control and
defiance presented by the plaintiffs and the United States. The court found that the State of Alabama
had an official policy of maintaining, and was then operating, a dual school system based upon race.
The evidence was “clear that over the years the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent
of Education have established and enforced rules and policies regarding the manner in which the city
and county school systems exercise their responsibilities under State law.” This control, Johnson wrote,
related to “accounting practices, textbooks, transportation, school constructions, and even Bible
reading,” but it was most “rigidly maintained through control of the finances.”9
As for the Macon County school officials, it was clear to the court that they had “fully and
completely attempted to discharge their obligations as public officials” throughout the “troublesome
litigation,” but it was “no answer” that they were “blameless” as to the situation created by the
governor and state board; Cooper v. Aaron had settled this matter. The Macon County school board’s
8
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plan to desegregate only the 12th grade that fall was, furthermore, “completely unacceptable” and a
step backward considering its present officially-desegregated status (students in multiple grades already
desegregated) and the recent rulings of the Fifth Circuit. The Macon County authorities were ordered to
submit a plan that embodied the new Fifth Circuit standards for “deliberate speed.”10
Turning to grants-in-aid, the court cited Griffin and held that such grants would be
unconstitutionally provided where public schools had become “’unavailable.’” Thus, the grant-in-aid
statute need not be found unconstitutional on its face, only in its application where “private schools”
existed only for white students. On Macon Academy’s status, the court held that, “the evidence strongly
indicates that there has been on the part of the Governor, the State Superintendent of Education, and
other state officials, public interference and public support and services” given or offered to the
academy. The court declined to rule on the segregated academy’s public or private status, however,
until the school had an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Macon Academy was thus made a party
defendant and directed to show cause why it should not be deemed a public institution and enjoined.11
On the constitutionality of the Alabama Pupil Placement Law, the Court essentially echoed the
Shuttlesworth decision. It was clear that the law had been designed to apply only to black students
requesting transfer to white schools, and it was equally clear that state authorities intended that it be
used in this fashion. This was, in fact, the only way in which the Macon County Board of Education had
applied it. However, Johnson wrote, the law should not “be stricken down because of its application in
Macon County . . . since its illegal use [there] was brought about through intense pressure” from the
defendant state officials. A judgment on the law’s constitutionality must be reserved, Johnson argued,
until local school boards across the state had a chance to apply it “in somewhat more normal
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circumstances” – that is, with the state school board and governor enjoined. Despite its dubious origins,
the law could still be constitutional in its application by local authorities, if state officials would cease
interfering. So the court suggested. 12
The court then addressed the more controversial claims in the case. Johnson wrote that “the
purpose of the [defendant] state officials . . . was clearly to prevent or impede any desegregation
through their unlawful interference with the city and county school boards attempting to comply with
the law.” The court enjoined the state board, its individual members, the state superintendent, and
Wallace as the board’s president, from any further such interference in court-ordered desegregation
“anywhere in Alabama.” The defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs could not represent a statewide
class was simply “without merit.” The plaintiffs’ right to represent a statewide class had been upheld in
the Bush v. Orleans case and implicitly sanctioned in the Ft. Worth case, Potts v. Flax. Furthermore,
considering that the United States’ interest in the case was to see to the “due administration of justice
in the federal courts,” the defendants’ claim that relief ought to be limited to the individual plaintiffs
“border[ed] on the frivolous.”13
Finally, Johnson came to the only question that had given the court “considerable concern”:
whether or not it should order the statewide desegregation of schools based upon the state officials’
usurpation of local authority. There was “no question” that the state officials had demonstrated,
through their interference in Macon County, that they had “considerable authority and power over the
actual operation of local school systems.” This was true “irrespective of any supposed limitations on
that power as set out in the Alabama law.” The state board and the governor had “actively participated
in the perpetuation of a segregated school system in Macon County. That the defendants had admitted
to having abused their authority, subsequently relied upon the advisory opinion of the Alabama
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Supreme Court, and promised within the proceedings not to “’do it again’” placed them, Johnson wrote,
“in a very weak position.” The court held that “a present recognition of . . . past illegal activity will not –
in this case – justify this Court’s failure to take appropriate action now.” Nor could the state board of
education deny that it, in fact, had the sort of “general control and supervision over the public schools”
of the state which would make a statewide order feasible. However, “at this particular time,” Johnson
wrote, the Court decided that it would “not order desegregation of in all the public schools of the State
of Alabama.”14 Johnson continued:
For the present time, this Court will proceed upon the assumption that the Governor, the State
Superintendent of Education, and the State Board of Education will comply in good faith with
the injunction of this Court prohibiting such interference with the local city and county school
boards, and, through the exercise of considerable judicial restraint, no statewide desegregation
will be ordered at this time.15

The court specifically retained jurisdiction on this and all other questions, such that if “interference on
the part of the [state officials] continues or occurs in the future – either directly or indirectly – through
the use of subtle coercion or outright interference,” then the court could “reappraise this aspect of the
case.”16
Johnson then proceeded to suggest how the court’s injunctive power might be used to effect
desegregation if the state did continue to interfere. First of all, the state officials had an “affirmative
duty,” via Brown and Cooper v. Aaron, to exercise their general control and supervision to bring about
desegregation. Most especially, this meant utilizing their control over the distribution of state funds for
school operation. The Court held that it not only “could” but “probably should” have immediately
enjoined the state’s support of segregated education through the “illegal and unconstitutional practice
of distributing public funds for the purpose of operating segregated schools.” Though the panel had
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elected not to enjoin such practice at that point, Johnson wrote that, “needless to say, it is only a matter
of time until such illegal and unconstitutional support must cease.” Within a “reasonable time,” the
court would “expect and require such support to cease.” The state board, superintendent, and governor
were then ordered to “proceed to formulate and place into effect plans designed to make the
distribution of public funds to the various schools throughout the State of Alabama only to those school
systems that have proceeded with deliberate speed” to desegregate. After all of that – almost as an
afterthought – the temporary restraining order was enlarged into a preliminary injunction.17
The court’s reluctance to order statewide desegregation can be attributed to several factors.
First, Judge Johnson might have entered such relief had he been the only judge hearing the case. But he
respected his fellow judges, especially the elder Judge Rives. Both Rives and Grooms were more
cautious and more willing to allow time to prepare whites for unpalatable changes . All three judges
understood that such an order would enrage segregationists. And all three believed, at that point, that
local boards of education could effect desegregation once freed from state pressure and intimidation.
Most importantly, the court understood that such an order would be unprecedented. Despite the
court’s refusal to enter a statewide desegregation order or to overturn the state pupil placement law,
Jack Greenberg at the time called the ruling “the most sweeping decree in the history of the Legal
Defense Fund’s school integration campaign.” Not only could local school desegregation suits in
Alabama proceed without interference, but the groundwork had been laid for an eventual statewide
order.18
State Attorney General Richmond Flowers reacted similarly, though with foreboding rather than
satisfaction. As the Macon County school board’s counsel and de facto counsel for the state, Flowers
recognized the ruling as “momentous” and “the most far-reaching [decision] since” Brown. “Our backs
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are really to the wall now,” he said. “If we appeal it,” he warned, “it might become the law of the land”
and that would be “far worse than the original Brown decision.” He added that he did not think his
estranged colleagues in the state government realized how important the ruling really was. The court
had adopted a “new concept in school desegregation cases” by suggesting that the state might be
enjoined against disbursing funds to segregating school systems. “The order is coming,” he continued,
“I’m afraid we’ll not even be able to get by this year . . . . Time requests don’t work anymore. The court
says time is of the essence [and] that it’s been too long since the 1954 decision.” Wallace’s office
declined comment. The governor was on the national campaign trail in – of all places –
Little Rock.19
The Montgomery Advertiser concluded that the court had “for all practical purposes, . . .
ordered virtual statewide school desegregation in Alabama with the threat of cutting off needed
operating funds.” The Birmingham News bent its front page coverage to the fact that Alabama was “off
the hook in statewide mixing.” The News’ editorial page revealed more perception. “This is a massive
opinion,” it wrote, and a potentially “landmark implementation ruling” which was “a predicate for far
more drastic action.” Judges Johnson, Rives, and Grooms would “not be ignored in wisdom. They
counsel a change of state policy. All of which the Governor and State Board of Education brought upon
themselves.” It was “a very disturbing opinion raising grave questions about the future,” the News
concluded, “but it [was] not at all surprising.”20 As the reality of the ruling continued to sink-in the
following week, the News issued a rhetorical call to law, order, and compliance:

Obviously Alabamians do not want desegregation. There is no argument as to the vast majority
feeling. But the fact of the law as it stands, and of court insistence on positive action as against
continued resistance, must be understood. A time of grave decision is all but upon us. It is, we
think, a matter of months. And it most comes to rest on officials. Will enough Alabamians see
this and demand an awakening to reality?21
19
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The Civil Rights Act
The ominous decision in Lee v. Macon was not the only thing causing a furor among
segregationists in Alabama that summer. Just two weeks prior to the ruling, President Lyndon Johnson
put his signature on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supposedly telling an aid afterward that the
administration had thereby “delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.”
Southern Senators had mounted the longest filibuster in the history of the United States Congress that
spring in an attempt to block the legislation. The national outrage over the previous year’s events in
Birmingham and the martyrdom of President Kennedy – whose administration had proposed the bill –
allowed Johnson to push the legislation through. At first most whites in Alabama seemed more terrified
over the act’s provisions for the desegregation of public accommodations than anything. Fearing a mass
movement to desegregate parks, motels, and other public places, the Birmingham News called for the
city’s blacks to avoid “deliberate, provocative exploitation in any tests that anyone may wish to
make . . . .” The paper’s editors understood that the city’s whites would find the law “most disturbing,”
but they urged segregationists to challenge the statute only through a “law and orderly process” in the
courts. The Executive Committee of the Alabama Citizens’ Council was “convinced that many parts of
the so-called “Civil Rights Act” [were] unconstitutional, especially the public accommodations section.”
It urged whites to oppose the legislation by “refusing to eat or sleep under integrated conditions.”
Birmingham restaurateur Ollie McClung – owner of the popular Ollie’s Barbeque – was soon equally
convinced of the unconstitutionality of the public accommodations section and took up the call of the
News. His case later resulted in one of two landmark Supreme Court decisions upholding the law –
Katzenbach v. McClung.22
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At the time, many in Alabama overlooked the act’s provisions for school desegregation. Title IV
finally gave the Attorney General the authority to bring suits against segregated school districts. This
would allow the Civil Rights Division to initiate its own civil actions, rather than having to “piggy-back”
on those brought by the LDF. This was of course a relief to the LDF, which along with its local associated
counsel had carried the burden of school desegregation litigation largely by itself. Title VI was, in
essence, the statutory embodiment of the enforcement mechanism suggested in the CRD’s brief and
Judge Johnson’s opinion in Lee v. Macon. The court in Lee v. Macon had been persuaded by the
suggestion that the state ought to use its control over funding to encourage school systems to
desegregate. Such an approach also had origins at the federal level in Senator Adam Clayton Powell’s
efforts over the years to insert an anti-discrimination rider into any bill appropriating federal money to
the states, and in the Justice Department’s own efforts to force school desegregation in “impacted
areas.” The act was drafted by the head of CRD’s Appeals and Research Section, Harold Greene, in close
consultation with congressional leaders and with Burke Marshall and John Doar. Marshall had once
testified before Congress in opposition to this punitive approach, but given the years of continuous
defiance and frustration, all agreed that it was time to insert some such provision into the new
legislation. Thus did Title VI prohibit discrimination in any program receiving federal funds, including
public schools, and authorize the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) to undertake administrative proceedings to cut off such federal funds to segregating
school districts.23
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Within a year, a massive increase in available federal funding for schools and the formulation by
HEW of specific desegregation guidelines for local systems would vault the federal bureaucracy to the
center of the segregationist consciousness. But with the news days later of the Lee v. Macon decision,
the immediate threat to segregated education in Alabama continued to be confined in the judiciary.
Even for those segregationists who did see the potential for doom in the act’s school desegregation
provisions, the focus was on Title IV. The editors at The Citizen, the organ of the Mississippi-based
Citizens’ Council of America, understood that only “a few . . . heretofore excellent public school
systems” had been “infected by a potentially-lethal virus in the form of court-ordered race mixing.” But
“all Southern school systems,” they continued, “received their death sentence when the misnamed ‘Civil
Rights Act of 1964’ gave the U.S. Attorney General authority to obtain court orders on his own initiative
to compel wide-spread integration.”24

Schools Open, Fall, 1964
It was too late for the Justice Department to initiate any suits which might yield results that fall,
and HEW was not yet prepared to begin initiating a compliance campaign. But the summer’s court
orders produced a modest expansion of desegregation in Alabama when schools opened in September.
In Madison County, schools desegregated for the first time, as four black students were accepted and
admitted to Sparkman High School. Huntsville become the school system with the largest number of
blacks admitted to white schools, with 31, the vast majority of these at Butler High. Birmingham
admitted seven new black students to its white schools, including for the first time at Phillips, Jones
Valley, and Ensley High Schools. Montgomery desegregated for the first time, admitting three black
students each to its two white high schools, Sydney Lanier High and Robert E. Lee High. Ten years after
the initial post-Brown challenge to segregated Alabama schools, two black children also entered
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Montgomery’s Harrison Elementary School. In Mobile school authorities appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court for a stay of the accelerated desegregation order, but the stay was denied by Alabama’s own
native son, Justice Hugo Black. Days later the school system admitted seven black students to white
schools, including three at Murphy High, from which both Henry Hobdy and Dorothy Davis had
graduated that spring. Gadsden schools enrolled 20 black students in white schools for the first time,
mostly at Gadsden High and Emma Sansom High. Bullock County admitted 3 black students to Bullock
County High School at Union Springs, also for the first time; the Black Belt County was spared the fourgrade initial desegregation formula suggested by the Fifth Circuit and applied elsewhere. As soon
became his custom, Frank Johnson afforded the county board of education leeway in exchange for its
full cooperation.25
The Macon County school authorities were forced to reopen Tuskegee Public and admit 14 black
students. Some whites came back to the Macon public school system – 59 that September and 133 by
the end of the year. With no further high profile incidents or interference, some parents decided that a
token black presence was preferable to paying for private school or transferring out of district. But
enrollment remained too low to sustain all three of Macon County’s white high schools, one of which
was still partially burned down in any case. So, the board closed Shorter and Notasulga and arranged to,
ironically, bus students into Tuskegee as necessary. Macon Academy continued to expand its operation,
enrolling 322 students and adding to its fledgling facility. Its leaders petitioned the court to dismiss it as
a party defendant, but the court refused. Meanwhile, the University of Alabama increased its black
enrollment to 10, and Auburn University quietly admitted its first two undergraduate students, none
other than Lee v. Macon plaintiffs Anthony Lee and Willie Wyatt.26 Finally, the Mobile-Birmingham
Catholic diocese ordered the beginning of token desegregation in its 80 elementary and 12 high schools
25
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across the state, and four black students enrolled at John Carroll Catholic High School, just outside of
Birmingham.27
State Superintendent Meadows and others congratulated the people of Alabama on what was a
peaceful and largely uneventful desegregated opening of schools. Edward Fields and J.B. Stoner of the
National States Rights Party attempted to stage protests on the first day of classes in Birmingham and
Montgomery. Stoner led a small group picketing Robert E. Lee High School in Montgomery, waving
Confederate flags and placards. The group packed up and left as soon as the three admitted black
students entered the school. Fields also organized a motorcade in support of school closure in
Birmingham, but the Birmingham police broke the motorcade up shortly after it took to the streets.
There were no major disturbances like there had been the year before. “The fact that schools over the
state were integrated without incident and in compliance with the law,” Meadows announced, “speaks
well for the people of our state and for their firm belief in law and order.” Meadows was “extremely
well pleased that our people have demonstrated their belief in law and order, even though they, and I
along with them, disagree with the principle involved.” Governor Wallace’s opponents undoubtedly
understood that the lack of major disturbances was due in large part to the lack of high profile
interference from Wallace. Attorney General Flowers maintained that the “law and order” stance was
“the only sane and sensible attitude, and the only attitude, that we in the South can take and survive.”
Defiance of court-ordered desegregation would “only bring violence and federal intervention,” Flowers
said, “as it did last year and the year before.” Similarly, outgoing Alabama State Chamber of Commerce
Chairman Winton Blount told a meeting of his organization that the state’s citizens, black and white, had
“conducted themselves in a manner which can only reflect credit on Alabamians,” unhampered as they
were by the “tense and unnatural environment” created by Wallace the previous fall. They had, Blount
said, “repudiated the misrepresentation of our state as a body of unlawful people.” Surely, he
27
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continued, “other sections of the country” were “beginning to understand our position – that we believe
in law and order, and that when legislation is enacted through the normal constitutional process we will
abide by this legislation even though we believe the law to be unwise and even though it is abhorrent to
us in every way.”28
In each desegregating school district, the number of black students admitted to white schools
was significantly lower than the number of those who applied for transfer. And in each case, the
number of students applying for transfer was a very small percentage of the number of black students in
the school system. For example, Montgomery school officials approved only 20 of an initial 40
applicants for transfer. Birmingham accepted 8 of 29, Gadsden 7 of 32. Plaintiffs in several cases
expressed disappointment over what they saw as simply more foot-dragging. Plaintiffs in the Carr case
petitioned Frank Johnson to order more acceptance in Montgomery, to no avail. Johnson cited the
school board’s good faith and reaffirmed his approval of its plan. In Mobile John LeFlore argued that a
number of applicants for transfer under the Davis injunction had been rejected on “obviously spurious
grounds” and that the school board was still rigidly applying the “nearest school” policy to black
students, meaning that a black applicant for transfer was rejected out of hand if there was a black
school nearer his home than a white school. LeFlore argued further that admitting 7 students to
desegregated schools, when there were 28,000 black students in the Mobile City-County system still
attending segregated schools, was “a rather poor reflection of compliance with the federal court order
that the pace of desegregation should be accelerated.” The LDF’s Derrick Bell followed-up LeFlore’s
complaints by filing a motion for further relief in Davis asking the court to order desegregation of all
grades the following fall; Judge Thomas denied it. Meanwhile, Alabama remained above only
Mississippi and Louisiana in the number of desegregated school districts, with 8. And with .032 percent
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of its black students in desegregated schools, it ranked only slightly above Mississippi and just below
South Carolina.29
George Wallace produced no third stand in the schoolhouse door that fall. He was, after all,
enjoined from interference, and his behavior years before as a circuit judge proved that his
grandstanding would stop short of inviting contempt of court. He did, however, react to the increase in
token desegregation and the threat of further increases by calling the Alabama legislature into special
session late in September. The state’s lawmakers then unanimously passed a resolution calling for an
amendment to the United States Constitution which would give control of public education completely
over to the various states. Wallace insisted in an address to the legislators that, contrary to what some
were saying, “total federal control” of education was not inevitable, nor was fighting it futile. “Home
rule” and “states’ rights” could prevail. Wallace called the resolution “the first shot in a battle” and “a
Crusade” to “preserve the most democratic institutions on earth.” Meadows offered support for the
measure, which he insisted was “non-partisan and non-racial.” Alabama and other states, the
superintendent argued, were “under the thumb of federal control in public education,” which would
soon “necessarily be used to destroy the American system of representative democracy.” Evidently
comparing the U.S. government to that of Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, Meadows said that
“dictatorship nations” had historically used the education system to “capture the minds and souls of
their youth . . . making slaves of them. This must not happen in America,” he continued, “but it will
happen unless federal control of our education system is resisted throughout the nation.” The measure
received token support at the annual meeting of southern governors that fall but never came close to
being replicated in 37 states, the number which would have forced Congress to initiate the amendment
process.30
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Meanwhile, Wallace’s slate of unpledged presidential electors suffered a crushing defeat in the
November general election, as the prediction Lyndon Johnson had made upon signing the Civil Rights
Act began to look rather poignant. Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater won an
astounding 70 percent of the Alabama vote, carrying 62 of 67 counties. Ironically, Wallace’s own
consistent bashing of the Kennedy/Johnson Administration had contributed significantly to this
outcome. Democratic Alabama congressmen had tried to urge voters to split their tickets, voting
Republican for president only, but even they were swept out on the rising Republican tide. Only one
Democratic congressional candidate with Republican opposition retained his seat, and Alabama soon
sent Republican congressmen to Washington for the first time since Reconstruction. The election left
the state’s congressional delegation in the House 5-3 Republican. Republicans took a number of local
offices across the state as well. State Democratic chairman Roy Mahall attributed the losses directly to
federal court decisions and to the fact that Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act. “Persons who
call themselves Alabama Democrats try to put political views on the basis of liberal and conservative,”
Mayhall said, “but the basic issue in the state is segregation. The race issue is the cause of the whole
march of people from the Democratic Party.” It was time, he argued, “for Alabama to rejoin the Union,”
to “furl the Confederate flag and unfurl the American flag.”31

HEW, Form 441, and the 1965 Guidelines
In response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Division developed a two-pronged
school desegregation litigation policy: it would use its new-found power to initiate suits on its own, and
it would at the same time support HEW’s own school desegregation program. In Tennessee early in
1965, the CRD filed its first unilateral school desegregation action since the seminal “impacted areas”
suits. Around the same time, HEW issued its first regulations pursuant to compliance with Title VI. The
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HEW regulations called for all school districts requesting new or renewed funding from the U.S. Office of
Education (USOE) to execute “assurances of compliance” indicating that they did not discriminate. In
practice this meant submitting not only a signed assurance form – the innocuously named “Form 441” –
but also a plan for desegregation which would then be subject to approval by the Commissioner of
Education, Harold Howe. The regulations explicitly excluded those school districts under federal court
order. The department thus deferred to the courts where the two entities’ jurisdiction overlapped. In
time, the three-way relationship between HEW, the courts, and the CRD would produce its share of
antagonism, but in 1965 the focus for all three was bringing as many school systems as possible into
some sort of compliance with the law.32
The punitive enforcement mechanism was simply the newest method for effecting this
outcome. It has been described by one historian as a “clumsy” one which “undercut the principle of
nondiscrimination.” The cutoff of federal funds to school districts which failed to comply with the
federal nondiscrimination policy was, as another scholar described it, “like a hydrogen bomb,” that is,
“better suited to threats to than to actual use.” Howe himself defended the mechanism by saying that
HEW had to “make a philosophical judgment about what is most important – a system to create
pressure to guarantee individual rights, a system free of discrimination, or a system involving payment
of funds for a specific program. Most people,” he said, “place the first one first.” For segregationists the
question was: would the federal government really punish students for the transgressions of their
school boards. And many of them were willing to push HEW and the CRD to the limit to find out.33
The threat of a funding cutoff captured Alabama school officials’ attention as soon as HEW set
its program in motion. The department sent notice of its policy regarding Title VI to all of the state’s
school districts on January 4, accompanied by Form 441. State Superintendent of Education Austin
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Meadows immediately called a meeting in Montgomery of the state’s city and county school
superintendents. He fumed to the press that the sanctions would have a “crippling effect on education
in Alabama” – which was set to receive over $30,000,000 in federal funds in the following fiscal year, not
counting funds made available through assistance from the USOE. Federal funds only accounted for
around ten percent of most local systems’ total budgets (in impacted areas, the percentage was larger),
but it was ten percent that most could not do without. “If this money is lost and made up on the state
or local level,” Meadows said, “it would result in us losing our vocational education program. The
lunchroom program would be wiped out, and other services would suffer,” he said. “We are damned if
we do sign,” Meadows concluded, “and twice damned if we don’t. If a school board refuses to sign this
assurance,” he explained, “this will only advertise the fact that it does not plan to abide by the Civil
Rights Act, and this in turn would provoke a desegregation suit under Title IV of the same act.” In a
similar address to the state’s white teacher association, the state superintendent expressed his
incredulity. “Every type of educational facility available to the majority group in Alabama has been
made available to the minority group,” he said. Was this not enough, he wondered. Would the nation
not just “let Alabama continue its progress, nurture its fine culture, and further its goal of peaceful
existence in the only way it knows to exist?” Or would all of this “be destroyed by outsiders who either
do not understand or do not care enough for either race in Alabama?”34
Local school officials expressed similar dismay. One told reporters, “The public needs to
understand [that] we don’t have any choice when you come down to it. They think we are selling them
down the river for a little money if we sign,” he argued, invoking the sale of slaves. “If I could assure us
of keeping our schools white by not taking the money,” he said, “I’d do it. But we’ll come nearer having
Negroes in our schools next year if we don’t sign. We would be foolish to turn the money down and
maybe next year take Negroes anyway.” Others remarked that they “wouldn’t have money to keep the
34
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boilers hot” or “couldn’t operate [their] schools a month” without federal funds. Despite the shared
apprehension, Meadows urged the superintendents at the meeting to avoid signing the assurance of
compliance form. The local school officials dutiful followed suit, but many left feeling anxious about the
ultimate wisdom of such a course. Meanwhile, defiance-minded segregationists supported the school
officials’ refusal and urged continued resistance. The Citizens Council of Alabama called Form 441 a
“destructive and diabolical agreement,” the signing of which would amount to “accepting a bribe in
payment for violating the principles that have been proclaimed over and over by Alabamians.” It would
“not only destroy the school system by integration but would insure immediate federal control of the
affected school systems.”35
The following month, local school systems began to give in on signing the assurance of
compliance form, despite admonitions from the governor and from Meadows. One educator in Calhoun
County, which received impacted areas funds in addition to normal federal allotments, said that the
question was not one of “signing or not signing the compliance form. It is a question,” he said, “of
whether or not we want to lose federal money.” Answering that question seemed easier in March,
while the eyes of the state turned to events in Selma. Voting rights demonstrations in the black Belt city
commanded the attention of observers around the world, in fact. On March 7 protestors organized a
March from Selma to Montgomery to raise awareness of the murder of activist Jimmie Lee Jackson by a
state trooper in nearby Marion. The would-be marchers were set upon, tear-gassed, and beaten by
state troopers and Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark’s mounted posse before crossing the Edmund Pettus
Bridge. This event – captured by news cameras and broadcast across the nation in prime time – came to
be known as “Bloody Sunday.” It was followed by more demonstrations and the murder of Unitarian
minister James Reeb. A week later, Frank Johnson lifted an injunction against the still-planned
Montgomery march and ordered the state to provide protection for the marchers. A white female
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activist from Michigan was subsequently murdered when Klansmen discovered her ferrying marchers
back from Montgomery in her car, accompanied by a young black man. In the immediate aftermath of
the violence, a group of Alabama business moderates issued a renewed call to law and order. An
advertisement was placed in all of the state’s major newspapers, signed by the Alabama State Chamber
of Commerce, a number of local chambers of commerce, the Alabama Bankers Association, Associated
Industries of Alabama, and the Alabama Textile Manufacturers Association. The ad expressed the
business groups’ belief in “the full protection and opportunity under the law of all our citizens, both
Negro and White,” and in “basic human dignity. . . . We believe in obedience to law” it read, “even
though some may question the wisdom of particular laws.” The environment created by the sensational
events in and around Selma that spring allowed local school systems to sign their compliance assurance
forms without the kind of negative scrutiny that might otherwise have accompanied such decisions. By
the end of the month, all but 11 local systems across the state had signed Form 441.36
One system, Bessemer city, actually announced its intention to refuse to sign the document and
to file a court test of the same. The Bessemer Board of Education argued that signing Form 441 “could
mean virtual abdication over our schools [sic] to Washington bureaucracy.” “From past experience in
other phases of our lives,” it announced, “we know we can expect ever-increasing control from
Washington bureaus, and we consider this ‘assurance of compliance’ form to be pretty much a blank
check to the HEW to go ahead with their controls.” The Bessemer action gave the state board of
education and Governor Wallace additional rationale for counseling similar defiance. On March 4 the
state board voted unanimously to avoid signing the form pending the outcome of the legal test. Wallace
had already been urging local school officials not to sign, calling the pledge “repugnant to the American
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system” and applauding the Bessemer officials. Wallace accused HEW of “bureaucratic cannibalism,”
because it had “[fed] upon the power creating it” and had then begun “a voracious quest for more
power,” ultimately “asserting itself free from all limitations imposed by the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government by the Constitution itself.” Wallace also sent a telegram to his fellow
southern governors, urging them to arrange similar tests of the compliance form. The governor was
playing a dangerous game again, as he and the state board were under injunction in Lee v. Macon to
avoid interference in desegregation and to utilize state financial power to actually encourage it. He
made sure to publically state that the Bessemer challenge did not mean that “the Bessemer board or
any other board that joins with them in this suit intends to disobey the law. Congress has passed the
law,” he added, “and we must obey it. But we don’t have to like it.” Meadows subsequently made a
public show of “relieving the executive branch of [the] pressure” placed on it by the injunction in Lee.
He purported to be taking the heat off of Wallace and the state board by signing the assurance of
compliance form himself and by accepting the duty to use the state’s power over funds disbursement to
encourage desegregation.37
Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel was unimpressed by Meadows’ actions. He singled
out the state of Alabama by writing a letter to the state superintendent expressing “grave concern as to
whether this office can continue legally to provide funds to your department under the several
programs which we administer.” Keppel was especially disturbed by the state board of education’s
deferral to Meadows in signing its assurance of compliance form. This constituted a “serious misreading
of the requirements of the act,” according to the commissioner. Keppel noted that most of the state’s
school systems had submitted their assurances, but he added the obvious: that all of them continued to
operate schools on a segregated basis. Merely submitting the assurance forms was “not only
insufficient,” Keppel wrote, but “inappropriate” where systems maintained dual systems with no plans
37
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in place to disestablish them. “Since almost all of these districts remain fully segregated,” Keppel added,
“and as far as we know have not undertaken the steps necessary to change the situation, we can only
conclude that they did not realize that they were committing themselves to full and immediate
compliance or they did not understand what full compliance means.” The commissioner urged the
state’s local systems to accept this reality immediately, so that they would “have the opportunity to
prepare and submit plans for review and approval.” These plans were to be submitted no later than
early May and geared towards beginning desegregation that fall. Meadows sent word to local
superintendents that the assurance forms were not enough and that they must show HEW they
intended to take some action towards desegregation. Rather than suggest that they draft and submit
desegregation plans, though, he advised them to continue using the pupil placement law and to retain
counsel.38
The stakes for school systems became much higher in April. On April 11 President Johnson
signed into the law the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). In authorizing 1.3 billion
dollars in federal funds for state and local school systems, it represented by far the largest single
commitment by the federal government to education in U.S. history. The act provided for millions of
dollars to be disbursed to systems for library and textbook upgrades, for the establishment of creative
research centers, for the dissemination of federal educational research, and for the strengthening of
state departments of education. Title I was the most significant provision for the majority of local school
systems, though. In HEW’s own words, it recognized “the long-standing relationship between
educational achievement and the cycle of poverty,” and it provided for millions in aid to school districts
with a “high concentrations of low-income families.” In Alabama this meant that nearly every school
system in the state was eligible for a significant increase in federal funding. Each state would receive
tens of millions for Title I grants alone. Local systems could apply to the state for grants based on the
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number of children in their district from low-income families, and they could then use that money for
supplementary and remedial instruction programs, guidance and counseling services, health and welfare
services, equipment, and facilities.39
With this carrot, however, came a much more well-defined stick. Days later HEW issued a
“General Statement of Policies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Respecting Desegregation of
Elementary and Secondary Schools,” soon to be known simply as “The Guidelines.” The department
clarified exactly what compliance would mean for school systems which wanted to remain eligible for
federal funds. Since Title VI prohibited “the extension of Federal financial assistance to any dual or
segregated system of schools,” school officials had to “eliminate all practices characteristic of such dual
or segregated school systems” to be eligible. The Guidelines clarified that any school district which had
failed to eliminate all practices characteristic of a dual or segregated system could not execute Form
441, meaning that merely signing Form 441 was moot for nearly every system in the state of Alabama.
Segregating systems not already under court order were instructed, then, to formulate and submit
desegregation plans, along with “initial compliance reports.” The core of the Guidelines was in the
specifics HEW provided as to what types of plans would be accepted. Here the department leaned
heavily on the latest federal school desegregation jurisprudence. It indicated that it would accept either
geographic attendance zone plans, so-called freedom of choice plans, or some combination of the two.40
Geographic attendance zone plans were specified to be those in which “racially separate
attendance zones” were “abandoned entirely” and in which all attendance zones were “part of a single,
non-racial zone,” the boundaries of which were drawn “to follow the natural boundaries or perimeters
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of compact areas surrounding schools.” Regarding freedom of choice plans, the Guidelines specified
that all pupils were to be given adequate notice of their eligibility to choose which school within a given
system that they wanted to attend. The Guidelines explicitly placed the burden for desegregation on
the school board, not the pupils and their families, and ruled out the use of pupil placement laws if they
were used to “limit desegregation through restriction of any pupil’s right to choose.”41
In reality HEW officials knew that the opposite would be true, at least at first. School board’s
would undoubtedly see adopting freedom of choice plans as a “clever way” to “appear to comply,” as
one official with the Office of Education put it. Local boards knew that the number of black students
choosing white schools would remain relatively small as long as the threat of violence, economic
reprisal, or general pressure from the white community remained, along with pressure from those in the
black community who favored strengthening black schools. School officials also surmised that they
could limit the number of blacks they accepted into white schools, despite the admonition against
placement law abuse in the Guidelines. Boards could rest assured, too, that no whites would elect to
attend black schools. Putting whites into formerly black schools would undoubtedly have to be part of
most geographical zone plans, and this would be an intolerable circumstance, they reasoned. HEW
understood that a great many school districts would opt for freedom of choice plans. In explaining its
decision to accept such plans, the department argued that it was simply following the lead of the federal
courts. They were in agreement, it seemed, that while time may have run out on delay, pushing too
quickly might encourage more systems to simply forego federal funds rather than comply.42
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In addition to provisions for pupil desegregation, the Guidelines further required that any plan
include provisions for faculty desegregation; the elimination of segregated transportation; the
elimination of discrimination and segregation in all services, facilities, activities, and programs; and the
preparation of faculty, staff, and community for desegregation, including adequate publication of the
plan in the local press. The Commissioner of Education reserved the right to “from time to time
redetermine the adequacy of any desegregation plan to accomplish the purposes of the Civil Rights Act.”
HEW required any school system which did not fully desegregate that fall to supply some justification for
this, and it set the fall of 1967 as the target date for all systems to extend desegregation to all grades. In
light of the target date, all systems were required to “provide for a substantial good faith start on
desegregation” beginning with the coming fall of 1965. A “good faith start” was defined in line with the
current standards of the federal courts: the desegregation of at least four grades, the elimination of new
initial assignments on the basis of race, and the provision for some sort of faculty desegregation.43
In the wake of the passage of the ESEA and the issuance of the HEW Guidelines, many school
systems scrambled to secure compliant status, despite the efforts of the governor and his cadre to
intensify their defiance campaign. Wallace attacked the Guidelines with a standard mix of states’ rights
and Cold War rhetoric. “Even if Congress had the power,” he said, “this business of punishing school
children to compel elected officials to act in a certain way is a viscous procedure heretofore unknown in
a society of free people but universally employed in totalitarian nations.” The policy was the product of
“left-wing liberals” who justified “the federal government withholding aid to children in our nation”
while at the same time “loudly [opposing] cutting off federal aid to communists and communist satellite
nations. . . . We don’t believe the people will put up with this,” he concluded, and “we will resist as long
as we can within the law.” The governor supported the state legislature’s passage of a resolution which
urged local school systems not to take any further action to comply with the HEW policy until the
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Bessemer suit was adjudicated. Seven of the state’s eight U.S. representatives signed a resolution of
their own in support of the state resolution.44
For the first time in Wallace’s tenure as governor, he encountered significant domestic
resistance to defiance. A group of state legislators mounted a sustained attack on what they
determined was yet another in a long line of “so-called ‘nigger resolutions.’” Several legislators
expressed concern that, in light of the injunction in Lee v. Macon, the resolution would “rise up and
haunt us” and invite a statewide desegregation order “in one fell swoop.” One north Alabama senator
told his colleagues that the resolution’s 11 opponents in the Senate sat “with tears in their eyes” while
the rest were “flirting with disaster” and refusing to “listen to the voice of reasons” [sic]. Another asked
Wallace, specifically, to “quit appealing to the worst in people and appeal to the best,” or to “quit
rubbing these sores.” Another senator borrowed a favorite line of Martin Luther King, charging the
governor with effecting more desegregation in Alabama than had any other governor anywhere at any
time. “The strategy employed by the governor,” he added, with all of its “bluff and blunder,” had “set
our state back 100 years.” In a lengthy but doomed filibuster, the group used several rhetorical barbs
which particularly stung the administration: Alabama needed a “real stand, not a grandstand”; instead
of “stand up for Alabama,” the governor’s slogan should have been, “stand up and run”; and finally,
Wallace had “laid the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny” in his inaugural address, but King had “picked
up that gauntlet and beat our people over the head with it.”45
Others state politicians made their disapproval know, some more vocally than others. Senators
Hill and Sparkman, along with north Alabama representative Bob Jones, refrained from signing the
resolution put forth by the rest of the state U.S. congressional delegation. Richmond Flowers continued
to oppose the governor, lamenting that the state was “dominated by race hatred and defiance.“
Flowers said, “I have been at tremendous odds with Governor Wallace, and I have always taken a strong
44
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stand for law and order.” The state’s attorney general was thankful that others were finally “becoming
more aware that defiance is futile.” Lest anyone misunderstand him, Flowers clarified that just because
he had chosen “to speak factually and with reason and moderation” and to “strongly disagree with the
methods used by the governor of Alabama in his resistance to school integration,” did not mean that he
was not a “strong segregationist.” The “defiant attitude” of Alabama’s leadership was simply “painting
[the state] in a corner.” Flowers argued that as unfortunate as it was, it was time to accept that
“segregation as we know it is gone.”46
Few local school officials were prepared to accept that segregation was truly doomed. But
neither were they all willing to follow Wallace this time. By June, 53 of the state’s 118 local systems had
submitted voluntary desegregation plans, all of them freedom-of-choice plans. Some of the plans called
for the application of freedom of choice to all grades in the fall. This was particularly true of north
Alabama districts with small percentages of black students. These systems were rewarded with a
telegram from the governor advising them that it was his administration’s “considered judgment that
any plans for so-called non-descrimination [sic] in all grades is beyond even the minimum requirements
set by the U.S. Commissioner of Education.” Wallace wrote, “We think it would be advisable for your
school board to reconsider your action in the submission of your compliance plan.” Fifty-five other
districts had at least submitted Form 441, and the seven under injunction had submitted their court
orders. In all 111 of the state’s 118 boards of education had made some sort of compliance effort by the
beginning of summer. At first review, HEW accepted only 13 of the 53 full desegregation plans. By midsummer, after negotiations, that number had increased to 28, and by the end of the year it would
increase significantly. The department continued to ignore the empty assurance of compliance forms.
School systems were slowly accepting that they had to submit plans to be in full compliance. HEW’s
director of compliance noted that the Alabama State Board of Education still refused to sign its
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compliance instrument. He described the state as thus “playing Russian roulette” with 30 million dollars
in federal aid.47
The widespread signing of compliance forms and formulation of desegregation plans frightened
parents across the state into forming new private school organizations. Such organizations already
existed in Birmingham, Montgomery, Tuskegee, Anniston, and the Birmingham suburban community of
Indian Springs. But newly formed organizations soon cropped up in Selma, Demopolis, Greensboro,
Lowndesboro, and Marion – all in the Black Belt. Each effort was encouraged by the local Citizens’
Council. The Councils’ Mississippi-based news organ had recently issued a manual on “How to Start a
Private School,” and Councils in Alabama were poised to put that information into practice. Innovation
and adaptation to local circumstances were key. Typical of these initial efforts were the establishment
of the school in Lowndesboro – where an eight-room recreation center was quickly converted into a
schoolhouse – and the establishment of the school in Selma, which was set up in the former mansion of
Confederate General John T. Morgan.48
The Alabama state legislature responded to these private school efforts by passing another
tuition grant-in-aid bill in August. It provided $185 per-pupil grants to any family which opted to send its
child to a private school when attendance at public schools had become “detrimental” to the physical or
emotional health of the student. A companion bill set aside nearly $2 million each of the following two
years to fund the grants. There was little doubt that the measure was a Council-inspired maneuver.
Wallace was an active fundraiser for the organization. Callers to a Citizens’ Council hotline in Mobile
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heard the governor argue that “organized, intelligent resistance” was the only way to meet the
challenge posed by “outside agitators with Communist backing” and “Federal bureaucrats and Federal
judges . . .trampling on our rights as free men and women.” The Citizens’ Council, Wallace said, had “an
action program” which was “our best example of intelligent resistance.” The bill was sponsored by longtime Selma Councilor Walter Givhan and supported by the governor’s State Sovereignty Commission,
the agency established by Wallace to undergird segregation. The Sovereignty Commission’s Eli Howell
told legislators that the bill was “perhaps the most important piece of legislation you have ever
considered,” and that it would give parents “freedom of choice between public and private schools.”
Neither Howell, Givhan, nor the bill itself made any mention of race, but the purpose was clear. It
passed with near unanimity. Outside the legislature, many wondered if this was not just more powder
for the cartridge that would ultimately propel a statewide desegregation order in Lee v. Macon.49
Meanwhile, the litigious assault persisted, as the LDF continued to bring suits against Alabama
school districts. Jack Greenberg, his colleague Norman Amaker, and Birmingham’s Oscar Adams filed
complaints against the Bessemer Board of Education, the Jefferson County Board of Education, and the
Fairfield Board of Education in May and June. The CRD intervened the United States in all three cases.
Bessemer – Birmingham’s large, industrial, southwestern neighbor – was a logical choice. City officials
there had challenged the HEW compliance effort. Jefferson was a logical choice for another reason. The
county included Birmingham, Bessemer, and the city of Fairfield, sandwiched between the two.
Working class blacks and whites had long since populated the city’s western suburbs like Fairfield and
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Bessemer. Suburban migration was not limited to the western part of the county, however, and it was
rapidly increasing with the looming threat of integrated schooling.50
Small Jefferson County cities, some newly incorporated and some simply newly invigorated, sat
along the northern and eastern edge of Birmingham as well. But it was the southern edge which was
becoming more popular with whites looking to escape. As early as the 1920s, a few whites had begun to
migrate across Red Mountain, on the Birmingham’s southern border, to a few exclusively white and
wealthy suburban neighborhoods. White migration “over the mountain” had increased during World
War II, when the affluent city of Mountain Brook was first incorporated. After the war, black
encroachment into white neighborhoods had helped increase the flow of whites into Mountain Brook
and the fledging cities of Homewood and Vestavia Hills. By 1965, with Birmingham under a
desegregation order, the trickle of whites from the city to the southern suburbs started to become a
deluge. For this reason, along with the fact that Blevia Stout and his daughter were willing to act as
plaintiffs, Jefferson County was an attractive place for the LDF to support a suit.51
It was another LDF suit, though, that made headlines in June, as it directly concerned the HEW
Guidelines. The Jackson, Mississippi case, Singleton v. Jackson, came before the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals when Jack Greenberg and Derrick Bell, along with their associated Jackson counsel, Jack Young,
filed a motion to compel the Jackson school board to accelerate their desegregation plan. Judge John
Minor Wisdom wrote for the three-judge panel and declared that “the time has come for footdragging
school boards to move with celerity towards desegregation.” Wisdom explicitly noted the issuance of
the Guidelines and held that the court attached “great weight to the standards established by the Office
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of Education.” Wisdom argued that “in carrying out a national policy, the three departments of
government are united by a common objective.” Therefore, there ought to be “a close correlation
between the judiciary's standards in enforcing the national policy requiring desegregation of public
schools and the executive department's standards in administering this policy.” The USOE was “better
qualified than the courts,” and was “the more appropriate federal body,” to “weigh administrative
difficulties inherent in school desegregation plans.” But courts would continue to have to sometimes do
it themselves, and in these cases, the standards needed to be uniform, Wisdom reasoned. At the very
least, the courts’ standards need not be lower than those of HEW. Otherwise school boards could invite
litigation, use the courts as “a means of circumventing the H.E.W. requirements,” and in effect receive a
”premium for recalcitrance.” It was a powerful endorsement and adoption of the HEW Guidelines. It
would have significant reverberations in Alabama very soon, when the Jefferson County case came
before the appellate court the following year.52

Schools Open, Fall, 1965
As the opening of schools in the fall of 1965 approached, systems across the state were
preparing to desegregate for the first time. Many of these, particularly in north Alabama, had gone just
beyond the bare minimum required by HEW and had opened up freedom-of-choice within their systems
for all 12 grades. Like the courts, HEW required that only four grades be opened that fall to
desegregation, and most systems chose to go with the minimum. Neither avenue brought systems to
more than token desegregation. Fifty-three of Alabama’s 118 school systems had submitted voluntary
freedom-of-choice desegregation plans. Forty-two of these called for 12-grade desegregation that fall.
In seven of those, freedom-of-choice resulted in no transfers at all. In others, the numbers were
minimal: 3 black students in Morgan County, 9 black students in Butler County, 3 black students in Clay
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County, 2 black students in Cleburne County, 2 black students in Coffee County, 4 in Covington, 2 in
Geneva, 3 in Lamar, 1 in Monroe, etc. The numbers were higher in some systems opting for only fourgrade desegregation: 34 in Walker County, 31 in Selma, 58 in Anniston City/Calhoun County, 42 in
Cullman County. Other four-grade plans, however, resulted in minimal desegregation: 2 black students
in Opelika and zero in Dallas County. Court-ordered desegregation plans produced similar results: 53
black students in Birmingham, 14 in Bessemer, 8 in Jefferson County, 39 in Mobile, 31 in Huntsville, 22 in
Madison County, 32 in Montgomery. No white students anywhere applied for transfer to black
schools.53
In total Alabama had around 1,000 black pupils in formerly all-white schools that fall, in close to
half of the state’s 118 school districts. HEW ultimately approved 84 systems’ plans, rejecting only 16
and calling those systems to participate in “extensive negotiations” to attempt to proceed to approval.
This could only be seen as progress, considering the numbers the previous fall: 101 black students in
white schools in only nine districts. But, as the Alabama Council on Human Relations concluded, this
was still only a “token of tokenism.” Over 99 percent of the state’s approximately 300,000 black
students still went to school in substandard and underfunded “Negro” schools. All of the state’s
formerly all-white schools were still racially identifiable as white, whether token desegregated or not.
No teacher desegregation whatsoever had occurred. And, most damningly, the burden for
desegregation still rested on the black pupils and their families, instead of on the state and local school
officials, where both the courts and HEW had insisted it belonged. Considering that the HEWpromulgated goal for total disestablishment of dual school systems was two school years away, this was
not significant progress.54
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Despite the seemingly negligible results, Governor Wallace and his allies in the state
government reinvigorated their defiance campaign, rebilling it as one of absolute minimal compliance.
The state board of education passed a resolution charging HEW and its subordinate the USOE with
issuing “conflicting pronouncements.” It again urged local boards of education to take no action until
the Bessemer suit challenging the Guidelines had been decided. It also instructed superintendent
Meadows to ask the systems to ignore any compliance plans “not required by the law or court order.”
The state board members specifically lamented that some local school systems had jeopardized the
“good will and support of the people of Alabama” by “taking action in excess of the requirements of
laws and court orders.” State officials went so far as to harass local superintendents whose school
systems had submitted 12-grade desegregation plans. For example, Wallace joined Lieutenant
Governor James Allen and state Speaker of the House Albert Brewer in sending a telegram to the
superintendent of Lauderdale County Schools, lamenting the county officials’ adoption of a 12-grade
plan, which HEW had publically deemed a model plan. The Lauderdale superintendent had attempted
to justify the school system’s choice in a statement to the governor. The telegram he received in reply
read:

Your statement to the governor’s office . . . that you are satisfied with the public school situation
in Lauderdale County, where more Negro pupils are enrolled in previously all-white schools [73]
than there are in either of the large cities of Birmingham and Montgomery, and your further
statement that you plan to eliminate eventually all Negro schools in the county and transfer the
pupils to white schools, could do more to destroy the public education system in Alabama than
any action since the infamous 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court. Those who
have worked diligently to raise support of public education to a high level in our state resent and
reject this attitude. We call upon you to align your policies with the minimum requirements of
the law and of court orders.55
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To increase pressure on the Lauderdale officials, the telegram was sent to the local county
newspaper in Florence and to the Associated Press in Montgomery. A “follow-up” telegram sent later
the same day to not only Lauderdale, but to all systems which opted for 12-grafe desegregation plans,
made specific reference to the state board’s resolution and its expression of “grave concern about the
future of public education in Alabama in view of the fact that some school boards have gone beyond the
maximum requirements of court precedents in existing compliance plans.” The adoption of such plans,
the telegram read, was “not in the interest of public education in the State of Alabama.” The three state
officials “respectfully request[ed]” that the school boards remember the design of the Pupil Placement
Act and “take whatever action necessary to see that the administration and execution of these plans do
not go beyond the requirements of federal court orders of five grades.”56
Wallace continued to apply pressure by summoning all of the state’s superintendents of
education to a meeting in Montgomery on September 7 to discuss “matters of vital concern to the
people of Alabama involving the future welfare of the public school system.” In the meeting, which was
closed to the press, Wallace reiterated his desire that all local systems would refrain from “going any
farther than the law required” and repeated his plea for them to await the outcome of the Bessemer
suit before engaging in any more compliance efforts. “Our purpose here,” he said, “is to minimize the
effect of integration.” The Lieutenant Governor was just as plain, saying, “We’re in favor of maintaining
the dual system in Alabama by whatever means that is [sic] peaceable, legal, and honorable.” Some
local superintendents expressed dismay that the meeting had been held so late in the year. It was
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difficult to undo what had already been done that fall. Wallace seemed to blame Meadows for this,
saying the meeting “should have been called by the Department of Education months ago.” For his part,
the state superintendent reminded everyone that he and the state school board were under injunction
in Lee v. Macon. Indeed, the governor and the state board seemed to be acting with reckless disregard
for the terms of the court’s 1964 ruling.57
Later that fall, as Wallace attempted to persuade the legislature to amend the state’s succession
laws to allow him to run for a consecutive term as governor, the voices of opposition continued to
clamor. One state senator accused the governor of trying to “pick up support” by attempting to “pit the
white race against the minorities of this country – the same way Adolph Hitler pitted the Jews against
the master race.” Tuscaloosa News editor Buford Boone similarly charged the governor with being the
“chief architect” of an “atmosphere of violence.” Wallace had, he wrote, “encouraged the violent and
the lawless” through his defiance of federal authorities and “his frequent reference to resistance and his
general antagonism to necessary change.” It was becoming increasingly clear that the nascent
challenges to Wallace’s wide popularity represented a surging uneasiness among the state’s law and
order and compliance moderates, vis-à-vis Wallace’s law and order and defiance cadre. Boone
concluded that Alabamians had not “had the [necessary] leadership to tell us that the honorable correct
way is unpleasant and undesirable, but it is a way that we must walk.” Instead they had been “torn
asunder by the same man who has condemned the concentration of power in Washington.” The
president of Troy State College, Wallace-appointee Ralph Adams, responded in Wallace’s defense,
arguing that the governor had “in all his statements asked the people to stay away from points of
tension and to let the lawful authorities handle whatever situation may develop.” He juxtaposed the
riots surrounding the enrollment of Autherine Lucy in 1956 with the governor’s “stand in the
schoolhouse door” in 1963. It was Boone’s city of Tuscaloosa that was “in danger of being torn asunder”
57
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in 1956. That contrasted, Adams said, “with the situation which existed in 1963 when Wallace
attempted to raise constitutional issues regarding the ability of a state to govern its own school
system.”58
Both men abhorred violence, though Adams failed to connect the governor’s defiance with the
tragedy in Birmingham. For Adams, the absence of violence and the “raising of constitutional questions”
was enough to constitute adherence to “law and order.” For Boone, it meant accepting that which was
“unpleasant and undesirable” as an inevitable consequence of settled law, instead of using that
unpleasantness and undesirability for political purposes. Boone’s approach was gaining followers
entering 1966, but the Wallace-Adams approach remained strong, not least because the governor was
pushing it with all the political power he could muster. One thing remained clear about both sides: they
would have to be dragged kicking and screaming towards the elimination of dual school systems.59
Meanwhile, local officials’ resistance continued to match that of state officials. Sixteen of the
state’s non-complying school systems were called before HEW in Washington for “extensive
negotiations,” that fall. Only 13 appeared to plead their cases. Among them was the relatively newly
independent Mountain Brook city system, which had no black pupils. There were also seven Black Belt
county systems, which stood to lose the most in federal funding, most of it from increases associated
with Title I of the ESEA. Barbour, Clarke, Greene, Hale, Lowndes, Perry, and Wilcox Counties were
among the poorest in the entire state and were willingly facing the loss of between $400,000 and
$600,000 each by refusing to comply with the HEW Guidelines. They at least made an effort to convince
federal officials to cut them a break. Among the most recalcitrant systems were those that did not
bother to show up to the Washington talks. This included the industrial, working-class Birmingham
suburb of Tarrant, which decided to voluntarily forego federal funds rather than comply; the Bibb
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County system, which decided to join Bessemer in mounting a legal challenge to the Guidelines; and the
Barbour County system, which chose not to embarrass the county’s native son, George Wallace.60
Resistance elsewhere included tried and true economic reprisal tactics. Seven teachers were
dismissed in Wilcox County. Some of them had 20 years’ tenure in the system. The city of Camden in
Wilcox, like several Black Belt communities, had experienced voting rights and school desegregation
demonstrations that summer and fall. When teachers were suspected of involvement in these civil
rights demonstrations, dismissal was a preferred tactic, as the laws passed in late 1950s had long since
suggested. School officials accused teachers of encouraging student truancy by supporting activism. In
Wilcox, this was exacerbated by the fact that Rev. Frank L. Smith, a black community leader and teacher,
had not only participated in voting rights demonstrations, but had had the audacity to request the
transfer of his children to white schools. Wilcox had no desegregated schools that fall. The Wilcox
school board denied firing Smith and the others on account of their activism, citing generally diminishing
student numbers. The president of the state’s black teachers’ association, Joe Reid, argued in rebuttal
that the Wilcox system was, in fact, growing, overcrowded, and in need of more, not fewer, teachers.61
The school authorities’ resistance in Wilcox brought no respite from the pressures of
desegregation. It brought, instead, a suit filed by the Justice Department. Blacks had sent complaints to
the Civil Rights Division, allowing the CRD to bring the suit. CRD attorneys needed no complaints to
know that Wilcox was one of the blackest, poorest, and most segregated counties in the entire country.
Its school system included 1,005 white students in three white schools and 4,789 pupils in 15 black
schools. Resistance was often stiffest in a Black Belt county like Wilcox, because whites faced being
“overrun” by blacks in such an overwhelmingly black county. If voting rights were to be granted to the
county’ blacks, this meant black elected officials in, potentially, all elected posts. And if schools were
desegregated, it meant the threat of white students ultimately attending majority black schools. Most
60
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whites found either scenario unthinkable and intolerable. The CRD understood this. And it understood,
just as the LDF and its associated counsel did, that the Black Belt counties lie mostly within the Middle
District. Accordingly, the Wilcox suit was only the first of several the Justice Department would file
against Black Belt school systems in Frank Johnson’s court.62

*****
The court in Lee v. Macon had been compelled to enjoin Alabama state officials from
interference in school desegregation, but it had stopped short of ordering them to bring about school
desegregation through the application of their considerable statewide control. Despite this “exercise of
considerable judicial restraint,” the litigious assault mounted by the LDF, the CRD, and local attorneys
and plaintiffs against segregated education in Alabama continued in its slow march against dual school
systems, one by one. Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Act resulted in not only increased pressure from the
Justice Department, but in new pressures from HEW, which used the threat of losing newly increased
federal funding to persuade local school officials to comply.
Law, order, and compliance gained adherents as local officials began to favor “unpalatable”
acquiescence to the minimal standards of the courts or of HEW versus the loss of tens of thousands in
federal funds. But Wallace-style defiance remained a palpable force, even among some school officials.
It continued to rule the day at the state level. As an HEW official had remarked months before, the state
was “playing Russian roulette” by defying federal authority. Such action might force the court to fire the
“single-shot” which state officials had feared even before Lee v. Macon was filed. The use of such
violent metaphors was hardly surprising considering the history of resistance to school desegregation to
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that point in Alabama. Entering 1966, it underscored a deep uneasiness across the state, as the forces
of desegregation, law, order, compliance, and defiance worked with and against one another in a
struggle over the fate of Alabama’s children.
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CHAPTER 10: “BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP”: DEFYING THE REVISED HEW GUIDELINES, 1965-66

In the fall of 1965, a group of 500 white residents of the city of Anniston, Alabama joined in
signing a pledge, which they publicized in the local newspaper, the Anniston Star. They were people
“known in every corner of [the] city” from “every walk of life and station,” and they represented
“persons of completely opposite attitudes and convictions on racial matters – from the most militantly
opposed on down the scale.” They were united in a belief that Anniston was “a law abiding
community,” that “laws must be obeyed,” and that violence had “no place” in their city. They reasoned
that the Civil Rights Act had brought about “changes” which were “largely economic in nature” and
which threatened the “peace and progress of [the] community. . . . Regardless of our personal feelings
over the merit or lack of merit of this legislation,” they urged, “we feel that the Anniston Community
must react to this new situation confronting us in a responsible, realistic, and thoughtful manner,” in
other words, “within the framework of law and order.” Above all, “order and respect for the law” had
to be maintained. These white community leaders, along with the local board of education and
superintendent, fostered an atmosphere of reluctant but committed compliance with Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) desegregation Guidelines that school year. The result was HEWapproved token desegregation, and a great deal of uncertainty entering the 1966-67 school year. This
was typical of the compliance efforts in a number of Alabama cities and counties.1
Earlier that summer, whites in Lowndes County got wind of a number of local blacks’ intentions
to request transfer to all-white Hayneville High. One afternoon, two white men named Buddy Woodruff
and Brady Ryan drove to the home of Jordan Gully, a local black farmer. When Gully answered the door,
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Woodruff barked, “what kind of shit are you trying to run over me?” Startled, Gully said, “I don’t know
what you’re talking about.” Woodruff asked, “Ain’t you got a girl named Pearlie Pate?” Realizing where
this was going, Gully replied that he did indeed, but he wondered why Woodruff wanted to know.
“When was the last time she’s been here,” Woodruff asked. She’d moved to Geneva recently, Gully told
them. Woodruff persisted, didn’t Gully have another daughter named Wilma Jean Pate? He did.
“Where is she,” Woodruff demanded. She was in the house. “You’re the head of this house, ain’t you,”
Woodruff replied. “Yes,” Gully said. Didn’t he know that Wilma Jean had applied for transfer to attend
Hayneville? “I did,” Gully said simply, trying to walk the tightrope between the maintenance of dignity
and the outright provocation of violence. Woodruff growled, “Don’t come to me for any help no more.”
Ryan added, “don’t come to me for no help either.” Such threats were common in areas like the Black
Belt, where poor black farmers – nearly all of them landless – lived like sharecroppers. They were often
obliged to ask a small oligarchy of white landlords or local white bankers for credit or short-term loans.
When blacks attempted to secure their constitutional rights, paternalistic whites reacted with an angry
incredulity unmatched since slaves began freeing themselves in the latter years of the Civil War. The
withdrawal of past forms of petty assistance was an easy way to channel that anger and, at the same
time, provide some motive for a change in black behavior.2
Woodruff said Gully had been “paying attention to them folks running up and down the roads,”
referring to civil rights volunteers. “We didn’t bother about y’all registering [to vote],” Woodruff
grumbled, “We didn’t bother y’all about going to mass meetings.” While this may have been true of
Woodruff and Ryan, it was patently false in relation to many other whites in the county. There were no
registered black voters in Lowndes, and reprisals for attending mass meetings were common.
Nonetheless, Woodruff concluded in a tirade, “I’ll be goddamn if this shit is going over this time. . . . This
2
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shit ain’t going to pass this time. We going to stop it. Don’t you ask me for no goddamn help for
nothing.” Such were the responses to attempts at token desegregation in the Alabama Black Belt.3
When local school officials across the state in 1965 and 1966 tried to comply in good faith with
HEW desegregation Guidelines, they found themselves caught between the requirements of the law and
the demands of the white community. The vast majority of whites still hoped to avoid anything more
than token desegregation, and many were certain that they could avoid even that. Federal court orders
and HEW enforcement efforts convinced many school boards, as in Anniston, that they had no choice
but to accept token desegregation. But Governor George Wallace and his allies in the state legislature
and state department of education continued to encourage defiance. Wallace and others initiated an
intense campaign against the HEW Guidelines as well as a renewed effort to provide tuition grants to
white students attending segregationist academies. They pressured, harassed, and intimidated local
school officials into defying the federal authorities, while at the same time encouraging whites in their
respective communities, like Buddy Woodruff, to believe that the disestablishment of their dual school
systems was neither inevitable, necessary, nor even legal. As the pincers tightened around local school
boards, the reckless political maneuvering of state officials brought the prospect of a statewide
desegregation order closer and closer to becoming a reality.

Desegregation Snapshot, 1965-66
At the time, Anniston was a city of roughly 34,000 situated 60 miles east of Birmingham, along
the east-west corridor to Atlanta. It was just outside the city’s limits that Klansmen had stopped a
Freedom Riders’ bus, beaten the riders, and burned the bus just 4 years prior. Many of Anniston’s
approximately 12,000 black residents worked in the city’s several textile mills and cast iron pipe
foundries. The city was also home to federal military installations: the Army’s Fort McClellan and
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Anniston Army Depot, which also employed a number of blacks. The school system educated 7,414
students, 3,213 of whom were black (43 percent). It included 7 black schools and 13 white schools, with
one high school for each. A major highway and railroad tracks split the city and separated the white and
black communities, east-west. In 1964 the activist Calhoun County Improvement Association, an SCLCaffiliate, petitioned the school board for the presentation of a desegregation plan and threatened to
bring suit in federal court if none were presented. The superintendent and the school board quickly
desegregated the system’s summer school program and formulated a geographical zoning plan for the
city’s two high schools which would have effected limited desegregation by incorporating a few small
pockets of blacks on the white side of town into the white high school zone and one small pocket of
whites nearest the black side of town into the black high school zone. The plan was accompanied by a
freedom-of-choice provision, however, which would have allowed all the whites to request transfer back
to white high school. Elementary school students were to attend the nearest school to their home,
which also would have sustained the status quo. HEW soon convinced the school system to adopt a
freedom of choice plan along the lines of the “model” Lauderdale County plan: free choice for all in the
system, grades 1-12, with adequate notice and explanation of the plan to the community and with
provisions for future faculty desegregation. The plan was faithfully executed by the Anniston
authorities, with the assistance of the Improvement Association and the compliant law-and-order
moderates.4
Fifty-eight of sixty-nine black students who requested transfer attended white schools that fall.
The numbers might have been higher, of course. Many of Anniston’s black families were ill-informed, or
simply uninformed, about the possibilities inherent in desegregation, despite the school system’s public
notice to parents. Some were undoubtedly apathetic about school desegregation. For those black
students who did transfer, motivations were diverse. It was simply easier and cheaper for many of the
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black families living on the white side of town to send their children to the white high school. Rather
than pay bus fare to be ferried across town to all-black Cobb High, they could walk the few blocks to
Anniston High. Others felt that with better resources came a better education and resolved to take
advantage of the opportunity which desegregation provided. Some had been encouraged by the efforts
of the city’s mayoral biracial committee, which had secured Birmingham-style concessions from white
downtown store owners in the wake of a black boycott. The relatively peaceful progression of local
desegregation in general was also encouraging – the Freedom Riders’ assault notwithstanding. The
students who transferred reported mostly positive experiences. Some white students were outwardly
friendly. Some displayed open hostility, usually in the form of calling them “nigger.” This was especially
true at what blacks called the “lower class whites’” elementary school. As students in Huntsville,
Birmingham, Tuskegee, and Mobile had already discovered, most white students were simply
indifferent. And the hostility seemed to subside as the year went by. As one student remarked, “it’s
getting better all the time.”5
This seemingly encouraging picture was clouded by continuing resistance within, and especially
outside, the city of Anniston. One of the most visible and enduring symbol of resistance was one local
white man, described by his neighbors as possibly insane, who picketed desegregated schools on a daily
basis, usually alone. But more ominous signs of resistance were evident from the beginning. During the
integrated Anniston summer school session, a black student attending the program was beaten by a
local white adult. Both the Ku Klux Klan and the National States Rights Party were active in the city that
summer and during the school year. In the weeks preceding the opening of schools, the KKK sponsored
a major rally and march through town, and the NSRP brought in what the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
described as “some of the most widely known racists in the country” for a rally of its own. The local
NSRP leader was a member of a notorious local white family, whose rabble-rousing male members were
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known simply as “the Adams boys.” Kenneth Adams was arrested for trying to acquire a large amount
of explosives not long after the rally. Also in the wake of the rally, a local black man named Willie
Brewster was shot to death by a white man. Brewster’s killer was supposedly enraged that Brewster
had been hired over him. All of this contributed to a general atmosphere of fear. Many black parents
did not want to send their children to be “guinea pigs” in such an environment. Some wondered if
“somebody might bomb the house” on any given night. Others feared economic reprisal. “I don’t think
my boss would like it,” one black parent told representatives of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC), “he doesn’t like colored people too much anyway.” As elsewhere in Alabama, the
numbers told the story well enough by themselves: 98 percent of the school system’s black students still
attended “Negro” schools, and five of its schools remained all-white.6
As complaints made to the Alabama State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission attest, resistance could be found all across the state at the local level: intimidation,
economic reprisal, and violence, in addition to footdragging, disingenuousness, and minimal compliance
on the part of local authorities. This was especially true, if unsurprisingly so, in the Black Belt in the fall
of 1965. One incident in Greene County was especially illuminating. A number of black families had
applied for their children to transfer to the county’s white schools that summer. Local officials and
landowners used intimidation and deception to get many of them to recant their requests – just as
whites in Lowndes County had done. When a few of the families refused to be intimidated, the Greene
County school board simply rejected all but one of the applications. The one girl who was accepted,
Mattye Lee Hutton, showed up at her bus stop on the first day of school to find that the bus was empty
but for the white driver. Hutton’s mother subsequently drove her to the white high school in Eutaw,
where the two were met by local sheriff’s deputies and state troopers. Mrs. Lee was told it was too late
to enter the school and that her daughter should have taken the bus. When she replied that the bus
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was empty, the sheriff said, “Hell no, what you think? No one was on the bus, and no one will be riding
with her; no one will sit with her; no one will have a damned thing to do with her!” He threatened to
have her car towed and advised her to come by his office before returning to the school the following
morning, because “them damned son-of-a-bitches up on the hill is Ku-Kluxes,” and “if you go up there
[alone], they will get you.” Hutton’s daughter did return the next day, but she later withdrew from the
white school.7
There were numerous other reported instances of intimidation. In Pickens County, the sheriff
visited black parents who applied for their children’s transfer to white schools and “advised them to
change their choices.” One man who did change his choice continued to be intimidated and “liv[ed] in
fear of his life.” In Marengo County, Klansmen burned a black church between the towns of Demopolis
and Eutaw, likely in retaliation for black applications for transfer to white schools. Sympathetic local
whites observed state troopers at a Demopolis restaurant, joking with a white waitress as they had
coffee in lieu of responding to the fire. The waitress loudly opined that she “hoped the church was full
when they started the fire,” while the troopers wished that the rain would abate and let the fire burn.
The waitress told the troopers upon their departure not to “go putting out that fire,” or she would “tell
Al Lingo on [them].” In another retaliatory incident, the desegregated white high school in Elba, in
South Alabama’s Coffee County, was dynamited the following winter. In addition to these acts of
intimidation, there was intransigence from local school officials. Like many others, the Hale County
Board of Education not only failed to publicized its desegregation plan in the county newspaper, it failed
to send any sort of notification to black parents or to reach out in any way to the black community. The
Hale County superintendent also harassed black students who requested transfer, asking about mass
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meetings and “so-called preachers” who counseled activism. He summarily denied all requests for
transfer from those who told him that they had attended the meetings or participated in a local boycott
of all-black schools.8
Then there was Lowndes. The Black Belt County was home to around 4,000 black students and
only about 600 white students. A small group of white families owned the vast majority of the land in
the largely rural county, and whites in general held an increasingly tenuous death grip on politics and
the economy. Episodes like those at Jordan Gully’s house were commonplace, especially in the summer
of 1965. Many of the nearly 50 black families who applied for their children to attend one of the three
white schools in the county were similarly harassed. A white teacher came to the home of Robert Harris
in Hayneville and told him that the whites at Hayneville High did not want black children at the school.
He asked Harris with whom did he do business. When Harris advised that he did business with Bob
Dixon, the man replied that Harris should have run this by “Mr. Bob,” who would undoubtedly have
been displeased. “Mr. Bob” was not going to advance him another year if he did not remove his child’s
name from the transfer application list. Another man, Eli Logan, was also visited by a teacher from
Hayneville High. The man told Logan that if he did not take his child’s name off the list that “the Ku Klux
Klan would be through here next Tuesday” and that he should not tell the SNCC operatives in the area
that he had talked to him. Logan displayed a growing measure of black defiance when he told the
teacher that he would not take his child’s name off and that he should tell the Klan “to come during the
day and not by night . . . because it won’t be good for them if they come at night.” Willie Joe White, a
tenant farmer who drove a cotton picker for a landed white man, was similarly harassed. His employer
8
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advised him to “get that girl [his wife] to take the children’s names off of that thing,” meaning the
transfer list for Hayneville High. He told White that he could “let that woman and them kids go if they
didn’t go over there and take their names off.” Cato Lee received a somewhat gentler but no less direct
threat from the man who had loaned him money on his house. The man told Lee that applying for
transfer was not illegal, but that “there might be some trouble in September” if his children transferred.
Lee might also “lose some friendship” in his hometown of Lowndesboro if he did not withdraw the
children’s names. Another man was told that the Klan was going to “get the leaders of those mass
meetings.”9
Resistance continued in Lowndes, despite the pressure. One of the leaders of “those mass
meetings” in Lowndes was John Hulett. In the way that many had mimicked the Montgomery MIA by
forming their own “improvement associations,” Hulett had founded the Lowndes County Christian
Movement for Human Rights, evoking the more militant Shuttlesworth outfit of Birmingham fame.
Hulett had been rebuffed, in fact, by the conservative SCLC and had sought out the assistance of the
increasingly militant SNCC, especially in organizing voter registration. The voter registration drive, the
passage of the Selma-to-Montgomery march through the county, and the efforts of these families to
apply to white schools provoked a visceral reaction from whites in Lowndes in 1965 and 1966. It
included the murder of white civil rights volunteers and the eviction of black tenant farmers like Willie
Joe White. Only one of the 47 families who applied for transfer to white schools dropped their
children’s names from the transfer list, however. With the assistance of SNCC’s Stokely Carmichael,
Hulett formed the Lowndes County Freedom Party – whose black panther emblem later lent its name to
the more visible Oakland-based defense group – and blacks in Lowndes continued to press for the
fulfillment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That fall the Lowndes
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County Board of Education rejected all but five of the applicants for transfer, prompting the local black
leadership to petition the Justice Department to file a desegregation suit against the school district.
They advised DOJ, “We cannot afford to bring a law suit,” and that, “We believe that if we do institute
litigation, it would jeopardize the personal safety, employment, and standing of ourselves and our
families.” Many of them had, after all, already “been threatened or harassed after [submitting]
applications to the Lowndes County Board of Education.”10
The Civil Rights Division answered the call from the Lowndes activist-parents and filed suit
against the Lowndes County school board in January of 1966. Before the start of the 1966-67 school
year, the CRD also filed suit against four other recalcitrant Black Belt systems: Wilcox County, Hale
County, Perry County, and Choctaw County. Additionally, it filed amicus briefs in private suits brought
against the Black Belt counties of Crenshaw and Greene. The new litigation brought the number of
school systems in Alabama under federal court scrutiny to 17. Many of the complaints from Black Belt
counties to DOJ came from teachers who had been dismissed in retaliation for their role in encouraging
student transfers. The CRD noted as much in its complaints in these cases, along with descriptions of
the inadequate and even hazardous conditions in the often dilapidated black schools. The CRD also
noted that the vast majority of freedom-of-choice transfer requests had been rejected. In response to
the CRD’s filing suit in Lowndes, the county schools superintendent argued that if the school board had
accepted all of the applications for transfer, they “wouldn’t have had a Hayneville High School” to
attend because all of the whites would have withdrawn to attend Lowndes Academy, the newly
established segregationist academy in Lowndesboro. “These people,” she clarified, “are not fighting the
admission of some Negroes to white schools, but they’re not going to let their children stay in school if
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the schools are overrun with Negro students.” The same could have been said for whites in the other
Black Belt Counties.11
In February of 1966, Judge Frank Johnson entered an order in the Lowndes case directing the
desegregation of 6 grades that fall on freedom-of-choice and full desegregation as such the following
year. He ordered the county to provide remedial educational opportunities to the system’s 4,000 black
students in order to “eliminate the past effects of racial discrimination,” and to close 24 substandard
black schools. The unprecedented closure order followed upon undisputed evidence presented in the
CRD’s complaint which depicted the vast majority of Lowndes’ black schools as pathetic reminders of
separate and unequal. Twenty-three of the twenty-seven had fewer teachers than grades; the majority
lacked plumbing; many were decades-old, un-insulated wooden structures; and a few even lacked a
source of drinking water. The school board was forced to concede that black students had been
provided with educational opportunities “unequal to or inferior to” those of whites. It probably
welcomed the court order, which put it out of the line of fire of angry whites, who began to look more
closely at Lowndes Academy as their ultimate escape hatch. The segregationist academy was not yet up
and running, but local whites were making fevered efforts to open its doors. Judge Johnson followed
the Lowndes order up with almost identical orders in the Montgomery case and Bullock County case.
He entered another for the three judge panel in Lee v. Macon. Macon was ordered to desegregate all
grades the coming fall, while Montgomery and Bullock were given until the fall of 1967-68. The court
also ordered a total of 41 schools closed in the three systems by the start of the 1967-68 school year.
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Each school board was also required to take steps towards faculty desegregation, the desegregation of
extra-curricular activities, and the establishment of remedial education programs.12

The 1966 Guidelines and Form 441-B
As the litigious assault slowly spread across the state in 1966, HEW intensified its efforts to
enforce compliance with the U.S. Office of Education (USOE) Guidelines for desegregation. On March 7,
the USOE issued a revised set of Guidelines. The revised Guidelines placed more demands on already
reluctant school boards, which were themselves besieged by enraged, anxious, and fearful white
parents. Across the country, more than 1,700 of around 2,000 school districts had already agreed to
desegregate all 12 grades by the fall of 1966. Only 79 districts had registered no compliance
whatsoever. But the courts had steadily been moving more quickly, and court orders were becoming
more stringent than the original HEW Guidelines. HEW determined that by early 1966, it had “become
clear that school districts not operating under court orders could and should make more progress . . .
towards desegregation than was [previously] required.” Accordingly, the department issued a “Revised
Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” The
revised Guidelines called for a number of accelerated actions which threw local school officials into a
frenzy, including the requirement that school systems make a real beginning on faculty desegregation.
Originally, HEW had only asked that desegregated faculty meetings be held. The revised Guidelines,
“following the decisions of the courts,” required the elimination of “the pattern of assignment of
teachers and other professional staff among the various schools of a system . . . such that schools are
identifiable as intended for students of a particular race, color, or national origin,” or such that teachers

12

School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, Feb., March, 1966; United States v. Lowndes
County Board of Education, Order of Feb. 10, 1966, Race Relations Law Reporter (RRLR) 11.2, Summer, 1966, pp.
692-3; Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 253 F.Supp. 306, see also at RRLR 11.2, pp. 682-7; Harris v.
Bullock County Board of Education, 253 F.Supp 726, see also at RRLR 11.2, pp. 687-90; Lee v. Macon County Board
of Education, Order of March 11, 1966, 253 F.Supp. 727, see also at RRLR 11.2, pp. 690-92.

382

and staff of a particular race were “concentrated in those schools where all, or the majority of, the
students are of that race.”13
Calls for faculty desegregation in the previous Guidelines had been widely ignored. School
boards knew that resistance from white parents would be stiff. For many white parents, black teachers
in positions of authority vis-à-vis their children was simply intolerable. Most considered black teachers
unqualified and inadequate. All black teachers had, of course, been educated in the very segregated
and inequitable school systems which were supposed to be under eradication. But many black teachers
were wholly qualified and, in many cases, more adequate than some white teachers. Nonetheless,
segregationists applied the assumption of inferiority in blanket fashion. Unfortunately for them, the
Fifth Circuit had already spoken as to the validity of the faculty desegregation requirements of the
original Guidelines.14
In a second review of the Singleton v. Jackson, Mississippi case in January, the appellate court
held that, in Judge John Minor Wisdom’s words, “an adequate start toward elimination of race as a basis
for the employment and allocation of teachers, administrators, and other personnel” was an “essential”
component of any desegregation plan which hoped to pass muster before the court. In its previous
ruling in Singleton, the court had already held that the HEW Guidelines as a whole provided adequate
standards for the courts to follow in fashioning relief in school desegregation cases. In what became
known as Singleton II, the court reaffirmed this holding but added an explicit acknowledgment that
“attaching great weight to the standards” established in the Guidelines did not mean ‘abdicating the
court’s judicial responsibility.’ The court maintained its prerogative to determine the constitutionality of
desegregation plans before it. While this recognition of the Guidelines as simply “minimum standards”
13
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would soon have implications of its own, the reaffirmation of the Guidelines’ validity – particularly as to
faculty desegregation – served to increase both fatalism among school officials and determined
resistance among other segregationists. In fact, the Supreme Court and a number of lower courts had,
by that time, held that meaningful desegregation must include some sort of provision for desegregating
faculty. This was one way in which HEW was “following the courts.”15
In addition to calling for faculty desegregation to begin forthwith, the new Guidelines also called
for the immediate desegregation of all transportation programs, athletics programs, and all other extracurricular activities, as well as the closure of inadequate school facilities and the proactive courting of
community support. For systems using geographic zone plans, the new Guidelines restricted transfers
to majority-to-minority situations; this was an effort to eliminate the sort of transfers the Anniston
authorities had in mind when zoning the small group of white students to the black high school. The
most controversial aspect of the new Guidelines, though, involved the many freedom-of-choice plans.
HEW acknowledged what everyone already understood: that “a free choice plan tends to place the
burden of desegregation on Negro or other minority group students and their parents.” The Guidelines
continued:

Even when school authorities undertake good faith efforts to assure its fair operation, the very
nature of a free choice plan and the effect of longstanding community attitudes often tend to
preclude or inhibit the exercise of a truly free choice by or for minority group students. For
these reasons, the Commissioner will scrutinize with special care the operation of voluntary
plans of desegregation in school systems which have adopted free choice plans.16
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In determining the fair and effective operation of free choice plans,’ HEW claimed that it would
take into account community support, the racial identifiability of schools, and faculty and staff
desegregation. But the “single most substantial indication as to whether a free choice plan [was]
actually working to eliminate the dual school structure” would be the “extent to which Negro or other
minority group students [had] in fact transferred from segregated schools.” As a “general matter,” HEW
was looking for “substantial increases” in black transfers that fall. If school systems had a token number
of blacks in white schools, with no indication of a potentially substantial increase, then their plans would
fall under strict scrutiny, and they would likely be required to “take additional actions as a prerequisite
to continued use of a free choice plan.” If they failed then to utilize some other effective measure to
accelerate desegregation, then they would be subject to administrative proceedings and potential
federal funds deferral.17
Most controversially of all, HEW provided numerical guidelines for adequate progress for the
fall. “If a significant percentage of the students, such as 8 or 9 percent, transferred from segregated
schools for the 1965-66 school year,” the revised Guidelines read, “total transfers on the order of at
least twice that percentage would normally be accepted.” If the percentage for 1965-66 were closer to
4 or 5 percent, then a “substantial increase” would likely mean triple that percentage in 1966-67. And if
the 65-66 percentage were lower than 4, the increase would need to be “proportionately greater.” In
cases like Greene County in Alabama, where no black students had transferred, “a very substantial start
would normally be expected.”18
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The Civil Rights Division and the Legal Defense Fund understood that HEW was following the
courts’ lead in a sense. But they also surmised that the new standards provided an opportunity for
plaintiffs to seek uniformity in desegregation cases – which resulted in sometimes disparate relief. The
CRD immediately petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the consolidation and expedition of all
appeals in school desegregation cases in which the U.S. was an intervening party, including the Jefferson
County, Bessemer, and Fairfield cases. The LDF quickly noted that Judges Johnson and Wisdom had
already anticipated and “substantially embraced” the spirit of the new Guidelines: Johnson in the
several Black Belt cases, Wisdom in the Singleton II ruling. So the LDF filed new motions for further
relief at the trial level, as did the CRD, seeking new desegregation orders based on the Guidelines’
standards. In Alabama, the CRD and LDF followed up local activists’ complaints by filing motions for
further relief in the Birmingham, Huntsville, Madison County, and Gadsden cases. As a new HEW
compliance instrument – Form 441-B – went out to, not just these, but every school system in Alabama,
segregationists quickly seized on what they understood to be numerical quotas for desegregation.19

“Beyond the Law”: Reaction to the New Guidelines
The new Guidelines caused a furor among segregationists. Secretary of HEW John Gardner and
Commissioner of Education Harold Howe insisted that the revised Guidelines were not intended to
prescribe “rigid means” for effecting desegregation compliance. They were intended to bring about a
“reasonable beginning” and “reasonable progress” thereafter, all with “considerable flexibility.”
Nonetheless, school authorities, politicians, and random segregationists everywhere began to clamor:
Form 441-B was a “blank check” which would bind school boards to any future revisions that HEW might
19
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make to the Guidelines; the calls for faculty desegregation would mean wholesale reassignment on an
unimaginable scale; freedom-of-choice was being slowly eliminated regardless of good faith efforts; the
use of percentages was intended to engender “racial balance” within school systems and therefore went
beyond the call of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Gardner himself wrote to members of Congress to
assure them that such assumptions “misconceived the purpose” of the Guidelines. The percentages
were flexible; faculty desegregation would not mean “the instantaneous desegregation of every faculty
in every school building in every school district”; Form 441 was simply a “declaration of intent”; and
school boards could take exception to any future changes as they wished.20
Segregationists in Alabama were not assuaged. Governor Wallace called a meeting of all local
superintendents at which he and state Superintendent Meadows condemned the Guidelines and called
for a “friendly suit” to prevent faculty desegregation and for the adoption of a resolution seeking
congressional intercession. Wallace announced, “We must obey the laws, just and unjust, but we
should not have to obey edicts of bureaucratic officials which go beyond the law.” This was the mantra
which segregationist officials across the state would adopt. The Civil Rights Act contained a clause which
read, “Desegregation shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome
racial imbalance.” It was a compromise measure which was intended to appease non-southern
members of congress who feared the forced dismantling of so-called de facto segregation in the
Northeast, Midwest, and parts of the West. According to the developing southern segregationist
resistance, the numerical standards in the Guidelines were in violation of this principle. Similarly, school
officials attacked the provisions for faculty desegregation. They argued that a clause in the Civil Rights
Act prohibiting “action . . . with respect to any employment practice of any employer” precluded any
requirement for large-scale faculty desegregation or the elimination of race as a consideration in hiring.
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The superintendents at the Wallace-Meadows meeting voted 76-4 to adopt an intercession resolution
embodying these complaints, along with the general statement that the revised Guidelines were “too
voluminous, too complicated, and too confusing to be put into effect . . . in any sensible, justifiable
manner.” A spokesman for the group announced after the meeting that “if the local boards [would] go
along with the superintendents,” then there would be no signing of Form 441-B. The local officials had
“gone the last mile” and had “done everything that was requested,” and now, the spokesman said,
“HEW comes along with another thing.” They had supposedly had enough.21
The U.S. Office of Education quickly announced the establishment of teams of investigators
which would be deployed to determine compliance in the various states. The Alabama group consisted
of five investigators and was headed by Alabamian Gene Crowder – the soon-to-be nemesis of many
local school officials. While the creation of a permanent enforcement staff enraged state and local
authorities, it disappointed many in the Alabama Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission, which understood the futility of sending such a team to deal with nearly 100 reluctant and
defiant school boards. Along with the Alabama Council on Human Relations, the Advisory Committee
was one of only two state-level biracial bodies actively working towards school desegregation. Many of
the committee members were familiar names in the statewide movement: John Cashin in Huntsville,
Orzell Billingsley in Birmingham, John Leflore in Mobile. These were activists who had dealt with all
manner of defiance, sabotage, reprisal, intimidation, and foot-dragging. They understood that even
after the breakthroughs of the previous three years, there was a “an increasing polarization between
the attitude of the moderate white who intends to comply with federal law, but such compliance
moving only as rapidly as white society permits, and the attitude of the more militant in the civil rights
movement,” seeking more than “simple compliance with law.” They thought that the federal
government ought to be attempting to secure “far more than token compliance with existing laws,
21
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especially Title VI . . . .” Accordingly, the committee moved to hold its own regional informational
meetings to counterbalance the dissemination of misinformation from the governor’s office and the
state board of education. It also issued a statement, saying “in view of the enormity of the problem of
school desegregation, the general intransigence of school administrators at the state and local levels,
and the history of inadequate enforcement of last year’s Guidelines, [we] consider [an HEW]
enforcement staff of five persons, working out of Washington, to be totally inadequate . . . .” The
committee expressed hope that the USOE would open an office in Alabama with more personnel. It also
conveyed “hope and desire” that the Justice Department would continue bringing actions in federal
courts as well.22
The USOE enforcement team waded into this sea of apprehension and disappointment that
summer when it held its own meeting with the state’s superintendents. Local school officials seized the
opportunity to levy the same criticisms which they had incorporated into the intercession resolution.
Crowder and his team responded by arguing that the Guidelines were, indeed, authorized by the Civil
Rights Act. Faculty desegregation had nothing to do with employment, and everything to do with the
disestablishment of dual systems based on race, namely the elimination of racially identifiable schools.
And the use of percentage milestones in desegregation was limited to the proper working of freedom of
choice plans, which they argued were probably going to be deemed ineffective when too few black
students chose to transfer from segregated black schools. Meadows was in attendance and offered
some familiar platitudes, such as, “It takes longer to work out things in a democracy than in a
dictatorship.” Local school officials expressed incredulity. “What if I can’t find a Negro teacher qualified
to teach in a white school,” one asked. HEW officials responded with exasperation of their own. “If she
22
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isn’t qualified, what is she doing in your system,” HEW consultant and Marquette professor Wallace
McBain replied. “The separate but equal ruling was made in 1894,” he said, “[but] you aren’t even
willing to go that far!” Meadows telegrammed Harold Howe after the meeting to protest the dispatch
of a “staff permanently located in Alabama to snoop on the actions of legally constituted education
officials in Alabama.” He called on the commissioner to “trust local school officials rather than
announcing distrust by sending a horde of snoopers into the schools of the state.” Howe responded by
saying he understood the state’s officials’ apprehension, but that there would be no change in the
Guidelines simply because they had misinterpreted their legal basis and intention. Meadows argued in
turn that the Guidelines were abhorred by “every board member and superintendent in Alabama” and
would be “disastrous in this state if followed.” And any action on Howe’s part, Meadows asserted,
would be “illegal,” since Howe had “no right and no authority to require guidelines which destroy
authority of local school boards in placing teachers.” It seemed that communication and negotiation
were going nowhere very quickly.23
Wallace, meanwhile, renewed his verbal assault on the revised Guidelines, and he and Meadows
set about pressuring local school boards to follow the lead of the superintendents in registering
objection and defiance. The governor’s attacks were fueled by his newly announced de facto
gubernatorial campaign. By state law, Wallace could not succeed himself in the governor’s chair, so he
attempted to have the legislature and the electorate amend the state’s constitution. Failing in that, he
decided to run his wife as a stand-in candidate. If victorious, Lurleen Wallace would act as governor in
name only, allowing George to continue running the state, or more accurately, to allow George to
campaign for the presidency and leave the business of state administration to his subordinates. He
called the revised Guidelines the “last straw.” Alabamians, he claimed, had “gone just as far as [they
were] going to go” and would not allow HEW to enforce “illegal” guidelines in its attempt to “take over
23
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and control every aspect of the school system of the state.” Wallace called the new rules “political sop”
cooked up by the “liberal, socialistic, beatnik crowd . . . roaming the streets in this country” and “using
school children as pawns.” Ignoring the arguments made by the HEW officials at the March meeting,
Wallace said, ”HEW guidelines now seek to integrate faculties and bring about racial balance even
though the Civil Rights Act prohibits this. We’ve tried to obey the law,” he claimed, “and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is going to obey the law too.” He then all but dared HEW
officials to defer federal funds, adding “they’re the law violators, not us.” Wallace predicted that “most
of the local boards will put up a united front” in opposition. No such united front immediately
developed, however. So the governor and Meadows began to try and create one.24
Joining Wallace and Meadows was an unusually united cadre of state and federal-level Alabama
officials. Lieutenant Governor James Allen, a longtime Wallace foe, called the Guidelines “arbitrary,
illegal, burdensome, and . . . far beyond the law.” State House Speaker Albert Brewer argued publically
that HEW was “trying to destroy the public education system.” Republican U.S. Representative and
gubernatorial aspirant Jim Martin accused the Office of Education of being “concerned only with social
reforms” and Howe of “demanding swift obedience to his edicts.” Martin called upon the state’s two
U.S. Senators to hold a meeting with the state’s entire congressional delegation, Wallace, and Meadows
and find some way to “save the South from the utter confusion and chaos that will erupt should the
guidelines be placed into effect as proposed.” The generally aloof Senators John Sparkman and Lister
Hill did, indeed, join the fray. “In addition to being illegal,” Hill announced, “the guidelines are
unreasonable and so impractical as to destroy the difficult and sincere efforts that have been made and
are being made by local officials.” The new regulations threatened “to disrupt the orderly compliance
with the law by these officials,” and Hill promised to “do all in [his] power to get them rescinded.”
Sparkman echoed these comments and vowed to have the Guidelines “rescinded and withdrawn.” He
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was “convinced that they [were] beyond the law” and “hopeful a law suit [could] be brought to test this
thing out.” Both men cited the same two sections of the Civil Rights Act regarding “racial balance” and
employment practices which had already been seized upon. The generally compliance-minded
Birmingham News concluded that the revised Guidelines had elicited unusually condemnatory reactions
across the state from “many people besides those from whom criticism of federal actions is almost a
reflex action.” The “best asset” the USOE had up to that point had been “the cooperation, however
reluctant, of local school boards and educators.” Now it was in danger of being “blown to bits by do-itnow-or-else mandates which do not take into account practical problems in hundreds of sensitive
situations.”25
When Wallace initially invited the state’s entire congressional delegation to Montgomery to
discuss resistance, the congressmen seemed more swayed by Jim Martin’s suggestion that they all meet
in Washington with HEW officials. Then Lurleen Wallace ran away with the Democratic nomination for
governor in early May. Mrs. Wallace won 54 percent of the vote – the other 46 percent of which was
divided among her nine competitors, including former Governor John Patterson. When George Wallace
argued that he had no intention of ‘meeting with bureaucrats’ in Washington, the delegation agreed to
come to Montgomery. It was a great political victory for the governor, and a great disappointment for
Martin. The meeting produced a condemnatory resolution which called upon local school officials to
defy the federal government. The group urged school boards to “continue to resist” because “no
principle of law is more essential to the preservation of liberty than one which holds any regulation of
any bureau, department, commission, or agency of government is null, void, and unenforceable if such
regulation exceeds the statutory authority granted to that department.” The Guidelines were “without
authority of law” and were “in violation of specific prohibitions” of the Civil Rights Act. The 12 found it
“shocking that an agency of the federal government would undertake to disregard the law and flout the
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repeatedly reaffirmed public policy of this nation,” especially by employing “totalitarian methods in the
form of threats to deny benefits of educational programs from innocent parties in order to accomplish
an illegal purpose.” They urged local school authorities to “stand firmly upon their constitutional rights,
power, and prerogatives and to firmly resist every effort to subjugate those rights, powers, and
prerogatives to the dictations and threats of the federal bureaucracy.” Finally, they advised those
school systems which had signed HEW compliance agreements to reconsider.26
Some local school boards had made public efforts to comply, and many others had done so
clandestinely, fearful of political reprisal. Meadows reported that, as of mid-May, 24 school systems
had signed the new compliance forms, but the USOE was reporting that 54 systems had done so. Some
had filed their Forms 441-B with the USOE but had withheld their carbon copies from the state
department of education. Others had refused to sign 441-B but had given informal forms of assurance
to HEW officials. For example, the Opelika City system declined to sign 441-B but submitted its own
“Resolution of Compliance.” Similarly, others had agreed to comply with the new Guidelines but had
included clauses stipulating that they would not bind themselves to any part of the Guidelines which
might be held illegal in the future. Anniston Superintendent Revis Hall asked HEW to accept a certified
copy of the school board’s meeting minutes in lieu of Form 441-B. Hall explained that there were
“certain factors” that existed in the state which might “infringe our ability to carry forward an orderly
program if adverse publicity to our school system develops during political campaigns.” More
specifically, Hall wrote, “adverse publicity would prevent” the development of a proposed education
park, because state officials had the authority “to not only determine who the architect will be, but also
the extent to which local capital outlay millage . . . can be extended for certain purposes.” Filing the
minutes in lieu of Form 441-B, Hall argued, would allow his school board to “meet [any] state or local

26

School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, May, 1966. Wallace proposed a line
condemning such systems which had complied, but some in the delegation refused to sign if such a line were
included.

393

criticism which may arise,” but it would not “interfere with the Board’s decision to meet its
responsibility under the law.” A few systems were openly challenging the Guidelines or were simply
eschewing federal funds, including Bessemer, Bibb County, Tarrant, and all-white Mountain Brook.
Most continued to follow their plans formulated under the original Guidelines and said that they were
playing wait-and-see. The constant discussion of the Guidelines’ “illegality” had convinced many that
there was a good chance they could be rescinded. As one superintendent said, “[We] are struggling to
determine exactly what is the law under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”27
Amid the uncertainty, more state officials set about trying to influence the public towards
defiance. The state board of education issued its own resolution, in which it “highly commend[ed] the
. . . Alabama Congressional delegation, the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the
House, and the State Superintendent of Education” for their condemnation of the “so-called guidelines
in violation of the Civil Rights Act.” The state board “recommend[ed] that local school superintendents
and boards of education withdraw any 441-B signed agreements for the new guidelines because the
guidelines erroneously attempt to desegregate teachers and set up quota or percentage ratios of pupils
in schools, both of which are in violation of the Civil Rights Act.” The board was careful to include an
acknowledgment of the “autonomy of local superintendents and boards of education,” but it
immediately reiterated its “request” that they “withdraw signed guideline agreements which are illegal
and which attempt to usurp the powers and duties of local” officials. Meadows himself sent a personal
letter to all of the state’s local school boards, in which he called the landslide nomination of Lurleen
Wallace represented “an absolute mandate . . . against the encroachment of the U.S. Office of Education
on local superintendents of education.” He requested that no school officials sign 441-B and asked
those who had done so to withdraw the agreements. He further asked that all boards report to his
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office any action taken on the matter. Despite the USOE’s claim that it was prepared to withhold $40
million in federal aid to Alabama, Meadows assured them that he was “completely certain that the U.S.
Commissioner of Education will not take any action to withhold funds for failure to carry out” the
controversial and supposedly illegal sections of the Guidelines. Finally, the Alabama state legislature
resolved that, “in view of the illegal nature of the regulations and in view of the arbitrary methods
employed to require agreements with local boards of education,” it was of “the unanimous opinion that
every reasonable official should continue to resist all illegal requirements imposed by the 1966
Guidelines.” The legislators “urge[d] the responsible [local] officials to take appropriate action to effect
this resistance.” The actions of Wallace, the state board, Meadows, and the state legislature convinced
not only some school boards, but many other white citizens, that the Guidelines were in fact “illegal.”
The Russell County school board, for example, heard from a citizens’ group which told it that “frankly,
the people of Russell County and all over Alabama are confused about these guidelines.” They urged
the board “not to sign them until they have been tested in court.”28
Not only did the state officials’ resolutions and numerous public statements encourage
community pressure on local authorities, at the same time, Meadows and Wallace undertook a behindthe-scenes campaign to harass and intimidate school boards into withholding or rescinding Form 441-B
agreements. Investigative records of the HEW-USOE reveal that, in telegrams and phone calls to local
officials, Meadows deliberately misrepresented the number of school systems which had withheld or
rescinded their compliance forms, and that he and the governor applied political pressure on a number
of school systems during the summer of 1966. In one case, the state superintendent announced
publically that the Marion County superintendent had rescinded his board’s pledge. The Marion
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superintendent had, in fact, done no such thing and actually told USOE officials that he would appreciate
their telling Meadows that they were dealing directly with him. Anniston Superintendent Revis Hall was
surprised to hear from the USOE that nearly 2/3 of the state’s systems had signed Form 441-B and that
HEW was, indeed, preparing to initiate non-compliance proceedings against the remaining systems. Hall
said he had been under “considerable pressure from the State Department of Education” and had been
told by Meadows that only Anniston and one other system had failed to rescind their compliance forms.
The assistant superintendent of the Calhoun County system complained to USOE officials about “the
political pressure they were getting from Gov. Wallace and the lower, uneducated elements in their
area.” He assured the officials that he and the school board were attempting to comply by following “a
middle path.” The superintendent of the Escambia County system, Harry Weaver, told the USOE that he
understood his district was risking funds deferral, but that they “just couldn’t reassign teachers.” With
the “pressure from the people and the government,” there was “absolutely no chance.” The
superintendent of the Limestone County system admitted that his board had been withholding Form
441-B in hopes that the passage of time would ease the political pressure it was under. The Talladega
County superintendent said that his board feared signing 441-B since a copy was supposed to go to the
State Office of Education. The St. Clair County superintendent told HEW investigators flatly that his
board “won’t sign until Governor Wallace says so.” Several other systems had signed 441-B but had
included amendments regarding percentages or faculty desegregation; they were surprised to be
informed that their funds would be deferred anyway.29
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In an attempt to mollify local authorities’ concerns, HEW officials eventually recommended that
systems which refused to sign instead include an amendment which read, “This assurance does not
commit this school system to comply with any requirement of [HEW] which is contrary to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.” After more letters from Meadows and Wallace, another mandatory meeting in
Montgomery, and numerous requests for desegregation figures and Form 441 statuses, many
superintendents simply told USOE investigators that their school systems would not sign anything
because the governor and state superintendent had said the Guidelines “went beyond the law” and
were, therefore, “illegal.” A number of systems which had signed unqualified assurance forms rescinded
them on account of the pressure. A few resolved to continue complying in good faith despite
“[incurring] the displeasure of professional and political leaders in the state.” The majority ultimately
signed amended forms with some sort of caveat. When HEW agents reported up the chain of command
to Commissioner Howe about the state’s intimidation tactics, Howe issued a public memorandum to
Meadows in which he sought to “make it absolutely clear . . . that school districts which are not in
compliance will have federal funds for new projects deferred” and that “districts which do not make
progress in faculty and student desegregation in accordance with the guidelines will necessarily be held
by the commissioner to be out of compliance.”30
In a clear expression of disregard, Wallace subsequently threatened to hold mass meetings in
communities whose school boards had signed compliance forms, so that the local officials would have to
explain their actions to angry local whites. As the superintendent of the Florence system explained to
HEW officials, “about that time the top blew off again in Alabama over the fact that we had signed 441B. Some local boards, including ours,” he wrote, “were threatened with called mass meetings to oppose
30
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the singing of 441-B.” The Florence school board remained “unmovable,” but he added, “It seemed best
not to go beyond our present position for fear that a certain party might cause an explosion in our
otherwise peaceful and harmonious community.” Another superintendent said that he would like to ask
Wallace, “what good will such mass meetings do except perhaps arouse somebody to do something
foolish?” But he added, “I don’t want any fight with the governor; that’s a fight you can’t possibly
win.”31
As before, state-level intimidation emboldened the more committed segregationists at the local
level to undertake their own campaigns of harassment. Typical of such local intimidation were the
efforts of the superintendent of the Marengo County school system, Fred D. Ramsey, to avoid faculty
desegregation. Ramsey required all teachers in the Marengo system to respond to a questionnaire
which asked, “Do you believe that Marengo County Schools will improve its quality through
integration?” “To what extent should schools be integrated, fully or token?” “Would you be willing to
teach children of the opposite race from you?” “Would you be willing to take the National Teachers
Examination” or “other examinations” as “a basis for your candidacy in teaching school?” And, “Would
you willingly resign, if it became necessary, to carry out full integrated [sic] faculties?” Teachers were
fired and intimidated in Crenshaw, Wilcox, Greene, and Hale Counties, as well, for encouraging student
activism and communicating with civil rights volunteers. The superintendent in Hale County continued
openly discouraging students who considered applying for transfer, blaming “so-called preachers” who
supposedly filled students’ heads with misinformation at mass meetings. The school board in Wilcox
County refused bus transportation for black students attending white schools, while half-empty busses

31

USOE Telephone and Conference Records, Alan Ellis to Supt. Garner, Brewton, July 7, 1966; Martin
Cooper to David Brown, Colbert County, July 19, 1966; John Deason to Richard Fairley, Aug. 26, 1966; Harold Howe
to Austin Meadows, June 3, 1966; all the above in NAACP Lee v. Macon Files: Background Information (Papers of
the NAACP, Supplement to Part 23, Series A, Section I, Reel 3); Trial Brief of the United States, Jan. 5, 1967, Lee v.
Macon County Board of Education, Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 19, Folder 5, pp. 2730, 32; Jeffrey Frederick, Command and Control: George Wallace, Governor of Alabama, 1963-72 (Ph.D. diss.,
Auburn University, 2003), p. 310.

398

carrying white students passed by the houses of those black students. When a father of one of the
Wilcox children began providing transportation for his son and some others, he was fired by the school
board and had his mailbox destroyed by a shotgun blast and his car pelted with rocks. Students in Dallas
County were reportedly charged tuition to attend white schools, and the parents of transferring
students in Marengo County were threatened with eviction from public housing. One family which sent
their black child to a white school in Wetumpka had its house bombed with Molotov cocktails and
burned to the ground. Another Wetumpka family with children in white schools was refused a burial
plot in the local cemetery for their son, a soldier who died fighting in Vietnam.32
The frustration of local activists was effectively conveyed in a letter from the Crenshaw County
Improvement Association to John Doar at the Justice Department. “We colored people have . . . been
harased, arested, [sic] jailed, beaten, segregated, discriminated against, [and] fined,” it read. The
association asked DOJ to bring an “immediate action against the educational system and law
enforcement” in Crenshaw, as these two departments seemed to be “the very strong hold of corruption.
. . . We listen to Governor Wallace say the federal government is bluffing and can’t do anything with
Alabama, because he is boss here, and what he say goes,” they wrote. “It seem[s] to be working so well,
we hardly know what to believe since nothing has been done in this place we live now and the rest of
our lives.”33
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“The Citizens of Alabama are No Longer Willing to Abide”: Anti-Guidelines Legislation
The summer of defiance and intimidation culminated in the passage of legislation which became
known as the Alabama “Anti-guidelines Bill.” The legislature invoked its “authority and . . . duty to
require or impose conditions or procedures deemed necessary to maintain a system of public schools
throughout the State . . . and to preserve peace and order in [those] public schools . . . .” Wallace’s
point men in the legislature introduced the bill in late August. It passed with overwhelming majorities in
both houses on September 2, and Wallace immediately signed it into law. It was, supposedly, an act to
“preserve the integrity of the local school systems against unlawful encroachment in the administration
and control of local schools.” In reality, it was exactly what it purported to avoid: an encroachment
upon those same local school systems, in this case by the state itself. The legislators surmised that
“public confidence in local school systems [was] being destroyed by the recent attempt by [HEW] to
control the internal operation of local schools in Alabama, by issuing certain so-called ‘guidelines.’”
These guidelines would “either effectively destroy the public schools or destroy the quality of education
offered in public schools . . . .” Furthermore, it was “immoral and repugnant” for HEW to use education
funds and “threats, intimidation, and coercion” as means to these ends. And of course, none of HEW’s
actions were “required or authorized by law.” The lawmen encapsulated the self-victimization of white
Alabama and at the same time captured the nascent rationale for law-and-order style evasion of school
desegregation: “The time has come when the citizens of Alabama are no longer willing to abide by such
infringements of constitutionally guaranteed personal rights and freedoms.”34
The legislators understood that the time had passed for violent resistance, and that the time for
economic reprisal and harassment would, perhaps, pass sometime in the near future. The time for
legislative resistance was reaching its climax. And when it passed, what would be left but the legal
34
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struggle to protect “constitutionally guaranteed personal rights and freedoms.” They took it upon
themselves to preserve these by declaring the Guidelines “unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and
unconstitutional,” and by declaring any signed Forms 441 or 441-B “null, void, and [of] no binding
effect.”35 In case this was unclear, the act established that:

No local county or city board of education shall have the authority to give any assurance of
compliance with the guidelines or to enter into any other agreement with any agency of the
government of the United States which would obligate [them] to adopt any plan for
desegregation which requires the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome
racial imbalance or which would authorize any agent of the United States to take any action
with respect to any employment practice of such board or to take any other action not required
by law.36

In addition to the nullification provision, the Anti-guidelines Bill established a 160-member
“Governor’s Commission.” The commission was to act on behalf of local school boards vis-à-vis the
federal government and to request the opinion of the justices of the Alabama Supreme Court as to the
legality of signed Guidelines agreements. Of the 160 members of the commission, 141 “happened to
be” in the legislature, and there was a 14-member executive committee chaired by Wallace and
Lieutenant Governor Jim Allen. The commission would have the authority to invoke the state’s police
power anytime “peace and order” in school systems were threatened. This was widely interpreted to
mean that the commission could call in the state troopers to obstruct desegregation, as Wallace had
done via executive order in 1963. The act also promised state funds to local school systems which had
federal funds deferred as a result of their refusal to comply with the Guidelines. That fall HEW was
already moving to cut-off funds to 23 systems in Alabama. Wallace announced that the federal
government could take its money, and he said, “they know what they can do with it.” The state would
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not subject itself, he argued, to compliance with “outlaw guidelines” which were really just “a blueprint
devised by socialists.”37
In a press conference the day of the act’s passage, Wallace called it “freedom legislation.”

It

would “free the school boards to carry on as they ordinarily would do” and would simply “bring into the
open what HEW has attempted to do in the dark.” He had introduced the bill as an instrument to
“protect the autonomy of our local school boards” and to “relieve [them] of the threats, the
intimidations, and the blackmail of quasi-secret agents of [HEW] who are attempting to buy or threaten
away the rights of our people.” Then, after the bill’s passage, he subtly warned the same local school
boards against traitorous behavior, saying “We in Alabama do not intend to sit idly by and let the
children of the state be sold for 30 pieces of silver.” There would be no penalty for signing Guidelines
agreements, but the governor said that he assumed local officials would “obey the [new state] law.”
Within a week, he had ordered school boards to renege on singed agreements and to reassign teachers
and students transferred as a result of Guidelines-based desegregation plans. “Any assignment of
teachers or students based on the guidelines is a violation of public safety,” Wallace declared, and such
assignments should be reversed “forthwith in those cases where other than ordinary assignments have
been made.”38
Wallace specifically mentioned Tuscaloosa, where 2,000 white parents had signed a petition
seeking the removal of two black teachers assigned to white schools. The pressure exerted on the
Tuscaloosa officials demonstrated just how far state officials would go to prevent faculty desegregation.
Klansmen had picketed the affected Tuscaloosa schools, and a group of whites had staged a march and
accused the school board of “selling out” to federal officials. The marchers carried signs reading “Down
with [local superintendent] Elliot” and “March with Wallace.” They told reporters that the school board
37
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had not “shown the Governor of Alabama and Legislature the courtesy of a common hobo by waiting for
a court decision.” Wallace and Meadows seized upon the local pressure and applied their own.
Meadows called the school board three times “recommending” that it reassign the teachers back to
black schools, because the assignment of black teachers to white schools was “against the law” and
contrary to the “public policy” of the State of Alabama. He had recently sent a release to all of the
state’s superintendents arguing that it was “obvious that for even a few school boards to agree to assign
teachers and/or pupils not required by Sections 604 and 401(b) [of the Civil Rights Act] jeopardizes all
other school systems because federal officials can say, ‘well, if a few do it, the others can do the same
thing.’” Wallace’s legal advisor, Hugh Maddox, also called the Tuscaloosa officials and urged them to
reassign the teachers, promising that the federal government could not really cut off federal funds to
the system. Meadows subsequently offered to award local systems, including Tuscaloosa, additional
teacher units so that they could provide alternative teachers for white students who were assigned
black teachers. Of course, in his remarks at the press conference, Wallace did not mention the
harassment of the Tuscaloosa officials by Meadows and Maddox, only that local whites demanded the
teachers’ removal.39
In the same press conference announcing the Anti-guidelines Act, Wallace also lambasted
continuing court-ordered desegregation. He mentioned his own son, who was attending a desegregated
school in Montgomery. “You might point out,” he told the press corps, “that the federal judge who
ordered all this put his child in a private school.” By “the” federal judge, he meant Frank Johnson, and
by “all this,” he meant the recent orders handed down in the Montgomery, Lowndes, and Macon County
cases, which called for faculty desegregation and black school closure in addition to freedom-of-choice
pupil desegregation. In a recent televised address, he had accused Johnson of acting with “swift
39
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vengeance” to destroy the Lowndes system, specifically. The governor had also asked for donations to
the Lowndes County Private School Foundation. The foundation was still trying to have Lowndes
Academy open for the fall, when blacks would be attending Hayneville High for the first time. Many
understood Wallace’s actions to be recklessly inviting a statewide desegregation order via the Lee v.
Macon case. Lurleen Wallace’s gubernatorial opponent Jim Martin often used this as a talking point in
his campaign. When a reporter broached the subject, Wallace said “nothing could be worse that what
they are doing now; HEW has desegregated all the schools as it is.” In reality HEW had done very little.
And reckless defiance of its policy was making it increasingly likely that an unprecedented court order
would supersede its efforts. Frank Johnson wrote to John Doar at the Justice Department in August and
advised him to have DOJ people on the ground for the opening of schools in Lowndes, Montgomery, and
Tuskegee. He told Doar he would not be surprised “if there were no white students attending
‘desegregated schools’ in Lowndes County that fall. In short,” he wrote, “I expect these three systems to
be used as political footballs in the governor’s race that is now taking place in this state.” Wallace was
calculating that the political yardage to be gained by continuing to encourage, facilitate, and now order
defiance was greater than that to be lost by risking a statewide order.40
In addition to passing the Anti-guidelines Bill that summer, the state legislature, Wallace, and
Meadows had all been pushing for the application of the state’s latest tuition grant bill. The bill had
been introduced the previous summer by longtime Citizens’ Councilor and state Senator Walter Givhan.
It had become law in September of 1965, at which time the legislature had also approved nearly $4
million in appropriations for the grants. The new law was intended to replace the 1957 tuition grant
law, the application of which had been enjoined by the court in the 1964 ruling in Lee v. Macon. In this
case, the racial purpose of the law had been removed from its face. Also, any connection to the closure
of local public schools was removed in light of the recent ruling in the Prince Edward County, Virginia
40
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case. By virtue of the new legislation, students were eligible for tuition grants anywhere “the parent or
guardian determines that the child’s attendance in the school to which he is assigned will be detrimental
to the physical or emotional health of the child or subject the child to hazards of public safety.” Grants
of $185 per student were, in effect, made available to any white students who wished to avoid
desegregating schools, particularly in majority or substantially black systems where private schools were
already established or being hastily set up. Tuition at most of the schools was around $20-$30. In
March of 1966, when the revised Guidelines were released, the state board of education adopted
regulations for administering the tuition grants to any student who was refused a placement transfer by
a local school board. The legislature later adjusted the law so that students could seek transfer to any
school in the state, even out of district, and apply for grants upon the rejection of their request.41
In July Wallace opened a special session of the legislature and, in a televised address, beseeched
whites to further support the private school movement. “I ask you tonight, there at home,” he said, “if
you will, get out a pencil and paper and write down this address as it flashes on your television screen.”
To this address, they could send donations to “help people in our state who are being forced to conduct
private schools because of the destruction of their public schools. . . . These people – these parents –
are fighting for their freedom too, a freedom that affects all of us, and I hope that you will join me in
helping those whose schools have been taken away from them. . . . We stood at the University of
Alabama,” he reminded them, “opposing the enemies of freedom . . . .” And they were using that stand
to “warn the people of this nation that if men in high places in Washington break the law of our nation,
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then every revolutionary, every thug who can assemble a mob, will feel that they, too, can break the
law.”42
Superintendent Meadows briefly expressed doubt as to the legality of approving grants for
students to attend racially exclusive schools, but he nonetheless began approving them that summer.
At the time, there were at least 11 post-Brown segregationist academies in the state, in addition to
several older private schools which were also racially exclusive. Montgomery Academy had been
established in 1959, when the Montgomery Improvement Association had threatened a suit to
desegregate the city’s schools. It enrolled over 400 students in 1966. Three smaller elementary-level
segregationist academies had since been opened in the city, enrolling nearly 400 more students among
them. St. James School in Montgomery, established immediately after Brown in 1955, also enrolled
several hundred students. Macon Academy in Tuskegee had been thriving since its opening in 1963, and
it enrolled nearly 400 that fall. Hoover Academy in Birmingham remained small but continued to
provide an escape for white students assigned to Graymont Elementary, which had been desegregated
by the Armstrong boys three years prior. And whites in Tuscaloosa had established a small school when
desegregation had been announced there the previous year.43
When several Black Belt county school systems were forced to desegregate in the fall of 1965,
whites in the affected counties had also set up private schools: including in Dallas (John T. Morgan
Academy), Hale (Southern Academy of Greensboro), Perry (Perry Christian School), Greene (Warrior
Academy), and Marengo (Marengo Academy). And in Lowndes, when efforts to intimidate blacks
seeking transfer to white schools failed, arch-segregationist and local engineer Ray Bass and a small
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group of white parents finally opened Lowndes Academy in an old recreation center in Hayneville. The
Tuskegee-style exodus Judge Johnson had predicted began shortly thereafter. Three of the five
members of the county school board were on the private school foundation board of trustees. All but a
dozen whites boycotted Hayneville High and enrolled in the new academy. The tremendously popular
football team – which had not lost a game in three years – even followed the Tuskegee example and left
with its coach for the new private school (the coach also donated a 10-acre site for the building of a new
school facility). Like a few other academy foundations, the Lowndes leadership remained wary of
accepting tuition grants, worried that it would nullify their “private” status. But by the opening of
schools in 1966, grants had been approved and paid to students at all but the Greene, Hale, Lowndes,
and Macon segregationist academies. Most segregationist academy founders were committed to
avoiding desegregation, regardless of the cost. As Bass explained about the Lowndes group, “We hope
[tuition grants] will be [available], but we’re not basing our plans on that. We’re not too optimistic
about it.” Lowndes’s parents would “have to make a sacrifice,” but they all felt it was “of the utmost
importance” to do so. “With desegregation like they’re taking about,” Bass said, “we don’t think we’ll
have the high standards of education we’ve had in the past.” So, he said, “We’re prepared to carry the
load ourselves.”44

Scrambled Eggs and Paul Bunyan’s Litigious Stick
Meanwhile, the number of black students in white schools increased substantially in many
systems across the state with the opening of schools in September of 1966. Under pressure from state
officials, a number of systems refused to provide racial attendance statistics, but HEW estimated that as
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many as 12,000 black students were in formerly all-white schools – a little over 4 percent of the state’s
total black student population. Seventeen of the state’s 118 school systems were under court order. Of
the rest, 52 were found not to be in compliance with HEW Guidelines. Two of those, Bibb County and
Tarrant City, had federal funds completely cut off. Three systems had federal funds deferred, and the
remaining 47 non-compliers were in the midst of the funds deferral process. All student desegregation
had been achieved through freedom of choice, meaning the burden to desegregate was still on black
families. Just over 1,000 teachers had been given desegregated assignments, although the vast majority
of these were white teachers assigned to black schools. Most systems continued to delay faculty
desegregation altogether, either encouraged by, or intimidated by, the Anti-guidelines legislation and
Wallace’s pressure campaign.45
Also working against faculty desegregation was Judge Johnson’s decision to allow Montgomery,
Bullock, Lowndes, and Macon to delay faculty desegregation until the following year. Johnson felt that
the desegregation of faculties ought to proceed immediately, especially since the Fifth Circuit’s Singleton
II decision had ordered as much in Mississippi. But the Justice Department’s appeal in the combined
Jefferson County cases (styled U.S. v. Jefferson) was pending before the appellate court, which was
considering a circuit-wide model decree based on the Guidelines. So Johnson deferred to “orderly
judicial procedure” and stayed his own orders pending the outcome of the Jefferson appeal. Other
school boards felt they could not go over and above what the court-ordered systems had been required
to do. Anything that appeared to be voluntary or over the absolute bare minimum risked incurring the
wrath of the local white citizenry. One Birmingham News columnist observed that the governor and
state legislature had “not acted alone” in their anti-guidelines fight, but had indeed had “substantial . . .
popular backing [from] the people in their actions.” There were times, he continued, when people were
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“ready to go to great expense and deprivation to make any manner of sacrifice for what they consider a
just cause.” The fight to preserve segregation was such a cause, he imagined, and “the people of
Alabama, for the most part, [were] that kind of people.” George Wallace knew this well.46
Local school officials expressed a mixture of frustration, exasperation, and anger at the pressure
from the courts and HEW on one side, and local whites and state officials on the other. Some happily
embraced the interference from the governor and the legislature. The attorney for the Crenshaw
County board, State Representative Alton Turner, wrote HEW’s general counsel and advised that any
contact that the department wished to make with the school board should go through the governor’s
legal advisor. Crenshaw was under federal court order but, like other such systems, was nonetheless
required to sign a Form 441-B. “Should the board still be faced with the asinine demand to file with
HEW an assurance [of compliance],” Turner wrote, “then I would advise them not to do so.” The
Crenshaw school board was comprised of “law abiding citizens” and therefore had “no choice but to
comply with this court order, but under no circumstances,” he continued, “would I advise them to
submit to this unlawful and unreasonable demand.” Turner – who at trial had tried to introduce
evidence that a number of the black students requesting transfer to white schools in Crenshaw were
illegitimate – told HEW that the board was “fed to the teeth with [its] unlawful attempt at social reform
. . . in the name of Education and under the guise of the Civil Rights Act.” Others were either relieved to
have someone to blame for their non-compliance or simply too intimidated to defy the state authorities,
particularly when most whites in their respective communities supported the state’s efforts. The

46

Statistical Summary of School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, 1966-1967 (Nashville:
Southern Education Reporting Service, 1966); School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, Sept., 1966;
Birmingham News, Aug. 28, 1966. See, for reports of student and faculty desegregation and, especially, antiguidelines legislation influence and political pressure, HEW-USOE Equal Educational Opportunity Program (EEOP)
Official Files, Telephone and Conference Records: Tuscaloosa City, Tuscaloosa County, Athens City, Sheffield City,
Sept. 7, 1966; Autauga County, Sept. 8, 1966; Oneonta City, Sept. 12, 1966; Phenix City, Sep. 13, 1966; Autauga
County, Sept. 16, 1966; Sylacauga City, Sept. 20, 1966; Brewton City, Sept. 26, 1966; Opp City, Sept. 8, 1966;
Calhoun County, Oct. 5, 1966; Cherokee County, Oct. 11, 1966; “Alabama School Districts which Have Experienced
Political Pressure and Influence”; all in NAACP Lee v. Macon Files: Background Information (Papers of the NAACP:
Supplement to Part 23, Series A, Section I, Reel 3).

409

superintendent of the Talladega County system wrote HEW to insist that his school board was not
“defying or resisting” the Guidelines, but that “the action of our legislature has made it very difficult for
school boards in Alabama to proceed with desegregation plans.” The Calhoun County superintendent
told the USOE that it stopped implementing its desegregation plan because it “felt that would be in
violation of state law, which is not a good thing.” One superintendent said the “situation [was] too
explosive.” Another said there was “too much opposition.”47
Most commonly, local officials revealed a sense that theirs was a terrible dilemma. In a letter to
HEW compliance officials following a meeting with investigator Gene Crowder, Butler County
Superintendent H.L. Terrell said his school board had planned to place one black teacher in a white
school that fall, but “due to these federal court orders and actions of our Governor and State
Legislature, [the] Board decided that it would not be expedient for us to assign at this time Negro
teachers to our all white schools.” He reminded the officials that “in Alabama, local boards of education
and superintendents of education exists [sic] solely at the disgression [sic] of the Governor and State
Legislature. As you can see,” he concluded, “our Board of Education is sort of caught between ‘the devil
and the deep.’”48
As local school boards settled into the business of administering the fall semester in such a
dilemma, the Justice Department, the state NAACP, and the NAACP-LDF began their anticipated legal
assault on the tuition grant and anti-guidelines legislation. The Civil Rights Division on August 31 moved
for leave to intervene as a plaintiff in Lee v. Macon and filed, at the same time, a supplemental
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complaint against the governor and state board of education. The complaint alleged what everyone
already knew to be the truth – that “the purpose and effect of the adoption and implementation of the
tuition grant program . . . is to provide a means by which the State of Alabama can use public funds and
official influence to perpetuate racially segregated education . . . .” The CRD asked the court to enjoin
the state authorities from paying tuition grants to students at segregationist academies. Shortly
thereafter, the Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches initiated its own suit against the governor,
the Governor’s Commission, the state board of education, Meadows, and various other state officials.
Birmingham attorneys Orzell Billingsley and Oscar Adams filed the suit and requested the convening of a
three-judge court to rule on the constitutionality of the anti-guidelines law and enjoin its
implementation. The head of the state NAACP, Birmingham dentist John Nixon, announced the suit,
styled NAACP v. Wallace, by telling reporters that Alabama was “so far out of step with national policy,
the NAACP [felt] that real resistance to Governor Wallace’s anti-guidelines legislation [could] best be
made through the courts.” To demonstrate the application of the legislation, Billingsley and Adams
named as defendants the Tuscaloosa County school board, which Meadows had attempted to pressure
into reassigning black teachers placed in white schools. Judge Elbert Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals named Judges Johnson, Richard Rives, and Virgil Pittman of Gadsden to the panel hearing the
case. The panel, in turn, ordered the United States into the case as a litigating amicus curiae.49
Days later, Fred Gray filed a motion for the plaintiffs in Lee v. Macon, seeking either a contempt
citation against Wallace or, in the alternative, an injunction against any enforcement of the Antiguidelines Act. The governor, as ex officio president of the state school board, had “used his influence,
control, and supervision over the public schools of the State of Alabama in a manner as to prevent and
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discourage the elimination of racial discrimination therein.” He and the state board clearly had failed,
then, to take affirmative action to dismantle the dual school system as the court had ordered in 1964.
Gray asked the court to again consider requiring the state officials to use their power and influence over
local school systems to “accomplish and effectuate total desegregation of all the public schools of the
State of Alabama by any and all possible means, including the withdrawal of state funds from school
districts which have not taken or are not now taking affirmative steps to effectively desegregate their
schools.”50
The editors at the Montgomery Advertiser expressed the feelings of many Wallace supporters
who had begun to break with the governor over his reckless political engineering. “As the suit snowballs
to federalize Alabama schools,” they wrote, “accommodating the death wish of Gov. Wallace and the
Legislature in the Anti-guidelines Bill, grief has replaced anger that the state would be so foolish. An
existing injunction [in Lee v. Macon] was primed and ready,” they continued, and the state had already
been “put on clear notice that a statewide school desegregation [order] would follow if the Governor
and state school officials did not stop interfering with local schools. It seems impossible to unscramble
that egg now.” Alabamians could only hope, then, “that the three-judge federal panel tempers justice
with more mercy than the state has asked for or has a reasonable right to expect.” The Birmingham
News concluded that Wallace had “led Alabama up a blind alley” and had “set in motion the type of
politico-legal circus in which he thrives.” He had given school systems “false hope.” Some systems
already engaged in litigation were figuring this out. The Crenshaw County, Barbour County, and
Choctaw County school boards, which had all limited their desegregation efforts after the passage of the
Anti-guidelines Bill, were hit with court orders that month demanding acceleration. These “piecemeal
court orders,” however, did not begin to “approximate a single [statewide] decree,” which the News
argued would be “the direct result of the anti-guidelines law which Wallace is using to flirt with a jail
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term to promote his own political future.” Remembering Wallace’s remark that the federal government
could keep its money and ‘knew what it could do with it,’ the Advertiser observed that this “[did] not
change, in any way, the liability of local districts to desegregation orders by the courts.” Brown was still
“the law of the land, like it or not,” and the “court stick” to HEW’s ‘arrogantly-wielded’ carrot of federal
funding was “Paul Bunyan size.”51
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CHAPTER 11: ‘SEGREGATION IS STILL A PERFECTLY GOOD WORD’: FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN PRACTICE,
LEE V. MACON ON TRIAL, 1966-67

“’Segregation’ is a perfectly good word. It has been practiced through the ages for good results
[and] used by people of the civilized world for man’s greatest advancement.” Thus began what might be
called a memorandum to all local superintendents of education issued by State Superintendent of
Education Austin Meadows in the summer of 1966. The state’s leading education official had teamed
with the governor to force local school boards to disregard the revised desegregation Guidelines of the
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). By the time of the memo’s release, HEW
enforcement staff, Department of Justice attorneys, the state NAACP, and the NAACP-LDF were carefully
documenting every move that the governor and the state superintendent made. While Meadows
thought he was simply penning an eloquent appeal to reason aimed at like-minded, white Alabama
schoolmen, he was also hastening a renewed legal challenge to segregated education on a statewide
basis. When Lee v. Macon County Board of Education came before the court for trial in the late fall of
1966, attorney Fred Gray was prepared to introduce the “segregation” missive into evidence and to
make Meadows look quite foolish in the process.1
On a balmy late November day, the second floor courtroom of the federal courthouse in
Montgomery was packed with reporters, school officials, and attorneys. A light breeze blew in through
the open windows and under the tall limestone arches which dominated the Depression-era chamber,
with its ornate, stenciled ceiling beams and high wooden gallery in the back. A long, straight wooden
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bench stretched in front of a massive, arched-stone niche, at the back of which was a blue wall dotted
with gold stars. Aloft on the bench sat the four judges hearing the combined Lee v. Macon and NAACP v.
Wallace cases: Judges Frank Johnson, Richard Rives, Hobart Grooms, and Virgil Pittman. In front of
them, facing the bench, sat attorneys for the defendant state and local officials, the plaintiffs, and the
United States. And in the middle of it all sat state Superintendent Meadows, on a simple wooden
witness stand below and in the center of the bench. Meadows was under injunction in Lee v. Macon
and was supposed to have been using his office to promote desegregation in the state’s public school
systems. The “segregation” memo indicated quite clearly and forcefully that he had been doing exactly
the opposite.2
Fred Gray chose his moment carefully. After questioning an equivocating Meadows for an hour,
Gray began to ask him about the discharge of his affirmative duty under the 1964 injunction. “Have
[you] recommended or encouraged any superintendent of education to abolish segregation in his
particular school system,” he asked. Meadows faltered and replied incoherently, ”No, I don’t remember
it, because I approach it from discrimination; nondiscrimination if that is necessary; I have told
Superintendents if this is necessary to not discriminate, to integrate pupils, and then you must follow
that and abide by that in your opinion, you should do it.” The state department of education had been
forced to surrender documents to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, so Gray asked, “Would any records in your
office show any affirmative act which you have done in the last year?” Meadows tried again to be
evasive. “Whatever they are, I have already furnished them to you,” he said. Gray asked, more
specifically, were there any releases to the state’s local superintendents in which he had encouraged or
promoted the elimination of dual school systems? “No,” Meadows replied, “I approach it from
2
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nondiscrimination.” Gray then offered the “segregation’ is a perfectly good word” release into
evidence. He asked Meadows pointedly, “Is it your understanding that by circulating that release to the
City and County Boards of Education, it would encourage them to segregate rather than to integrate?”
Meadows said no; it was “an editorial statement on the word ‘segregation.’” Gray began to question
the uncooperative Meadows about the document’s contents when presiding Judge Richard Rives
interrupted him, saying, “You might read the statement to us . . . if you will, Mr. Gray.”3
As Gray obliged and began to read the essay, Meadows chuckled. By the end of the reading,
however, the state superintendent was squirming uncomfortably in the witness stand, and it was the
panel of usually stern and decorous federal judges who were smiling and struggling to contain laughter.
Segregation was, Meadows had written, “the basic principle of culture,” whereby “the good join
together to separate themselves from the bad.” It was biblically sanctioned, for “the Lord set aside or
segregated fruit in the Garden of Eden from Adam and Eve.” Eve had destroyed this arrangement by
convincing Adam to eat the fruit, and “honest men and women,” he wrote, “have been obliged to work
for their living ever since.” From the witness stand, Meadows felt the need at this point to interject,
“That’s right.” Gray looked up briefly and then resumed. Marriage was “the highest type of
segregation,” without which “there would be no family unit.” It too was sanctioned by scripture.
Segregation was also “one of the principles of survival throughout the animal kingdom.” Animals joined
“their own kind to defend themselves by numbers against other animals that would destroy them
without such segregated bond. Birds of a feather truly flock together.”4 Gray continued as the judges
began to grin:

Wild geese fly across this continent in ‘V’ formation but they never join any other flock of birds.
Wild duck fly together and not with other birds. The wild eagle mates with another eagle and
not with any other bird. Red birds mate with red birds, the beautiful blue birds mate with other
3
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blue birds and so on through bird life. There can be segregation without immoral discrimination
against anyone. Integration of all human life and integration of all animal life would destroy
humanity and would destroy the animal kingdom.5

Beneath the surface of what Meadows described as an innocuous “editorial statement” were
the same age-old white hopes and fears. Desegregation was abhorrent to god. It would lead, without
question, to miscegenation, the emasculation of all white men, and the degradation of Western
civilization. If whites did not band together, especially in the cities and in the Black Belt, they would be
overwhelmed by blacks. But they could unite and defend segregation. They could do this, too, without
any moral qualms, provided they observed and maintained law and order. Who would not recognize as
much when the stakes were so high as the destruction of humanity? Meadows discerned that a “time of
reckoning” was coming in “this United States of America” on the “fundamental principles of segregation
and non-discrimination,” which he apparently still believed could “be [maintained] without destroying
segregation in its truest sense.” By that November he had to convince not only the state’s local
superintendents of this, but four federal judges deciding the fate of segregated education in the state of
Alabama. And they were laughing at him.6
When schools opened earlier that fall, the defiance and intimidation campaign undertaken by
Meadows, Governor George Wallace, and the state legislature had resulted in motions for further relief
in the Lee v. Macon case and in the initiation of the suit against the Wallace himself, NAACP v. Wallace.
Since there were “common questions of law and fact” in each, the respective judicial panels assigned to
both actions had combined them for the purposes of the November trial, resulting in the designation of
a four-judge court of sorts (really just two three-judge courts sitting together for the purpose of a
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hearing). Judges Johnson and Rives were already sitting on the three-judge panels in both cases, and
Judges Grooms and Pittman were each sitting on one of the two.7
The court in Lee v. Macon had denied a request for a contempt citation against Wallace because
he was a defendant in the case only in his capacity as ex officio president of the state school board, and
the supplemental complaint against him alleged acts committed in his capacity as governor. Also,
Johnson understood that a contempt citation would have played into the “politico-legal circus” which
Wallace had already created. Johnson believed that enforcing or expanding the existing injunction
would be a more sensible course of action, should the court side with the plaintiffs. But this matter still
had to be adjudicated anew, and both cases involved state interference: in Lee v. Macon, interference
with the 1964 order and defiance of the injunction; and in NAACP v. Wallace, interference with local
school boards’ compliance with HEW Guidelines. The court decided to withhold judgment on these
issues – and on the issuance of a potential statewide desegregation decree – until the combined hearing
on November 30, 1966, at which Gray forced Meadows to sit and listen to his own racist parable being
read before the court.8
As the fall semester drew to a close for students in schools across the state, all eyes were on this
unfolding courtroom drama and the developing federal-state showdown. At the same time, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals was considering a consolidated set of school desegregation case appeals from
black plaintiffs and the U.S. Justice Department. Among the decisions being appealed in light of the
issuance of the revised HEW Guidelines were those in the Jefferson County, Fairfield, and Bessemer
cases – all under the styling U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education. By the beginning of 1967, the
panels hearing Lee v. Macon and NAACP v. Wallace would be awaiting an en banc rehearing of the U.S.
7

Birmingham News, Oct. 1, 1966; Order of Oct. 13, 1966, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education and
NAACP v. Wallace, in NAACP Lee v. Macon Files: General Case Material, 1966 (Papers of the NAACP: Supplement to
Part 23, Reel 7); School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, SERS, Oct., Nov., 1966.
8
Birmingham News, Oct. 1, 1966; Order of Oct. 13, 1966, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education and
NAACP v. Wallace, in NAACP Lee v. Macon Files: General Case Material, 1966 (Papers of the NAACP: Supplement to
Part 23, Reel 7); School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, SERS, Oct., Nov., 1966.

418

v. Jefferson appeals, as a statewide desegregation order and the freedom-of-choice method of
desegregation itself hung in the balance.

The Freedom-of-Choice Experience in 1966-67
Meanwhile, in each community, white and black students, their families, teachers, and
administrators dealt with the realities of desegregation in the classroom that fall. They had no part in
formulating court orders, signing HEW compliance forms, drafting anti-guidelines legislation, or
developing school board desegregation plans, but all of these documents informed their daily lives.
Freedom-of-choice desegregation had become a reality in nearly every school system in the state by the
fall of 1966. For the estimated 7,000 or so black students around the state of Alabama who had elected
to transfer to white schools in 1966-67, it was a varied experience.9 Many of them were interviewed
about their experiences for a 1967 study sponsored by the Council on Human Relations. The results
showed that students found everything from cautious friendship to outright hostility, inspiration to
disillusionment, hope to despair, reward to regret.10
Relationships with white teachers were often especially problematic. Some black students
reported that their white teachers were “real nice” to them and often reprimanded white students for
harassing them. But interracial student-teacher interactions were just as often fraught with
misunderstanding and, in some cases, resentment and aggression. Many black students had been
unaccustomed, for example, to replying to teachers using “yes, ma’am” and “no ma’am,” and some
9
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found that white teachers reacted to this oversight with incredulity. Said one student, “It seemed as if
all [the teacher] did the whole time was to just wait for us to say ‘yes’ so she could make a big thing out
of it. . . . She got fed up because I got tired of her trying to make me say ‘yes, ma’am,’ and I started
saying, ‘I think so’ . . . .” Some teachers tolerated belligerent white student behavior towards black
students and, occasionally, colluded with these students themselves. “Some of the teachers will try to
be funny,” one student said, “when they get to a word like ‘Negro,’ they call it Nigger or else try to make
it fun.” Another reported that their teacher divided up the classroom everyday into black and white
sections and made a point to assign black students to older lab equipment. One teacher was reported
to have interjected her opinion anytime civil rights came up, saying things like, “’In a little time our
freedom will be gone.’” One girl explained that “there were always conversations going on between the
teacher and the students,” and “the teacher was always saying some kind of wise crack [and] praising
the governor.” Other petty intimidations included calling on black students only when their hands were
not raised and ignoring them when their hands were raised, and encouraging white students to call on
black students with difficulty reading to read aloud.11
Some black students insisted that their relationship with white students was “not entirely a
hostile one.” One black girl claimed that white girls would “call the white boys down” about bothering
her, for example. But black students continued to report a wide array of persistent intimidation and
harassment from their white classmates, not unlike that endured by the first students to desegregate
white schools in 1963. Two black ninth graders in Wilcox County withdrew from Wilcox County High
after being ambushed in the hallway and assaulted. It was not the first time. One of the students had
already been “jumped” by a gang of four white boys in the bathroom. “I’m tired of getting’ hit,” he said,
especially since “nothin’ ever done about any of it.” Elementary students in Wilcox endured similar
physical attacks. White children in another county repeatedly threatened black students with BB guns.
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White students elsewhere encouraged their classmates to injure black students at recess and pelted
black students with rocks and crayons in class. A black student at Washington County’s Leroy High was
beaten to the point of hospitalization. One black students in a Choctaw County white school received a
typewritten message on the school bus, which read “YOU AND YOURS SISTER ARE GOING TO GET THE
HELL BEAT OUT OF YOU AND YOURS SISTER UNLESS YOU AND YOUR SISTER STOP COMMING TO
SCHOOL. Go to your on negere schools [sic].”12
Often white students made a show of avoiding any contact or close proximity to black students.
In one school, a student-written play called for three characters to embrace their respective nieces;
upon realizing that black girls would be playing the white nieces, the white boys playing the uncles
refused follow through, and the scene was called off. “Sometimes we were going down the hall,” one
student recalled, “and if any white students was standing in the hall and they see us coming they say
‘here come a black Nigger, you better stand back’ or something. They would get back against the wall.”
Being called “Nigger” was far and away the most common harassment that the students had to endure.
“You got used to things [like that] written on the bathroom wall,” one girl remembered. One boy
recalled not knowing how he would react to the insult. “I couldn’t tell anybody I wouldn’t hit anybody
when they called me Nigger,” he said, “but after I got over there and I had been called a Nigger about a
thousand times during the first six-week period I’d [still] feel a burning inside. And after the third sixweek period, I’d get over this burning inside.” Often black students recognized that this sort of behavior
was encouraged and instilled by white parents. “For the most part,” one girl said, those children over
there want to be friendly, some of them do, but their parents tell them what to do and what not to do
and all.” Others attributed much to peer pressure. “You can tell some of them want to say something
[friendly] to you,” a girl observed, “but they are scared that if they say something to you, then the other
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one is going to call them ‘Nigger lover’ and all that kind of junk.” Added another, “They all seem to be
afraid of what someone else might think; they can’t even think for themselves.”13
Desegregation often shattered preconceived notions for black students. Expectations about
white students, in particular, were disappointed. “Some people think that white people are higher class
than Negroes,” one girl reported, “but from the way the children behave, they are lower class people
than the Negro.” Another said “I was really surprised as I went to the white school. They say, ‘oh, the
Negroes are so dumb,’ but I really found out that the Negroes are not really dumb at all. . . . I was kind
of backward on some subjects,” he remembered, “like math, because the only time I took that was in
the seventh grade, and I had a hard time with math. But in all my other subjects, I caught up with most
of the white children and passed them in the first six weeks.” One student said that she’d grown up
thinking that “the white person was just smarter than we are . . . born smarter just because they were
white, but I found out that this isn’t true. . . . I think that maybe the reason we think we aren’t as smart
as they are” she said, “is because they’ve made us feel like we don’t know anything.” Another said that
whites had made blacks feel inferior “because they always keep us in jobs like in the kitchen or in the
yard or on the farm. They never have made us feel like we should be anything,” he added.14
All black students who transferred on freedom of choice had to endure certain sacrifices, among
which were the inability to participate in most extracurricular activities and the loss or certain other
opportunities. One student who transferred had friends who approached him and said that they would
like to come to the white school, but they would prefer to also play basketball, and that was not possible
for them there. A student named Jimmie Doctrie from the small east Alabama city of Opelika revealed
the depths of sacrifice for many when he tried to change his choice of a white high school back to the
city’s black high school just before the start of fall classes. Doctrie was president of the student council,
president of his class, and a member of number of different student organizations – none of which he
13
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had a chance of participating in at the white school. His mother eventually prevailed upon him to
change his choice at the last moment, arguing that “he really did not realize what he was doing.” But it
was too late. Another girl, Phyllis Mills, also tried to change her choice of formerly all-white Opelika
High School back to the black high school, Darden. She had been top of her class and could have been
valedictorian at Darden. She was also hopeful of receiving academic scholarships to college based on
her stellar grade point average. Her parents felt that at Opelika she “might not get everything [she]
could qualify for” at Darden and were thus “totally against it.” After discussing it with them at length,
she professed to have “made a haphazard decision” without studying “all of the evidence.” Mills and
Doctrie both appealed to the city school board and directly to Judge Frank Johnson. Neither was
allowed to alter their choice and spent the year at Opelika High.15
While adjusting to everyday life in white schools – new teachers, friends, enemies,
opportunities, sacrifices – black students who transferred on freedom of choice often had to go back to
their respective black communities and justify their choices. One girl remembered, “We had to deal
with a lot of criticism, because they just didn’t feel like this was something that needed to have been
done. It was not easy,” she said, “especially being ten or eleven years old, and you’ve got to deal with
that.” Another girl said she “noticed that some of the kids at the Negro school would say that we were
stuck up. . . . They are the first to say that you won’t speak to them anymore,” she added, “but they
won’t give you a chance. They turn away or make some snide remark,” like, “’You think you are so big
or so important that you can’t be around your old friends anymore.’” Another girl heard, “’You think
you are so good because you go to an integrated school.’” Another said a friend assumed that “just
because I went to the white school . . . that we were ‘big Niggers” . . . and had a lot of money.” With or
without the criticism, there was always additional scrutiny, one girl added, because friends and
neighbors “wanted to see if [we] could even compete academically” with white students. Another girl
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said she was intimidated by fellow blacks who said that “the white school wasn’t any better than the
Negro school” and that she “was just trying to be popular.” Some blacks believed that desegregating
the schools was unnecessary, telling transferring students they were not “ready to be with the white
people yet.” Fear undoubtedly influenced some of these discouragements. “They said that our house
was going to be burned and the Ku Klux Klan was going to get us and lots of people was going to get
killed,” a girl said. Then “our house did get burned, and when it did people said, ‘That’s what I told you
was going to happen.’” One student argued that many of these critical people actually supported
desegregation in principle, but they were scared and “waiting for somebody else to do it.” These
people, he said, “did not realize that those who first went down had to sacrifice.”16

Do You Know Alabama?
Transferring black students were often impressed by the quality and novelty of the textbooks
that they were given in white schools. But their full exposure to some of these books’ content was a
painful reminder of the endurance of institutionalized white supremacy. In the black schools, many
students simply went without their own texts. As one student recalled, parents who could afford it
could buy books for their children from local bookstores, but she said, “Other than that, there were only
the always-outdated volumes provided by the school system. When we integrated, that problem left,”
she explained, “We had workbooks per child, individual books, art supplies; everybody got what they
needed.” In the case of at least one widely-used history textbook, however, pleasant surprise gave way
to disgust. The Know Alabama fourth grade textbook was used in nearly every white elementary school
in the state. Its chief writer was Auburn University graduate and influential Vanderbilt University and
University of Alabama historian, Dr. Frank Owsley. Owsley once described freedmen as “half-savage
blacks” who could “still remember the taste of human flesh” because “the bulk” of them were “hardly
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three generations removed from cannibalism.” Published a year after Owsley’s death in 1957, Know
Alabama represented a disturbing exposition of the Lost Cause mythology, an apology for white
supremacy, and a not-so-subtle indictment of the civil rights movement and the federal government’s
support thereof. From its idyllic and paternalistic representation of white family life on the antebellum
plantation; to its presentation of slaves as docile, content, and ignorant; to its argument that
Reconstruction was an abhorrent mistake; and finally its depiction of the Ku Klux Klan as the benevolent
savior of southern society, Know Alabama explained the state’s history as whites wanted to imagine it.17
The textbook described plantation life as “one of the happiest ways of life in Alabama before the
War Between the States.” The life that “plantation owners made for themselves” had “lived on in song
and story to become part of the history of the Old South.” The planters, it read, raised cotton “with
Negro slaves to help do the work.” The book invited white students to imagine living on such a
plantation, where they might awaken to run down and eat breakfast served by “the Negro cook whom
you call ‘Mammy,’” and whom “you have known . . . all your life and love . . . very much.” The day
proceeds with the student-imaginer riding the fields with his father on horseback. “In those days of
slavery,” it read, “the plantation owners had many slaves,” and “most of them were treated kindly. . . .
There were a few masters who did not treat their slaves kindly,” of course, but “the first thing any good
master thought about was the care of his slaves.” This was supposedly true of the mistresses, too.
“Many nights you have gone with your mother to the “quarters” where [your mother] cared for some
sick person,” the book suggested, “She is the best friend the Negroes have, and they know it.” As the
child rides by the slaves working in the fields, they stop working to say hello, but only long enough to tip
17
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their hats. “You like the friendly way they speak and smile,” it read, “They show bright rows of white
teeth.” One slave named Sam tells “’Marse Tom’” that the slaves have “’mes more cotton than [they]
can pick,’” then “chuckles to himself” and goes back to work, “picking as fast as he can.” The child later
plays “Indian” with his siblings and is joined by a Negro boy named “Jig,” who “got his name because he
dances so well when the Negros play their banjos.” Jig asks to play a game, and the child agrees but
insist that Jig be the Indian. Jig “goes off gladly to be the Indian, to hide and to get himself captured.”18
Know Alabama’s depictions of the “War Between the States” and its aftermath were equally
romanticized and disturbing. Slavery was “only one of the causes of the War Between the States,” and
“the Southern states had a right under the law to leave the United States.” The South lost the war only
because “the North had more men, guns, and more food,” and after four years “this ‘more’ of
everything finally caused the South to lose.” Northern troops marauded the Tennessee River Valley in
northern Alabama “burning crops, taking things that did not belong to them, and killing Southern men,”
while “old men, women, and children had a hard time” doing anything about it. The history of
Reconstruction in the textbook was particularly illuminating, as it was clearly intended to inform
students’ contemporary sensibilities. For example, the leader of the Freedmen’s Bureau was “sent by
the people in Washington who did not want things to be easy for the South.” Most such
“carpetbaggers” were “not honest men, and they came to steal and cheat people,” aided by “scalawags”
who had “turned against their own people in the South.” Under “terrible carpetbagger rule,” these
people tried “to turn the Negroes against the white people” and used the Freedmen’s Bureau to “make
promises that were not true to Negroes,” including the delivery of forty acres and mule. Most blacks
who voted could not read “and did not know what they were voting for,” so Alabama’s subsequent
government was “a poor kind” and really “no real government at all.” The legislature “was made up of
carpetbaggers, scalawags, and Negroes,” with the latter being, by implication, as bad as the former two.

18

Owsley, et al., Know Alabama, pp. 93-98.

426

The blacks were “nearly all field workers” who were illiterate and, therefore, “did not know what it
meant to run a government.” Most of the laws passed were “not for the good of the people” and were
intended only for the carpetbaggers “to get something for themselves.” The legislature even “had a
hard time finding a man who could write well enough to keep a record of the meetings.”19
The coup de grace of Know Alabama’s first half, and indeed of Southern whites’ understanding
of their early history, was the Redemption of the South. “The loyal white men of the South,” it read,
“saw that they could not depend on the laws or the state government to protect their families,” so they
recognized that they, themselves, “had to do something to bring back law and order” and to “get the
government back into the hands of honest men who knew how to run it.” According to the textbook, “it
happened that at this time a band of white-robed figures appeared” and “rode through the towns like
ghosts and then disappeared.” The Ku Klux Klan “did not ride often, only when it had to.” Such it was
that “whenever some bad thing was done by a person who though the ‘carpetbag’ law would protect
him, the white-robed Klan would appear on the streets” and “go to the person who had done the wrong
and leave a warning. Sometimes,” it continued, “this warning was enough, but if the person kept doing
the bad, lawless things the Klan came back again.” The Klan subsequently would hold a “court” in “the
dark forest at night,” where they “passed sentence on the criminals and they carried out the sentence,”
which “sometimes . . . would be to leave the state.” It did not say what the sentence was in the
alternative. Eventually, the Klan “struck fear in the hearts of the ‘carpetbaggers’ and other lawless men
who had taken control of the state,” and “many of the ‘carpetbaggers’ went back North,” upon which
“the Negroes who had been fooled by the false promises of the ‘carpetbaggers’ decided to get
themselves jobs and settle down to make an honest living.” The blacks had only “lately been freed from
slavery” and “had no education,” but they “knew who their friends were. The Southern white men who
had been good to them in the time of their slavery were still their friends.” When the Democrats were
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able to run the last of the carpetbaggers out of the government, “law and order were restored,” and
“there was no more need for the Ku Klux Klan.”20
Thus were white children in schools across Alabama indoctrinated with the history of the Lost
Cause and the value of “law and order.” Owsley himself had intended as much. He once described the
“purpose of [his] life," as undermining the great “Northern myth” of the Old South. He sought to do this
by influencing fellow historians, who would then "teach history classes and write textbooks and . . .
gradually and without their knowledge be forced into our position." By the end of his career, he had
evidently moved on to simply writing the textbooks himself. Know Alabama was the only fourth-grade
history textbook approved by the Alabama Department of Education and was, therefore, required
reading in white and black schools alike, technically. But black teachers could supplement or simply pass
over the objectionable sections, if they bothered to teach the book at all. When black students began
entering the classrooms of white teachers, though, they and their parents discovered the highly
distorted image of southern history which was being taught in the white schools. It was hardly
surprising; they understood that this was how many whites continued to construe the history of the
state, and that this directly informed the way that they interpreted the present political situation. It was
particularly disturbing, though, for black children to have to read these passages aloud in a classroom
full of white children. Even in other grades with different texts – some of which were nearly as
grotesque as Know Alabama – students were exposed to the same distortions and presentist political
applications.21 As one high school student remembered, “in history classes it was very bad.” The
teacher was constantly talking with the white students about “the Governor and integration and the
President and the federal government and all such that. They were talking against the federal
government because the government was for integration and the like,” she recalled, “they were talking
against integration because they don’t see any sense to it.” Another student explained that “in history
20
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[class], you see, we have about a week to study one subject, but the teacher sit up there and talk about
integration for four days. Then on Friday she come up and give one big whole week lesson and have us
get that and have a test on it that Monday.”22
Across the South, there were plenty of textbooks like Know Alabama, whose salacious
misrepresentations were being simultaneously uncovered by blacks in white schools. That fall the U.S.
House Subcommittee on Education began looking into “the problem of racially distorted schoolbooks.”
HEW, however, declined to take action, preferring to “encourage voluntary action.” In at least one case,
the Alabama Council on Human Relations (ACHR) chapter in Muscle Shoals, in northwest Alabama,
complained to the local school board in January, 1967 about the Know Alabama text, and certain
sections were removed and supplemented. In most cases, however, voluntary school board action
never came. State-level action was certainly not quickly forthcoming. The state textbook review
committee counted among its members a Montgomery minister known as “The High Priest of
Segregation” as well as a known associate of the Citizens Council and the John Birch Society. The
committee was more concerned with rooting out “communist” literature, like Catcher in the Rye – which
it recommended be removed from state college readings lists – and the history textbook Under
Freedom’s Banner – which contained references to “known communists” like Langston Hughes and Jane
Addams. Not until the mid-1970s did school systems begin phasing out Know Alabama and similar
books, even as the state superintendent continued to defend them. At that point, some school boards
simply stopped buying new editions of the book, while the older editions continued to circulate. Even
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this modest adjustment came about only after parents and representatives of the NAACP and ACHR
complained repeatedly to state and local school authorities, to HEW, and to the courts.23
Meanwhile, in the fall of 1966, Governor Wallace and other state officials were able to
incorporate HEW statements regarding such textbooks into their anti-guidelines talking points. In early
November, just before the Lee v. Macon trial, Wallace gave an exclusive interview to the organ of the
national Citizens’ Council, based in neighboring Mississippi. In typically hyperbolic form, he argued that
under the “so-called ‘guidelines,’” HEW could “change the instructional materials used in a school if they
consider them inferior, which means that Commissioner of Education Harold Howe is going to be in
complete charge of what is taught your children and my children. The other day [Howe] said in a
speech,” Wallace continued, “that we are using ‘distorted’ books in the South, which means the HEW
bureaucrats are going to determine what books will be used in the school system.” Wallace maintained
that the Guidelines were part of an HEW conspiracy to “destroy the public school system as we have
known it, and take over every right and vestige of the states, and to completely capture your child.” It
was HEW which was “trifling with the health and the safety and the security of the minds of our
children.” But the Guidelines, Wallace said, were “not the law,” and he did “not believe any such
‘guidelines’ [would] ever stand any test. We passed this law in Alabama,” he added, “it’s now being
attacked by the NAACP, but we felt that we could bring [the conspiracy] out into the open” to “prevent a
complete takeover of the school system before the people knew about it.” By the fall of 1966, Wallace
actually wanted to take the Guidelines fight into the court, where his defiance would gain maximum him
exposure.24
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The Lee v. Macon and NAACP v. Wallace Trial
That November the general election for governor was held. As some of the state’s newspapers
described it, voters were “hypnotized” and whipped into a “general psychosis” by George Wallace. They
overwhelmingly elected his wife, Lurleen, and thereby inaugurated what has been described as four
years of “political ventriloquism.” Mrs. Wallace defeated Republican Jim Martin, 538,000 votes to
250,000. Martin had campaigned on a strong but smart defense of segregation, characterizing George
Wallace’s own defense of the same as defeatist. He won only two of the state’s 67 counties. Since
Martin was as committed to segregation as his opponent, many blacks voted for Wallace by default. A
straight Democratic ticket at least allowed them to vote for the several blacks in various cities and
counties who had won their primaries. The Republican surge that had begun to show in the last election
had temporarily receded. Alabama’s white voters – particularly the lower class and the rural – had been
mesmerized by Wallace’s brazen defiance of the courts, DOJ, HEW, and the NAACP. The Democratic
Party in Alabama, in general, was the beneficiary. Martin’s accusations of recklessness in the Wallace
Administration’s anti-guidelines policy probably only enhanced Wallace’s heroic image in the minds of
these segregationists.25
Later that month, many Wallace voters could applaud as the defendant state officials in Lee v.
Macon and NAACP v. Wallace submitted their answers to the respective complaints in those cases. The
defendants collectively and categorically denied all claims made by the plaintiffs and motioned for
dismissal of the complaints. But this was not all. They filed a cross-claim against the United States –
then an intervening plaintiff in both cases – alleging that under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act, the 1966
HEW Guidelines and Form 441-B were unconstitutional. If the court had accepted it, this would have
had the effect of impleading the U.S. as a “third party defendant.” But the cross-claim was “erroneously
characterized,” insofar as the U.S. was entitled to sovereign immunity and could not be sued as such.
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The validity of the Guidelines was clearly at issue, however. DOJ attorneys were prepared to litigate the
issue, so they waived any formal objections to the claim’s mischaracterization or to its “lack of
timeliness” and consented to the naming of Commissioner of Education Harold Howe and HEW
Secretary John Gardner as parties defendant for this purpose. At the same time, the plaintiffs in Lee v.
Macon filed a motion to add Wallace as a party defendant in the case in his capacity as governor. Fred
Gray filed the motion along with a motion for a preliminary injunction against the governor. Gray asked
the court to prevent the governor from implementing the Anti-guidelines Bill. He also asked that the
court force Wallace to use the power of his office to facilitate – rather than frustrate – school
desegregation on a statewide basis. Wallace answered by denying that he had made any attempts to
interfere with local school boards; by claiming that any actions he had taken or statements he had made
had been solely in relation to the “unlawfully, arbitrarily, and capriciously applied” Guidelines; and by
claiming that ordering injunctive relief against him as governor would constitute “judicial
encroachment” and a violation of the separation of powers clauses of the state and U.S. constitutions.26
When the hearing finally convened on November 30, the issues before the four judges included:
the constitutionality of both the Alabama Anti-guidelines Act and the tuition grant law; the
constitutionality of the revised HEW Guidelines, themselves; the question of whether the defendant
state officials – including Wallace as governor – had demonstrated control over local school systems;
and the question of whether those officials ought to be not simply enjoined from interference in school
desegregation statewide, but ordered to actually effectuate school desegregation on a statewide basis.
Finally, there was the question of how the defendant state officials might be ordered to achieve the
latter. In addition to their standing obligation to “promote and encourage” statewide desegregation,
26
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they could be ordered to withhold state funds from segregating districts. Or they could be ordered to
utilize many of the other controls which they allegedly wielded, including the approval of transportation
plans, construction plans, architects, textbooks, and curricula, the closure or consolidation of various
schools, the allotment of teacher units for the hiring of faculty, and the assignment and reassignment of
teachers.27
Fred Gray represented the plaintiffs, along with Melvyn Zarr and Henry Aronson from the
NAACP-LDF. The Civil Rights Division’s St. John Barrett led the team representing the United States,
along with the CRD’s Brian Landsberg, HEW’s Albert Hamlin, and as a formality, the U.S. Attorney for
Alabama’s Middle District, Ben Hardeman. Barrett’s group represented the U.S. as plaintiffs and
Commissioner Howe and Secretary Gardner as impleaded defendants. Birmingham’s Orzell Billingsley
and Oscar Adams represented the Alabama NAACP, joined by Joan Franklin from the NAACP’s New York
office and Howard University law professor Frank Reeves, a veteran of the NAACP’s trial of the Brown v.
Board cases. Assistant state Attorney General Gordon Madison appeared for the Macon County Board
of Education, and his son-in-law, Tuscaloosa attorney Martin Ray, represented the Tuscaloosa City and
County Boards of Education. The defendant state officials were represented by Montgomery attorney
Maury Smith and the governor’s personal legal advisor, Hugh Maddox. Also representing Wallace was
Mississippi’s John Satterfield, a former state legislator who had worked closely with the Mississippi
Citizens Council and who had represented his state’s Sovereignty Commission. Satterfield had also
defended Governor Ross Barnett in the case evolving from the attempted enrollment of James Meredith
at the University of Mississippi. Time magazine would later refer to him as “the most prominent
segregationist lawyer in the country.” It was a courtroom full of attorneys, and it was a microcosm of
the decades-long legal struggle over segregation.28
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Entering the actual trial, the Department of Justice had already deposed dozens of local
superintendents across the state, as well as several state officials, Commissioner Howe, and USOE
investigator Gene Crowder. The DOJ attorneys spent weeks traveling the state and conducting the
depositions. The U.S. was trying to establish that local school systems were still dual in nature and that
the state school board had used its power over them to perpetuate the duality. State control allegedly
included the allocation of state funding through construction bond issues, through the allocation of
teacher units, the approval of building projects, and the mandatory consolidation of schools. The state
had for decades conducted annual system-wide school surveys, which ironically proved invaluable for
the plaintiffs in demonstrating both duality and state control. In addition to labeling all schools either
“Negro” or “white,” the surveys designated each existing school plant as either satisfactory, in need of
repair, or in need of closure. In some cases, the state surveyors recommended plans for consolidation
when certain schools were slated to be shut down, and suggested in other cases which potential sites
would be most suitable for building new facilities. Of course, no consolidation across racial lines was
ever suggested, and no new school was ever proposed to consist of members of both races.29
The DOJ attorneys also wanted to show that each of these superintendents and their respective
school boards had initially cooperated with HEW officials until Wallace and Meadows began harassing
and intimidating them through their various telephone calls, telegrams, letters, and mandatory
meetings. They were particularly interested in the various meetings – at which Meadows had
repeatedly urged the local officials to defy the federal authorities and Wallace had threatened to hold
community mass meetings to intimidate them. This got particularly awkward when the U.S. attorneys
prodded the schoolmen about state harassment involving Wallace’s legal advisor, Maddox, who was
Satterfield/American Bar Association Collection, University of Mississippi J.D. Williams Library, Special Collections
and Archives, accessed online at http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/general_library/archives, Jan. 22, 2013.
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often present as defense counsel. Maddox and the state officials’ other attorneys tried to paint every
action by the state as merely suggestive and tried to establish that the local school officials were,
themselves, ultimately the sovereign decision makers. The school surveys, for example, were made only
upon the request of local school boards and, in the words of one angry superintendent, did not “have a
thing in the world . . . to do with [the U.S.’s] case.”30
Typically these depositions proceeded with a careful and lengthy direct examination by the Civil
Rights Division attorneys. Most superintendents were cooperative and forthcoming, revealing minimal
efforts to comply with federal law, heavy pressure from state officials not to go “beyond the law,” and
similarly heavy pressure from their respective white communities. Most had their own counsel present,
but this did not deter some from speaking frankly and openly. J.R. Snellgrove of the south Alabama
Wiregrass’s Enterprise city system certainly did not let the formality of the proceedings temper his
candor. In describing the demographics of his city, Snellgrove indicated, “We have three sections of the
nigger race in Enterprise.” Asked to summarize the demographics of the schools in the system,
Snellgrove continued, “Holly Hill doesn’t have anything except white people. There is not a nigger that
lives over in that section of the community. . . . I believe we have at this time ten niggers in the Hillcrest
Elementary there.” He listed further, “College Street Elementary, 565 whites and 26 niggers. That’s an
elementary school, one through six. Enterprise Junior High School, that’s seventh and eighth grade, 535
whites and fifteen niggers. Enterprise High School is 912 whites and ten niggers. Coppinville High
School, 389 niggers, that’s seven through twelve.” Like many others, Enterprise had only two full-time
teachers in desegregated assignments. Snellgrove explained that at Enterprise High, there were “thirtyfive white teachers, full time teachers, one nigger, full time teacher, and then one part time . . . .” At allblack Coppinville, he said, “We have full time one white teacher, eighteen full time niggers and one part
30
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time white teacher.” He almost forgot, “Plus we have a guidance counselor over there. Of course, she is
nigger . . . .” Many of the state’s local education leaders were more tactful, at least, but Snellgrove was
not an anomaly.31
Having deposed the local superintendents prior to the trial, none of the plaintiffs’ counsel saw
any need to call them to testify when the actual trial began. Fred Gray thus began the proceedings by
calling Austin Meadows. From the beginning, it was a tense and unlikely exchange. Gray introduced a
statement Meadows had made months earlier, in which the state superintendent had lauded Alabama’s
equalization program. Meadows had pointed out that “through out-of-state aid, the minority group has
been able to attend colleges that have been superior to colleges in the state of Alabama in the past.”
Gray asked if the state still provided these grants, which it did. What was the purpose of the program,
he asked? Meadows replied that it was designed to “give [Negroes] college advantages that they . . . are
not able to get in the state of Alabama.” It had been in existence since 1945. Meadows added, “I
approved a grant for out-of-state aid for you to study law.” It was true. Meadows had been state
superintendent when Gray was a young graduate of Alabama State College for Negroes, bound for Case
Western Reserve School of Law, since no law schools in Alabama would accept a black person. Now
Meadows was seated before the already accomplished Gray, forced to recount his many interferences
with the lawful operation of local school systems in Alabama.32
Meadows was consistently evasive but was forced to admit to having urged non-compliance at
the statewide superintendents’ meetings. He also had a hard time explaining away the many telegrams
and letters he had sent to local school officials. The most egregious was the “segregation is a perfectly
good word” memo to all local superintendents which Gray read in its entirety to the grinning federal
panel. In addition to that, there was a letter urging the Lauderdale school board to reconsider its 12-
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grade desegregation plan. There was also a letter to Tuscaloosa County officials, in which Meadows
offered to assign two new teacher units to the system so that the school board could offer white
students a choice between white and black teachers. Meadows had also offered to have the
department of education’s building authority (consisting of himself, Wallace, and a Wallace crony)
approve two additional classrooms for Tuscaloosa County as well. He acknowledged making a statewide
offer to do the same for any school systems faced with having to assign black teachers to white schools.
Perhaps most damaging of all was a reply which Meadows had sent to a woman from Holt, Alabama, a
suburb of the city of Tuscaloosa. Gray forced the state superintendent to read from the letter: “A strong
stand by people like you will help to prevent assignment of Negro teachers to white schools and
percentage or quota assignments of pupils from a school of one race to a school of another race.
Meadows continued, “I am sorry that your School Board has not followed the recommendation which I
made . . . to all County and City Superintendents of Education in Alabama.” The few school systems who
had signed compliance agreements had “jeopardized the other school systems,” because HEW had been
emboldened into thinking that other systems could subsequently be “browbeaten into doing likewise.”
If only “all school boards had followed [my] recommendation,” he lamented, “we would be better off.”33
The state superintendent was visibly annoyed by Gray’s insistent and pointed questioning. He
occasionally propped his feet up in the witness stand and scratched his nose with his tie, and he often
stared up at the ornately deigned wooden ceiling as he replied simply “yep” and “yeah” to Gray’s
questioning. Finally, Gray got Meadows to at least reluctantly admit that his office had done nothing to
promote or encourage the elimination of dual school systems, and that he, himself, had some
discretionary power over state funding. He introduced telegrams which Meadows had sent to local
school boards threatening to withhold state funds if the systems did not respond to an earlier request to
report on their Form 441-B status. Meadows was requiring the reports, ostensibly, so that he could
33
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determine which school systems to shake down. In court he tried to defend the telegrammed threats by
claiming, “School Board has to turn in a budget before we can allocate money.” Gray asked him to
clarify, “Now the report you are referring to there is what action they had taken with respect to HEW
Guidelines . . . the execution of Form 441-B?” Meadows said, “Well, that’s right.”34
The U.S.’s case was largely supported by the many depositions it had taken and by the state
department of education documents it had obtained in discovery. There were few witnesses to call. St.
John Barrett did call the department of education’s finance and administration director, George Leslie
Layton, who tried to avoid admitting that the state authorities encouraged the maintenance of dual
school systems. Barrett was trying to establish that the many annual school surveys conducted by the
department indicated as much. He was joined by Aronson for the NAACP, who was able to get Layton to
admit, like Meadows, that the state had done nothing to encourage desegregation. Defense attorney
Maury Smith continued to try and establish that the state never acted in more than an advisory capacity
and that it had no real authority over funding. For all of the plaintiff parties, the damage had largely
already been done and the case made by the Civil Rights Division staff. By midday on the second day,
the NAACP, the LDF, and the U.S. rested.35
The defense attorneys made the mistake of calling a number of local superintendents to the
stand. This was an attempt to show that HEW had made “ridiculous demands” of the local school
systems and that neither Meadows nor Wallace had done anything other than advise not going “beyond
the law.” According to this line of reasoning, systems had been in compliance with HEW’s 1965
Guidelines, but Gene Crowder had come in and begun making demands to “go beyond the law.” Upon
34
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cross examination, particularly by Barrett, Aronson, and Gray, several of the superintendents were
forced to admit to certain damaging realities which seemed to indicate that the harassment came, if
anywhere, from the state. Reluctant testimony revealed that county school boards routinely accepted
black students from within autonomous all-white city systems in order to preserve the latter’s racial
integrity. The superintendents also indicated that many systems which purported to have been in
compliance with the original HEW Guidelines never actually were. Several of them confessed that it
“would take a court order” for their school board to ever operate a singular, non-racial school system.
The admitted necessity of a court order was so damning that Satterfield began objecting to Gray and
Aronson’s lines of questioning, and Rives was obliged to sustain.36
Satterfield made a bold move himself in calling U.S. Senator Lister Hill. Over the objections of
Barrett, Aronson, and Gray, Hill testified to debates within the Senate Appropriations Committee
concerning the HEW Guidelines vis-à-vis the Civil Rights Act.37 Senator Byrd from Virginia had argued
that the Guidelines exceeded the statutory authority of the Civil Rights Act, and the committee as a
whole had instructed HEW to heed the warning of Congress not to establish "onerous guidelines that
contravene . . . legislative intent." On cross Gray established that Hill had not once voted for a civil
rights bill in his many years in Congress. He also introduced commentary from the Congressional Record
in which Senators Hubert Humphrey and Jacob Javits argued that the 1964 bill was not intended to
correct racial imbalance. The trial could have dragged on for several days, but the parties agreed to
stipulate much, and the court indicated its preference that the mountain of evidence be summarized in
briefs rather than introduced in an extended hearing. After the defense rested its case, the court gave
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all parties 30 days to file post-trial briefs and deposition summaries. Another hearing was then to be
held in early February, after which the court would finally decide the cases.38

The Fifth Circuit and U.S. v. Jefferson
Even as the Lee v. Macon / NAACP Wallace hearing was concluding, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals was considering the United States’ consolidated appeals in the Jefferson County, Fairfield,
Bessemer, and Caddo Parish, Louisiana cases. Along with these were appeals from private plaintiffs in
the Jefferson County case (originally styled Stout v. Jefferson prior to the U.S.’s intervention), and two
other Louisiana cases. The appeals were collectively styled United States v. Jefferson County Board of
Education. Many of the same attorneys from the Lee/NAACP cases had worked on these cases, on both
sides, including Barrett, Landsberg, Billingsley, Adams, and Satterfield. The Civil Rights Division had
initially appealed the various decisions seeking expedition of each system’s substandard desegregation
plan. When HEW issued the revised Guidelines, the CRD asked the court to consolidate the appeals and
to approve a model decree for the circuit, allowing for uniform-style elimination of dual systems, rather
than the haphazard style which had theretofore prevailed. The panel considering the appeals included
District Judge Harold Cox (sitting specially because of an overloaded docket), Circuit Judge Homer
Thornberry, and crucially, Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom. Cox was an out-and-out segregationist
from Mississippi who had only recently come around to the unfortunate reality that at least token
desegregation of schools was inevitable. Thornberry was a recent Lyndon Johnson appointee who had
previously held the President’s vacated seat in the Congress. He and Wisdom had already signaled their
desire for the court to move much more forcefully in school desegregation cases. Wisdom, in particular,
had reached the end of his patience with southern school systems. In Singleton v. Jackson I, Wisdom
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had declared that the court attached “great weight” to the original HEW Guidelines and called for an
end to “footdragging,” and in Singleton II, he had reaffirmed the court’s support of the Guidelines in
light of the revised provisions on faculty desegregation. In August, Thornberry and Fifth Circuit Chief
Elbert Tuttle had issued a ruling in the Davis v. Mobile case, in which they again reversed Judge Daniel
Thomas’s trial court and ordered Mobile to accelerate its desegregation plan to conform with the
Guidelines’ target date of fall 1967 for all-grade desegregation. In the Davis ruling, Tuttle had lamented
trial court recalcitrance and had issued a stinging rebuke of those calling for the maintenance of
“neighborhood schools” – the latest evasive trope being deployed by segregationists.39
In December the court handed down what has been described by legal scholars as a “landmark”
decision which “thrust law to the forefront of social change.” Wisdom wrote for the majority, with Cox
dissenting. “The only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards,” Wisdom
emphasized, “is one that works.”40 The appellate court again held that lower courts in the circuit
“should give ‘great weight’ to the HEW guidelines.” The Guidelines, Wisdom continued, “are based on
decisions of this and other courts, are within the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are prepared in
detail by experts in school administration, and are intended by Congress and the executive to be part of
a national program.” In short, they presented “the best system available for uniform application, and
the best aid to the courts in evaluating the validity of a school desegregation plan and the progress
made under that plan.” Wisdom noted that school systems under court order automatically qualified
for federal financial assistance under the Guidelines if they were in compliance with a final order of a
federal court. Accordingly, “strong policy considerations” supported the court’s holding that “the
standards of court-supervised desegregation should not be lower than the standards of HEW-supervised
39
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desegregation.” The court would not permit itself to “be used to destroy or dilute the effectiveness of
. . . congressional policy . . . .” He concluded, “There is no bonus for foot-dragging.” The Guidelines
were – and ought to be – “substantially the same as” the Fifth Circuit court’s standards. District courts
in the circuit were, therefore, instructed to “make few exceptions to the guidelines” in evaluating
desegregation plans.41
The court considered itself obligated to cooperate with the Congress and the Executive in
enforcing Title VI, and the Guidelines were “within the scope of the congressional and executive policies
embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” The defendants had argued, of course, that the Guidelines
“went beyond the law” as Congress had intended it. The court disagreed. Congress had bristled at any
inclusion of cross-town or cross-district bussing, but the Guidelines had no provisions for such. The
requirement that teachers be given desegregated assignments was not an infringement upon systems’
hiring practices, only on their placement practices, which sustained the systems’ duality. There were no
provisions demanding pupil placement to achieve numerical benchmarks. The percentages were meant
to be “general rules of thumb” or an “objective administrative guide.” Good faith had to be measured
by something other than “promises,” Wisdom determined. Defendant state officials in Alabama had
argued that the Guidelines required “integration” as opposed to simply “desegregation,” and that courts
had supposedly not bound school boards to fully integrate. This argument rested almost solely on
Briggs v. Elliott, the 1955 holding of District Judge John Parker of South Carolina in one of the remanded
Brown cases. Segregationists had immediately pounced on – and had since clung to – Parker’s
contention that “the constitution does not require integration; it merely forbids discrimination.”
Wisdom had already suggested in Singleton I that this interpretation ought to have been “laid to rest.”
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In Jefferson he dug the grave, writing that the “portion of the opinion most quoted” was “pure dictum.”
Briggs, he argued:

Did not paraphrase the law as the Supreme Court stated it in Brown or as the law must be stated
today in the light of Aaron v. Cooper, Rogers v. Paul and Bradley v. School Board. These and
other decisions compel states in this circuit to take affirmative action to reorganize their school
systems by integrating the students, faculties, facilities, and activities.42

Wisdom pointed out, for effect, that the school system under scrutiny in Briggs was still segregated ten
years later.43
The “Briggs Dictum” could be, according to the court, “explained as a facet of the Fourth
Circuit's now abandoned view that Fourteenth Amendment rights are exclusively individual rights and in
school cases are to be asserted individually after each plaintiff has exhausted state administrative
remedies.” This “abandoned view” was the basis for Parker’s holding in the Carson v. Warlick case. By
the early 1960s, the Fourth Circuit court had moved away from this interpretation and had begun to
entertain class suits aimed at abolishing discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court had since held
that administrative remedies need not be exhausted. It was, as one district court put it, “almost a cruel
joke” to suggest that administrative remedies in these cases would actually bring about the abolition of
dual systems. Wisdom concluded that “in the sense that an individual pupil's right under the equal
protection clause is a 'personal and present' right not to be discriminated against by being segregated,
the [Briggs] dictum is a cliché.” If the Briggs court had intended “integration” to mean “absolute
command at all costs that each and every Negro child attend a racially balanced school,” then the
dictum might have been defensible. But according to Wisdom, what was wrong about Briggs was “more
important than what [was] right.” It drained Brown of its “significance as a class action to secure equal
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educational opportunities for Negroes by compelling the states to reorganize their public school
systems.”44
The court had thus tightly embraced the HEW revised Guidelines and had attempted to inter the
Briggs Dictum once and for all. But what was most significant about Jefferson was the relief the court
fashioned. Wisdom wrote that “the only adequate redress for a previously overt system-wide policy of
segregation directed against Negroes as a collective entity is a system-wide policy of integration.”45
Segregated education was “an integral element in the Southern State's general program to restrict
Negroes as a class from participation in the life of the community, the affairs of the State, and the
mainstream of American life.” Concomitant with this was “the stigma of apartheid condemned in the
Thirteenth Amendment.” This was why Brown II had prescribed class-based relief, affirming blacks’
collective right to “unitary, non-racial systems.” Indeed, there would have been no need for the delay
justified by the phrase “all deliberate speed” if “the right at issue in Brown had been only the right of
individual Negro plaintiffs to admission to a white school.” Brown and Brown II rested not only on the
finding that segregated school systems were a psychologically harmful denial of equal opportunity, but
also on the recognition that “state-imposed separation by race is an invidious classification and for that
reason alone is unconstitutional.” If the assumptions of Briggs continued to rule the day, then that
separation would “continue indefinitely.”46
Briggs had been intended to limit relief to tokenism, and Wisdom was trying to remove what he
and others felt was the main jurisprudential impediment to the realization of the promise of Brown. The
mechanism behind the Briggs order was, of course, the freedom of choice plan. As construed by school
boards at the time, free choice plans provided “little prospect of . . . ever undoing past discrimination or
of coming close to the goal of equal educational opportunities,” according to Wisdom. In fact, they
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“necessarily promote[d] resegregation.” The “central vice” in dual systems remained in 1966
“apartheid by dual zoning.” Until this was eradicated, freedom of choice remained “better suited” than
any other method of desegregation to “preserve the essentials of the dual school system while giving
paper compliance with the duty to desegregate.” For these reasons, the court determined that “the
only relief approaching adequacy” was the “conversion of the still-functioning dual system to a unitary,
non-racial system – lock, stock, and barrel.” Because the court did not specifically hold that freedom of
choice was unconstitutional, or even wholly undesirable, on its face, many contemporaries overlooked
Wisdom’s writing on the proverbial wall. Freedom of choice ideally meant “the maximum amount of
freedom and clearly understood choice in a bona fide unitary system where schools are not white
schools or Negro schools – just schools.”47
The court did not attempt to jettison freedom of choice altogether, but it included in Jefferson a
set of uniform judicial standards for the circuit. This was embodied in a uniform remedial decree, which
was intended to make freedom of choice “more than a mere word of promise to the ear.” Wisdom
channeled Cicero through the state of Georgia, writing that “there should not be one law for Athens
[GA] and another for Rome [GA].” The decree indicated that all desegregation plans include the
following provisions: all-grade desegregation by 1967-68; mandatory annual choice of schools for all
pupils; adequate notice given to all parents and students; desegregation of services, facilities, activities,
and programs; school equalization; scheduled reporting to the court on the progress of desegregation;
and the desegregation of faculty and staff, to begin immediately. Progress was to be measured by
asking the question, “Has the operation of the promised plan actually eliminated segregated and tokendesegregated schools and achieved substantial integration?” Wisdom acknowledged that the USOE
would continue to monitor the bulk of the systems in the circuit, but he added that the court’s embrace
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of the Guidelines did not preclude pupils or school officials from bringing suits to challenge the
implementation, or lack thereof, of specific school systems’ desegregation plans.48
Cox’s dissent was vigorous. He warned, “If the majority opinion in these cases is permitted to
stand, it will, in the name of protecting civil rights of some, destroy civil rights and constitutional
liberties of all of our citizens, their children, and their children’s children.” Cox argued that “judicial
haste and impatience” could not “justify . . . equating integration with desegregation.” No court, he
wrote, had yet “been heard to say that this court now has the power and the authority to force
integration of both races upon these public schools without regard to equitable considerations or the
will or wish of either race.“ Wisdom and Thornberry sought to “disparage [Briggs] as dictum,” Cox
wrote, but the Fifth Circuit had “in several reported decisions . . . embraced and adopted Briggs with
extensive quotations from it as the decisional law of this circuit.” He suggested that the Jefferson
appeals be reheard en banc, concluding that, “Surely, only two of the judges of this court may not now
single-handedly reverse those [previous] decisions and change such law of this circuit.” The attorneys
for the defendant Alabama school systems agreed and soon asked for such a rehearing. They indicated
that they were also prepared to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court if necessary. In early 1967,
the Fifth Circuit agreed to hear the cases en banc.49

*****
On January 16, 1967, Lurleen Wallace became Alabama’s first female governor, and George
Wallace became its first and only regent. In her inaugural address, Lurleen called her election a “notice
to all the world that the strength and determination of a free people to defend the principles of selfgovernment will not be suppressed by force – force from China, from Russia, from Cuba, or from
48
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Washington, D.C.” She lamented the “menace to the welfare of our children” that was school
desegregation. “Even now,” she said, “a federal agency attempts to tell us the schools our children shall
attend, to regulate the contents of their textbooks, who shall teach them, and with whom our children
shall associate.” It was, she concluded, “an effort to gain control of [their] hearts and minds. I resent
it,” she declared, and “as your governor and as a mother, I shall resist it.”50
Austin Meadows had seen enough of the struggle. He retired and made way for a new state
Superintendent of Education, Dr. Ernest Stone. Upon leaving office, Meadows remained obdurate.
With no apparent concept of irony, he declared that the “greatest public school handicap” was the
“federal destruction of local school board authority in the assignment of teachers and pupils,” which
would soon “destroy the educational function of the public schools and finally the state public school
systems.” He called “mass integration” a failure “at the national level in the District of Columbia as
evidenced by the fact that 93 percent of the public school pupils are Negroes.” Similarly, “mass
integration” was a failure in Lowndes, he contended, as 114 of the 118 students enrolled at Hayneville
High were black. The nation was headed for a “tragic era” if the federal government did not realize that
the South needed more than “the federal bayonets of Little Rock or the federally-supported marches
against state and local constitutional authority.”51
Meadows’ successor in office tried to distance himself from the behavior of his predecessor. In
doing so, however, Stone made clear that his would simply be a more thoughtful defense of the
statewide dual school system. Like any successful white Alabama politician, he was an admitted
segregationist. He indirectly lamented the recklessness of the previous administration, saying that
Alabamians should have “prayed as much as [they had] cussed” since the “1954 ‘Black Monday’
decision.” This would have left the state in “much better shape.” He acknowledged that “laws and
court orders have to be obeyed” but indicated that his state education department would not move on
50
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desegregation any more than it absolutely had to. In a pithy encapsulation of the law and order creed,
Stone said, “We do not want to be belligerent . . . but we will volunteer no more.” Stone’s truest
feelings were perhaps best expressed by a letter he wrote to the governor in August, 1965, when he was
superintendent of the Jacksonville city system. Stone flaunted his segregationist credentials before the
governor, reminding him that he was from northeast Alabama’s Sand Mountain, a long narrow plateau
populated by mostly poor, white chicken farmers. “I was a big boy of several years before I even saw a
negro,” Stone wrote, “In fact a negro was not allowed to travel over Sand Mountain when I was a boy.”
Stone added that he and the Jacksonville Board of Education had done “only what we had to do in order
to keep our schools open. . . . I will match my segregation philosophy and beliefs with any man in
Alabama.” It impressed Wallace enough to put Stone atop the list of candidates to replace the retiring
Meadows.52 The new Wallace Administration, then, would be not be substantially different than the
old. The only question was, what legal obligations would state officials have, particularly Stone
himself?53
A statewide desegregation order via Lee v. Macon seemed possible, if not likely. At best the
state’s anti-guidelines and tuition-grant legislation appeared destined for invalidation. Some
segregationists held out a reasonable hope that the potentially crushing blow delivered in U.S. v.
Jefferson would be softened by the en banc rehearing or challenged by the ruling in NAACP v. Wallace.
If not, the HEW Guidelines were not only “within the law,” they were bare-minimum standards for the
courts, which appeared poised to become the prime arbiters of school desegregation in the state,
pending the Lee v. Macon outcome. Beyond these immediate concerns, some had ascertained that
Wisdom’s lengthy critique of freedom-of-choice might possibly be embraced by the Supreme Court.
Certainly, any perceptive and objective observers of the realities of token desegregation in Alabama’s
52
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schools understood the limitations of the present system. Not only were Alabama segregationists facing
a statewide order, then, they were facing the reality that token desegregation was not the worst that
could happen. Many of the state’s whites had only lately come around to the reality that token
desegregation was a lamentable necessity. In the Black Belt, many had refused to accept even this.
Most continued to believe that segregation really was “a perfectly good word.” Litigation was about to
force them to come to terms with more than just HEW-recommended tokenism, however. Wisdom’s
contention that “the only adequate redress for a previously overt system-wide policy of segregation” was
“a system-wide policy of integration” would soon impact the entire state, even the entire South, in a
way that few could have imagined when Detroit Lee first approached Fred Gray in Tuskegee almost a
decade earlier.
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CHAPTER 12: “THE COURT IS THE ONLY AUTHORITY TO DO IT”: THE STATEWIDE LEE V. MACON DECREE,
1967

Frank Johnson made the cover of Time magazine in May, 1967. It featured an oil portrait of the
judge, with characteristically stern and intense gaze and closely cropped hair, underneath a banner
reading “The Law and Dissent.” In the article, entitled “Interpreter in the Front Line,” Johnson remarked
on the widespread defiance of the law by state and local officials in Alabama and described his legal
philosophy relative to civil rights cases. “I’m not a segregationist,” he said, “but I’m not a crusader
either. I don’t make the law. I don’t create the facts. I interpret the law.” Johnson added, “I don't see
how a judge who approaches these cases with any other philosophy, particularly if he was born and
reared in the South, can discharge his oath and the responsibility of his office.” The piece also described
the beginning of a typical proceeding in Johnson’s courtroom: “Through a door in the starry wall strides
the judge, lean and tanned in his unvarying crisp black suit, white shirt and black tie. He usually shuns
robes: ‘If a judge needs a robe and a gavel, he hasn't established control.’"1
In the first six months of 1967, Johnson established that courtroom as the seat of control over
school desegregation in Alabama. Nearly 15 years after the Brown decisions, local school systems were
still segregated, and state officials were still doing everything in their power to keep it that way. By the
end of that spring, however, the three-judge court hearing Lee v. Macon County Board of Education had
entered a statewide desegregation order and brought 99 of the state’s school systems under the
umbrella of that single case. Through an agreement with the other two judges, Johnson himself took on
the bulk of the work in administering what became the first statewide structural injunction in U.S. legal
history. Many had assumed that desegregation in the state would continue to proceed according to the
dictates of the Department of Health Education, and Welfare (HEW) and its Guidelines for compliance
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with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But with the 1967 orders in Lee v. Macon, the court – and in
essence Johnson himself – took up the responsibility of enforcing compliance.
The mechanics of this arrangement were certainly more complex that such a statement
suggests. The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division (CRD) played an indispensable role for the
court. Once he was enjoined, so did state Superintendent of Education Ernest Stone. HEW battled to
maintain its enforcement authority, but the court was forced to enjoin the department from cutting off
federal funds to school systems in the state in order to protect the integrity of the statewide decree.
Ultimately, it was local school authorities themselves who carried out desegregation plans. The Lee v.
Macon order freed them from state interference and, just as importantly, freed them to blame the
federal court and alleviate white community pressure. But the primary authority ensuring compliance,
from March, 1967 onward, manifest itself in the Montgomery courtroom of Frank Johnson. Simply put,
there was widespread defiance of the law in Alabama, and Johnson understood that, at that point, the
quickest and easiest way to put an end to it was through the court. In a sense this meant his court
alone.

Lee v. Macon and NAACP v. Wallace Back in Court
Entering 1967 there was some hesitation and disagreement among the four judges considering
Lee v. Macon and NAACP v Wallace. The four judges agreed on much. They all agreed that Alabama
state officials had clearly interfered with local school systems’ ability to fulfill their constitutional
obligations to eliminate dual school systems. Incoming Superintendent Stone had filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming that he ought not be held accountable for the sins of his predecessor. But, the court
was in agreement that the 1964 Lee v. Macon injunction bound Meadows’ successors in office, and that
in any case, Stone had stated no grounds as to why the case was moot as to him. There was also no
question that the Alabama tuition grant and anti-guidelines measures were unconstitutional. They had
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not agreed on everything, however. After the U.S. v. Jefferson decision in late December, 1966, the
judges struggled over whether or not to wait for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to decide that appeal
en banc before issuing their own rulings. The decisions of the three-judge court were directly
reviewable to the Supreme Court; was the trial court bound, then, to follow circuit court precedent?
Johnson believed it was. He felt this was especially so, in fact, considering that the three-judge court
was, itself, an institutional safeguard against haphazard invalidation of state statutes or irresponsible
use of injunctive relief against state officials. A decision of the appellate court sitting en banc,
furthermore, required special deference. Johnson felt strongly that they should wait, but there was
some dissension on this point.2
The judges could also not agree on the constitutionality of the HEW revised Guidelines and, as a
consequence, the nature of the relief the court would grant in Lee v. Macon. The question of whether
the Guidelines exceeded the Congressional mandate was a serious one, and to make matters worse,
President Johnson had apparently failed to formally approve them. At a hearing on February 3,
presiding Judge Richard Rives hammered the attorneys for the NAACP and the CRD with questions and
generally expressed concern that the Guidelines “might transcend the legislative authority granted by
Congress in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” At one point, Rives said, “It worries me whether there is any
requirement of integration beyond true freedom of choice. I think there are some Negro children,” he
continued, “who prefer to go to purely Negro schools and some white children who prefer to go to
purely white schools.” Rives was holding to the Briggs Dictum interpretation – that the thrust of postBrown litigation had been, rightly, towards “the elimination of discrimination not the mixing of races.”
The Guidelines’ percentage provisions, he felt, were sure to ultimately result in “forced mixing.” At one
point he asked the CRD’s St. John Barrett, “If you classify students by race for the purpose of forced

2

Frank Johnson to Richard Rives, Hobart Grooms, and Virgil Pittman, Feb. 15, 1967 (P.S. Feb. 16, 1967);
Frank Johnson to Richard Rives and Hobart Grooms, March 15, 1967; Richard Rives to Frank Johnson, March 14,
1967; all in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 28, Folder 6.

452

integration, aren’t you coming close to depriving people of their rights under the equal protection
provision of the Constitution?” Later when the LDF’s Henry Aronson suggested that freedom of choice
was not working, Rives referenced the distinction again, saying, “If the goal is to mix, I will concede that
freedom of choice will not work, but if the goal is to abolish discrimination, then . . . it might work.”3
Barrett maintained that the often-quoted sections of the Civil Rights Act which seemed to run
contrary to the revised Guidelines were “at most . . . a limitation of the Commissioner [of Education]’s
power to take corrective action with respect to de facto desegregation.” He argued that Congress had
intended only to limit enforcement in metropolitan areas outside the South where “racial imbalance” (a
synonym for de facto segregation) was supposedly not the result of an official school board policy of
dual racial zoning. The CRD also argued that the Guidelines were not an exercise of the rule-making
authority of the USOE but were simply a “statement of enforcement policies” and, therefore, were not
subject to presidential approval. Finally, Barrett suggested that the court enter an order that would
require every school system in the state to implement a desegregation plan similar to those already
ordered in other cases in the state. The CRD had at one point suggested bringing only HEW-noncomplying school systems under a Lee v. Macon order. To Barrett’s revised suggestion, Johnson joked,
“Your proposition for the court to go into the guidelines business in very interesting.” He was ready to
validate the Guidelines and enter some sort of statewide order. Rives was clearly not. Judges Virgil
Pittman and Hobart Grooms looked to provide the swing votes on these aspects of the case. Grooms
thought Briggs should remain settled law, but he was not on the panel considering the Guidelines.
Pittman was. He had just been appointed to the federal bench the previous summer, having been a
state circuit judge in Gadsden. The World War II Navy veteran from a poor Wiregrass farming family
was likely to side with Judge Johnson and validate the Guidelines, but Rives’ trepidation commanded
3
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respect. At the end of the day-long hearing, the court asked for briefs on the difference between de jure
and de facto desegregation and on the necessity of presidential approval.4
To an extent, the questions debated at the February hearing were not controlling. The sticking
point in NAACP v. Wallace was clearly the validity of the Guidelines themselves. But the judges did not
feel it was necessary to even consider the Guidelines in determining the need for some sort of injunctive
relief in Lee v. Macon. Nor did the court need to consider their validity in determining the invalidity of
the state’s anti-guidelines measure at issue in NAACP v. Wallace. The defendant state officials had
obviously flouted the Constitution, the Brown decisions, and the 1964 Lee v. Macon decision in
perpetuating an official, statewide, segregated system and in frustrating local systems’ limited efforts to
comply with the law. The remaining question in Lee was: would the resulting decree run only to the
defendant state officials, as had the 1964 decree; would it run to local school systems as well, but only
to the systems which were not in compliance with the HEW guidelines; or would it run to all school
systems in the state not already under court order? The first choice would have been a weak response
to brazen and continuous defiance of the law. The second presented a different problem. In this
scenario, the three-judge court in NAACP v. Wallace might go against Wisdom’s recent U.S. v. Jefferson
ruling and declare the Guidelines invalid, and the three-judge court in Lee v. Macon might, at the same
time, excuse school systems from its decree based on their compliance with the very same Guidelines.
This would be, in Johnson’s words, “quite inconsistent.” So, he counseled patience.5
Rives polled the active judges of the circuit on the matter of timing: when should the threejudge panels in Lee v. Macon and NAACP v. Wallace release their opinions, relative to the pending en
4
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banc rehearing of U.S. v. Jefferson? Judge Johnson remained adamant that the court should await the
Jefferson decision regardless of the outcome of the poll. He insisted that a divided court, such as theirs,
would be of no assistance to the full circuit court in deciding Jefferson and reiterated that their panel
would be bound by the en banc decision when it was rendered. The conundrum was partially solved
when Judge Johnson convinced Judges Rives and Grooms to join in entering a statewide decree in Lee v.
Macon that ran to all school systems not already under court order, regardless of their HEW compliance
status. Johnson drafted the opinion and decree. He argued that a failure to include all the systems
would leave those systems which were in paper compliance with HEW standards (about half of the
state’s 118) free to do nothing until the Guidelines cases – NAACP v. Wallace and U.S. v. Jefferson – were
resolved. “Uniformity of operation” was important, he felt. Further, the court was holding the systems
accountable for fulfilling their constitutional requirements, not their obligations under the Guidelines.
Paper compliance, in the absence of meaningful actual compliance, ought not to excuse them. This
solution allowed the court to release its decision in Lee v. Macon in March, while the panel in NAACP v.
Wallace continued to await Jefferson. The timing was important. Systems would need time to adopt
the model freedom-of-choice plan in the decree, send out choice forms and notifications, and hold a
choice period of 30 days, all before they broke for the summer. Also, the state superintendent would
need time to compile reports on local action and submit them to the court in time for further action
before it was too late for fall implementation.6

The Lee v. Macon Statewide Decree
The court issued on March 22, 1967 its long awaited Lee v. Macon decision, the primary
consequence of which was a statewide, remedial desegregation order. The central question was simple:
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had the defendant state officials (then Lurleen Wallace, Ernest Stone, and the members of the state
board of education) continued to “use their authority to operate throughout the State of Alabama a
dual school system based on race.” Judge Johnson wrote:

Not only have these defendants, through their control and influence over the local school
boards, flouted every effort to make the Fourteenth Amendment a meaningful reality to Negro
school children in Alabama; they have apparently dedicated themselves and, certainly from the
evidence in this case, have committed the powers and resources of their offices to the
continuation of a dual public school system such as that condemned by Brown v. Board of
Education . . . . As a result of such efforts on the part of those charged with the duty and
responsibility under the law as announced in 1954 by the Supreme Court in Brown, by the
Congress of the United States in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and, more specifically, by this Court
in its July 1964 order, today only a very small percentage of students in Alabama are enrolled in
desegregated school systems. Based upon this fact and a continuation of such conduct on the
part of these state officials as hereafter outlined, it is now evident that the reasons for this
Court's reluctance to grant the relief to which these plaintiffs were clearly entitled over two
years ago are no longer valid.7

More than anything, Johnson concluded, the defendant state officials had consistently lied to local
officials about their constitutional duty, especially by telling them that “local school districts should go
no farther than ordered by the court.” Johnson called it “one of the most illegal methods adopted by
these defendants.” Per the 1964 order, the state officials had an obligation to inform local school
systems of their “federal constitutional duty to desegregate their school systems totally,
notwithstanding whether a particular system is under a court order or whether that school system
agrees to comply with the requirements of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare . . . .”
There was “no more clear an indication” of their having failed in this than Meadows’ own admission that
he had done nothing to eliminate segregation in the state’s schools.8
The court found that state officials had used their power over local systems in two ways: most
obviously, to levy extraordinary intimidation and punishment, and more importantly, to perform their
7
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ordinary functions in such a way as to perpetuate the segregated system statewide. The court cited
extensive evidence of the state’s “dramatic interference”: Meadows’ public assertions of the
equalization of facilities for “the minority race”; his circulation of the ridiculous segregation “parable”;
his and Governor Wallace’s many efforts at coercion and intimidation, including their joint effort to have
the black teachers in Tuscaloosa reassigned or effectively replaced. Johnson noted the effect these
actions had, namely school boards’ refusal to comply with the HEW revised Guidelines. But “the most
significant action by these defendant state officials, designed to maintain the dual public school system
based upon race,” according to the court, “[was] found in the day-to-day performance of their duties in
the general supervision and operation of the system.” For example, the court found the evidence
“absolutely overwhelming” that the state had exercised extensive control over school construction and
consolidation, especially through its annual school surveys. Also, the state officials had “endeavored to
thwart and, with considerable success, [had] thwarted efforts toward implementation of the
constitutional requirement to eliminate faculty and staff segregation,” such that only 76 out of 28,000
teachers in the state were assigned to schools where the opposite race was in the majority.
Furthermore, the state had annually conducted or supported segregated teacher institutes and inservice training programs and had issued teaching certificates so as to perpetuate segregated faculty
assignments. The state had shown similarly significant control over transportation, since it approved
bus routes and transportation equipment standards for all systems, and since “nearly 100% of the cost
of local school transportation programs [was] paid from the state Minimum Program Fund.” The court
also held that the state had exercised immediate authority of the state’s vocational schools, trade
schools, and junior colleges, in such a way as to maintain segregation therein.9
The court determined that the state’s tuition grant statute was “but another attempt of the
State of Alabama to circumvent the principles of Brown by helping to promote and finance a private
9

Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, Opinion, Order, and Decree of March 22, 1967, 267 F.Supp
458, 465-75.

457

school system for white students not wishing to attend public schools also attended by Negroes.” This
was “unmistakably clear” when analyzing the law “in the historical context which gave rise to its
enactment,” that is, when acknowledging that it was “born of an effort to resist and frustrate
implementation of the Brown decision” and to “fill the vacuum left by this Court's injunction against the
1957 tuition statute.” In short, the state had failed to provide any sort of rational basis for the law other
than the obvious: that it was “attempting to make a concerted effort to establish and support a
separate and private school system for white students.” The court warned that if the state persisted in
such efforts that it would be forced to declare the “’private’ system” a state actor under the Fourteenth
Amendment and bring it under the statewide desegregation order.10
Johnson felt that the relief had to be designed to “reach the limits of the defendants' activities”
in the various areas of their control and to “require [them] to do what they have been unwilling to do on
their own.” Accordingly, the state officials and the state itself were ordered to “take whatever
corrective action . . . necessary to disestablish” the statewide dual school system. The court could
“conceive of no other effective way” to effect this than to enter “a uniform state-wide plan for school
desegregation, made applicable to each local county and city system not already under court order to
desegregate, and to require these defendants to implement it.” The many individual school systems
were not, themselves, parties to the suit, of course. The court held that they need not be, but it warned
that they might be added as such in the future to insure that the decree was being implemented
properly. The court opted for statewide freedom of choice, since this was the method that had
“invariably” been used by courts in the Fifth and neighboring judicial circuits. Johnson emphasized,
though, that this was the plan which the court would require “for the time being” and with the
understanding that “administrative problems [might] make some other method advisable in the future.”
In a final word of warning, Johnson added that “if choice influencing factors are not eliminated, freedom
10
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of choice is a fantasy.” Echoing Judge John Minor Wisdom’s assertion in U.S. v. Jefferson that the only
freedom-of-choice plan that was constitutionally permissible was one that “works,” Johnson wrote that
freedom of choice was “not an end in itself,” but merely “a means to an end.”11
In the accompanying decree, the court ordered the state superintendent to use the authority of
the state school board and the state department of education over school construction, transportation,
and teachers to bring about the immediate disestablishment of segregated systems statewide. As state
superintendent of education, Ernest Stone was ordered to notify the 99 city and county school systems
not already under court order that they were to adopt a model freedom-of-choice desegregation plan.12
The plan included specific provisions for the desegregation of student bodies, faculty, staff, activities,
facilities, and transportation. There were specific instructions indicating who could exercise a choice,
when choice periods should run, what constituted adequate notice of plans to the community, what
choice forms should look like, what the text of letters to parents ought to include, what to do when a
student’s first choice was impossible to grant, and other minutia. School systems were given 20 days to
adopt the plan and report back to Stone, who was to then report to the court. Stone was also to
develop and submit to the court a statewide equalization plan designed to bring the “physical facilities,
11
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equipment, services, courses of instruction, and instructional materials of schools previously maintained
for Negro students up to the level in schools previously maintained for white students.” This was to
include the elimination of “disparities reflected in different pupil-teacher ratios, survey classifications of
buildings and sites, per pupil expenditures, valuation of school property, library books per pupil, course
offerings, accreditation, and transportation.” School systems were instructed to report at specified
times to the state superintendent, and the state superintendent to the court.13
Per agreement with Judges Rives and Grooms, Judge Johnson had followed the proposed decree
submitted by the Civil Rights Division very closely, making only minor changes. It was not unusual for a
federal court to rely upon the Justice Department in such a way. Judges had no staff save a few clerks
and marshals. In a case in which a state government was defying a federal agency while continuing to
flout established Constitutional law, the court and the Justice Department were, in a sense, on the same
team. In Johnson’s case, too, there was an immense amount of mutual respect between the judge and
the federal attorneys at the CRD. Johnson held Assistant Attorney General John Doar in especially high
regard. Doar’s former special assistant, the legal scholar Owen Fiss, explained that the two “relied upon
each other because they had this total respect, and they respected their differences . . . in roles.” Fiss
recalled that Doar had a “special place in Frank Johnson’s courtroom.” Johnson “wanted the
government to back him up,” and Doar was “very aware of that.” When Doar addressed the court, “He
made sure he spoke with full appreciation of the expectations that Johnson had of him and the [Civil
Rights] Division.” A former U.S. Attorney himself, Johnson appreciated that the federal lawyers always
had, in his own words, an "excellent understanding of the applicable law," an "enthusiastic attitude,"
and a "common-sense approach" to problems. Often, when he ordered the U.S. into cases as an amicus
curie, it was because he "wanted to make certain the case was investigated thoroughly and presented
fully and fairly” so that the court could “reach a full and fair result.” He added that perhaps the most
13
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important reason for including the U.S. in such cases was that DOJ “had the resources." Fiss called the
relationship “the truest sense of amicus ever in American law.” It is not surprising, then, that as the
court moved forward in its new role as statewide desegregation monitor, the attorneys from Justice
would continue to play an important role in assisting the court, utilizing those resources in manpower,
time, and authority.14
The 1967 Lee v. Macon decision had an immediate and jarring impact on school desegregation
litigation. It also had lasting implications for civil litigation more broadly and for federalism. First, the
Lee court acknowledged that relief in school desegregation cases ought to be formulated so as to not
only remove official discrimination and prevent its recurrence, but to also eradicate the effects of past
discrimination. Preventative or regulatory injunctions, then, were not sufficient for this task; it required
remedial relief. As an HEW attorney observed, the southern dual school system had been
“institutionalized through long years of law and tradition,” and such institutions “[did] not just go away
any more than they just happen[ed].” The court followed Judge Wisdom’s lead in approaching this
problem, where Wisdom himself had followed the suggestion of the Civil Rights Division in Jefferson.
What made Lee v. Macon unique was the omnibus, statewide nature of the relief. The court found that
segregated public education in Alabama was a state institution which continued to systematically
deprive black children of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Remedial relief aimed at this system
required the development of a statewide “structural injunction,” the first such in United States legal
history.15
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The Lee v. Macon injunction touched every aspect of the state’s myriad educational controls.
The court pledged to maintain its hold on these controls until every vestige of the dual system was
eradicated and its lingering effects ameliorated. The judges thus thrust themselves into the realm of
what have been called “hard judicial choices,” or those pitting federal district court judges against state
and local officials. The court took up the task of monitoring the desegregation efforts of the state
officials, who were themselves tasked with monitoring the non-party local school systems. The local
systems were expected to adopt and implement a model desegregation plan. If progress was not
satisfactory, then the plaintiffs could request a court order for more specific or more immediate relief.
In this way, the entering of the injunction was as much of a beginning as it was an end. The court
became the steward of school desegregation in the state of Alabama – along with the Justice
Department and the LDF. Not only was the decision, in Fiss’s words, “tremendously transformative in
terms of what school desegregation could do,” it had clear implications for federalism. There sat the
federal court, in the state’s capitol, orchestrating the restructuring of an entire state system, over an
extended period of time, in order to force lasting and meaningful compliance with Constitutional law.
Other judges would go on to use this kind of structural injunctive power in similar, and usually
controversial, ways.16 Johnson himself later used remarkably similar relief – in James v. Wallace, Pugh v.
Locke, and Wyatt v. Stinkney – to reform Alabama’s prison and mental health systems, in which
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overcrowding and otherwise abysmal conditions were found to be systematic human rights
deprivations.17
The decision had important implications for the relationship between the courts and HEW as
well. The Fifth Circuit panel In Jefferson had just sanctioned the HEW Guidelines in the hope that its
authority might soften the blow for school officials dealing with distant federal bureaucrats. The
appellate panel assumed that the HEW Office of Education could then alleviate some of the pressure on
courts overburdened with school cases. A review in the Yale Law Journal in late 1967 concluded that,
after the statewide Lee decree, it would “never be possible to tell whether the Jefferson opinion could
have succeeded in giving the Office of Education sufficient stature to reverse opposition to the
guidelines in the state that in the past had most vehemently opposed HEW efforts.” The Journal
predicted that the Lee decree would “put the Office of Education out of business in the State of
Alabama.” While this did not turn out to be the case, the decree certainly did “reverse the roles
originally envisioned for the courts and the USOE under Title VI.” HEW officials expected the courts to
establish desegregation standards, assuming that the USOE would then set about enforcing those
standards on the ground. With the Lee decree, this situation was, indeed, to be reversed. As the
Journal foreshadowed, the USOE would “at best” soon be “serving in an advisory role, helping the courts
determine the applicable standards and then helping, in tandem with the Justice Department, to advise
the courts on the adequacy of the desegregation plans submitted to school districts.”18
A more immediately recognizable reason why the Lee v. Macon order was significant was that it
eliminated the need for 99 sets of plaintiffs, or the Civil Rights Division, to file 99 subsequent suits to
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desegregate the state’s many school systems. It was the first school desegregation order to directly
involve every school system in a state not already under court order. As Fred Gray remembered, “It
saved us a lot of money, time, and effort.” The Christian Science Monitor called it “the most sweeping
implementation of the Supreme Court’s 1954 school desegregation ruling yet rendered by a lower
federal court.” Some jurists, notably Wisdom, did not feel that such a “sweeping” single-order strategy
was necessary, preferring that the circuit’s uniform decree be applied only where individual suits were
filed. Lee nonetheless soon proved to be influential in further school desegregation litigation. Jack
Greenberg called it “an unprecedented victory” and “an important step in closing the doors to evasion
of the Constitution.” Greenberg indicated that the LDF would pursue “similar orders in other hard core
states where massive resistance remains the order of the day.” The LDF and the Civil Rights Division
soon did exactly that, successfully seeking similar statewide relief in Georgia, Mississippi, Texas,
Arkansas, and South Carolina based on the Lee decree.19
Owen Fiss later claimed that he saw in Johnson’s handling of the Lee case “something as
ingenious, as path-breaking, as innovative as Marbury v. Madison.” From the vantage point of 1995,
Fred Gray estimated that “probably over 300 opinions” had been written “on various aspects of the
case.” By that time, Lee v. Macon had served as the inspiration for Alabama’s landmark, omnibus voting
rights case, Dillard v. Crenshaw County. Former Vernon Crawford associate James Blacksher had
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theorized that if a court could accept that there was statewide control and a statewide policy of racial
discrimination in education, then the same might be achieved relative to voting practices. With the
assistance of historians at the University of South Alabama, Blacksher was able to demonstrate a long
history of changes in county and city election laws – all regulated by the state legislature – which were
clearly designed to prevent or limit the effect of the black vote. The plaintiffs also successfully argued
that the passage of at least two state laws was secured for the expressed purpose of blunting the effect
of black voting. With this evidence, Blacksher was able to convince the court to consolidate into one
case a number of challenges to the discriminatory at-large system of county commissioner election.
Dillard was a product of Lee v. Macon, perhaps even more so that the prison and mental health systems
cases. Alongside the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmation of U.S. v. Jefferson, though, Lee v.
Macon’s immediate impact was even more staggering.20

U.S. v. Jefferson Affirmed En Banc
Alabama’s segregationists scarcely had a chance to react to the earth-shaking decision in Lee v.
Macon before the en banc decision in U.S. v. Jefferson came down like a terrible aftershock. One week
after the Lee announcement, the Fifth Circuit released its 8-4 ruling, affirming the panel’s judgment in a
per curiam opinion. The majority essentially adopted Judge Wisdom’s opinion and decree with only
minor changes. The court held that “if Negroes [were] ever to enter the mainstream of American life, as
school children they must have equal educational opportunities,” which meant, in Wisdom’s words,
access to “ a unitary system in which there are no Negro schools and no White schools – just schools.” It
explicitly repudiated Briggs and overturned all prior decisions which relied on it. It held that freedom of
20
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choice was “not a goal in itself [but] a means to an end” and was acceptable only if it worked to bring
about a unitary system. The full court agreed that the HEW revised Guidelines were acceptable minimal
standards to which courts in the circuit should afford “great weight.” The percentages so often assailed
were not meant to strike a balance, the judges determined, they were “rules of thumb.” Most
controversially, the court endorsed the line Wisdom had drawn between de jure and de facto
segregation, and it reserved judgment on the latter. This effectively adopted the Congressional
compromise which was intended to spare metropolitan areas outside the South from Southern-style
school desegregation. Finally, the uniform decree Wisdom had drawn up was approved, with minimal
adjustments, as the standard for the Circuit.21
Jack Greenberg at the LDF celebrated the decision, saying that “in conjunction with [Lee v.
Macon]” it gave the LDF “new judicial tools” to begin moving “scores of cases . . . forward.” The
“extremely detailed decree and the clear-cut majority” meant that the organization was, Greenberg
added, “in a position to bring about substantial school desegregation in the Deep South for the first
time.” The Southern Regional Council dubbed Jefferson the beginning of a “new judicial era” in school
desegregation and argued that Jefferson and Lee v. Macon were “the most significant school
desegregation actions of the 1960s.” The Yale Law Journal concluded that Jefferson and Lee were
“judicial acknowledgements of the inability of the administrative process to desegregate schools when
acting alone” and were “massive reaffirmations of the courts’ concern with the problem.”22
Despite what Greenberg called a “clear-cut majority,” the Jefferson decision was not without its
vehement detractors, however. Judges Gewin, Bell, and Godbold dissented, and Judge Coleman wrote a
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partially concurring opinion. Each strongly disagreed with significant portions of the majority’s opinion.
The conservative Gewin wrote that the “thesis of the majority” was “like Minerva (Athena) of the
classical myths,” that is, “spawned full-grown and fully-armed.” It had, he argued, “no substantial legal
ancestors.” Wisdom’s original opinion had “[espoused] the cause of uniformity . . . asserting that there
must not be one law for Athens and another for Rome,” but it had not followed its own logic. Gewin
thought that artificially separating segregation into de jure and de facto and then applying those
concepts sectionally was punishing the South while allowing the rest of the country to continue
unmolested in substantially the same practice. Further, Gewin charged that the issue of the HEW
Guidelines was never properly introduced into the trial court proceedings and never should have been
considered by the court in the first place (the United States had asked for a decree based on the revised
Guidelines while the cases were on appeal). Judge Godbold added a belated dissent. Godbold was an
Alabamian, a Harvard Law graduate, and a Johnson-appointee who later admitted that “with hindsight,”
a remedial order like Jefferson was necessary. At the time he argued that it was “especially
unfortunate” that the en banc court had “discussed validity and constitutionality” of the Guidelines
when NAACP v. Wallace was pending before the three-judge court in Alabama. Godbold noted that in
NAACP v. Wallace the issue “had been squarely raised, a record developed, and the application, effect,
operation and validity of the 1966 Guidelines litigated at length, including the difficult question of
presidential approval.” Of course, once the en banc court ruled – without the benefit of a fully
developed record – the three-judge court waiting to decide NAACP v. Wallace was then bound by the
circuit court’s decision. Speaking to the Guidelines anyway, Gewin indicated that he believed that the
grounds on which the court was basing its approval of pupil and teacher percentage guidelines were
very thin and hastily constructed. “If the alleged Briggs dictum,” he wrote, was “so clearly erroneous
and constitutionally unsound,” then it was “difficult to believe that it would have been accepted for a
period of almost 12 years and quoted so many times.” The Supreme Court had never altered Briggs and
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had, in fact, affirmed it indirectly by affirming Shuttlesworth (wherein Judge Rives had quoted from it).
Additionally, Gewin felt that adopting a uniform decree disregarded the myriad local differences which
Brown II had charged the trial courts with managing. He called the majority’s opinion “pessimistic” and
expressed “faith” that the trial courts and local school officials would soon arrive at a constitutional
compliance.23
Judge Bell went further, charging the majority with “eroding the doctrine of separation of
powers” and with judicial “overreach.” The court, he wrote “should cooperate with HEW,” but it should
not “be made to play the part of any stick” to HEW’s “carrot of federal funds.” The judgment was also
an “unclear and unfair” infringement on personal liberty, he thought. Judge James Coleman – a former
Mississippi governor – agreed with much in the majority opinion but also agreed with Judges Gewin and
Bell that the decision “strongly portended” the possibility of the court “arbitrarily” mandating a
“specified percentage of the various races” or “proportional representation of the races” in public
schools. Elaborating on Judge Bell’s contention that the ruling was an infringement on personal liberty,
Judge Godbold argued that freedom of choice, once exercised, was a choice “of associates.” The
“constitutional depths” of this choice were, he wrote, “not yet fully explored.” Freedom of association
was most often evoked when “the affairs of a group or association” were at issue, but in this context it
meant “the area in which the associational rights are not organizational but personal in nature.”
Godbold cited a Yale Law Journal article by the influential law professor Thomas Emerson, who had
argued, “’No one can doubt that freedom of association, as a basic mechanism of the democratic
process, must receive constitutional protection . . . .’” By threatening it, the court had sent
“paternalistic authoritarianism” colliding “head-on” with individual freedom. “No more invidious
discrimination, or improper government objective, can be imagined,” he wrote, “than national power
setting aside the valid exercise by members of a class in the name of the constitutional objective for
23
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which the choice was granted in the first place.” Godbold was arguing that blacks who chose to remain
in black schools would soon have their choice of association disregarded by requirements for racial
percentage quotas. In the near future, many whites would use this same logic for all of its worth. They
would claim with great fervor their right to “freedom of association” as it applied to their private
academies and suburban school systems.24

Segregationist Reaction to Lee v. Macon and U.S. v. Jefferson
The day after the Fifth Circuit ruling in U.S. v. Jefferson, Governor Lurleen Wallace went before a
joint session of the Alabama State Legislature and delivered a televised speech which was surprising only
in that it was Mrs. Wallace delivering it and not her husband. Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer
caught himself accidently introducing George Wallace – a perfectly natural mistake. The former
Governor Wallace had held closed-door meetings all day with local boards of education, at which over
300 individuals signed a resolution calling on the state’s attorney general and the current governor to
somehow oppose Lee v. Macon. Lurleen Wallace’s speech that night was largely prepared by George
Wallace and his advisors, of course, and contained many of the same defiant tropes people had come to
expect from the acting Governor Wallace. In recklessness and sheer absurdity, however, it actually
surpassed many of the former governor’s previous harangues. The Wallace camp undoubtedly
reasoned that it could make the court profoundly uncomfortable by inviting it to jail the nation’s first
female governor for contempt. Lurleen Wallace’s address would certainly not go unnoticed by the court
or anyone else in the state. It was covered by 20 television stations and 43 radio stations. According to
the governor’s office, this made it the most widely covered political event in Alabama history. Frank
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Johnson had advised John Doar, “You might make arrangements, as you see fit, to have the address
taped.”25
Lurleen Wallace strode confidently into this fire on the night of March 30, displaying a seemingly
genuine anger and anguish, even appearing on the verge of tears at times. The “Associate Editor for
Women” of the Birmingham News described the governor as a “grim-faced slip of a woman . . . . Eyes
red-rimmed, lips set, [with] nothing coy about her demeanor. Even her navy dress, with navy and white
stripped blazer, bespoke the seriousness with which she approached the matter.” Wallace began by
serving notice to “the people who would attack our children and our institutions” that “Alabama and its
elected officials dare defend our rights.” The floor erupted in applause here, and multiple times
throughout, as the governor denounced both the Lee v. Macon decision and the U.S. v. Jefferson
decision. They were, she explained, collectively “calculated to destroy the school system of Alabama.”
They constituted “the last step toward a complete takeover of children’s’ hearts and minds,” and such a
takeover was “exactly what Hitler did in Germany.” They were, in short, “beyond the law which governs
us as a people.”26
Wallace said she wanted “all the people of Alabama to understand what this decree purports to
do.“ Though it was sometimes unclear if the governor was talking about Lee or Jefferson, or both, she
insisted that “the order” took over “every single aspect of the operation of every school system within
the state of Alabama” and “destroy[ed] the authority of local school boards, the State Board of
Education, the Superintendent of Education, and the Governor.” It gave that authority, she claimed, to
“agents of the district court, who must execute the commands of three judges, who will determine all

25

New York Times, March 29, 1967; Washington Post, March 29, 1967; Birmingham News, March 29, 30,
31, 1967; School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, March, 1967, SERS.
26
Address by Governor Lurleen Wallace, Joint Session, Alabama Legislature, March 30, 1967 (Copy of
Speech with Handwritten Notes by Judge Frank Johnson) in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File,
Container 21, Folder 5 [hereinafter cited as “L. Wallace Address, March 30, 1967”]; New York Times, March 29,
1967; Washington Post, March 29, 1967; Birmingham News, March 29, 30, 31, 1967; School Desegregation in the
Southern and Border States, March, 1967, SERS.

470

matters of policy.” For example, the court would now tell parents “what bus a child must ride on,” and
it would close certain schools “and send the children to another part of town or to another part of the
county.” In addition to giving the court total control over all aspects of “education policy,” the order
“force[d] white children to go to all-Negro schools, and Negro students to go to predominantly white
schools.” It demanded plans for “massive reassignment and transfer of children and teachers.” The
governor suggested that should anyone resist this forced assignment, the court would “put their parents
in jail.” No parents were free “to discuss the order of the court, other than to express approval
thereof,” because “any open expression of disapproval subjects the individual to contempt.” Of the “socalled freedom of choice” desegregation plan, Wallace understood the court to mean that such a plan
“does not work unless you obtain balance in each and every school system.” Most Alabamians were
probably unaware of the mind-boggling irony of the governor’s next statement, in which she charged
the federal judges with threatening “to have your elected public officials coerce local school boards and
cut off state funds to any of our public schools and state colleges which fail to abide by their
interpretation.”27
The governor determined that compliance with the decrees would be “a physical impossibility”
and that, in any case, the decisions were unconstitutional. They had been rendered “in malice and
animosity”: in malice, she said, “against a free people who would exercise their sovereign power
through the accent of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe . . .” and in “animosity against the
leadership expressed by Alabamians through my husband, which brings this nation to a moment of
truth.” Wallace then embarked on a hopeless defense of a rapidly evaporating understanding of the
United States’ federal system. “There is a higher power than this three-man court,” she asserted, “and
it finds itself in the power given by the people to their elected officials.” This was “the police power of
the state, the right of state government to take whatever action which may be necessary to protect the
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morals, health, and welfare of its citizens, the peace and tranquility of its people.” It was “the highest
law . . . above the individual and above the three judge Federal district court.” Alabamians were bound
to “obey the law,” but they did not “have to take action beyond the law. And let this be understood,
too,” she paused, “federal judges are not beyond the law.”28
Lurleen Wallace concluded her speech with a call to arms. The citizens of Alabama had a
“standard of courage,” she argued, which could “not falter in its dedication to principle and to doing
whatever may be necessary to fulfill our duties.” She said plainly, “We must resist this decree in every
way possible . . . .” She asked the legislators to “resolve [themselves] into a committee of the whole and
. . . if necessary, invoke the police powers of this state.” The state was appealing the decision and
appealing for a stay of the order pending the appeal. In the event that these were unsuccessful, Wallace
asked the proposed “committee of the whole” to issue a “cease and desist order” to the three federal
judges who have issued the “unfounded decree,” to consider placing all authority over education in the
hands of the governor, and to “consider whether additional state troopers will be required in order that
the children of our state be protected.” In doing this, she declared, they could “win this battle, day by
day, inch by inch, and decree by decree, all within the law.” Evoking Andrew Jackson, she added
defiantly, “‘They have made their decree; now let them enforce it. . . . We shall never quit,” she
concluded, “and we shall win.”29
Shortly after the speech, Frank Johnson drafted a list of statements made by the governor
“which [did] not appear to have any basis in fact.” Johnson was irritated by what he understood were a
series of confusions and deliberate mischaracterizations which littered the speech. Since Fred Gray had
included the text of the governor’s address a memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ request for
a stay pending appeal, Johnson was able to incorporate a rebuttal of sorts into an order denying the
request. Johnson explained that the recent order “did not involve any new or novel constitutional or
28
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legal principles and did not add to the defendants’ obligations to eliminate discrimination in Alabama’s
public schools.” It only “made those obligations specific.” Without mentioning Lurleen Wallace by
name, Johnson wrote, “Interpretations of the order of this Court to the contrary are erroneous and not
factually sound, particularly public statements, now a part of the record in this case, made by one of the
defendants in this case to the following effect . . . .” He then listed the various misinterpretations,
including: that the order forced white children to go to black schools and vice versa; that the court
would determine such assignments; that it required bussing to achieve racial balance; that the court
would close schools and send students across town or county; that it required the closure of all black
junior colleges and trade schools; that the court would determine teacher certification; that no one
could criticize the order; and that it was “rendered in malice and animosity.” Johnson added, “Such
statements (and no attempt is made to enumerate all that are erroneous) may have the effect of
misleading the parents, school authorities, and other citizens of Alabama who are not personally familiar
with the decree . . . .” Federal judges generally considered themselves above the fray of state politics,
and Johnson was no exception. But he was not going to allow the defendants’ outright lies about the
court’s order to influence the public, who would after all be the ones who had to live with it.30
In the days following his wife’s defiant speech, George Wallace took his own, familiar shots at
the desegregation orders and the courts. Of the Lee v. Macon decree, Wallace said specifically, “[It] is
“impossible. It won’t work. It won’t work here and it won’t work in California, or Washington, D.C., or
New York, or Chicago. It’s intellectually moronic control of our children.” He surmised that the “Federal
Government” would nonetheless try to “cram this decree down our throats.” This was the same federal
government, he railed, which tried to tell Americans who they could “take a showerbath with” and who
30
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they had to “let use [their] restrooms. . . . It’s all beginning to grate on people’s nerves,” Wallace said,
Can’t the people have something to say about their own destiny. They’re just ordinary mortals.” He
predicted, “A clash and a collision is coming between moronic intellectual bureaucracy and the people
and the people’s representatives.” A Los Angeles Times national political correspondent observed that
what appeared “to Wallace fans outside the South” to be a variant of the states’ rights argument
actually “looked to many of the state’s educators and many citizens very much like another Wallace
bluff that could disrupt the gains the state has made and possibly even result in bloodshed.” He astutely
concluded, “Wallace apparently plans to use his defiance of the court’s edict in his campaign as a states’
rights candidate for president in 1968.”31
The white citizens of Alabama soon showed their own disapproval of the court’s actions. Two
white youths burned a cross on Johnson’s lawn, and hate mail and death threats began to pour into the
district court.32 One letter demanded that Johnson “withdraw, rescind, cancel, [and/or] void,” the
order. It continued:

We mean every word of this demand and if you ignore or fail to carry out the instructions
outlined above, your son, an innocent person will pay the penalty first, then your mother who is
also innocent, then will be your time. We will get you regardless of how many bodyguards you
have. At home, at the office, in court or in transit from your home to the office. . . . We have
plenty practice killing Viet Congs off by the dozens. We do not have freedom in the U.S.
anymore but we will soon have some satisfaction in getting rid of some of the bastards causing
the trouble. Singed . . . . . FIVE VOLUNTEERS33

A similar letter addressed to all three judges on the Lee v. Macon panel demanded, “The order you
issued must – I mean MUST be rescinded – reversed – done away with altogether or you or your families
will pay a mighty big price for it.” These men, possibly the same as the authors of the first letter, were
31
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“Armed Service men” who had spent “two years in Vietnam killing, sniping, and going through hell . . . .”
They warned:

If you, by this order force the schools and teachers against their will to mix in the Alabama
schools you will not live to see the end of the year – Your families will also suffer severe
punishment – possible death due to your efforts. Judge Grooms, that fine daughter of your [sic]
will pay the penalty with you. Judge Johnson, if your son should survive he will have to enroll in
a public school – not a private school this year. This had better be arranged at once and The
[Montgomery] Advertiser be advised so they can give due publicity of your action in a news
item. We mean NOW. Judge Rives, YOU OLD SOB had better get ready also, you don’t have
much longer to live and the sooner we get rid of you the better it will be. ALL THREE OF YOU
GET READY TO GO OUT LIKE A LIGHT.34

The letter-writers had determined that the court order was “more than [they would] stand for.”
George Wallace and some of those around him continued to indirectly encourage such defiance. “You
know what we goin’ to tell them when they ask us to give ‘em more in the schools of Alabama this fall,”
Wallace at one point asked reporters. “I’ll tell you what we’ll tell ‘em,” he said, “Goddamnit, we jus’
ain’t.” When the state legislature met as a “committee of the whole” as Lurleen Wallace had suggested,
Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer, Wallace’s legislative point man, argued that the court order in Lee
was going to “destroy public education because our people are not going to sit still for someone to come
and tell them that their children must be transferred to a school of another race.” Brewer added, “You
are going to have riots; you are going to have knifings and stabbings in every school in this state. The
people of Alabama are not going to suffer their children to be trifled with, not in Alabama or any other
state.” Ten days after the denial of the stay request, Frank Johnson’s mother sat watching television in
an upstairs bedroom of her south Montgomery home when an explosion blew out windows on the
ground floor and blew a two-foot hole under the foundation. Someone had made good on their threats,
planting a crude and fortunately non-lethal bomb under the kitchen window. In the spirit of law and
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order, George Wallace denounced the attack as a “cowardly act” and contributed to a reward fund for
the outing of the perpetrators.35
While state officials continued to bluster, reaction to the decisions from local school officials
included a mixture of trepidation and relief. Most state legislators had publically expressed support for
the governor, voicing their “bitter opposition” to the Lee decree and pledging to support the
“exhaustion of all legal remedies.” Several thought Wallace had “expressed the viewpoint of a great
majority of Alabamians” or had spoken “for the masses.” State Senator and Crenshaw County Board of
Education counsel Alton Turner called it “the greatest speech I have ever heard in eight years of service
in the legislature.” When the legislators met as the “committee of the whole” and held hearings and
heard testimony from local superintendents, however, the tone was different. Most of the local officials
indicated a preference to retain what local control they had. They continued to express concern over
finding competent black teachers and over impending violence if there was “a massive move towards
integration.” Some noted the potential impact of dealing with the court, as opposed to HEW, with one
indicating that he and his school board had been “doing as little as [they] could,” that is, “talking a lot to
HEW” but “doing little.” This would not be possible under the watch of Johnson’s court, he felt. Outside
the hearings, others privately confided that the Lee v. Macon ruling was a blessing in disguise, insofar as
it alleviated some of the conflicting pressures they had been under. One said, “I feel like it is going to
help us some” because “it puts the monkey on somebody else’s back.” In short, they could blame the
court if they were criticized by state authorities or by segregationists in their communities. They could
tell people that defiance would only invite a motion to add their systems as actual parties defendant and
that defiance beyond that would bring contempt. Thus freed to say, “We resisted as long as we could,”
many resolved to comply with the court’s order. When George Wallace called a meeting with state
Superintendent Stone and all local superintendents on March 30, the newfound reluctance of the local
35
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officials became evident. Wallace told them that they could be more influential than the legislature if
they would only denounce the Lee decision and school desegregation in general. Wallace suggested
that the Alabama Association of School Administrators might declare itself in session then and there and
issue some sort of “expression,” and then he left the auditorium. No one motioned for either a session
declaration or for the drafting of a resolution.36
At the same time, Lurleen Wallace was meeting with the governors of Georgia, Mississippi, and
Louisiana at a summit on school desegregation “problems” occasioned by Jefferson. It was George’s
idea. The fact that only four southern governors attended, including his wife, was a setback for Wallace.
The group still issued a joint statement in which they denounced Jefferson and Lee v. Macon and argued
that these would “bring nothing but chaos in the field of education.” The decisions required “ultimate
extremes” which simply could not “be accomplished in this area or in any other area of the nation
without destroying public education.” In individual statements to the press, none of the other three
governors would advocate or lend support to the kind of defiance Wallace had suggested in her speech,
though. Criticism and concern from other potential supporters followed. The Alabama Association of
School Boards sent a telegram to the governor asking her to “maintain the autonomy of the local boards
of education.” Dr. Alton Crews, the superintendent of Huntsville City Schools, argued in a late April
speech before the Alabama Congress of Parents and Teachers that it was “high time we recognize that
we’ve got to live with these people within the framework accepted by a majority of the people of these
United States.” Crews added that they could no longer “equate states’ rights with the denial of human
rights.” The Lee and Jefferson rulings thus seemed to significantly swell the ranks of the law-and-order
compliance camp. With a court order binding them, many local school officials resigned themselves to
at least system-wide freedom of choice and token faculty desegregation. At the same time, law-andorder defiance continued to emanate from Montgomery, encouraging recalcitrant local educators and
36
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enraged segregationist lay people alike. And if the tone of some of the mail arriving at the federal
courthouse in the state’s capitol and the bomb which nearly killed Frank Johnson’s mother were any
indication, not all of them were willing to eschew violence.37
The state’s major daily newspapers reflected the disappointment and resignation felt by a
number of segregationists. They also expressed incredulity over the state government’s continuing
defiant posturing. The Birmingham News called Lee v. Macon a “sweeping statement with historic
implications,” noting that “13 years later” the “shoe” had finally fallen “on the 90 and 9.” It lamented
the ruling and wondered if the court might “see fit to modify its insistence of rapid and disruptive
change in school areas, such as faculties, where immediate and wholesale change would prove highly
injurious to the state’s school children, Negro and white alike.” The order for faculty desegregation, in
particular, did not “begin to come to grips with either the practical problems this would create or the
human realities inherent in such a transition.” Despite its disapproval, the News was more concerned
with the response from the governor’s office. It was unbelievable, it reasoned, that the Wallaces would
lead the state’s school systems “on another – and undoubtedly futile – political snipe hunt. . . . Excesses
created by official state reaction,” it continued, would do “nothing to thwart implementation of federal
court orders.” But “proponents of civil rights” would certainly welcome “help in their cause in the form
of officially-inspired disturbance in Alabama.” The destruction of “relative racial peace” and the
restoration of “racial turbulence [and] all the danger it portends” would be the only tangible results of
the governor’s propositions for defiance. The News concluded that Wallace’s plan was essentially
another form of interposition, “a simple but potentially uproarious position” which still “excite[d] the
fancy of southerners,” but which was “discredited as far back as 1809 and [had] yet to carry any weight
in any instance in which it [had] been raised . . . .” When the Wallaces were spurned by several
governors at the proposed desegregation summit, the News considered it an indication that other
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states’ leaders understood Alabama’s course to be “doomed to failure, possibly disastrous to public
education, and an invitation to dangerous disorder.” The declining governors had probably concluded
that “shaking fists at federal courts” was “not going to accomplish anything.” Many similarly astute
observers in Alabama understood the Wallace speech and proposals to be nothing more than empty
political gestures, whose real consequences would be largely extralegal and wholly negative.38
Meanwhile, black leaders in the state served notice that they planned to use the Lee and
Jefferson decisions as springboards to more meaningful changes. At the annual convention of the black
teachers’ organization – the Alabama State Teachers Association (ASTA) – Executive Secretary Joe Reed
secured passage of a resolution declaring freedom of choice unworkable. Reed said that there would
“never be integrated schools as long as the burden is placed on the parents to break the tradition by
transferring a Negro child from a previously all-Negro school to a previously all-white school.” Reed
explained that “economic reprisals, political repercussions, and social insecurity” could all be brought to
bear, all of which made freedom of choice “in this sense . . . no choice at all.” The teachers also resolved
to initiate a campaign to reform the state’s history textbooks. Some texts were less blatantly racist and
pro-segregationist than Know Alabama, but they still distorted black history by generally limiting it to
the persons of George Washington Carver and Booker T. Washington. The association also announced a
challenge to the building of a second four-year college in Montgomery. The plans to open a satellite
campus of Auburn University in the city were widely understood to be part of a segregationist effort to
avoid integrating or upgrading the black teachers’ college in the city – Alabama State. Reed called the
plans “absurd, ridiculous, [and] ludicrous,” adding that Montgomery needed another four-year
institution “like a moose needs a hat.” The featured speaker at the ASTA meeting was the LDF’s Jack
Greenberg. The New York attorney encouraged the teachers to keep up their fight. He told them the
LDF had represented teachers successfully in discrimination suits before and added, “if we’re needed,
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we can fight and win in Alabama.” The association’s president, Choctaw County educator Anthony
Butler, responded, “We believe what you say, and we’re going to call on you.” Butler said that ASTA was
particularly concerned about black teachers and administrators getting displaced or demoted in
desegregation restructuring because of their supposed inferiority. He told the crowd, to great applause,
that the organization would fight such discrimination “until Hell freezes over.”39

NAACP v. Wallace Decided
When some of the furor over Lee v. Macon and U.S. v. Jefferson had finally begun to die down,
the court considering NAACP v. Wallace rendered its judgment. At that point it was nearly an
afterthought. In a per curiam opinion handed down May 3, the court unanimously determined that it
was “too clear for extended discussion” that the Alabama Anti-guidelines Act was “in conflict with Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act and, therefore, unconstitutional.” The statute had the “effect of deterring and
interfering with the efforts of local school boards in Alabama” which were trying to comply with HEW
regulations by signing 441-B. The Fifth Circuit had, of course, declared the Guidelines valid in U.S. v.
Jefferson, but the court here explained that the Alabama statute was invalid and unconstitutional
regardless of the Guidelines’ validity. It was, as the Civil Rights Division had suggested, violative of the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the federal Constitution. A state simply could not, except through
proper federal court action, “undertake to declare null and void any action of a federal department or
agency to implement or effectuate a federal statute.” This was particularly true “where such declaration
is a part of the State's effort to obstruct or interfere with the operation of such statute.” In short, the
state could not “take the law into its own hands.” The Lee v. Macon injunction had made any injunction
against the Anti-guidelines Act’s enforcement seem redundant, so the court let its invalidation stand
alone, while retaining jurisdiction to take any such other action as might be necessary. On the basis of
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the en banc U.S. v. Jefferson ruling, the court held that the Guidelines were constitutionally valid and
within the scope of the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act. The three-judge court was bound by the
appellate court’s decision, and even if it was not, the judges determined that the en banc decision was
“entitled to such great deference and respect that we would be unwilling to depart from it.”40
The court added several “ancillary” findings, mostly to facilitate the efficient implementation of
the Lee v. Macon decree. It held that the Guidelines were “simply a statement of policies” and did not
have the force of law. This meant that any termination of federal funds was subject to plenary judicial
review. In the absence of judicial review, school systems ought to respect the Guidelines as “a reliable
guide” to Title VI compliance. The court emphasized that Title VI compliance did not mean “compulsory
mixing of the races,” only the elimination of discrimination. Obviously, state and local officials disagreed
with HEW and the courts over the meaning of “elimination of discrimination,” so the court added that
this should mean the elimination of the “dual structure” and the removal of “every vestige of legal
discrimination.” There were need to be “some compulsory association of the races” in some systems,
but only for the purpose of eliminating the dual structure. This seemed like an attempt to assure people
that recent decisions of the courts would not automatically lead to “forced assignments” for the
purpose of achieving system-wide “racial balance,” while at the same time maintaining that nondiscrimination no longer meant mere tokenism. To further mollify school administrators’ concerns, or to
prevent further chicanery and evasion, the court added that the controversial requirement in 441-B
binding systems to “any amendment” of the Guidelines ought to be construed to mean “any valid and
lawful amendment.” Had the federal bureaucrats drafting the Guidelines fully understood how far some
Alabamians would go to avoid desegregation, they might have thought to include such language to
begin with. Finally, the court sounded an ominous reminder to HEW: systems that were subject to a
final order of a federal court were to be deemed in compliance with HEW. “As courts attempt to co40
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operate with executive and legislative policies,” it wrote, “so too the Department must respect a court
order for the desegregation of a school or school system.”41

Implementing Lee v. Macon
The mechanics of the statewide structural injunction in Lee v. Macon began to quickly manifest
themselves that spring. While the case was assigned to a three-judge court, Judge Johnson was the
primary administrator of the injunction. A letter from Judge Rives – the senior of the three and the only
Circuit Judge among them – revealed Johnson’s unique role. Rives wrote fellow Circuit Judge John
Brown in April to thank him for commending the judges on a fine opinion in Lee v. Macon. “The
responsibility,” Rives candidly wrote, “was and is that of all three judges but the glory belongs entirely to
Judge Frank Johnson. Since that is true,” he continued, “I can agree wholeheartedly with all of the good
things you have to say about this opinion as well as about the vast amount of administrative work he has
done and is continuing to do in this case.” Having agreed to take on this “vast” workload, Judge Johnson
subsequently contacted John Doar to ensure the Civil Rights Division would assist the court in
implementing the decree. Johnson called Doar in early April to advise him, in Johnson’s own words, that
“it was important for his office to be gathering the necessary factual data that might be needed in the
enforcement of [the] decree.” Johnson suggested that Doar consider maintaining a group of attorneys
in Montgomery for the purpose of monitoring the state legislature, should it decide to act on any of
Governor Wallace’s defiant suggestions. The ever vigilant Doar had already done so. If the legislature
stripped the state superintendent of his authority, the CRD was prepared to enter a motion asking that
this be declared unconstitutional. The CRD had also prepared to enter further motions should the state
continue to disburse funds to non-complying school systems. Division attorneys were also ready to
move to have individual school systems added as parties defendant in the case if they failed to adopt
41
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the court’s model desegregation plan. Johnson advised Doar at one point that he had been “receiving
information indicating that there may possibly be some official state interference and quite probably will
be interference from private individuals and groups at some of the schools . . . .” Johnson assumed any
state interference would again be based “upon the theory that it is incumbent upon the governor, in the
exercise of her police power, to maintain ‘law and order’ . . . .” The Division was ready act in such case,
and it was generally ready to be the court’s right arm as the first stage in the implementation of the
decree approached.42
In mid-April, Ernest Stone dutifully reported to the court which systems had adopted and
submitted desegregation plans, per the decree. According to Stone, 98 of the 99 school systems named
in the Lee decree had submitted some sort of plan. The court called upon the CRD to analyze the plans
and submit its own report. St. John Barrett bore the bad news to Judge Johnson in person first: nearly
half of the systems had submitted unacceptable plans, mostly because they refused to account for
faculty desegregation and the elimination of duplicate bus routes. Johnson warned the other two
judges that a “very disappointing” report was forthcoming. The CRD’s analysis revealed that 15 systems
had adopted plans “conforming to the Court’s model plan in all particulars,” while another 24 had
adopted a model plan with only minor deviations in choice period dates. Seventeen systems had
adopted close-to-model plans, which the CRD felt could be easily corrected. Most of these had made
subtle changes in the language of the court’s model plan which they felt would allow them to stall for
time or to avoid some particularly onerous detail. Ten school systems claimed to have closed all
previously black schools for the upcoming term; all of these systems had relatively few black students
and could thus absorb them into white schools with relatively few problems. Two of those 10 systems,
42
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though, ere city systems which had failed to ensure that their black students would not simply be
bussed out to all-black county schools. Ten others had simply sent in the text of press releases
indicating that they were in compliance with the outdated 1965-66 HEW Guidelines; these lacked any
provisions for facilities equalization, consolidation and construction, periodic reporting, or substantive
faculty desegregation. Another 17 had sent in HEW Form 441-B agreements, which included some of
the “principle features” of the court’s model plan, but which also “omit[ted] a number of its principle
provisions,” including those for equalization, consolidation and construction, and periodic reporting.
Five systems sent in plans which were neither patterned after the court’s plan nor HEW’s, and which
thus failed to meet the court’s standards in any way.43
The court ordered Stone to notify the systems with unsatisfactory plans that revisions were
needed. Most submitted or agreed to submit revised plans. As Doar had indicated to Judge Johnson
that it would, the CRD then promptly moved to bring the most recalcitrant systems into compliance.
Four systems failed, even after Stone’s notices to revise, to submit plans anywhere close to embodying
the standards of the model plan: Autauga County, Cullman County, Pickens County, and Bibb County.
The CRD moved to have them added as actual parties defendant to the case. Judge Johnson granted the
motion and ordered the systems to show cause why they should not be added as such.44
At an early May hearing, St. John Barrett revealed that Autauga, Cullman, and Pickens had filed
answers to the show cause order in which they agreed to adopt the model plan. In subsequent
correspondence with the court, they had agreed to address certain specific issues in their respective
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districts; for example, Cullman County agreed that black students from a closed black school would be
absorbed into the County’s white schools, not bussed out of the county to another system’s schools.
Bibb had made no response whatsoever. In fact Bibb had zero desegregated pupils and had resolved to
fight its inclusion as a party defendant, having secured noted segregationist attorney Reid Barnes to
plead its case. At the hearing, Barnes made an ill-prepared, stumbling, but insistent objection to Bibb
being directly enjoined by the court. But the judges were unconvinced. Barrett successfully parried all
of Barnes’ attempts to persuade the court, which had already made up its collective mind in any case.
The only question which gave the court any pause was that of jurisdiction: did the court have jurisdiction
over Bibb in this instance, since Bibb was in the Northern District of Alabama, not the Middle District.
The court found that it did, either via an ancillary proceeding or a properly joinable separate claim. The
court agreed to discharge Autauga, Cullman, and Pickens as direct parties to the case, but the Bibb
school board and its individual members and superintendent were enjoined from failing to adopt the
model desegregation plan.45
One week after the court issued the order enjoining Bibb County, the Supreme Court denied the
defendant state officials’ application for a stay pending the appeal of the March 22 decision in Lee v.
Macon. At the same time, the Civil Rights Division submitted its analysis of the revised desegregation
plans submitted by 48 school systems in April. The CRD determined that 38 had submitted revised plans
that conformed to the model plan and that another 5 had agreed to submit necessary adjustments
within three days. The remaining five had failed to submit satisfactory plans. The CRD entered a motion
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asking that these five – Jasper, Linden, Marion, Marengo County, and Thomasville – be added as parties
defendant and be ordered to show cause why they should not be enjoined.46
The recalcitrant school boards were learning quickly about Judge Johnson. If these systems
demonstrated good faith, or even just showed a genuine willingness to cooperate, he was quite
understanding. It they appeared to be uncooperative or unconcerned, however, he would not hesitate
to use the full power of the court to change their minds. He entered an order on May 26 adding the five
systems as parties to the suit and set a show cause hearing for June 9. At the conclusion of the hearing,
Marion and Thomasville found themselves the second and third systems under Lee v. Macon to be
enjoined individually. Linden, Marengo, and Jasper were not enjoined but simply ordered to report to
the court within the next several weeks as to their progress in adopting satisfactory plans. By the end of
the month, Linden had been discharged as a defendant, and the other systems were making efforts to
be similarly dismissed. Bibb remained obdurate and appealed its injunction to both the Fifth Circuit and
the Supreme Court, uncertain of which court had appellate jurisdiction.47
Ernest Stone had to work ceaselessly that summer compiling reports for the court. In addition
to reports on individual systems’ compliance status, Stone’s office had to compile a comprehensive plan
for the equalization of facilities in those systems, a similar plan for the elimination of dual transportation
systems, and another for encouraging faculty desegregation. When Stone submitted his initial plans to
the court, Judge Johnson submitted them to the CRD attorneys and to Fred Gray for analysis. The CRD
found both the proposed facilities and transportation plans inadequate and asked the court to require
“further implementation” of its decree. It suggested that the court require Stone to “prepare a further
and more detailed proposed plan for equalization in accordance with the Decree and [to] submit such
46
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plan to this Court no later than August 15, 1967.” Stone had submitted a very vague plan, so the CRD
suggested that the revised plan include “an itemized inventory of all existing inequalities between
schools attended predominantly by Negro children and schools attended predominantly by white
children in each of the 99 systems . . . .” It further suggested 13 categories into which the inventory
should be itemized, including per pupil spending, valuation of facilities and equipment, availability of
textbooks, accreditation, and courses offered. Finally, the CRD proposed that Stone be required to work
with each school system on individualized equalization plans and to submit those collectively to the
court in the fall. When Stone submitted such plans for transportation desegregation, the CRD
scrutinized each system’s plan and motioned for “more specific relief.” It asked the court to require
each system to make certain modifications, including reports as to the number of expected black and
white students on each bus and their ultimate destination. The court immediately approved each of the
U.S.’s motions and ordered Stone to make the necessary changes, using the exact language from the
CRD motions.48
The avowedly segregationist Stone was obliged to carry out the court’s orders, faced as he was
with contempt proceedings if he failed to do so. At the same time, the Justice Department was obliged
to work with Stone to ensure that systems were complying. Johnson wrote to John Doar after entering
the orders requiring further relief, advising him, “This Court expects, and requires, your office to ‘follow
through’ on these matters by consultation with the State Superintendent of Education and the various
local school authorities in an effort to eliminate these inequalities and, if necessary, as a final resort, by
appropriate petition or petitions presented to the Court.” Johnson thus monitored the CRD’s progress,
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while the CRD monitored Stone’s progress. After hearing from the CRD attorneys, Stone often wrote to
Johnson to emphasize his good faith and to beseech the court for more time. When the CRD advised
Stone that he was behind in submitting the revised report on equalization, he wrote to Johnson, “The
State Department of Education is woefully lacking in personnel to handle the obligations of the Court
and the regular obligations to the schools. We are working overtime most every day,” he continued, “in
an effort to satisfy these obligations [and] pray that the Court will understand our problems and will
bear with us as long as we put forth every possible effort . . . .” Johnson believed Stone was doing his
best and generally granted the state superintendent the extensions he requested.49
Johnson was patient with Stone because he understood the difficult task which he had been
assigned. The plaintiffs, the CRD, and the court had envisioned Stone acting in the same capacity as
Attorney General Meadows had recently acted, only he would be insisting upon desegregation rather
than discouraging it. Johnson understood that, in doing so, Stone had to work very closely with very
reluctant and often recalcitrant school boards and superintendents. For example, Stone wrote to the
superintendent of Escambia County Schools, “Upon examination of your Inventory of Equalization . . .
we find what appear to be inequalities. In further compliance with the special order,” he continued, “it
will be necessary for you to submit to me in triplicate your plans in detail to correct the inequalities
listed by item on the attached sheet.” These were inequalities which had been red-flagged by the CRD
attorneys. Stone advised, “Barton Elementary with an enrollment of 64 is substandard in size. The site
is classified for temporary use only. Are there any plans to close and consolidate this school and enroll
pupils in other schools meeting desirable standards?” Stone was also obliged to point out, “Life Science
and General Shop in grades 9, 10, and 12 is not taught in predominantly Negro schools whereas this
subject is taught in these grades in predominantly white schools.” Stone similarly informed Conecuh
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County that its per pupil valuation of school buildings was $313.28 in black schools, compared to
$582.91 in white schools. The same for “furniture and fixtures” was $2.16 to $4.45. Per pupil
expenditures on instructional materials was $1,875 to $3,400. Such systems were expected to submit
appropriate changes to Stone, who forwarded them to the CRD and the court. These were the early
mechanics of the Lee v. Macon statewide decree. Johnson and the Civil Rights Division attorneys at the
Department of Justice supervised and advised state Superintendent Stone, who tried to keep local
systems on schedule in submitting satisfactory plans.50

The Court v. HEW
As the court went about implementing its decree through the Justice Department and
Superintendent Stone, HEW continued to monitor school systems in Alabama. The two entities quickly
clashed over jurisdiction. As early as April, school systems began complaining to Judge Johnson that
they were being harassed by HEW investigators. Johnson called John Doar and asked him to talk to HEW
officials and to ascertain their intentions relative to the Lee v. Macon school systems. Doar told Johnson
that HEW felt it had “a continuing responsibility to audit the performance of all school boards,” whether
they were under a court order or not. But HEW officials assured Doar that, pursuant to the revised
Guidelines, HEW would consider systems “in-compliance” if they were “subject to a final order” of a
federal court. Doar and Johnson assumed that this meant the Lee systems were “in-compliance” as long
as they had adopted the court’s model plan and submitted an assurance of compliance to HEW. St. John
Barrett had argued as much in court during the April hearing on the Lee v. Macon stay application.
Problems arose, however, with respect to those systems which HEW had already cited for noncompliance prior to the March 22 Lee v. Macon order. HEW refused to give those systems an assurance
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that their funds would be restored, despite their adoption of the court’s model plan. The affected
school boards could not, then, hire and place teachers, because they did not know if they could pay
them, and they could not plan remedial education programs, because they did not know if they would
be funded. Johnson alerted the other two panel judges and suggested that they “advise the
Department of Justice attorneys that such action on the part of HEW is thwarting the implementation of
our order.” Johnson felt that should ask DOJ to “attempt immediately to make arrangements with HEW
officials for a continuation of funds” for all of the 99 Lee systems, and to attempt to “work out some
policy on this point” in a “high level conference with HEW officials.”51
When local school officials began complaining of HEW investigators demanding pupil
assignments to meet percentage quotas, Johnson became more irritated. Doar assured the judge that
these must have been the actions of “some low level bureaucrat” proceeding without the authority of
established HEW policy. The judges considered enjoining HEW itself. Johnson felt it would have been
counterproductive. The court would need HEW later, once securing “paper compliance” had given way
to monitoring “actual performance” in the 99 systems. Johnson believed that enjoining HEW would
have had the effect of “sabotaging” the department’s effectiveness in this regard. But if HEW actually
did adopt, at its highest levels, the “unrealistic policy” of waiting until after school had begun to assure
compliant systems of funds reinstatement, or of requiring pupil assignment to achieve quotas, then he
would “feel it necessary to take some action.” Judges Rives and Grooms agreed. Rives commented that
it appeared HEW was “not complying with the spirit or the letter” of the Guidelines. Doar continued to
meet with HEW officials, but he was frustrated in his efforts to secure some sort of arrangement which
would have kept HEW and the court from what appeared to be an increasingly serious confrontation.52
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The department and the court simply disagreed fundamentally as to HEW’s role moving
forward, as far as the Lee systems were concerned. The court felt that HEW ought to continue to
monitor these systems, just as the Civil Rights Division was doing. But the judges assumed that HEW
would not defer or terminate funds without first bringing the matter before the court. Any analysis or
determination the CRD made was submitted to the court in the form of a recommendation or motion
for some sort of action. HEW did not see its role in this way. Its position was that the 99 systems were
not “subject to a final order” of a federal court, because other than Bibb and a few others, the systems
were not actual parties to the suit. Therefore, systems which were notified of non-compliance before
the Lee v. Macon order needed to take some action to restore their complaint status, beyond simply
adopting the court’s model plan. Accordingly, Peter Libassi, head of the HEW Office of Civil Rights,
instructed HEW officials to continue in their funds deferral and termination process where systems were
found to be inadequately proceeding towards meaningful desegregation. HEW Secretary John Gardner
had recently given Libassi control over all HEW civil rights enforcement, meaning that the controversial
Harold Howe was no longer in charge of school desegregation compliance. This was widely seen as an
effort to mollify the concerns of irritated southern Democrats, whose support the Johnson
Administration needed to renew the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Removing Howe’s
enforcement powers undoubtedly helped bring some Democratic legislators on board with the
administration. But if Libassi’s appointment was supposed to signal an HEW retreat, Alabama’s
Democrats were quickly disappointed.53
In June HEW moved to terminate federal funds to the Lanett city system, one of the 99 Lee
systems. This action brought matters to a head with the court. Lanett had been deemed a noncomplier before the March order. HEW investigators found that the system was maintaining a black
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high school which the department felt ought to be closed and its student body consolidated. They also
determined, in the words of the Lanett superintendent, that the Lanett school board “did not have
enough mixing as a result of freedom of choice.” The school board had submitted an adequate plan to
the court and had submitted all necessary reports to Stone as ordered. Indeed, as part of its approved
plans, Lanett was scheduled to rectify the problem areas cited by HEW investigators. But HEW was not
satisfied. Doar wrote Judge Johnson and tried to lobby for HEW, prompting Johnson, in an extremely
rare difference of opinion, to accuse Doar of being “high-handed.” HEW then moved to defer funds to
Talladega County, another Lee system, whose compliance efforts Johnson described as “magnificent.”
At this point, Johnson wrote Rives and Grooms, calling their attention to the “ridiculous situation” and
suggesting that it made an injunction “even more necessary than the Lanett situation . . . .” The court
decided that it could not allow school boards to be subject to such conflicting pressures and
requirements, nor was it prepared to let its authority be challenged in such a way. Johnson drafted and
entered an order adding Libassi, Secretary Gardner, and HEW attorney James Dunn as defendant parties
in Lee v. Macon and temporarily enjoined them from terminating funds to any of the 99 systems.54
To consider the enlargement of the restraining order into an injunction, the court on July 22
held a hearing, the circumstances of which could be described as farcical. The Justice Department
attorneys already working on the Lee case were put in the position of defending Gardner, Libassi, and
Dunn. And St. John Barrett did so with determination. All three judges were of the opinion that HEW
had overstepped its newly proscribed bounds in Alabama by moving to terminate the funds. In their
minds, HEW was essentially attempting to pass judgment on which systems were actually in compliance
with the court’s own order. In a mirror image of most proceedings in Lee v. Macon – or any school
54

Order Adding Parties Defendant and Temporary Restraining Order, July 14, 1967, Lee v. Macon County
Board of Education, Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 29, Folder 5; Prehearing
Memorandum with Handwritten Notes, Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 21, Folder 8;
Frank Johnson to Richard Rives and Hobart Grooms, July 27, 1967, and Frank Johnson to John Doar Aug. (date
missing), 1967, in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 29, Folder 3; New York Times, July 15,
1967.

492

desegregation case – the defense counsel for the state officials found themselves in total agreement
with the court, while the CRD attorneys vigorously defended HEW against the court’s interpretation.
Barrett called Libassi to the stand in an attempt to establish HEW’s position. Libassi’s testimony was
frequently sidelined, however, as the CRD’s point man argued openly with Judge Rives, who became
visibly angry, saying at one point, “We’ve gone about our limit in trying to work with HEW.” Towards
the end of the day-long hearing, Barrett maintained that school boards subject to termination
proceedings had the recourse of “judicial review,” meaning they could appeal for a stay of any
termination action pending court review. There was a question, even then, of whether this would be
reviewed by the Washington, D.C. district court or the three-judge court with jurisdiction in Lee v.
Macon. Johnson, Rives, and Grooms mostly felt that question was moot, however, which only served to
enhance their irritation.55
Judge Johnson spoke to the fundamental issue, “Before that final determination is made [to
terminate federal funds], as Judge Rives says, which has the practical effect of hurting the school system
. . . it must be submitted to the Court so the Court can determine whether or not its order has been
complied with.” That determination could then be made on the basis of the factual record developed by
HEW during its administrative procedure. At the end of the hearing, Johnson noted the bizarre
circumstances:

The court observes – and I guess it is permissible for me to say this – that there are several
ironies in this case; at this posture it has reached the point, almost, of being ridiculous: That
HEW failed to achieve school desegregation here in Alabama and, through the Justice
Department, sought the aid of this Court and requested a Court order. And now HEW claims
authority to determine if the Court order is being complied with. The defendants opposed the
entry of a Court order in this case and contested vigorously the jurisdiction of the Court to enter
it, but now they maintain that it should be strictly complied with. The defendants have the
court order on appeal contesting its validity, and the [federal] Government is maintaining, on
appeal, that the Court order is valid. . . . All of that is designed to point out the position that
55
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Judge Rives stated originally in this hearing, that there must be some authority to determine
these issues insofar as those 99 systems are concerned, and the Court is the only authority to do
it.56

On June 28, 1967, the court enlarged the temporary restraining order into a preliminary
injunction. It ordered HEW to rescind its termination of federal funds to the Lanett system and to
refrain from any further terminations without first submitting such a matter to the court. Judge Johnson
argued that the March 22 order had effectively restored the 99 systems to “in-compliance” status for
the purpose of federal funding. All of the Lee v. Macon systems, save Bibb, had subsequently submitted
plans and assurances of compliance. When HEW made an independent determination, after the fact,
that Lanett was not in compliance, it violated the federal regulation respecting systems subject to a
court order. The court rejected the argument that the systems were not technically subject to a final
court order. According to Johnson, it overlooked “the real basis for the entry of [the] Court’s statewide
desegregation decree” and ignored “the fact that said school systems, by filing their desegregation plans
with [the] Court as ordered, submitted to the jurisdiction of [the] Court.” Johnson also determined that
HEW’s finding of non-compliance, based as it was on meeting quotas, was an “attack on the ‘freedom of
choice’ method of desegregation.” The judges had acknowledged that freedom of choice might not
work, but at that time it was still the policy of the Fifth Circuit to give it the opportunity to work. In
closing Johnson wrote, “To permit the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to terminate funds
to school systems under the order of this Court would be an abdication on the part of the Court of its
authority to require compliance with a court order. There can be no administrative supervision or
review of a judicial decree.”57
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HEW Acting Director of the Office for Civil Rights Derrick Bell called it a “pseudo-legal
interpretation.” Bell indicated that an appeal of the decision – which would have run to the Supreme
Court – was unlikely, however. He called HEW’s enforcement program “one of the few positive steps
the government can point to in these troubled times,” and he expressed “hope” that it would not be
“scuttled” on the basis of the trial court’s ruling. He noted that the court still expected HEW to conduct
reviews of desegregation in court-ordered districts. The department would attempt to continue in this
role. Nonetheless, Bell said, “In Alabama, the decision certainly means that our basic tool for bringing
about compliance – if not taken away – is at least placed in the background.”58

*****
The U.S. Civil Rights Commission released a report on school desegregation that summer, 1967.
The Commission found that there had been “significant progress” since the passage of the Civil Rights
Act and the implementation of Title VI by HEW. But when that progress was “measured against the
constitutional rights of Negro school children,” it became “clear that the task of securing compliance
[had] only begun.” The fight over the validity of the HEW Guidelines had obscured this fact. The vast
majority of black school children who had entered the first grade the year after Brown had graduated
that spring “without ever having attended a single class with a single white student.” Most of the
progress that had been made had been progress towards only token pupil desegregation. In the Deep
South, over 90 percent of black students still attended all-black schools. The commission determined
that the “central fact” to emerge from its investigations was that “the vast majority of Negro school
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children [were] being denied the rights declared to be theirs in the School Segregation Cases and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.”59
Making the law “work” was the principle task moving forward, and the “real issue” involved in
that task was “whether further delays [were] permissible . . . .” There would be costs, but they had to
be “weighed against the costs of continuing disrespect for the law [and] the damage already sustained
in the loss forever to a generation of Negro children of their right to a desegregated education and the
prospect that the same loss [might then] be inflicted upon many thousands of children of a new
generation.” The Civil Rights Commission’s recommendations hinted at the abandonment of freedom of
choice as a preferred desegregation method. It determined that “substantial desegregation” could not
be achieved unless there was “a rapid acceleration in the numbers of Negro students attending
desegregated schools” and a similar acceleration in the pace of eliminating racially identifiable schools.
Moving forward in Alabama, it would be up to the court to determine what made the law work, what
freedom of choice really meant, and what it would take to grant black students their constitutional
rights. Lee v. Macon County Board of Education had ensured that.60
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CHAPTER 13: THE FLEETING FREEDOM TO CHOOSE, 1967-68

When school opened in the fall of 1967, there was a modest increase in pupil and teacher
desegregation in Alabama and across the South, the vast majority of it through some form of freedom of
choice. By the summer of 1968, though, freedom of choice was all but dead. In June, 1968 Governor
Albert Brewer reacted to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
by announcing, “Because of . . . innovation by judicial decree, the courts are now declaring that a person
in this republic no longer can exercise a choice.” But Alabamians, he concluded, were “satisfied with the
operation of the freedom of choice plan” and therefore stood poised to resist the recent decisions and
to defend freedom of choice as a preferred method of desegregation. Why did the courts begin to
scrutinize free choice plans more closely, and what would make a career segregationist like Albert
Brewer defend them?1
The short answer was: because freedom of choice did not work. It proved to be what most
thought it would be – an avenue to tokenism. Brewer, the Wallaces, and most white Alabamians
supported it for this reason. It was clearly better for segregationists than the alternative, that is, the
actual eradication of the dual school system based on race. Throughout 1967-68, the plaintiffs in Lee v.
Macon County Board of Education continued to use that case as a means to bring Alabama’s dual system
to an effective end by making the choice in freedom-of-choice actually free. The Civil Rights Division of
the Justice Department and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, represented by Fred Gray, entered motions
which took Lee v. Macon into several different “phases.” The first of these were aimed at eliminating
the last major state-sponsored attempts at total defiance, at forcing some meaningful measure of
faculty desegregation, and at desegregating the state’s high school athletics associations. Whites across
the state – at the state and local level, officially and unofficially – continued to resist even the
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incremental changes which these efforts produced. Meanwhile, decisions in several of the state’s other
desegregation suits – U.S. v. Jefferson, Carr v. Montgomery, and Davis v. Mobile County – closely
anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court’s most important school desegregation decision since Cooper v.
Aaron, or perhaps even since Brown II.
In September, 1967, the school desegregation watchdog the Southern Education Reporting
Service determined, “Court action continues to play a central role [in school desegregation] despite the
considerable pressure exerted by the federal guidelines for compliance with the Civil Rights Act.” The
Service indicated that the efforts of the federal courts and those of the HEW Office for Civil Rights were
both concentrated that fall on faculty desegregation. In the 99 systems under the Lee v. Macon County
order, there were reportedly 7,441 black students and 541 black teachers in formerly all-white schools,
as well as 346 white teachers in all-black schools. The 19 systems under prior, independent court orders
had seen their requirements brought up to the standards of Lee v. Macon and U.S. v. Jefferson through
various motions for further and supplementary relief. Including those 19 systems, there were around
16,000 blacks in school with whites in Alabama. This remained a fraction of a percent, as the vast
majority of black students continued to attend all-black schools. Faculty desegregation rarely exceeded
more than one teacher of the opposite race at a given school, black or white, and many schools still had
single-race faculties.2
Perhaps because there was still only token change, there were no high profile incidents of
violence or direct interference. The courts had obtained reasonable compliance from the state’s local
school officials, who seemed to be resigned to carrying out their duties, free to deflect pressure by
blaming the federal court. Most were simply relieved to be able to share in the state’s $37 million Title I
federal funds allocation for 1968, which had increased by $7 million from the previous year. Governor
Lurleen Wallace’s speech and charge to the legislature in the wake of Lee v. Macon and U.S. v. Jefferson
2
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had apparently not produced any sort of third ‘stand in the schoolhouse door.’ At least, there were no
elaborate shenanigans designed to prevent the actual entry of students into schools. Of continuing
defiance, however, there was plenty, even before freedom of choice appeared to be on its way out of
judicial favor.3

The Teacher Choice Act and the Third Tuition Grant Act
Just after schools opened that fall, the Wallace Administration asked that school systems
circulate “teacher choice” forms to their students’ parents. The forms asked parents to indicate a
preference: would they rather their child be taught by a teacher of his or her own race, or by a teacher
of the opposite race. The administration knew that very few white parents would indicate a preference
for black teachers, and it had guessed that probably very few blacks would prefer white teachers. The
survey was flawed, of course. It did not ask if parents would object to their child having a teacher of the
opposite race, only if they preferred that to the status quo. Some school systems understood this and
added the option, “I prefer that the board of education assign qualified teachers, regardless of race.”
Some systems did not give out the forms at all. At least one board told the governor’s office frankly that
they felt the survey would have no bearing on their assignment of teachers and suggested that they
were a waste of time. Most were not so bold. The superintendent of Butler County Schools called Frank
Johnson on the telephone to complain and expressed to Johnson’s law clerk that the “request” of the
governor amounted to a demand that school boards deliberately violate the lawful orders of the court.
He expressed the “fervent hope” that “someone should go to jail.” He indicated that the survey was
already having one of its desired effects: parents were sending him petitions requesting “a teacher of
their own race” for their children. He was bewildered about anyone finding out that he called, telling
Johnson’s clerk to “forget that he called” and agreeing to send in a copy of the survey form only if he
3
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could address it to the clerk personally – so that he could “look anyone in the eye and say I never did so
and so.” The attorney for the Washington County school board placed a similar call to Judge Richard
Rives, displaying a “general aura of disgust for state government antics.” Many local officials were
exhausted from state-level defiance, but they were still held hostage by the effect that it had on whites
in their districts.4
The governor’s office received around 300,000 responses, out of an estimated statewide
enrollment of over 800,000. Lurleen Wallace announced, “The significant part of the poll indicates that
99 percent of the parents of both races either prefer a teacher of their own race or do not have a
preference and, therefore, would not be harmed if given a teacher of their own race.” Wallace said that
the results proved “conclusively that the March 22 [Lee v. Macon] order was erroneous.” She added
that she would “call upon the court to admit its error and reverse the ruling it has made.” It was an
utterly fantastic suggestion. But it was the Wallace way. It was intended to increase community
pressure on long-besieged school boards and to further aggrandize the administration in the eyes of the
mass of segregationists, who clung to the notion that dogged resistance would one day result in victory.
It was also designed to supplement another maneuver with only a slightly greater chance of success: the
passage of yet another defiant law.5
On September 1, 1967, the state legislature approved Act Number 285, the “teacher choice”
law. Governor Wallace called it “one of the most meaningful pieces of legislation ever passed by the
Alabama legislature.” It declared, “Local boards shall have the authority to assign and reassign or
transfer all teachers in schools within their jurisdiction; provided, however, all students, acting through
their parent or guardian, shall be required to exercise a choice . . . of the race of the teacher desired
. . . .” The law included a sample form which read, “I (we) prefer that my (our) child be taught by a
4
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teacher of the following race: White ___ Negro ____.” This was identical to the form that the state
asked systems to circulate. Indeed, the governor had sent out a form letter to all superintendents in the
state which read, “In order to get evidence to present to the Court . . . in connection with the Teacher
Choice law, I request that you take action immediately and . . . allow parents or guardians of students to
exercise a choice of the race of teacher they prefer.” The law aimed to force local school boards to do
what the Tuscaloosa board had been unwilling to do before: allow white students to transfer classrooms
when they objected to black teachers. It declared, “No child shall be required to have a teacher of a
race different from the one preferred by his or her parent or guardian except where the preference
made does not reflect the majority will of parents or guardians similarly situated.” It threatened local
school boards which did not carry out the requirements with the cut-off of state funding, and it gave the
governor the authority of enforcement through “such administrative action as is deemed necessary.”6
Fred Gray immediately filed a motion for further relief in Lee v. Macon, asking the court to
declare the act unconstitutional and to issue a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. “Apart
from its obvious incompatibility with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gray
wrote, the act “could not be more obvious in its design to thwart this Court’s decision of March 22,
1967.” He quoted from the March order, which had allowed for considering race in teacher assignments
for remedial purposes. “It cannot be seriously suggested,” Gray argued, “that the purpose of the
Teacher Choice Act is to correct the effects of past faculty desegregation. Rather, it constitutes the most
recent – and reckless – form of ‘dramatic interference with local efforts to desegregate public schools.’”
The Civil Rights Division soon filed its own supplemental complaint, also asking for a declaration of the
act’s unconstitutionality and for a preliminary injunction. The CRD attorneys argued that “the inevitable
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effect of enforcing [the act]” would be to “perpetuate the dual system based on race, and to impede
and interfere with efforts of local school systems to transform” their dual systems into unitary ones.
The state NAACP in Birmingham also filed its own complaint against the law, as a motion within the
Brown v. Bessemer litigation. George Wallace acknowledged that the law’s fate was thus “up to the
judges,” adding that its invalidation would “prove once again that the Constitution has been raped and
the courts and the federal government have taken over completely.”7
The teacher choice law was not the only obstructionist bill passed by the state legislature that
fall. The legislators passed a bill directing all state-supported colleges to fly the Confederate flag and
play the unofficial anthem of the Confederacy – Dixie – at all homecoming football games. Of more
immediate relevance, though, was the bill passed on August 31, which became Act Number 266. It was
yet another tuition grant law, the third of its kind to be passed by the Alabama legislature since Brown.
Like one of its predecessors, this one was patterned after a recently passed Louisiana statute. It created
a “Financial Assistance Commission” to administer funds “for the purpose of providing financial
assistance to students attending private non-sectarian elementary or secondary schools in [the] state.”
The governor was to appoint a three member commission, which could then establish local “offices” to
administer the grants.8
Fred Gray moved to have the court strike this law as well. He argued that “no difference of any
legal significance exists between Act. No. 266 . . . and the Tuition Grant Statute invalidated by this
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Court’s Decree of March 22, 1967; for Act No. 266 was nonetheless born of the effort to discriminate
against Negroes.” Gray quoted the section of the decree which compared that statute with the statute
struck down in the 1964 order and wrote, “Act. No. 266 calls for the third – and hopefully last – strike.”
The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order against both the Tuition Grant Act and the
Teacher Choice Act, pending a judgment on injunctions against each. The court issued such an order
against the Teacher Choice Act but not the Tuition Grant Act. Using the standard of “immediate and
irreparable injury and damage,” the court determined that the tuition grant law could await a proper
hearing. The judges then set the motions for preliminary injunctions for such a hearing, to be held
September 16.9
Lurleen Wallace called the issuance of a restraining order against the Teacher Choice Act a “Star
Chamber type of procedure.” Her husband refused to allow a U.S. Marshall to serve the order on his
wife, telling him to inform the Attorney General of the United States, “Rather than go around attacking
the individual rights of school children, he could spend his time better prosecuting these people who
burn the country down and preach violence and overthrow of the government.” Mrs. Wallace had
recently been diagnosed with cancer. Her condition began to worsen that summer, and her
involvement in the day-to-day affairs of governing soon diminished. Not eager for a fight under the
circumstances, the Marshall simply left the order on the desk of Wallace advisor Hugh Maddox. Days
later George – who kept up his torrid presidential campaign pace during Lurleen’s convalescence –
asked a crowd in Mobile at a Labor Day rally, “Is it unconstitutional to have mothers and fathers say who
they want to teach their children?” Those children’s “hearts and minds,” he added, ought not to
“belong to politicians and judges.” An informal survey conducted by the Birmingham News concluded
that the teacher choice law “appeared to rate high in public regard.” School systems were under so
9
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much pressure not to defy the Wallace regime that some sent out the teacher choice forms with
disclaimers, mindful of the restraining order placed on the teacher choice law. The Montgomery school
board wrote on its survey forms, “This notice is not intended in any way to enforce, take any steps to
implement, or otherwise put into effect any of the provisions of Act No. 285 of the legislature.10
Almost no one outside the Wallace Administration expressed much hope that the teacher
choice bill would escape court censure. But there was some thought that the court would refuse to
strike the tuition grant bill until the “commission” had been appointed and grants had actually been paid
out. Anticipating this latter quandary, Fred Gray filed a supplemental memorandum with the court just
prior to the September 16 hearing. Gray predicted that the defendant state officials would argue that
“the actual effect of Act No. 266 must be demonstrated at the hearing . . . before its enforcement
[could] be enjoined. Gray argued, “The state of desegregated public education in Alabama is too
precarious to permit yet another scheme for frustrating Brown v. Board of Education and the Court’s
order of March 22, 1967 to come to fruition.” There was “no doubt” as to what the effect of the act
would be, he felt: the subsidization of “the flight of white students from desegregated schools.” Gray
quoted the court’s observation in the March, 1967 Lee ruling that, under the previous tuition grant law,
“every dollar paid during the 1965-66 school year went to students enrolled in all-white private schools
established when the public schools desegregated.” He warned that the effect this time could be
significantly different. Prior to the March decree, only 19 school systems were subject to court orders,
and the amount awarded to nascent segregationist academies was a mere $28,000. Now, Gray
observed, every system in the state was subject to a court order, and the state had appropriated over $3
million for grants. The law’s passage clearly demonstrated state officials’ “determination that the
magnitude of the refuge from desegregated education in Alabama [would] keep pace with the
10
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implementation of Brown and [the District] Court’s orders.” Fortunately for the plaintiffs, a three-judge
court in Louisiana had recently struck down that state’s latest tuition grant law on the basis of its
“purpose and reasonable effect,” in a case styled Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance
Commission. Gray quoted that opinion, arguing that the new Alabama statute would “make previous
tuition grant schemes seem ‘but a drop in the bucket compared with its future costs.’”11
Gray knew that the Lee court was already aware of the Poindexter case and the defiant actions
of the Louisiana state government in general. Judge Rives sat on the three-judge panel hearing the longrunning Bush v. Orleans Parish case, in which much of Louisiana’s defiance had been litigated. Rives had
compared the political situation in Alabama to that of Louisiana as far back as April. Not long after
Lurleen Wallace’s defiant speech in March, Rives wrote Judges Johnson and Grooms, telling them he had
“turned back to all the schemes attempted by the Louisiana legislature and declared null and void by the
three-judge district court of Rives, [Herbert] Christenberry, and [Skelly] Wright” and found that each of
them was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Rives wondered “whether the Alabama legislature [could] be
any more ingenious,” cleverly alluding to the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in Cooper v. Aaron that
states could not nullify school desegregation law through “evasive schemes . . . whether attempted
‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’” The day the Poindexter decision came down, Rives wrote Johnson and
Grooms and again acknowledged that the Alabama legislature seemed to be “repeating so much that
[had been] done by the Louisiana Legislature . . . .” Rives was confident that the court could and would
strike the recent Alabama action with minimal effort. It was virtually identical to the Louisiana statute.
“I would doubt,” he wrote, “whether any intelligent person can hope to defeat our [March 22] decree
legally. It is the actually but covertly illegal moves which will probably trouble us most,” he ominously
cautioned, “the attempts to work some people up into a frenzy and practically to substitute mob rule for
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a rule of law.” One week after Lurleen Wallace signed the tuition grant bill into law, she vowed to
withhold a $470,000 grant to Tuskegee Institute if the court struck the law. The state had been paying
the Tuskegee grant for 50 years to finance nursing, engineering, and veterinary medicine programs for
black students. The governor said she saw “absolutely no difference between the payment of tuition
grants to students who may wish to attend a private school like Macon Academy and state grants to a
private school like Tuskegee Institute.”12
The September 16 hearing to consider the latest legal schemes of evasion quickly became an
omnibus affair, reflecting the ever-increasing complexity of the Lee v. Macon litigation. In addition to
the two state statutes, the court had to consider motions of the United States to add more school
systems as parties defendant and a motion to intervene filed by the Alabama State Teachers Association
(ASTA). On September 4, the CRD motioned to have seven systems (Baldwin, Cherokee, Chilton, Dallas,
Limestone, Pickens, and Washington Counties) added as parties defendant, citing their inadequate
progress in faculty desegregation. Cherokee, for example, had only desegregated two of its seven allwhite faculties (with one black teacher each) and had relied on volunteers for the task. None of the
systems had achieved any substantial desegregation of faculties at all-black schools. The CRD also
objected to the particular assignments given to black teachers in white schools. According to the
Division, there were seven black teachers in formerly all-white schools in Washington County, and none
of them was “scheduled to instruct in substantive courses”; it was also “apparent that four [would] do
no teaching at all.” Many desegregating black teachers were assigned to physical education classes,
study halls, and libraries. At the same time, many desegregating white teachers were assigned to black
schools on a part-time basis. The school boards in each system argued that they had limited their
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assignments because they could not obtain any more volunteers. The CRD responded that the systems
could not ‘transfer their constitutional obligations from themselves to the teachers.’ They had not met
their obligations “in numbers or in substance,” so the CRD attorneys suggested that each be enjoined
from refusing to implement more specific provisions.13
The ASTA was also concerned with the particulars of faculty desegregation and filed a complaint
seeking to intervene in Lee v. Macon as a plaintiff for this reason. Fred Gray’s partner, Solomon Seay,
Jr., represented the organization. Seay was the son of the Montgomery reverend and civil rights leader
Solomon Seay, Sr., a veteran of campaigns against police violence and of the famed bus boycott. The
younger Seay attended Howard University, where he obtained his J.D. at the state of Alabama’s
expense, just as his predecessors had done. Like Gray, he returned to Alabama on a mission to bring
down the last bastions of Jim Crow. Seay joined Gray in 1964 and soon inherited much of the leg work
in the Lee v. Macon litigation. In representing ASTA, the two attorneys argued that the 99 Lee systems
were disregarding the March decree when forced to close substandard all-black schools. School boards
were supposed to reassign teachers from closed schools without regard to race. Gray and Seay
maintained that some systems were instead simply dismissing black teachers, administrators, and staff,
or at best, demoting them upon reassignment. Furthermore, school boards were often transferring
uncertified white teachers to black schools or allowing new teachers to use black schools as a “back
door” to the white schools. At the same time, school boards were privately insisting that black teachers
in white schools be, in Seay’s words, “light, bright, or damned-near white.”14

13

Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Brief in Support of Its Motion to Have Parties Added as Defendants, Sept. 26,
1967, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 22, Folder
2.
14
Complaint in Intervention of Alabama State Teachers Association, Sept. 2, 1967, Lee v. Macon County
Board of Education, Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 30, Folder 2; Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene, Sept. 16, 1967, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, Frank Johnson
Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 22, Folder 2; Solomon Seay, Sr., I Was There by the Grace of God
(Montgomery: New South, 2002); Seay, Jr., Jim Crow and Me, pp. 89-98; Seay Interview; see for “back door” to the
white schools characterization, Steering Committee of the Burrell-Slater PTA to Frank Johnson, Sept. 11, 1968,
Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 25, Folder 11. There was some question as to whether

507

The court granted ASTA’s motion to intervene, and the organization was allowed to file its own
complaint in intervention and to seek injunctive relief against the discriminatory placement of black
teachers, administrators, and staff. Gray and Seay prepared to represent ASTA at the September 16
hearing. The white teachers’ organization, the Alabama Education Association (AEA), declined an
invitation from the administration to participate alongside the state in the hearing. The AEA announced
in rejecting the invite that it had a “long-standing policy” of supporting “local control of schools by local
boards of education” and that it looked “with disfavor on laws or court decrees which limit[ed] the
power of local boards.” AEA was also involved in a pending merger with ASTA, as ordered by its parent
national organization, the National Education Association (NEA). It need not tangle in court with the
organization with which it was soon forced to merge. The two would have enough to mediate without
the extra burden.15
At the September 16 hearing, the defendant state officials’ defense team – including Attorney
General MacDonald Gallion, Assistant Attorney General Gordon Madison, and Wallace legal advisor
Hugh Maddox – tried to call the teacher scheme a “freedom of choice plan.” Maddox, a onetime law
clerk for Judge Johnson, took the stand himself to introduce the teacher choice poll results. He tried to
present the returns as indicating that less than one percent of white and black parents wanted their
children to have teachers of the opposite race. Maddox claimed that 77 of the state’s 119 school
districts had replied with results. But Judge Johnson pressed his former assistant. Maddox was forced
to admit that the actual number of districts reporting was 45, and that the number of student’s parents
indicating a choice was less than half of the state’s total enrollment. “Do you contend that this has any
value as an indication of what the parents want,” Johnson asked. Maddox stubbornly maintained that
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“white and Negro parents overwhelmingly prefer a teacher of their own race.” Gordon Madison at one
point suggested that parents might exercise their choice in teachers at some point after faculty
desegregation had taken place. Johnson stopped him to ask if there was any indication in the act that it
should not operate until that point, which was very unlikely to be soon reached. Madison was forced to
concede that there was not. Newly assigned Civil Rights Division attorney Alexander Ross argued that
the teacher choice law had “no legitimate educational goal for operation of public schools.” Neither the
administration nor the legislature had consulted any educators at any point in the drafting of the bill,
Ross added, which had not really been debated, either. Turning to the tuition grant bill, the state
argued as Gray had predicted, claiming that the law was perfectly constitutional on its face. Johnson
tried repeatedly to get the state’s attorneys to admit its real purpose, asking why the state needed to
“establish a school system in addition to the public school system already established.” At the
conclusion of these phases of the hearing, Judge Rives asked defense attorneys if the language in the
two bills did not corroborate the earlier finding in Lee v. Macon that the state controlled the “purse
strings” attached to all of Alabama’s school systems. No one could give a satisfactory reply.16
The court also heard the issue of adding more school boards as parties defendant. The CRD
withdrew its motions to add Baldwin and Pickens after adequate agreement had been reached between
the systems and the CRD attorneys. Judge Johnson concluded that none of the remaining five systems
in question had “adequately complied” with the March order. But he was unimpressed with the CRD’s
eleventh-hour motions; they were “simply not timely.” He argued that the U.S. had adequate time over
the summer to challenge the systems’ faculty desegregation plans. In a recent and similar scenario in
the Carr v. Montgomery case, Johnson had told the CDR attorneys, “I just don’t have any sympathy with
you at all in this case.” He agreed that to force school boards to alter their plans’ so late in the summer
“would unduly disrupt the orderly operation of the schools and educational process therein.” Johnson
16
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made it known that he was not “exactly satisfied” with the level and nature of faculty desegregation in
these systems, and he put the five systems on notice that the U.S. or the plaintiffs could renew the
motion at a time sufficient to effect some change prior to January, 1968. Judges Rives and Grooms
agreed that the could not sanction the placement of a few black teachers in vocational education,
physical education, and library work, where “contact with students [would] be minimal.” This would
leave faculties segregated “for all practical purposes” and would influence students’ choices.
Accordingly, the court accordingly entered a per curiam order denying the motion to add the systems
but ordering them to take steps to further desegregate their faculties before the beginning of the next
term. If systems were making reasonable efforts to comply, the court demonstrated that it would
protect them from state interference and from unreasonable demands from the plaintiffs or Justice
Department. But it continued to hold them accountable.17

State Court Interference: Elmore v. McClain
After the September hearing, the judges took the injunctions against Acts 266 and 285 under
advisement. Meanwhile, an altogether different style of interference emerged, the latest episode in
what was quickly developing into a Lee v. Macon saga. The Henry County Board of Education was one of
the 99 systems under desegregation orders in Lee. The Henry County school officials had instituted
system-wide freedom of choice as part of their court-approved desegregation plan. When choice forms
were returned that summer, a black high school showed significantly reduced enrollments. The white
high school in the same town, less than a mile away, was to have a particularly low enrollment as well.
The Newville School was to have 65 students in its 9-12 grades, and the Rosenwald School was to have
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52 students in those grades. These enrollments were less than 15 and 10 percent, respectively, of the
recommended state minimum of 525 students for high schools. Both schools had been slated for
closure in the last state school survey. Systems were encouraged by the court to close schools facing
these conditions. Accordingly, the Henry County school board took the initiative to close both high
schools (technically the high school grades at the K-12 schools) and consolidate their students systemwide. Since this increased desegregation and expedited the elimination of the dual system, the court
looked upon it favorably. Many parents did not.18
Parents of students from all-white Newville and all-black Rosenwald filed separate suits in state
circuit court against the Henry County superintendent, W.J. McLain, seeking an injunction to force the
reopening of the closed grades at the two schools. Many blacks lamented the closure of black
community schools, in which they often took a great deal of pride.19 But in this case, it is possible, if not
likely, that the black petitioners were encouraged or even coerced into filing the suit. Both actions were
filed by a local white attorney. The state circuit court, in Elmore v. McLain and Johnson v. McLain, issued
injunctions and ordered the Henry County board to reopen the closed grades. When the CRD moved in
Lee v. Macon for an injunction to prevent this action, the governor took the liberty to respond to the
show cause order directed at Henry County, claiming that the school board closed the grades under
“pressure” from the Justice Department. Wallace’s attorneys argued that DOJ was “interfering” with
the county school system in seeking to “control the assignment of students” and to close schools “in
violation of the policy of the Congress of the United States.” They cited some of the statements from
the governor’s March speech which Judge Johnson noted as “erroneous,” namely those predicting that
“the court” would assign pupils and close schools. The Henry County officials did not contest the motion
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for an injunction in Lee v. Macon. The school board’s attorney met with Judge Johnson and assured him
that the schools were closed in furtherance of the court’s March decree and in the best interest of the
pupils involved. Johnson agreed.20
Johnson drafted an order which the court entered on October 30. It enjoined the Henry County
officials from giving any force or effect to the state circuit court’s order and rebuked the circuit court
and the petitioning parents’ attorney. Johnson characterized the entry of the injunction against the
Henry County school board as “in flagrant violation” of established principles of both state and federal
law. With the matter of desegregation of Henry County’s schools before the federal court, the circuit
court should have declined jurisdiction in the cause in the first place. Johnson dismissed claims by the
circuit court that Henry County had failed to follow Alabama Code in closing the schools, calling them
“completely erroneous” and having “no bearing whatsoever.” Johnson also chastised the attorney who
filed the claims. As an officer of the federal district court, he was “certainly possessed of the knowledge
that this court was open and available to adjudicate matters over which it had already assumed
jurisdiction.” Filing the suit in state court was impeding the federal court’s jurisdiction, and such action
would, in Johnson’s words, “not be further tolerated.”21

Lee v. Macon Affirmed, Freedom of Choice Challenged
Four days after entering the Henry County order, on November 3, the court entered separate
orders declaring the Teacher Choice and Tuition Grant Acts unconstitutional. Judge Rives wrote both. In
the opinion and order striking the tuition grant law, Rives noted its similarity with the Louisiana statute
20
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and quoted at length from Poindexter, in which Judge Wisdom had “relied heavily” on Lee v. Macon.
The court determined that the new Alabama law contained “all of the malignant coloring which so
fatally marked its two predecessors, plus the fresh evidence of its contemporaneous enactment and like
sponsorship with Act No. 285 . . . .” Not only was the law “clearly . . . no more than an evasive scheme
to circumvent Brown,” it was also an inducement to “private persons to engage in the kind of racial
discrimination which would be condemned if attempted by the state.” This was “wholly impermissible.”
Rives was similarly abrupt in his explanation of the court’s judgment of the teacher choice statute: “We
adhere to [the March] opinion and decree and cannot permit their frustration by the expedient of Act
No. 285. That act is clearly unconstitutional.” Rives cited Loving v. Virginia – the Supreme Court
decision which had recently invalidated Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law. The Supreme Court in Loving
had determined that laws which made use of racial classifications had to “be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it
was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.” No such objective, “free from invidious
racial discrimination,” could justify Act No. 285. Indeed, race was “the only factor upon which Act No.
285 operate[d].” As 1967 drew to a close, the door appeared to shutting on Wallace-style, statesponsored, bitter-ender resistance. The court had again cleared the way for freedom of choice to work
in Alabama. But its position at the top of the judicial list of remedies was increasingly tenuous.22
In December the U.S. Supreme Court, having heard the appeal of the Bibb County Board of
Education and the governor, affirmed the March 22 Lee v. Macon decision. It thereby sanctioned the
statewide, structural injunctive approach. It also upheld the July Lee v. Macon ruling invalidating the
tuition grant law. Attorney General MacDonald Gallion had futilely argued that ordering the state to
dictate to local school boards was beyond its powers. The CRD had reiterated its claim that the
22
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defendant state officials were “plainly no strangers to the Alabama school system.” And Solicitor
General Ralph Spritzer had argued that as the state officials had since been ordered to use their
authority “in the opposite direction,” it was then ‘ill-becoming’ of them to deny their jurisdiction. The
Court issued a generic, 11-word per curiam opinion affirming the decision. It had recently denied
certiorari in U.S. v. Jefferson, allowing the many desegregation orders already affected by that case to
remain in effect and the dozens of LDF and government appeals based on it to proceed. Granting cert
and affirming Lee v. Macon was a much easier way of placing some measure of Supreme Court approval
on U.S. v. Jefferson-influenced desegregation plans, because the model decree in Lee was almost
identical to that in Jefferson.23
Meanwhile, a few days after the Lee affirmation, the Court agreed to hear the plaintiffs’ appeal
of Green v. County School Board of New Kent County. A Virginia district court had approved the New
Kent freedom of choice desegregation plan, under which no whites had chosen black schools and 18
percent of blacks had chosen formerly all-white schools. Jack Greenberg and the LDF appealed to the
Fourth Circuit appellate court, arguing that this was not a plan which held out hope of eliminating the
dual system. The circuit court ultimately affirmed the judgment sitting en banc. When the plaintiffs’
petition for certiorari was granted, John Doar suggested that the Civil Rights Division support the LDF’s
appeal. Derrick Bell, the Deputy Director of the HEW Office for Civil Rights, advised the CRD’s Stephen
Pollack to include a statement of HEW policy in its amicus brief – that freedom of choice plans were only
acceptable under Title VI if they worked. This was the Fifth Circuit’s Jefferson standard and already the
position of the Justice Department. The Supreme Court’s terse affirmation of Lee v. Macon had seemed
to support the Jefferson model decree, but the Court had said nothing explicitly about the limitations of
freedom of choice. If the united front of the LDF, the CRD, and the HEW-OCR had its way, it would force
23
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the issue in Green v. New Kent. The looming decision thus had the potential to be the most important
High Court pronouncement on school desegregation since Cooper v. Aaron.24
John Doar indicated the potential impact in a letter to Solicitor General Spritzer. “The Supreme
Court has seldom granted review of school desegregation cases,” he wrote, and “when it has, the
decision has usually represented an important addition to the law. This case will be no exception." Doar
added that the Court would “almost certainly have to consider the HEW Guidelines and the Jefferson
County decree in reaching its decision." Pollack felt that the Court ought to enter an order which would
“preserve the continuity with the course of judicial decisions,” and he believed Jefferson was “the
present high water mark to which . . . the Supreme Court wishes to bring the other circuits.” Solicitor
General Spritzer proposed submitting an amicus brief which called for a declaration that freedom of
choice itself was per se unconstitutional. Pollack advised that this would be a “tactical mistake” and
questionable policy. It would be asking the court to use the "most far-reaching grounds" possible for its
decision and to put itself on a limb upon which neither the CRD, nor HEW, nor any of the appellate
courts had been willing to climb. It would, in short, necessitate the abandonment of the Jefferson
decree and "disrupt the enforcement relationship" that had been developing between the appellate
courts, the trial courts, and the CRD. "Progress is being made," Pollack wrote. Even "school systems in
Mississippi and Alabama” were “accepting the necessity for change." Jettisoning freedom of choice at
that point would threaten that progress.25
Pollack prevailed, and the government’s brief was restrained. Nonetheless, if the Court adopted
the government’s position, some systems would have to use some other means beyond freedom of
24
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choice to eliminate their dual structure. Federal district judges in Alabama had only just begun shutting
the door on state-level defiance. If freedom of choice was in jeopardy, their task was very likely far from
over. This was to say nothing of the lingering effects of previous official defiance. Local resistance was
sure to continue, if not intensify. The day the Supreme Court upheld Lee v. Macon, Governor Wallace
had predicted “the people are ultimately going to change the effect of this ruling.”26

Faculty Desegregation and School Closures
As segregationists listened to the resounding echo of yet another defeat for massive resistance,
and as freedom of choice hung in the balance in Washington, local school boards were left again to
implement their desegregation plans in the spring of 1968. The complexities and conflicts only grew as
the requirements became more stringent. Though law and order had prevailed over violent resistance,
resistance nonetheless remained, even as the forces of compliance moved to thwart the growing
movement to abandon public schools. Communities often had unique problems. In southwest
Alabama, for example, eliminating discrimination in education meant eradicating “tri-segregation.” In
and around the Mobile-Tensaw River Delta, a number of people who identified as Cajun had been
barred from white schools for as long as blacks. The Alabama laws regulating racial definitions had long
classified them as non-white at best. The Cajuns themselves celebrated their unique culture and their
French, Spanish, Mexican, and Native American ancestry. But they deeply resented any assertion that
they had “black blood” or that they were in any way of African descent. The Cajuns in Mobile, Baldwin,
and Washington Counties, therefore, refused to send their children to black schools. They generally
attended small, dilapidated Cajun-only schools in their tiny communities. One boy had attempted to
desegregate a white school in Mobile County in the 1950s, but a circuit court and the Alabama Supreme
Court had ruled that the burden of proof of “whiteness” was on the pupil, not the school system. When
26
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white county school systems were faced with admitting black students to white schools, though, they
began to relent on the Cajun students. They perhaps saw the racial writing on the wall from Loving v.
Virginia and its application to the state’s teacher choice statute. According to a state department of
education report, by the spring of 1968, Baldwin County had closed its 28-student Cajun school, and
Washington County had closed two of its five. A large, 500-student Cajun school remained in operation
in rural Mobile County.27
While the problem of “tri-segregation” was unique to southwest Alabama, a number of conflicts
across the state that year sprang from two universal issues: school closure and faculty desegregation
requirements. Many white students across the state were being taught by black teachers for the first
time. Black teachers had undoubtedly not been given the opportunities that white teachers had.
Acutely aware of this, many black teachers themselves were nervous in their new assignments. Under
the scrutiny that came with their new roles, it was almost inevitable that some black teachers would fail
to live up to the standards of certain white parents. Parents and administrators often jumped at the
opportunity to condemn black teachers in white schools. In some communities, faculty desegregation
occurred with little trouble, but in most others there was significant resistance. Incompetence could be
found among white and black teachers alike. If it was more widespread among black teachers, it was
likely the result of inequitable opportunities and administrative indifference. As one Mississippi state
official admitted, southern school boards’ apathy became “untenable” as a result of faculty
desegregation. “They’ve had a black teaching for 15 years,” he said, “and suddenly, now that she’s
teaching white children, they discover she’s incompetent.”28
Exemplary of the latter was the situation in Dale County, in the Wiregrass of southeast Alabama.
The Dale County superintendent, Joe Payne, wrote state Superintendent Ernest Stone a letter in
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exasperation. Payne wrote, “I am receiving complaints daily about the Negro teachers. . . . It is getting
to the point that we all dread to see someone come in or dread to hear the phone ring.” Payne wanted
“advice” and “help now, not later.” He advised Stone, “The whole problem is that these Negro teachers
are not capable to teach in the white schools. They give tests and write words on the chalkboard with
incorrectly spelled words. They are using verbs in the wrong place,” Payne ran on, “using plural words in
the wrong place, their sentences are incorrect, they are using words in places they do not fit, and none
of them have any discipline.” Payne told Stone that he was fed up with the black students in white
schools as well, a number of which had been moved into white schools after the closure of two black
schools in the fall. Payne had made an “oral survey” of those students’ performance. “It is disgusting
for me to have to say,” he wrote, “that 86 percent of them are failing.” As long as he was
superintendent, he told Stone, these things would “not be tolerated.” In closing he added, “These
incapable Negro teachers is why these students are failing today in our white schools [sic]. If we have to
lower our educational standards, we might as well close the schools down and return to the jungles of
prehistoric time.”29
Besides coming to Stone with their many problems and complaints, a number of school officials
wrote directly to Judge Johnson. While Johnson was eager to work with school boards in conference
with their counsel, he always referred such letters to Stone or to the Justice Department attorneys. In
addition to complaints about teachers, many school boards were happy to forward complaints about
school closures. Often black parents and students did not want to close black schools any more than the
local authorities did. Officials jumped at the chance to use this as leverage to return to the status quo.
Joe Payne in Dale was no exception. He wrote Johnson, “Since equality entered in on the Negro schools,
we would like to know the status of three white schools in the county.” Many school systems had been
frantically trying to upgrade black facilities for years in the hopes that separate but equal might remain
29
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legal if it were actually true. This was what Payne meant when he referenced equality “entering in on
the Negro schools.” The superintendent wondered why the school board was asked to close two newer
and “equal” black schools in the county while three of the white schools were both older than the black
schools and inadequate to handle the potential transfer of black students. This was a serious problem,
but the parties litigating the case and the court understood that whites would generally refuse to attend
formerly all-black schools, even in the unlikely event that they happened to be “equal” to the white
schools in a district. Payne probably knew this, too, but the chance to direct the court’s attention to a
real conundrum which its decree had created was too much to pass up. Similarly, Marengo County
Superintendent Fred Ramsey wrote Johnson to advise him that the parents of the all-black Shiloh school
asked him to “continue its operation for at least several more years.” Ramsey had only recently
harassed black teachers and students in an attempt to discourage desegregation, prior to the statewide
Lee v. Macon order. Now he was purportedly lobbying for black parents who wanted to keep a black
school open.30
Ramsey was nothing if not an opportunist and a committed segregationist. As the chief of
Marengo schools, he exemplified the schoolman committed to law and order but hell bent on
frustrating desegregation efforts in any way possible. Two encounters between he and attorney
Solomon Seay are indicative of the hurdles the plaintiffs’ attorneys in Lee v. Macon faced in dealing with
such officials, even after favorable orders had been entered. When Seay took over the representation
of ASTA, he subsequently began barnstorming the state, just like the CRD attorneys, working with local
school officials to craft acceptable desegregation plans. He remarked later that he “became quite
familiar with the highways and byways in all but a handful of the state’s sixty-seven counties.” It was
Seay’s job to ensure that black teachers were not dismissed or unfairly demoted when black schools
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were closed and to ensure that qualified black teachers were hired any time they were needed and
available. Seay also represented ASTA in its merger with the all-white AEA and became co-counsel for
the integrated organization. When he first met Fred Ramsey, it was just prior to a hearing in Judge
Johnson’s chambers. Ramsey, a rather large man at around six feet seven inches and two hundred and
fifty pounds, approached Seay, introduced himself, and proceeded to lecture the Howard-educated
attorney on the constitutionality of segregated schools. “Now, I’m not a racist, Seay,” was his
concluding remark. Seay, a skinny but tall and headstrong man at around six feet three inches, was not
about to back down. He challenged Ramsey, suggesting that the superintendent might like to bring back
slavery, considering his position. Ramsey indicated that in that case he would like to own Seay. Seay
replied that this would not be preferable for Ramsey, as he would have to “make a house nigger” out of
him, and surely Ramsey did not want “this big, black buck anywhere around the big house.”31
While this tense incident produced a measure of “grudging respect” between the two men,
another indicates more directly what the plaintiffs’ attorneys were faced with. Once when Ramsey was
scheduled to be deposed at the county courthouse in the Marengo County seat of Linden, he asked that
the ASTA and CRD attorneys first confer with him in another room. The CRD attorneys did not show up,
but “motivated solely by curiosity,” Seay did. He entered the room to find it full of black teachers and
administrators. Ramsey shamelessly revealed the pitch used by many local school boards in counseling
school desegregation resistance in their local black communities. He told Seay that he had invited “his
good friends” to the meeting so that Seay could tell them what he planned to do “to help them feed
their families when [Seay] and the Justice Department” succeeded in “shutting down the school system
and leaving them with no jobs.” Ramsey and the Marengo County school board may have been the
“most recalcitrant” Seay ever dealt with, but this line of reasoning was common throughout the state,
especially in the Black Belt. It was not simply rhetorical. Men like Ramsey believed this to be inevitable:
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that when the plaintiffs pressed for school closure and teacher reassignment, it would drive whites from
the system into private schools. When this “destroyed” the public school system, it was the fault of the
Justice Department, the LDF, the plaintiffs, and lawyers like Seay. Ramsey and others saw it as almost a
sacred duty to try and avert such an outcome at all “legal” costs. Rather than using the powers of their
office to facilitate community acceptance, they used them to hamper the elimination of the dual system
in any way possible, and in doing so they probably only hastened the very exodus which they were
trying to prevent.32

Plotting the Next Course in Lee v. Macon
While the fall, 1967 court orders in Lee v. Macon curtailed the latest in state-level interference
with school desegregation, it was clear that continuing performance evaluation was needed for the 99
school systems themselves. Beginning that fall, and into the spring of 1968, the court established an
orderly process to ensure compliance. The first task was to reintegrate HEW and make use of its
resources, while continuing to control its ability to cut-off federal funding. Ernest Stone attempted to
use the March, 1967 order to keep HEW investigators away from local school boards altogether. He
wrote Peter Libassi at the Office for Civil Rights and argued that the order did “not call for additional
reports or field visits,” only the evaluation of reports to Stone’s office. Stone pleaded, “Our school
boards, Mr. Libassi, are near the breaking point!” He told Libassi, “We want to work with your office,
but extensive additional reporting on the part of your office plus visits by different people making
conflicting demands may completely close many of Alabama’s school systems.” Stone contended, “It
would take us right back to where we were before July 28, 1967” – when the court enjoined HEW from
funds deferral or termination. After discussing the matter with Judge Rives, Judge Johnson tried to
break the impasse. Johnson told Stone that there appeared to be “some misunderstanding regarding
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the duty and obligation on the part of various school systems and officials in the State of Alabama . . . to
comply with the reporting requirements” of HEW. According to Johnson, the court had anticipated that
HEW would continue to examine and audit the policies of Stone’s office and those of the 99 systems.
This would include regular reporting and field visits, with which state and local officials were obliged to
cooperate. The court thus ensured that it would have not only the Civil Rights Division, but also the
Office for Civil Rights monitoring compliance with its orders, regardless of whether Stone felt that local
school boards were “near the breaking point.”33
It was the Civil Rights Division which continued to work most closely with the court in the
administrative task of structuring compliance. Johnson suggested a procedure to Judges Grooms and
Rives. He believed that the court ought to be primarily concerned with making sure that freedom of
choice plans were truly free. This meant removing “choice influencing factors,” chief among which were
segregated faculties and grossly inferior black school facilities and curricula. Johnson closely scrutinized
the CRD’s own analysis of the 99 systems’ efforts entering the spring of 1968. The CRD had determined
that, on average, 6 percent of a given system’s black students were in desegregated schools. If a system
had achieved more than this, Johnson suggested being lenient as to requiring further steps. Otherwise,
he felt that the court should push for a plan which would effect an acceptable level of faculty
desegregation and the closure of substandard black facilities. He suggested that the court avoid
entering show cause orders and adding lagging systems as defendant parties, arguing that the “’ice [had]
been broken’” and that progress could be made in negotiation without further proceedings “if the right
approach [were] taken.” Johnson wanted to have the CRD representatives work with Stone’s office to
arrange conferences with each school system to work out acceptable plans. If school boards refused to
work with the CRD or otherwise failed to implement their plans, then the CRD could move to have them
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added as parties defendant. The three judges understood that what Judge Rives called this “almost
entirely administrative, most important and difficult” phase of the case was going to be “necessarily left
to [Johnson’s] capable hands alone.” As all of this had to be done in time to implement changes by the
fall of 1968, Rives and Grooms allowed Johnson and the CRD to go to work.34
Johnson’s longtime point man at the CRD, John Doar, had stepped down, and Stephen Pollack
had taken his place. So Johnson wrote Pollack in January to advise him of the court’s expectations. “For
the time being,” Johnson wrote, “the Court is not particularly concerned with further implementing the
March 22 order with the idea of attempting to directly increase the percentage of desegregation
through the ‘freedom of choice’ plans in the various systems covered by this order.” However, the court
was “vitally concerned” with ensuring that systems’ plans were “indeed free choice plans.” Johnson
indicated which school boards needed to increase faculty desegregation and which needed to close
substandard black schools, and he advised Pollack to begin working with these districts as soon as
possible to implement workable plans. “As amicus,” Johnson wrote, “you are hereby requested to
speak for the Court in this regard.” To make sure Pollack understood the urgency of beginning this
process quickly, Johnson admonished him for previously lax communication. “I have been experiencing
some difficulty,” he wrote, “in securing responses to requests that I have made of your division in
connection with this case,” and “as a matter of fact, in several instances, months have passed and I have
received no response to my communications.” Johnson made sure Pollack knew that he was
“requesting a prompt acknowledgement” this time.35
Pollack immediately began formulating a program to insure compliance in Lee. But the Justice
Department did not, for once, share Judge Johnson’s views about the CRD’s role in the pending phase of
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the case. “In certain of the earlier phases of the litigation,” Pollack wrote to Johnson in February, “the
United States was defending the process of this court against official interference. However, in the
proceedings leading up to the decree of March 22 and since the entry of that decree, the Department of
Justice has been representing the interest of the United States as an active litigant in this case.” Pollack
felt that an active litigant should not speak for the court. The CRD was prepared to continue in its
capacity as a plaintiff-intervenor. In this capacity it would continue to analyze school systems plans and
reports, to submit its analyses to Stone, and if necessary, to initiate appropriate proceedings against
recalcitrant individual school systems. Pollack indicated that the CRD would maintain an office in
Montgomery, staffed with an attorney who would be available to school officials in an advisory role. He
had been in discussions with HEW, as well, and indicated that that department was also going to make
someone available to assist in this way. Pollack told Johnson that HEW’s Office for Civil Rights was going
to start contacting the school systems with insufficient progress to try and initiate negotiations and, if
necessary, to conduct field investigations. Johnson told Pollack that this arrangement was “entirely
satisfactory.”36
This was how Lee v. Macon would progress. HEW would do much of the ground work. The CRD
would make its own independent analyses and initiate proceedings as necessary. The state department
of education would continue to monitor all of these developments and ensure that school boards
understood their obligations. Stone himself would continue to report regularly to the court and the
Justice Department. And the administration of the entire system would remain, for the most part, in
Judge Johnson’s “capable hands alone.” Judge Rives even suggested that the three-judge court might
tentatively be dissolved or that Johnson might otherwise exercise the authority of a single judge.
Johnson preferred to leave the three-judge court intact, as the specter of state intransigence still
loomed, and since it made it easier on everyone when there were three judges to blame. If anything,
36
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the denunciations of the court and the individual judges were growing more frequent as the
requirements of the decree came to bear in actual schools themselves. They certainly increased that
spring, as the court and the CRD initiated the first of several off-shoot phases of Lee v. Macon: the
desegregation of the state’s athletics systems.37

Desegregating the AHSAA
The Alabama High School Athletic Association (AHSAA) remained largely segregated in 1968. A
select few of the black students who had transferred to white schools to that point played on
desegregated teams. Indeed, black student-athletes in many cases transferred to white schools for the
primary purpose of taking advantage of the white schools’ athletics programs, and coaches at the
formerly all-white schools actively recruited a number of them. But there was still only one association
for the formerly all-white schools – the AHSAA – and one for the all-black schools – the Alabama
Interscholastic Athletic Association (AIAA). The AHSAA belonged to a national organization which
recognized only one state association. This meant that for national organizational purposes, the AIAA
did not exist. Among the consequences of this was that black athletes did not receive recognition for
many of their achievements. For example, if the white champion in the men’s 100 yard dash ran the
event in 10-flat, he was the state champion, even if the AIAA champion could, as one person described
it, “run a 9.6 barefoot in a cow pasture.”38
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There were more serious problems with the segregated athletics system. White schools which
belonged to the AHSAA did not play black schools in AIAA. In the brief period in which blacks at formerly
all-white schools had begun playing on sports teams – usually one or two on a football or basketball
team – those teams continued to play against AHSAA competition. Desegregated teams were often
harassed when playing teams that remained all-white. More often than not, this type of harassment
came not from the opposing players or coaches, but from the fans. In at least one instance, it came
from uniformed local and state law enforcement. In this case, the local superintendent, R.W.
Hollingsworth of Fayette County, wrote to Judge Johnson to inform him of the affair. At a seasonopening September, 1967 football game against neighboring Carrollton, two state troopers and a local
sheriff’s deputy “harassed the Hubbertville High School Coach and his players throughout the football
game . . . .” The men “continued intimidation which could have resulted in an ugly scene” after the
game. Hubbertville had two black players, while Carrollton had none. The Hubbertville team was
scheduled to play all-white Lynn High the following Friday, at which time Hollingsworth expected “a
repeat of the Carrollton affair.” Johnson forwarded Hollingsworth’s letter to John Doar, advising him
that this was “a matter which may need some investigation and appropriate action.” The CRD followed
through on Johnson’s suggestion and in February filed a motion to force Stone to merge the
associations.39
When it came to the particulars of how the athletic associations would merge, there was much
disagreement, particularly over compulsory scheduling of games between formerly all-white schools and
all-black schools. AIAA president Allen Frazier favored compulsory scheduling, but others wanted to
avoid this at all costs, including state Superintendent Stone and AHSAA executive director Herman Scott.
Stone argued that compulsory scheduling would “kill” high school athletics, because formerly all-white
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schools would eliminate their programs rather than play the black schools. He also predicted that
“blood [would] flow” if any of these contests ever actually took place. In his response to the
government’s motion in Lee v. Macon, Stone argued that he could not “sit by idly and submissively
accept the Justice Department’s plan for reordering Alabama athletics without making known to [the]
Court his strong conviction that, if the Government prevails on this motion, the result could very easily
be disastrous.”40 Scott registered opposition to the merger because he felt the AIAA did “not have
anything to merge” because it had no full time staff and that it was “not nearly so tight” as the AHSAA.
Scott also pointed to desegregated teams at formerly all-white schools as a sign that the present system
was working and needed no adjustment. He cited the fact that there were four black starters at
Birmingham’s Ramsey High; Tuscaloosa High’s football team had 6 black starters; the runner-up for the
Most Valuable Player award given at the state’s most recent basketball tournament was a black studentathlete from Butler High in Huntsville. These desegregated teams were actually encouraging further
freedom of choice desegregation and further extra-curricular participation from black transfer students;
it was true. Detractors argued that compulsory scheduling would ruin such progress.41
Stone and Scott were particularly concerned about fan violence in the case of compulsory
interracial games. They and a number of coaches expressed apprehension that the games would turn
into “clashes of the races.” What they did not wish to admit to was fearing that white schools would be
defeated by black schools, perhaps even badly, and that this would be the proximate cause of these
“clashes.” On the other hand, if white schools were to routinely defeat black schools, this would create
other problems. Some coaches at the formerly all-white schools felt that this would bring pressure to
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bear from the black community on black transfer athletes, who would be accused of “beating their own
people.” At the same time, white coaches recruited black athletes to win, and they were not about to
let them go without a fight. For example, Tuscaloosa County High beat Tuscaloosa High in basketball for
the first time in 10 years thanks to the “assistance” of its star black player. What if he were convinced to
return to the county’s black school? In fact such conflicts had already occurred, without compulsory
scheduling. The principal at Opelika’s all-black Darden High convinced four black student-athletes to
return from formerly all-white Opelika. This prompted the principal of Opelika High to complain to the
school board, which prevented the boys’ transfer back to Darden. As long as there were black schools
and a black athletic association, the formerly all-white schools would continue to prevail in such
circumstances. According to AIAA’s Frazier, he received nearly 20 complaints in 1967-68 on account of
white schools “raiding and taking away their best athletes.” White coaches deposed by defense
attorneys for this phase of the Lee litigation may have couched their concerns primarily in terms of the
impedance of integration, but the more immediate concern was probably the loss of their relative
competitive edges.42
For the court itself, these questions were largely immaterial. The March, 1967 decree had
placed an affirmative duty on state officials to abolish the dual school system, and this included
athletics. There simply could not continue to be two statewide athletic associations. The Justice
Department filed its motion on February 20 asking the court to require Stone to notify the 99 Lee
systems that they could no longer belong to segregated athletic associations and that they must begin
scheduling their contests without regard to race. After hearing testimony in early March, Judge Johnson
decided to allow Stone and the two associations to work out the particulars themselves, under certain
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parameters. On April 1, the court entered a decree directing the three entities to prepare a merger
plan. He enjoined each from participating in the operation of a dual athletics system based on race and
served notice on the 99 school systems that if they belonged to any athletics association at all, it had to
be the one formed by said merger. Johnson also entered an order in Carr v. Montgomery aimed at
bringing that system within the bounds of the April 1 order. This put the other 18 non-Lee systems on
notice that they might as well proceed as though they were next. Stone tried to wash his hands of the
matter, telling Frazier and Scott that he had “no official responsibility in working out the details of [the]
merger.” But Johnson and Rives decided that the opposite was true, advising the state superintendent
to actively participate in the discussions and to ensure that the merger was effective and fair.43
The completed merger plan called for open membership to all schools in the state, the creation
of geographical districts, and the creation of a biracial legislative council and central board. The court
had stopped short of ordering compulsory scheduling between black and white schools, but the newly
created geographical districts necessarily meant there would be some measure of such scheduling. The
plan also contained a special provision for the recruiting of athletes. To prevent “raiding” of black
schools’ players by predominantly white schools, the plan called for investigations upon complaints of
such practice. However, the Executive Secretary of the merged association was to have sole
discretionary authority in these cases, and the Executive Secretary was going to be Scott. The AIAA
chose not to retain Fred Gray and Sol Seay during the merger negotiations, and Seay privately criticized
the organization for conceding too much. There was an understanding that Frazier or some black
successor would serve in an Associate Executive Secretary role, but there were no guarantee as to that
person’s authority, compensation, or benefits. And there were no guarantees that recruiting of black
43
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athletes to formerly all-white schools would not continue to the chagrin of the black schools.
Nonetheless, the court approved the plan May 3, and the AHSAA and AIAA ceased to exist in their past
forms. The first off-shoot phase of Lee v. Macon thus began and ended rather quickly.44

“Beyond Tokenism” in Carr v. Montgomery
While much of the state’s attention in the spring of 1968 remained on developments in Lee v.
Macon, Judge Johnson entered an order in the Carr v. Montgomery case which proved to be both highly
controversial and ultimately influential. The previous fall, when the CRD had moved to accelerate
faculty desegregation, Johnson had sided with the Montgomery Board of Education over the Justice
Department. The judge chided the CRD for its untimely motion and afforded the Montgomery
authorities the chance to progress on their own. It soon became clear that not only had the school
board failed to move forward in faculty desegregation, it had built three new schools and was blatantly
marketing them as safely all-white alternatives to its existing schools. The CRD filed a motion for further
relief in February, which was joined in by Fred Gray and Sol Seay. Nothing irritated Johnson more than a
lack of good faith, especially when it proved that he had misplaced his confidence in litigants who then
failed to demonstrate it. He took the opportunity created by the plaintiffs’ motions to enter an omnibus
order in Carr that addressed the faculty and school construction issues, along with several others.45
Since Johnson had given the Montgomery board a reprieve the previous fall, it had assigned 75
new teachers to faculties in which their race was a majority. Those were 75 chances to increase faculty
desegregation which the board had chosen to ignore. The only faculty desegregation which it had
undertaken since the beginning of the school year was the placement of seven white teachers in black
44
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schools. The board had also failed to undertake any desegregation of its substitute or student teacher
programs. Additionally, it had initiated the school construction projects, which Johnson determined had
violated “both the spirit and the letter of [its] desegregation plan.” Specifically, the board had
constructed three new schools in an affluent white section of the city, had ascertained the number of
white students in the surrounding area, and had tailored the schools’ size to accommodate only these
students. The board had hired a principal, three coaches, and a band director for the high school, all of
whom were white. These individuals had actively engaged in fundraising campaigns only in the white
community and had begun to schedule competitions against other white schools. The football coach
had distributed literature about the commencement of spring practice only to white students. The
school was to be “non-transported,” meaning the school board would not provide bus service, while it
provided such transportation to formerly all-white Robert E. Lee and Sidney Lanier High Schools.
Transportation would not a problem for the wealthy white families in the new high school’s vicinity. If
this picture were not clear enough, the school’s name should have unclouded it: Jefferson Davis High
School was intended to be a predominantly white school, and everyone knew it. At the same time, the
Montgomery officials had expanded Hayneville Road School and George Washington Carver High, both
all-black schools in all-black neighborhoods. The Jefferson Davis school project and contemporaneous
expansions at Carver constituted, in Johnson’s words, “one of the most aggravating courses of conduct
on the part of the defendants and their agents and employees.” The order he drafted was reflective of
his exasperation.46
On February 24 Johnson entered the order, indicating that further delay would “not be
tolerated.” Johnson insisted that the reluctance of teachers to take desegregated assignments was not
an excuse for the school board to fail to make such assignments. He added, “Unless the ‘freedom-ofchoice’ plan is more effectively and less dilatorily used by the defendants in this case, the Court will have
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no alternative except to order some other plan used.” In accordance with those “caveats,” Johnson
ordered the Montgomery school board to adopt a supplement to its desegregation plan, which the
judge attached to the order. The board was ordered to obtain approval from the state department of
education for any new construction projects, effectively putting it under the requirements of Lee v.
Macon in this regard. It was ordered to temporarily provide transportation to any students who elected
to attend Jefferson Davis High, provided they lived closer to Davis than Lee or Lanier. Johnson added
other steps to help “eradicate the effect of the efforts . . . to create the impression throughout the
school system that Jefferson Davis High School, Peter Crump Elementary School and Southlawn
Elementary School [were] to be used primarily by white students.” These included sending letters to all
students in the system regarding their eligibility to attend the schools, the text of which the CRD
provided and Johnson included in the order. They also included visiting existing schools to inform
student-athletes of their eligibility to play at Davis and honoring “the choice of each Negro student who
chooses to attend Jefferson Davis High School during the 1968-69 school year, in the absence of
compelling circumstances approved by [the] Court on the school board’s motion.”47
As significant as these requirements were for the Montgomery authorities, the most
immediately controversial aspect of Johnson’s order involved the specific program he prescribed for
faculty desegregation. The supplemental plan read:

In achieving the objective of the school system, that the pattern of teacher assignments to any
particular school shall not be identifiable as tailored for a heavy concentration of either Negro or
white pupils in the school, the school board will be guided by the ratio of Negro to white faculty
members in the school system as a whole. The school board will accomplish faculty
desegregation by hiring and assigning faculty members so that in each school the ratio of white
to Negro faculty members is substantially the same as it is throughout the system. At present,
the ratio is approximately 3 to 2.

47

United States and Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, Opinion and Order 289 F.Supp. 647,
649-54; Birmingham News, Feb. 25, 1967.

532

Johnson included a schedule for achieving this system-wide ratio. For the upcoming year, he required
that at least one out of every six teachers at a given school be of a different race than the majority, with
this ratio to be increased the following year to one in five. He ordered the board to immediately achieve
the system-wide ratio for student teachers and night school teachers and ordered it to stop hiring
substitute teachers who refused to teach in desegregated assignments.48
The order lit a firestorm in Montgomery and garnered criticism from whites across the state. It
was interpreted by many segregationists as having laid out “strict rules” and having “set quotas for race
mixing.” Former lieutenant governor and Democratic senate nominee Jim Allen said the order was
“typical of the vindictive treatment the people of Alabama have been receiving from this Washington
crowd.” Allen observed that the it had rightly “angered Alabamians not only in Montgomery but
throughout the entire state,” because it went “far beyond any concept of freedom of choice.” The
Montgomery school board immediately filed a notice of appeal and applied for a stay of the order
pending the appeal. In its motion for a stay, the board called the order unprecedented, arguing that it
contained “far reaching pronouncements of legal principles heretofore unprecedented in this District
and this Circuit.” It noted that the new faculty requirements involved a “fixed ratio based on race” and
that it required the board to give “an affirmative racial preference” to black students regardless of their
proximity to the new schools. What immediately alarmed the city’s affluent whites most of all was the
directive to notify all students in the system that they were “eligible to attend” Davis. They were
interpreting the order to mean that any black students who wanted to attend Davis could do so, to the
exclusion of the white students for whom the school was built. The prospect of a brand new, all-black
school in the middle of the wealthiest white section of town was a segregationist’s nightmare. That it
bore the name of Jefferson Davis would be a horrible irony which only added insult to injury. The board
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of course could not couch its objections in these terms and opted instead to warn of “extensive student
and procedural confusion” and disruption of “orderly school administration in [the] county.”49
Judge Johnson surprised when, on March 2, he issued an order amending his previous order and
staying its implementation until August 1, pending the school board’s appeal. In his supplemental
remarks, Johnson first clarified his rationale for the previous order. He recounted the 1964 origins of
the case and emphasized the Montgomery school authorities’ recalcitrance and the court’s own
patience. He wrote, “Even though ten years had passed [since Brown] the Montgomery County Board of
Education was allowed, by this Court, to proceed with desegregation gradually.” The court exercised
restraint because it recognized desegregation would “cut across the social fabric of [the] community and
that there would be both administrative and other practical problems for the board to cope with in
order to comply with the law.” Johnson noted that the Montgomery board had adequately passed
through the stages of “’paper compliance’” and “token desegregation of pupils and faculty.” But of the
present state of the litigation, Johnson wrote, “We have reached the point where we must pass
‘tokenism,’ and the order that was entered in this case on February 24, 1968, [was] designed to
accomplish this purpose.”50
Johnson then generally stood by what he felt were requirements which were “not only
authorized but required by the applicable law.” The judge called the charge that the order was
unprecedented “incorrect – in both law and fact.” Regarding faculty desegregation, Johnson pointed
out that the 3:2 ratio was simply a benchmark which could be gradually achieved. He argued that the
court had actually required for 1968-69, “very little - if any – more” than the board already had planned,
and certainly not more than the minimum at that point required under the law. Additionally, the Tenth
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Circuit had already required a similar system-wide ratio, and the Fifth Circuit had anticipated such
specificity in Jefferson.51 On the transportation requirements, Johnson noted that the 99 school systems
in Lee v. Macon were already subject to such terms. He added that the court had “ordered no ‘busing’
of students other than requiring the board of education to provide exactly the same type transportation
and upon exactly the same basis as that already provided by the board to students attending Lee and
Lanier High Schools.” As to Jefferson Davis, Southlawn, and Peter Crump, Johnson reiterated that each
was very obviously designed to be operated on a segregated basis and that the law would “simply not
permit” this. The school board had gone to great lengths to dissuade any blacks from applying to the
school. Johnson maintained that “fairness and justice” required that “something be done to counteract
this aggravated type of discrimination.” He added that the Jefferson Davis scheme was classdiscriminatory, “according to some theories.” Under the scheme, white children in less-exclusive
neighborhoods outside the air-conditioned Davis’ “high-income tax bracket community” would bear the
burden of desegregation alone. The requirement that the board honor the choice of black students
requesting Davis was meant to be temporary, Johnson noted, and he had indicated that
“reasonableness” would determine if “compelling circumstances” allowed the board to deny such
applications.52
Johnson then agreed to stay those “certain features of the order to which the Montgomery
County Board of Education most strenuously [objected]” pending appellate review. He refused to stay
the provisions to desegregate the substitute and student teacher programs and the night school
program, as they did “not even approach new or novel areas.” He also declined to stay the general
requirement for desegregated system-wide transportation and the requirements for obtaining
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permission for construction projects and for reporting to the state superintendent; they had recently
been approved by the Supreme Court in its affirmation of Lee v. Macon. Johnson stayed, “for a limited
time,” the portions of the order relating to the faculty desegregation ratio, the transportation
requirements relative to the three new schools, and the requirement that black students choices of
Jefferson Davis be honored in the absence of “compelling circumstances.” The judge also agreed to
change the language in the letter of notice to students, from “You are eligible to attend Jefferson Davis”
to “You are eligible to choose to attend Jefferson Davis.” Finally, Johnson ordered the attorneys on both
sides to seek an expeditious appeal at the Fifth Circuit, and he set the stay for expiration on August 1 in
the event that one was not secured.53
The Montgomery Advertiser reasoned, “Some fears should now be allayed.” It assured the city’s
whites that while pupil and faculty desegregation would be “on the far side of tokenism,” they would
remain ”short of anything revolutionary.” The three new schools would be “integrated by much the
same standards which [applied] to all other city schools.” Jefferson Davis would “not be required to
take all Negro applicants” as previously suspected. As segregationists were breathing a sigh of relief in
the state’s capitol, however, they were soon hit with a newly alarming court order in the state’s port city
of Mobile. The origins of this order – the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals – were particularly foreboding for
Montgomery’s whites, as the Fifth Circuit was the destination, of course, of the Carr appeal.54

The Effect of Jefferson and Lee on Davis v. Mobile
The March 12, 1968 order in Birdie Mae Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile was a
potentially devastating blow to segregationists and the latest signal that freedom of choice was on its
way out. In 1966 the LDF had appealed U.S. District Judge Daniel Thomas’ approval of the Mobile school
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board’s desegregation plan. Later that year, the Fifth Circuit had found “no true substance to the
alleged desegregation” which the plan might engender. The appellate panel determined that the plan
was lacking in a number of specific ways: a fraction of a percent of black students were in white schools;
the plan would take an inordinate amount of time to move beyond such tokenism; white students were
given the option to transfer to other white schools, while black students were not afforded the same
opportunity; black students were denied the opportunity to attend white schools when those schools
offered courses their schools did not; and there had been a total failure to desegregate faculties. The
appellate court subsequently ordered Thomas to have the board submit a revised plan, which he did. It
was the implementation of this plan which the LDF had again appealed, leading to the March, 1968
decision.55
Mobile was the largest school system in the state, with 93 schools and 75,000 pupils, 31,000 of
which were black. Mobile County had a unified city-county school system, including the City of Mobile,
its few suburbs, and the largely rural, unincorporated county surrounding it. The school board’s revised
plan had treated the city-suburbs (the metropolitan area) and the surrounding county separately. The
board had created a hybrid geographic zone and freedom of choice plan for the city of Mobile and the
adjacent cities of Prichard and Chickasaw, while it maintained traditional freedom of choice for the more
sparsely populated surrounding county. It had redrawn attendance zones on a supposedly non-racial
basis and made a larger number of schools – black and white – available to black students by choice.
However, the option to attend schools outside one’s zone only applied to incoming students, to those
who had moved into a new zone, and to those who were matriculating from one school to the next. The
board made a start to faculty desegregation, but on a strictly voluntary basis. The school board had
facilitated a near 100 percent increase in pupil desegregation from 1966-67 to 1967-68. There were 33
desegregated schools in the district, enrolling 29,031 students, or 38 percent of its total system
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enrollment. This was perfectly satisfactory for Judge Thomas, whose commitment to agonizingly slow
gradualism was already notorious among LDF and CRD attorneys.56
The Fifth Circuit again disagreed with the trial court. The panel assigned to the appeal included
the former moderate Louisiana legislator Robert Ainsworth; the increasingly liberal Homer Thornberry,
lately of the U.S. v. Jefferson majority; and Third Circuit Judge Albert Maris, sitting by designation.
Thornberry wrote the decision, in which he argued that the numbers in Mobile were “superficially
acceptable,” but that “beneath the surface” the picture was “not so good.” Thornberry argued that
when applying the qualitative standard which he believed to be both the letter and the “spirit” of U.S. v.
Jefferson, the court was “unable to say that Mobile's plan is working so well as to make judicial
interference unnecessary at this time.” Two thirds of the system’s schools were still fully segregated.
Furthermore, the number of pupils in “desegregated schools” had been drastically skewed by the fact
that four white students attended formerly all-black schools. This added 1,316 black students at those
schools to the number of students educated in biracial schools. More tellingly, there were only 692
black students attending formerly all-white schools. This was 511 more black students than had been
enrolled in white schools the previous year, but it was still only 2 percent of the black student
population system-wide. Thornberry wrote, “The number of Negro children in school with white
children is so far out of line with the ratio of Negro school children to white school children in the
system as to make inescapable the inference that discrimination still exists.”57
In fashioning a remedy, the appellate court determined that its “primary concern” was to “see
that the attendance zones in the urban areas of Mobile County be devised as to create a unitary racially
nondiscriminatory system.” The plaintiffs pointed to overcrowded downtown schools next to underpopulated white schools and to the fact that schools often sat on the edge of the zone they served as
56
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opposed to at their center. The court called the board’s rebuttals of these points “somewhat
unpersuasive.” It ordered the Mobile officials to conduct a proper survey and redraw the zone lines
“according to objective criteria with the caveat that a conscious effort should be made to move
boundary lines and change feeder patterns.” Zones would have to be “in terms other than race” or they
would be “constitutionally suspect.” Thornberry wrote, “To go a step farther, we hold that once
attendance zones have been properly designated, the student’s option to attend the nearest formerly
white or formerly Negro school outside his zone must be eliminated.” He continued:

The idea of superimposing limited options on an attendance-area plan has failed to bring
Mobile very far along the road toward the ultimate goal of a unitary system wherein schools are
no longer recognizable as Negro or white. . . . As the Court said in the per curiam entered in
Jefferson County, freedom of choice is not a goal in itself but one of many approaches available
to school boards. If it does not work, another method must be tried. Since the limited options
have not worked, we hold that after the boundary lines have been redrawn on a nonracial basis,
each student in the urban areas must attend the schools serving his attendance zone absent
some compelling nonracial reason for transfer.58

While the court left the rural half of the system alone, the effect of the foregoing passage was clear. Not
only had the court thrown out freedom of choice for the city schools, it had determined that 2 percent
of black students in formerly white schools was not even close to adequate progress towards
elimination of the dual system, even when this was a 200 percent increase from the previous year’s
pupil desegregation. If the school board intended to comply in good faith, then there would be
wholesale changes in Mobile schools the following fall. 59
On top of these pupil desegregation requirements, the court addressed faculty desegregation.
There were 2,700 teachers in the school system. Under the voluntary transfer plan adopted by the
board, 12 black teachers had elected to teach in formerly all-white schools, and 3 white teachers had
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chosen to teacher in black schools. Thornberry argued that the “surface of the problem of faculty
segregation” was “hardly scratched by the transfer of 15 teachers to schools of the opposite race.” The
responsibility for desegregated faculties ought to lie, in any case, with the school board and not the
teachers themselves. Again citing Jefferson, the court required that the Mobile school board adopt a
“pattern of teacher assignment” which was not “identifiable as tailored for a heavy concentration of
either Negro or white students.” At the very least, the board was to assign one teacher of the minority
race at both predominantly white and black schools; it was to assign more than one “wherever
possible.” The court finally embodied all of this in a comprehensive decree similar to the Jefferson and
Lee decrees, except that it contained added provisions for the citywide survey and geographical zone
plan. The crux of the decision was also the same as that of Jefferson: “The time for implementing
programs that work,” Thornberry wrote, “is now.”60
Three weeks after the Fifth Circuit panel handed down the Davis opinion and decree, James Earl
Ray shot and killed Martin Luther King, Jr. King had been in Memphis, Tennessee to support a sanitation
workers strike. His shocking murder outraged blacks, many of whom took their grievances and their
grief into the streets of American cities. The latest in a disturbing trend in urban riots fueled
segregationists’ preconceived notions of the volatile nature of black communities in general. This was
particularly relevant in Mobile, where nascent white protest groups seized the opportunity to point to
the riots as evidence that system-wide school desegregation would threaten their children’s lives. Some
Americans understood that the violent protests were a desperate response to ghettoization,
unemployment, police brutality, and racism in general. But many Alabama whites unsurprisingly shared
George Wallace’s characterization of the problem of urban unrest as a telling representation of a
segment of America which refused to work hard and obey the law.61
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Lurleen Wallace’s untimely death followed one month later, on May 6. Her cancer had begun to
spread relentlessly the previous fall, and her condition had steadily deteriorated thereafter. By April the
cancer had reached her colon, liver, and lungs, and she weighed less than 80 pounds. Many Alabamians,
even some blacks, grieved for the state’s first female governor, but her painfully slow descent had
prepared most for the inevitable. Her husband soon returned to the presidential campaign trail. His
former legislative point man, Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer, assumed the governor’s office. And
Alabamians quickly remembered that they were in the midst of a school desegregation crisis that would
not go away on account of two tragic deaths.62
In mid-May, the Mobile school board announced that the March court decree would
“necessitate shifting a large number of students.” The board had even begun to publicize a few of the
newly redrawn districts. It warned citizens that the final plan would more than likely be “even more
drastic” than what it was revealing. White residents of an upper-middle class neighborhood west of
downtown Mobile learned that their children would soon be rezoned from Murphy High, Phillips Junior
High, and Leinkauf Elementary to largely-black Williamson Junior-Senior High and Harmon Elementary.
A group of them besieged the school board at a meeting on March 16 and hurled indignant protests at
the board members. One mother argued that sending her daughter to Williamson instead of Murphy
would be “jeopardizing a child’s life. I wouldn’t let my dog walk down some of those streets,” she said,
“and yet you’re telling me I must send my 15-year-old daughter through one of the roughest sections of
Mobile to go to school,” referring to the Maysville section of town. Another white parent chimed in
about Maysville, where Irish place names still adorned the street signs and where relative poverty was
common. It was “known to police as a jungle, the worst colored area in Mobile,” she said furiously,
“How can you expect us to send our children into a jungle.” A third parent demonstrated the attitude of
what was to be a steadily increasing number of parents. “I’ll tell you now,” he said flatly, “my child is
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not going to that school, and that’s final. And I think that goes 100 percent for all of us who live in these
neighborhoods that are affected.” The school board had received a number of similar indications that
parents would either move, establish private schools, or simply disregard the state’s compulsory
education law rather than send their children to formerly black schools or school which would have
anywhere near a black majority. Attorneys for the school board advised parents to wait before taking
such action, because “a person may move into a worse spot than the one he’s moving out of.” The
board knew that when the full plan was unveiled, there would be much more desperate protest from
whites.63
Meanwhile, whites and blacks began to mobilize. Blacks had recently resurrected the nearly
moribund Neighborhood Organized Workers (NOW), in the wake of the King murder. NOW began to
hold mass meetings and stage various protests, included marches on city hall and student-pickets of
black high schools. This was not John Leflore’s organization. Leflore’s Biracial Commission was
irrelevant, and his message of patient cooperation, in general, was losing traction rapidly. NOW
members not only felt that the school and city authorities were not doing enough to end racial
discrimination, they approached the issue with a sense of urgency and, some would have said, a
militancy which many of Leflore’s generation eschewed. Most NOW members were more receptive to
the message of black power conveyed by former Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee leader
Stokely Carmichael, who addressed one the organization’s summer rallies. White parents began to
organize in opposition to the impending desegregation onslaught, forming such groups as “Operation
Snowball,” “Whites Rights,” and “Whites Organized for Rights Keeping” (WORK). Such groups planned
to stage mass protests and apply pressure on the federal courts, the Justice Department, and of course,
the school board. School board chairman Arthur Smith announced that the board was “wholly
sympathetic with those who are protesting. But just about everything we do now,” Smith added, “is
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under court order, and we aren’t the court.” WORK’s leaders subsequently argued that school board
members should defy the court’s decree, accept contempt citations, and serve jail sentences in
protest.64
The group Stand Together and Never Divide (STAND) ultimately exerted more influence than
any of the other white protest organizations. It was founded by a 37-year-old “tree surgeon” and small
business owner named Lamar Payne. Payne modeled his organization after the Citizens’ Council. It
prided itself on an air of respectability. Its members were mostly middle class, rejected violence, and
embraced law and order. They gave lip service to denouncing “racism and hatreds.” But they were
prepared to devote themselves wholly to avoiding widespread school integration at nearly any cost.
One of STAND’s seminal rallies drew nearly 10,000 whites to a local National Guard armory. Shortly
thereafter, STAND’s attorney – Harvard-educated state Senator and local Citizens’ Council leader Pierre
Pelham – filed a motion to intervene the group in Davis as a defendant. Pelham argued that white
children would be in imminent danger in black schools and in black neighborhoods. He characterized
the black community as increasingly hostile, citing the emergence of such leaders as Carmichael and the
eruption of urban riots in cities across the nation. Pelham failed to appreciate that the most recent of
these “disturbances” had been occasioned by King’s assassination, or the significance of such
connection. Nonetheless, Judge Thomas allowed the group to file a complaint in intervention and to
thereby join the suit.65
The white parents’ revolt escalated on May 20 when the Mobile school officials held a full
community hearing on the new desegregation plan at the city’s Municipal Auditorium. Nearly one
thousand angry whites stormed the auditorium and turned the school board’s public hearing into what
reporters called “the most turbulent and rowdiest meeting [it] ever held.” White parents yelled at
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board members and vowed to circumvent the proposed plan at any cost. Several among the few
hundred blacks either countered in support of the plan or argued that it did not go far enough. Police
kept a tenuous peace as white and black parents sniped at each other. The hearing devolved into near
chaos at several points, and the board almost adjourned it in disorder. A group of nearly 300 white
parents eventually staged a walkout, barking at black audience members as they left. The walkout
coincided with the emergence at the podium of leaders from the newly reinvigorated NOW. Jacqueline
Jacobs, the wife of NOW president David Jacobs, shouted in frustration at the departing whites, “Run,
run! You can’t run forever!” Jacobs continued screaming and gesturing animatedly, as board chairman
Smith screamed for order. When police temporarily calmed Jacobs, and Smith restored a semblance of
order, the NOW representatives were allowed to proceed. Jacobs argued that her children had been
forced to go to Williamson, despite the rampant crime, which she readily conceded was a problem. Why
should white children be exempt from such hardship? NOW’s direct action director Jerry Pogue then
chided the board for its previous recalcitrance and wondered why there were not any black members on
it, since the city was itself roughly 40 percent black. Jacobs and Pogue were followed by black
community leader Jesse Thomas, who argued that Maysville was not some “jungle” wherein white
children would be in danger. He added that the neighborhood certainly was not the only section of
town with a crime problem; there were white neighborhoods with such issues, too. After this, the aging
activist Leflore – architect of the city’s first desegregation attempts almost 15 years prior – strode to the
podium. As the spokesmen for a bygone era, he called for biracial cooperation and understanding.
Neither the blacks nor the whites in attendance seemed interested in such a message.66
Leflore was followed by Catholic priest Leon Hill, whose comments were nearly smothered by
abuse from the whites in attendance. Hill was the pastor of Our Mother of Mercy in the predominantlyblack Plateau section of town. He tried to counsel acceptance of the inevitable and to encourage law
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and order, arguing, “Changes are coming, whether we like it or not, so why delay, delay, delay?” He
added, “If we’re going to cut off our tail, then let’s do it all at once.” Hill was run off the podium to a
pointed catcall: “How many kids do you have, father?” It seemed that the gathered whites were only
interested in the kind of defiant pronouncements which they had come to expect from their state
government. Thus, the exact opposite reaction greeted several white parents who went before the
raucous crowd. A few spoke again of a crime epidemic which they believed existed in Maysville, from
whence they heard sirens and gunfire and even screams at night. Others spoke of a “burden” that was
“too great . . . too heavy” for their children to bear. One white parent’s remarks could have just as easily
come from a black parent. He told the board members, “We have begged, but we beg no longer. We
have petitioned, but we petition no longer. We will stand together 100,00 strong – and more if
necessary, God being our helper, we will succeed in saving our children and our schools.” The applause
was even louder for another white parent who declared, to the blacks as much as to the board, “I don’t
care how many plans you sit here and make, or how many court orders you get, my children are not
going to Williamson or any other Negro school.” Many white parents – not just in Mobile but across the
state – felt exactly the same way.67

Green v. County School Board of New Kent
One week after the revealing Mobile school board hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County. On May 27, the Court firmly
embraced the Southern appellate courts’ trend towards more demanding relief and sounded the
beginning of the end for freedom of choice in the process. The New Kent school board had attempted
to argue that its freedom of choice plan was acceptable because the Fourteenth Amendment did not
support “compulsory integration.” The Court held, “That argument ignores the thrust of Brown II.”
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Justice William Brennan delivered the opinion. As he prepared to read it, the aging and soon to be
retired Justice Earl Warren slipped him a note which read, “When this opinion is handed down, the
traffic light will have changed from Brown to Green. Amen!” Brennan read:

In the light of the command of [Brown II], what is involved here is the question whether the
Board has achieved the "racially nondiscriminatory school system" Brown II held must be
effectuated in order to remedy the established unconstitutional deficiencies of its segregated
system. In the context of the state-imposed segregated pattern of long standing, the fact that,
in 1965, the Board opened the doors of the former "white" school to Negro children and of the
"Negro" school to white children merely begins, not ends, our inquiry whether the Board has
taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated system.68

Freedom of choice was, then, “not an end in itself,” only one means to an end. It was
incumbent on school boards to demonstrate that freedom of choice was the most preferable method
for disestablishing the dual system. If “other more promising courses of action” were available and a
school board continued to cling to its freedom of choice plan, this constituted a lack of good faith. “We
do not hold that a ‘freedom of choice’ plan might of itself be unconstitutional,” Brennan wrote,
“although that argument has been urged upon us. . . . Where it offers real promise of aiding a
desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial
system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove itself in operation.” However, the
Court acknowledged that the “general experience under ‘freedom of choice’” had been “such as to
indicate its ineffectiveness.” Brennan emphasized that a school board’s “burden” was to “come forward
with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.” Thus, the
fundamental message: “If there are reasonably available other ways, such for illustration as zoning,
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promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, ‘freedom of
choice’ must be held unacceptable.”69
Green has been described as “a major milestone in the history of judicial steps towards
desegregation of public schools” and as a “watershed case.” It was important, as one scholar has
written, “not because of what was said but because the Supreme Court said it.” The Court adopted
Judge Wisdom’s position, and that of the en banc Fifth Circuit, in U.S. v. Jefferson. But Green was much
more than simply a validation of the appellate court’s decision, for the Court had already done that, in
essences, in its affirmation of Lee v. Macon and its denial of certiorari in Jefferson. The importance of
Green lie in the standards for judging free choice plans. The Court found that New Kent’s freedom of
choice plan was failing because no white children had chosen black schools and fewer than 15 percent
of black children had chosen white schools. The schools were still racially identifiable as judged by these
numerical criteria. If this was the new standard for the efficacy of freedom of choice, then there were
school systems across the South which were about to find that their freedom of choice plans would not
withstand renewed scrutiny. Mobile had discovered this about its own plan a few months earlier. Were
the rest of Alabama’s 119 school systems about to realize the same?70
As the summer of 1968 began, the spate of recent decisions, especially Green, ensured that the
issue of school desegregation would be once again at the center of the state electioneering. Former
Lieutenant Governor Jim Allen went to Mobile two days after the Supreme Court handed down Green to
stimulate his campaign to replace Lister Hill in the U.S. Senate. Allen, Governor Albert Brewer, and
others proved little different from George Wallace or John Patterson in fanning the flames of racial
resentment, antipathy towards federal government ‘meddling,’ and resistance to any and all efforts to
further effectuate school desegregation. Allen told a crowd of supporters at a headquarters reception
69
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that the recent Davis and Green decisions were condemnable. “These two decisions,” Allen announced,
“show the length to which the Washington crowd is going to take over our schools, our children, and the
daily lives of our young people.” Allen added that there was hope in defiance, though. “Even the
federal judiciary,” he said, would “move in the face of aroused public opinion.” He cited developments
in Carr: “We saw a recent example of this in Montgomery where the federal district judge modified a
school desegregation decree when public opinion was aroused and the people acted.” Allen concluded
that such “action” could “do wonders when the federal judges realize the people are not going to
submit.” This was a near total mischaracterization of what had actually occurred in the Carr
proceedings. In reality, Johnson had made a small semantic change in his decree and had temporarily
stayed portions of his order pending appeal, all in response to a properly filed motion. But Allen and
others continued to encourage white community resistance, nonetheless. He praised the efforts of
whites in Mobile, saying, “I stand with STAND . . . 100 percent.”71
Brewer matched Allen’s rhetoric. He asked the state congressional delegation “to propose
legislation which would overturn the decisions made by the courts,” meaning Davis, Carr, and Green.
Brewer channeled his mentor, Wallace, complete with paranoiac (and ironic) exaggeration: “Because of
this innovation by judicial decree, the courts are now declaring that a person in this republic no longer
can exercise a choice. Logically extended, this rule can be applied to determine where a person lives
and how he can make a living.” The governor continued, “There is a serious question as to how long we
can continue to operate our public schools if the federal courts abandon all restraint and continue to
encroach upon local control of our schools.” Alabamians were “satisfied with the operation of the
freedom of choice plan.” It was a “very small, but vocal and suit-conscious minority” which was
responsible for frustrating the will of “people of all races.” Resistance had reached the point at which
segregationist leaders were championing that which they had previously spent a decade trying to avoid.
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Freedom of choice had to be salvaged. Brewer thus praised the Alabama Education Association for
speaking out against the recent decisions, and he applauded a petition for intervention in Davis filed by
white students who had been “denied their freedom of choice.”72

*****
Segregationist outrage in Mobile reached a high point that summer. The ruling in Green made a
reversal of Davis seem impossible. Groups like STAND grappled for some way to avoid what appeared
to everyone else to be inevitable, as many in the city’s black communities saw for the first time some
measure of real victory in sight in their fight for their constitutional rights. With white expressions of
frustration and exasperation – along with black insistence on immediate implementation – came a sharp
and dangerous increase in racial tension. Attorney Vernon Crawford spoke to reporters about the
atmospheric change, saying it was “pretty bad” and that certain whites and blacks could “resort to
violence immediately.” Mobile Superintendent Crawford Burns expressed “deep concern about the sort
of problems that will come unless we can soften the decree or convince people to accept it.” STAND’s
attorney Pierre Pelham argued that there was no question about the immediate white response.
“Parents are going to resist,” he said, “When you had token integration there was resistance, but now
you’re way beyond that. You’re getting home. It’s a more personal thing.” Crawford, Burns, and
Pelham represented three distinct groups with competing desires. Crawford represented blacks in the
courtroom, which they had begun to realize was the only place where they might secure access to a
non-discriminatory education. Burns represented the school officials who begrudgingly had come to
accept that some sort of acquiescence to black demands was necessary if they were to avoid jail or the
“destruction” of the very school systems which they administrated. Pelham represented a newly
militant group of whites which was determined to avoid school desegregation at nearly any cost, if
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desegregation were to mean anything more than tokenism. On one point, however, the three were in
complete agreement – the demise of freedom of choice would have a profound impact on
desegregation in Mobile and across the state.73
On June 9, 2,600 whites gathered again at the National Guard armory to hear STAND leaders
discuss possible courses of action. Pelham assured the crowd that Governor Brewer was behind them
and was prepared to provide “the full resources of the governor’s office” if they were needed to
“protect the public school system of [the] state.” The organization was already seriously considering
setting up private schools if necessary. Pelham assured them of the righteousness of their resistance,
saying, “It is not you who are tearing down buildings and burning up cities.” Black neighborhoods, he
suggested, were violent and unsafe because black people were violent. And “no man, nowhere,” he
added, “would tell me to send my child to an unsafe school.”74
STAND leader William Westbrook also spoke at the rally. He described STAND’s plan to hold
mass demonstrations, in the belief that such events could influence some sort of retrenchment from the
courts. The distorted view of what had recently happened in the Carr case, articulated by Jim Allen,
provided them with a false sense of hope in this. Westbrook said that they could show the federal
judges that they would not let their children “go into an environment that [would] make bums, loafers,
hoodlums, and criminals out of them.” Westbrook envisioned a throng of STAND members marching on
the federal courthouse, “clean shaven and neatly dressed.” He asked the attendees to “imagine 50,000
people heading to the courthouse to attend court in behalf of our children” and to “consider the impact
on the courts and the nation.” He reiterated STAND’s charge to the members of the Mobile school
board, insisting that they had been “put on notice to get their bags packed and, if need be, to get ready
to go to jail in defiance of the court orders.” Westbrook then closed by evoking the recently slain Martin
Luther King. “We have had a dream too,” he declared, which “no power on Earth” could change. “Our
73
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dream,” he told them, “is we are not going to surrender our schools and our homes to the social-minded
reformers and Constitution wrecking judges. We are not going to send our children to Negro schools,
and that is a fact and not a fantasy.”75
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CHAPTER 14: THE TRAFFIC LIGHT CHANGES: THE GREEN V. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD EFFECT, 1968

The Supreme Court’s May, 1968 decision in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County
promised to immediately accelerate school desegregation in the South. Within a month, southern
congressmen were doing everything they could to effectively nullify it. Mississippi’s Jamie Whitten
introduced a proposed amendment to the annual HEW appropriations bill which Georgia’s John Flynt
described as a “congressional sanction to ‘freedom of choice.’” It read, “No part of the funds contained
in this Act may be used to force busing of students, abolishment of any school, or to force any student
attending any school to attend a particular school against the choice of his or her parent.”
Representative Emmanuel Cellar of New York and other congressional opponents of the move were
obliged to identify the effort for what it was. Cellar said, “What is sought here is to overturn the
Supreme Court’s decision,” meaning Green. The amendment had originally been offered by a North
Carolina congressman in 1966, but Whitten had taken it upon himself to reintroduce it annually
thereafter, thus it became known as “the Whitten Amendment.” In the wake of Green, Whitten and
others were able to secure the cooperation of some non-southern colleagues by warning that the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, HEW, and the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department might one day
seek the desegregation of their school systems, too.1
Until that time, many fears outside the South had been assuaged by language in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and supportive federal court rulings, which seemed to exempt so-called de facto
segregation in northern, Midwestern, and western cities from federal scrutiny. According to the
dominant narrative, de facto segregation was residential segregation which was free from officially
mandated, that is de jure, segregation. Green allowed southerners to exploit outside fears that de facto
segregation might soon be targeted, too. Whitten warned, “What has been visited upon certain areas of
1
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the country is about to spread throughout the nation.” The measure passed 139-109 but was assailed in
the Senate Appropriations Committee, where liberal northern Senators were able to force a change in
the language. The Senate product simply precluded the use of funds to achieve “racial balance.” This
was the same as the language in the Civil Rights Act and was similarly intended to keep southern style de
jure segregation in the crosshairs of enforcement while protecting northern style de facto segregation.
Wrangling in a House-Senate conference committee restored the Whitten language, but it then failed to
pass the House by a 175-169 margin.2
The near passage of the Whitten Amendment, with its new language aimed directly at the
standards set forth in Green, was a sign of the times. Not only did it underscored the importance of the
de jure – de facto divide, as it was understood by civil rights activists, bureaucrats, and politicians alike, it
also demonstrated that the path of evasion had, ironically, become more clear after Green. Most
southern congressmen had been above the school desegregation fray for years. Alabama Senators John
Sparkman and Lister Hill, for example, had remained aloof from much state-level defiance. There had
not been a concerted effort on Capitol Hill to derail school desegregation efforts since the fight against
the Civil Rights Bill. Having lost that battle, most southern congressmen had begrudgingly accepted
token desegregation as inevitable. The vitriolic and visceral reaction against the kind of compulsory
assignment of students and teachers portended by Green, however, forced them to make some kind of
stand, and supporting the Whitten Amendment seemed timely enough. But it was more than timing
and constituent pressure. The rhetoric had changed. Defending freedom of choice offered whites the
opportunity to employ the logical defense begat by the marriage of law and order. It need not be about
states’ rights and white supremacy anymore. Support for freedom of choice against compulsory
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assignment was support for the constitutional freedom to associate with those of one’s own choosing.
Who in a liberal society could fail to support this?3
As southern congressmen were fighting to save freedom of choice in Washington, whites in
Alabama were doing so in the courts, in meeting halls, and in the streets. Sensing that, as Earl Warren
had suggested, the “traffic light” was changing “from Brown to Green,” the LDF and the CRD filed
motions in all of Alabama’s desegregation suits seeking further relief along the lines suggested in Green.
This forced segregationists across the state to cling desperately to that which they had only recently
fought bitterly to avoid. They demonstrated that while many whites might reluctantly accept tokenism,
they would resume the fight in order to avoid anything more. Having recently made sense of their
acceptance of freedom of choice by way of deference to law and order, they sought solutions within the
realm of the law. First, they fought each desegregation case at every turn and made use of any
opportunity for delay which federal judges would grant. Second, they began to articulate a defense of
the white right to choose – a process which necessarily assumed blacks were attacking the Constitution.
Having successfully assaulted states’ rights, blacks supposedly had turned their ranks towards individual
freedoms. Whites rallied around the issue, and the prospect for the genuine eradication of the dual
school system based on race remained dim, despite a relentless drive in the states’ federal courts.4 By
the end of the school year in 1969, the Southern Regional Council was lamenting the failure of U.S. v.
Jefferson, Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile, Carr v. Montgomery, and Lee v. Macon to
yet live up to the promise of what had only recently seemed like the dawning of a “new judicial era”:

We teach our children, all children, that the United States of America is dedicated to law and
order. We lie. We have shown a generation of American children, in the public institution
closest to their lives, the schools, that this nation’s fundamental law need not be obeyed; we
have clearly demonstrated to them that what we expect is their conformity to lipservice to the
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shibboleth. What will be the awful effects of this lie upon children, black and white alike? What
depths of disillusionment when they hear us say “law” and observe only “order.”

After a generation has beheld successful evasion, rationalized vacillation, [and] outright
flaunting of the law, only a country absolutely wedded to the totalitarian concept of order
without law could turn on the victims of lawlessness and accuse them of destroying the fabric of
society.5

Freedom of Choice Temporarily Spared in Lee v. Macon
Green v. County School Board provided the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division and the
NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund with the grounds on which to seek further relief in the many cases already
in litigation across the South. The decision itself had been, in essence, a reaffirmation of U.S. v.
Jefferson, and therefore an endorsement of the CRD’s own policy. In late June the head of the CRD,
Stephen Pollack, outlined for Attorney General Ramsey Clark his plan to capitalize on Green. The Court
had found New Kent’s freedom of choice desegregation plan, and those of the companion case districts,
to be deficient based on the percentage of black and white pupils in desegregated schools in each
system. In each case no whites had chosen to attend black schools, and less than 15 percent of blacks
had chosen white schools. As soon as the decision was handed down, the CRD conducted a review of
the 190 school districts in which it was involved in litigation. Pollack told Clark that, “with few
exceptions,” those districts fell within the Green criteria for further relief. He felt that the Justice
Department had a “responsibility” to seek compliance along the lines set out in Green, meaning that the
CRD ought to file motions to get those districts to utilize some other, more effective method of
desegregation. The HEW Office for Civil Rights had already applied similar criteria in its Title VI
enforcement program, so there would be a uniformity in the federal government’s approach.6
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Pollack noted some limitations. First, the CRD only had so many attorneys, and it also had other
commitments. Pollack told Clark that the enforcement program would require a “considerable
commitment of manpower and resources moving forward.” This was particularly true in places like
Mississippi and Louisiana, where the CRD was involved in dozens of cases. It was certainly true in
Alabama, where the CRD’s involvement in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education meant that it was
involved with 99 systems, 76 of which were ripe for further relief per the Green standard. The Division
would have to prioritize certain districts and proceed in as many as possible. Pollack also acknowledged
that there would be “threats of forcible interference” from state officials and resistance from local
whites in places like Alabama. There was likely to be “a concerted effort . . . directed towards
undermining the public school system, such as [had] occurred in Prince Edward County, Virginia, and
Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.” Finally, Pollack admitted that the Civil Rights Division did “not have
complete control over developments.” There were private litigants who would file their own motions
for further relief in a number of cases, based on Green. In fact, he wrote, “such a motion has already
been filed in Lee v. Macon County.”7
Fred Gray had indeed filed a motion in Lee v. Macon on June 7, 1969 on behalf of the plaintiff
class and as associated counsel for the LDF. In his brief in support of the motion, Gray noted that the
Supreme Court’s directive in Green was nearly identical to the one already set out in Lee v. Macon in
March, 1967. The Supreme Court in Green had directed trial courts to ascertain whether or not freedom
of choice plans actually worked, and if not, to order the implementation of “reasonably available other
ways, such as for illustration zoning, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary
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nonracial school system.” Judge Frank Johnson had already written in the March, 1967 Lee opinion, “In
short, the measure of a freedom of choice plan . . . is whether it is effective. If the plan does not work,
than this Court, as well as the State of Alabama school officials – both state and local – is under a
constitutional obligation to find some other method to ensure that the dual school system based upon
race is eliminated.” Johnson had added, “we stress again that [freedom of choice] may only be an
interim plan.” Fred Gray argued that, with the decision in Green, this “interim period of tolerance for
freedom of choice plans [had thus] come to an end.” He asked the court to require state
Superintendent Ernest Stone to prove that each of the 99 systems was “employing the method of pupil
assignment which promises the speediest and most effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school
system.”8
The CRD filed its own motion for further relief in Lee v. Macon on June 15. It asked the court to
order Stone to require school systems to adopt and implement plans “for the assignment of students on
some basis other than freedom of choice” in order to “insure the immediate and effective eradication of
the vestiges of the dual system of schools based upon race.” The CRD’s brief in support of the motion
included a massive appendix in which it set out specific recommendations for the 76 school systems
which fell under the Green criteria. A systems-by-system analysis included each district’s pupil and
faculty integration numbers, by school. These figures were accompanied by district maps,
transportation plans as reported to Stone, and a listing of what steps, if any, systems had taken beyond
freedom of choice, for example, closing substandard black schools. In each system, there were still allblack schools within blocks of token desegregated, predominantly white schools; faculties were only
desegregated to the most minimal standard possible; the percentage of black students in formerly white
schools was generally well below 15 percent of the system’s total black enrollment; and the number of
white students choosing to attend black schools was always zero. A number of systems had closed
8
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black schools – or certain grades at some black schools – but the number of black students integrated as
a result was rarely enough to constitute significant progress towards eliminating the dual system.9
The CRD recommendations were specific. For example, for the Auburn city system, the division
recommended the closure of grades 5-9 at two black schools, the assignment of those students to
others (white) schools in the system, and the assignment of all students in the entire system in grades
10-12 to Auburn High. Or for the Washington County system, the CRD recommended the closure of two
black elementary schools entirely and the assignment of those students to white schools, as well as the
closure of grades 7-12 at the all-black K-12 Prestwick School and the assignment of those students to
Leroy High, the formerly all-white county high school. In some cases, the CRD recommended “pairing,”
or the use of formerly-black and formerly-white schools in tandem. Under this arrangement, one school
would enroll all black and white students in a combined, two-school zone for a certain grade set (for
example, 6-7), and the other would then take those same students for the remaining grades (8-9).
Judge Johnson set a hearing on the two motions for August 22.10
Meanwhile, the CRD began contacting the 76 systems – through Superintendent Stone –
regarding what it felt were their obligations. The response of the school officials in Autauga County is
typical of the responses from many systems to these notifications. The CRD recommended that Autauga
transfer certain groups of black students in the vicinity of predominantly white schools to those schools,
just as it had for Auburn, Washington County, and most of the others. The Autauga superintendent
replied that this was “virtually an imposition of a district line desegregation plan,” which the 1967 court
order in Lee v. Macon did not “require or authorize.” The superintendent added, “If this board were
9
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forced to have a compulsory attendance district, the [schools] that you mentioned . . . would become
. . . totally Negro school[s].” He argued that this would be “repugnant to the purpose as set forth by you
in your letter.” Bibb County’s superintendent was more direct: “It will be impossible for the Bibb County
School System to take the suggested step[s] as outlined in your letter to Dr. Stone . . . .” Many school
officials simply assumed that whites would not tolerate anything remotely close to minority status in an
integrated school. They assume – with good reason – that a Tuskegee-like exodus for private schools or
for nearby districts would take place, and they used this as a rationale for avoiding anything beyond
token desegregation. This was certainly possible, especially given that there was not likely to be any
moral leadership from white communities in support of working within such a situation. Even law-andorder style community compliance efforts would begin to breakdown once desegregation proceeded
beyond tokenism. But the courts had already spoken on the matter, both in Cooper v. Aaron (1957) and
more recently. Fred Gray addressed the issue in his August brief: “The speculation that white students
will flee an over-integrated public school system cannot support rejection of the government’s
proposals. Such speculation was strenuously urged in Monroe v. Board of School Commissioners of the
City of Jackson, Tennessee [1968] and summarily brushed aside by the Supreme Court of the United
States.” In addition to hiding behind the threat of white flight, school boards complained of potential
overcrowding, of a “total disruption” of their plans for the upcoming year, and of students’ “lack of
choice.” As before, their concerns resonated with the outcry from Montgomery.11
The state-level reaction to the motions in Lee v. Macon might have been different with the
Wallaces’ successor, Albert Brewer, at the helm of the state government. Only, it was not. The former
legislator from the north Alabama city of Decatur picked up the politics of legal and rhetorical defiance
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right where the late Governor Wallace and her husband had left it. Brewer quickly announced a defiant
resolution issued by the state board of education, which he said would put the state “on the offensive
rather than the defensive.” The governor was “gravely concerned,” he said, by these “arbitrary,
mandatory court orders.” He wanted to increase spending on education during his term, in order to
bring teachers’ salaries up to competitive levels, among other initiatives. But he argued that this would
be difficult if public support for education eroded as a result of compulsory assignment. The governor’s
response and the state board’s resolution were intended to support the state’s position at the Lee v.
Macon August 22 hearing, and to bolster its response to the recent zoning order in Davis v. Mobile. The
state board contended, “The freedom of choice plan, though involuntarily accepted by each board, has
been implemented in good faith by each board, and each school system has adjusted in part to the
requirements which the court has imposed.” The state board authorized Brewer to support the Mobile
school board in any way necessary, and it authorized the retention of state counsel “to defend the right
of each local school board to determine for itself the question of whether the freedom of choice plan
will be retained.” Brewer made sure the Mobile board knew that he had made his own legal advisor
available to supplement its legal team “if it would help.” The state’s attorneys were already working on
behalf of the 99 school systems in Lee.12
State officials – and most local officials – felt that freedom of choice was “working,” at least in
the way that they had assumed it would be allowed to work. Supposedly, no students had been denied
the right to choose. While this was shockingly untrue in a number of school systems, it was not the
most damning indictment of freedom of choice’s tenure in Alabama. Few school officials had
understood – or accepted – that freedom of choice was actually supposed to bring about the elimination
of the dual system. They assumed it was a permanent compromise. This was a fundamental
misunderstanding of the plaintiffs’ goals, the Justice Department’s goals, and of course, the law as most
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federal judges understood it. The fate of freedom of choice was to be decided by the results it had
wrought. And they were not promising. As of that summer, HEW reported that 13,000 of the state’s
233,000 black students were in formerly white schools: 5.4 percent, and lower than any other state save
Mississippi. In some Black Belt systems, the number was still a fraction of a percent. In the 76 systems
which were the target of the new motions, 91 percent of black students were set to attend all-black
schools.13
At the August hearing, the defendant state officials argued that freedom of choice had
“unquestionably worked.” Its abandonment would render the allocation of increased funding for
Alabama’s cash-starved schools “unquestionably . . . impossible.” Like many others at the local and
state level, the defendant officials subscribed to the “tipping point” theory, according to which,
increasing integration past a voluntary, token black presence would result in “totally Negro school
systems.” The defense also, predictably, pointed the finger north: “While it is true that 89.9 percent of
the Negro pupils in the affected areas chose for the coming year to attend formerly Negro schools, there
is nevertheless more integration in the state of Alabama than in the elementary schools of Washington,
Chicago, Atlanta, St. Louis, or Gary, Ind.” Brewer took the stand and argued, “The people are simply not
going to be willing to pay the taxes to finance the education system properly.” They would refuse to
send their children to formerly black schools, and they would refuse to finance majority black schools
through tax increases. They would, he maintained, send their children to private schools. Indeed, the
exodus had already begun. He accused the LDF of “emphasizing statistics and social objectives” and of
“missing the whole point of why we operate a school system . . . to educate young people.” Alabama’s
whites had “reluctantly” accepted desegregation, and as a result, Brewer claimed that there was “no
deep-seated bitterness between the races in Alabama as there is in a great many sections of country.”14
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The “tipping point” theory was self-fulfilling prophesy. The notion of “no deep-seated
bitterness” was, on the other hand, pure fantasy. This and other misconceptions and
mischaracterizations allowed Brewer to pitch himself – and one biographer to describe him as – “New
South”: as a progressive reformer unbound by the crass, racist demagoguery which characterized his
predecessors; as representative of modernizing, industrial and business interests in the cities poised to
replace the old planter aristocracy of the Black Belt; and as part of an emerging class of booster-leaders
with a vision of a Sun Belt rising. In reality, Brewer proved little different from Wallace when it came to
racial politics and the preservation of white privilege. Wallace’s and John Patterson’s brands of defiance
had given birth to the law-and-order style of minimal compliance, when litigation had forced the issue.
Brewer embodied such a style: reluctant and begrudged acceptance of the bare minimum required by
law and under the threat of sanction; denunciation of federal courts, judges, and decisions; criticism of
black plaintiffs and their demands; the unquestioned and unchallenged acceptance of white flight as an
inevitable outcome of further efforts to eradicate a discriminatory system; dogged contestation of all
litigation; and by way of all of this, the encouragement of defiance and evasion across the state. If
Brewer was different from Wallace, it was because Wallace had exhausted all avenues of high-profile,
direct defiance and interference.15
State Superintendent Stone – though he did everything the court asked of him – had embraced
the style himself and had echoed the governor’s remarks at the August hearing. Stone argued that if the
percentage of black students in desegregated schools increased beyond 15 percent (conveniently, the
yardstick for Green compliance) that whites would then flee the system. Forty local superintendents
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and other school officials testified to substantially the same. “If the federal government is going to run
the schools,” Brewer’s education chief said on the stand, “let them finance the schools.”16
Two rulings by Judge Johnson presaged the ruling of the three-judge court on the Greenmotions in Lee v. Macon. Johnson had heard similar motions in the cases against Crenshaw and Barbour
Counties. In the Crenshaw County case, Johnson acknowledged, “It is one of the facts of life that white
students will not elect to attend and will not, if any other choice is available, attend a predominantly
Negro school.” He had earlier admonished the Autauga County school board for constructing new
classrooms at a black school, saying it would be “naïve to the point of ridiculousness” to believe that
such construction was undertaken to attract white students. But he still believed that freedom of choice
could work if school boards were diligent about removing choice-influencing factors. “I have found,” he
wrote, “that school boards, with some prodding – and I use that word advisedly – are inclined to go
ahead and do what the judge requires even though what the judge requires is already what the law
requires the school board to do.” To that end, he ordered Crenshaw to close two black schools, to
eliminate certain grades at another black school, and to reassign those students to formerly all-white
schools. In a separate case, Johnson enjoined the Crenshaw County Unit of the United Klans of America
from harassing black children and their families. The Crenshaw Klan’s birth had been a “remarkable
coincidence with the birth of desegregation” of the County’s schools in 1965. Since that time it had
directly threatened black families, burned crosses and discharged firearms outside their homes, painted
KKK in the street at bus stops, and coerced white business owners into participating in a Citizens’
Council-style campaign of economic reprisal. The number of black students exercising and making good
on desegregation choices had steadily declined in the last two years as a result, Johnson found. He
enjoined the Klan and its members in order to “dispel the fears of Negro parents which are likely to be
the continuing effect of defendants' practices.” He wanted to give freedom of choice “another chance.”
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In the Barbour County case, he ordered the closure of three black schools and the acceleration of faculty
desegregation, writing, “Freedom of choice is at the present time the most feasible plan for the school
board to pursue for the 1968-69 school year.” During the hearing in the Barbour case, the county
superintendent had told Johnson that two new private schools in the county were “disrupting” the local
system. Some whites were already choosing the new segregationist academies, but none had chosen
the county’s black schools. “And I assure you,” the superintendent said, “they will not.”17
On August 28, the Lee court issued its ruling on the post-Green motions. Johnson acknowledged
the continued existence of all-black schools and the high percentage of black students in the Lee
systems which continued to attend them. But he otherwise began by describing the progress which
freedom of choice had made: every Lee system had adopted and implemented a plan which conformed
to the U.S. v. Jefferson standards; 151 substandard black schools had been closed, along with a number
of specific grades at others; faculty desegregation had begun, with 740 black and 400 white teachers set
to teach in desegregated assignments; the state had started a teacher placement service to assist in
faculty desegregation and had held desegregated in-service teacher training programs and teacher
institutes. Johnson even noted that Stone and Brewer were “approaching the problem of public school
desegregation in good faith.” Accordingly, the court determined that while freedom of choice had “not
yet completely disestablished the dual school systems based upon race,” it remained “the most feasible
method to pursue.” That meant no establishment of attendance zones, no consolidation, and no
pairing. The situation in Alabama and the situation in New Kent County, the court felt, were “vastly
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different,” and the Supreme Court had allowed for freedom of choice to work where there was a “real
prospect” of success.18
On the basic and immediate question, then, the defense had prevailed. But there was more.
Johnson stressed that this was only the court’s determination “at this time.” Furthermore, the court
noted that it had given “no consideration” to the threat of white flight, and that this had no bearing on
the constitutional obligations of school officials. Finally, and most crucially of all, the court ruled that
further faculty desegregation and the closure of certain black schools had to be implemented over the
next two years to facilitate genuinely free choice. The court – in this case, Johnson himself – had
“painstakingly” reviewed the CRD’s appendix to its brief and determined what steps each system should
take. Using the CRD’s analysis, Johnson determined specific faculty desegregation requirements for all
76 systems. The Fifth Circuit had recently upheld Johnson’s order in Carr v. Montgomery, albeit in
softened form. According, he used a faculty desegregation ration of 1-6 – less stringent than he had
originally ordered in Carr – as a measuring stick for adequate compliance. He also listed specific black
schools, and in some cases certain grades at schools, which needed to be closed. These were schools
which had fewer than the minimum student standard as set out by the state department of education,
or the operation of which otherwise had “the inevitable effect of thwarting the success of the freedom
of choice plans.” The specific orders were to be considered “the minimum necessary . . . in order to
justify the continued use of the freedom of choice method for disestablishing the dual school system.”19
The defendant state officials did not celebrate freedom of choice’s survival, nor did local
officials. The faculty desegregation and school closure requirements stung too badly. Governor Brewer
expressed “despair of providing quality education.” He reiterated his intention to introduce an
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education appropriations bill but complained that the court had made the “task that much more
difficult.” The three-judge panel, he argued, was “trying to achieve social objectives” while he and the
legislature were simply “trying to educate our young people.” This became the preferred Brewer spin
on the law-and-order line. His policies, he claimed, were colorblind; he simply wanted to improve
education for all Alabama’s children by raising revenue and increasing funding. Concomitantly, he
claimed to oppose further desegregation solely on the grounds that whites would flee public schools
and subsequently oppose measures to increased funding. Certainly, Brewer wanted to more adequately
fund education. But he was a segregationist, and his earnest desire to improve the quality of education
in Alabama could not erase this fact. Like the vast majority of white Alabamians, he assumed that
education reform could only work if it came within the bounds of what had already been begrudgingly
accepted. They clung to the notion that an ex post facto equalization of black school facilities would
relieve them of their obligation to eliminate segregation entirely. So, when Brewer spoke of equalized,
increased spending on black and white education, he meant it in the sense that he wanted to resurrect
Plessy and continue offering select blacks access to the white railcars-cum-schools, and everyone
understood exactly what he meant. So, after the August Lee v. Macon order, he chided federal judges
for paying “lip service” to freedom of choice while at the same time utilizing “devious and roundabout
means to effect social aims without regard to the educational system of this state.” Alabama’s whites
had complied in good faith with distasteful orders from the courts, he claimed, “Now these people want
to come along and want to tear down all we have done and all we want to do for public education.”20
Brewer and Stone joined together in a petition to modify the August 28 order. They argued that
“to appreciate the magnitude of the burden imposed on these school systems,” one had to understand
that the school year had already commenced and that “virtually all teaching positions” had already been
filled. Therefore, for every teacher reassigned to one classroom, another had to be moved from that
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classroom to another. So, the number of teachers to be transferred was significantly higher than the
actual number the court and the plaintiffs wanted reassigned. According to the motion, this had
“proven to be an impossible task.” The defendants listed over 20 reasons why this was so, from
legitimate administrative difficulties to the threat of “mass teacher resignations” to the contravention of
the state teacher tenure law. They also argued that the school closures ordered by the court would
cause widespread overcrowding, which would itself “place in jeopardy the whole process of public
education.” They offered the example of Crenshaw County, where “an overcrowded condition in some
schools” had led directly to the organization of a private school and the flight of whites from the system.
The motion failed to mention the activities of the Crenshaw Klan or the combative attitude of the school
board and its counsel. It did complain of the closure of recently built facilities, which it argued were in
some cases nicer than formerly all-white facilities. One particular case Brewer himself liked to publically
mention was that of a $1 mission black school facility in Chambers County. Why close a facility that had
a brand new swimming pool? Most people, particularly in the Black Belt, understood that city and
county officials had built pools at black schools in the aftermath of Brown and Browder in order to keep
blacks from trying to desegregate white community pools.21
The Civil Rights Division filed its own motion, this one for “clarification” of the August 28 order.
The Justice Department attorneys were concerned that the specific requirements enumerated in the
order would be “construed by the defendants and the school systems involved as the sum total of their
constitutional and legal obligations for the coming year.” The CRD planned to continue in its role as
supervisor and advisor to school boards throughout the fall. It perhaps anticipated that Brewer would
take to the stump – as he did a week later at a statewide school board conference – and begin telling
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local officials that they were not “under any obligation to obey any orders . . . from the Justice
Department.” The CRD wanted school boards to understand that the structural injunction entered in
the March, 1967 Lee v. Macon order still applied: they were still required to submit regular reports to
Stone, which were then subject to analysis by the court, which would determine if they had made good
faith progress towards eliminating the dual system. Most local systems had hoped, of course, that
freedom of choice would be spared in the subsequent August, 1968 order. Within days of the court’s
ruling to that effect, it was becoming clear to some that their situation might have become much more
difficult despite their hope’s fulfillment.22

Thomas Delays Again in Davis v. Mobile
Whites in Mobile, meanwhile, had spent the entire summer in a panic about the pending
implementation of the Fifth Circuit-mandated, city-wide zoning plan. By June the school board had
formulated its plan in response to the appellate court’s ruling and was prepared to seek District Judge
Daniel Thomas’ approval of it at a hearing on July 17. Local attorney Vernon Crawford and the LDF, as
well as the CRD, had prepared their own plans prior to the hearing. Mobile Assistant Superintendent
James McPherson complained ahead of the hearing that the plaintiffs’ plans would require “massive
transportation” among the zones, which were themselves the product of “obvious gerrymandering . . .
to achieve some sort of racial balance.” The LDF and CRD plans were, McPherson said, “the most
ridiculous I have ever seen.” The word busing soon entered the Mobilian lexicon. It was becoming a
way for whites in cities across the country to condemn any sort of system-wide compulsory assignment
which required theretofore unnecessary transportation. It quickly picked up the connotation of the
racial apocalypse, and the nascent white protest organization Stand Together and Never Divide (STAND)
prepared for as much. STAND’s leaders planned a mass protest to coincide with the hearing, calling on
22
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whites to inundate downtown Mobile and surround the federal courthouse. Of course, STAND leader
William Westbrook insisted that this be a peaceful and lawful protest – in fact, he refused to even
characterize it as a protest. The purpose, though, was clearly to influence Judge Thomas, in the way that
STAND organizers felt that Judge Johnson had been influenced in staying the recent Carr order. At an
outdoor rally before 6,000 whites citizens the day before the hearing, Westbrook said, “Law abiding
citizens of Mobile are going to court by the thousands,” adding paradoxically, “and we are not going to
abide by any boundary lines that take away freedom of choice plans.” He assured the crowd, “We will
not allow our children to attend a predominantly Negro school, whether the Justice Department, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or the NAACP believe or not.” As he had done before,
he mocked the late Martin Luther King, Jr. to a chorus of cheers: “I have not seen a mountaintop,” he
bellowed, “but I have seen the light.”23
The courtroom was integrated and overflowing on July 17 when Thomas convened the hearing.
U.S. Marshals and FBI agents lined the building in anticipation of a throng, and Mobile police kept the
sidewalks clear. Riot police remained on standby blocks away. The local NAACP had held its own mass
meeting the night before and had urged followers to arrive at the courthouse early to fill up the 200
seats in the courtroom itself. The turnout for STAND was around 600: a large enough contingent to
create a scene outside, but not anywhere close to the bold call for 50,000 that its leaders had made.
Acting on the advice of STAND attorney Pierre Pelham, STAND founder Lamar Payne had advised at the
last minute against the mob gathering. Pelham wanted to convince Judge Thomas of the
wrongheadedness of the proposed desegregation plans, not anger him by creating a circus outside.
Attempting to influence a court through demonstrations was a violation of federal law, in any case,
which carried the possibility of a $3,000 fine and a year in jail.24
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As the hundreds of STAND demonstrators who showed up anyway stared down the federal
agents outside, testimony inside the hearing was predictable. The school board’s attorneys called
Mobile Superintendent Crawford Burns to the stand, along with Assistant Superintendent McPherson
and an administrative assistant. The witnesses argued that compulsory assignment would ruin the
school system and that myriad administrative problems were being compounded each day that the
school board had to wait to begin preparing for the impending start of fall semester. The school officials
also argued that the school board’s attendance zones in its plan had not been drawn with racial
considerations. Legal Defense Fund attorney Charles Jones and Civil Rights Division attorney Frank
Dunbaugh challenged the three witnesses on the latter assertion. The school board’s plan had, indeed,
been carefully constructed to limit interracial assignments, just as the LDF and CRD plans had been
constructed to maximize them. Mobile officials would not admit this, of course. The school board’s
attorneys also called a number of parents, all of whom decried “outsiders telling us where our children
must go to school.” The parents all expressed their clear preference for a freedom of choice plan, as
opposed to an attendance zone plan.25
Both the CRD and the LDF called expert witnesses – educationists who testified to the
construction of the competing plans and the efficacy of attendance zone plans in general. The school
board attorneys and STAND’s Pelham successfully elicited that neither expert had been particularly well
informed about the Mobile school system before formulating these plans. Neither knew much about
the system’s budget or existing school plants, and neither had visited more than a few school facilities.
Nor had they talked to any of the local school officials. In presenting STAND’s case, Pelham called the
city’s police chief and tried to establish that black schools like Williamson High and Blount High were
hubs of criminal activity and that black neighborhoods in general were festering with violent animosity.
How could the school board send whites into these schools and neighborhoods? Judge Thomas swiftly
25
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sustained plaintiffs’ objections to this testimony, prompting an angry outburst from a frustrated Pelham.
He was limited to grilling the LDF and CRD’s experts. But even this backfired. Pelham at one point asked
LDF witness Dr. Myron Lieberman, “Do you believe white children should be forced to go to an unsafe
school?” Lieberman provided a poignant lesson in genuinely colorblind school policy when he replied,
“If the school is unsafe, no children, including Negroes, should be allowed to attend it.”26
On July 29, Thomas ordered the implementation of his own desegregation plan. It was a
compromise, in which the judge tried to balance the demands of the appellate court, the plaintiffs, the
school board, and the mass of angry white parents. Predictably, it pleased no one. Thomas had always
believed that as much delay as possible was warranted in desegregation cases, and in drafting his plan,
he was certainly motivated by providing for it. He called for the operation of attendance zones for the
metropolitan area’s elementary and junior high schools. Freedom of choice would be retained for the
rural parts of the county as well as the metro area’s high schools. Thomas had drawn the metro area
zones with an eye towards the Fifth Circuit court’s call for non-racial, natural, or “built” environmental
boundaries, though he did this at the expense of the other part of the appellate court’s mandate – to
bring about the swift eradication of racially identifiable schools. The court estimated that there would
be around 3,000 black students in formerly all-white elementary and junior high schools as a result of
the plan. This was more than quadruple the roughly 700 blacks in white schools the previous fall, but it
was still only 10 percent of the 30,000 black students enrolled in the system. There would continue to
be a number of all-white and all-black schools. Furthermore, the retention of freedom of choice in the
metro area’s high schools very likely meant that the number of blacks in white high schools would
remain roughly the same. Thomas determined, “No one at this time, however well versed or
experienced, could draw sound attendance area zoning plans for the high schools in the system. On the
contrary,” he argued, “the court finds that imposition of attendance zones for high schools at this time
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would result in locked-in segregation to a substantially greater degree than will be the case under the
freedom of choice system.” Thomas noted the provision in the recent Fifth Circuit opinion in the case,
that “compelling, non-racial reasons” might be taken into account in considering zoning. “This court is
compelled,” Thomas wrote, “to find under the evidence that such reasons exist for deferring the
attempt to devise rigid attendance zones for Mobile’s high schools for the time being.” Tying the two
parts of the metropolitan plan together, Thomas declared that the high school plan would “operate on
an interim annual basis,” with its continuance contingent “upon the speed of desegregation in the
secondary schools.”27
Displeasure with Thomas’ plan manifest itself quickly and continued into the fall of 1968.
Crawford and the LDF, the Justice Department, the school board, and STAND all appealed the decision.
The Mobile Press actually praised Thomas’ “solid, practical approach” and willingness to seek out a
compromise. At the same time, the Press condemned the NAACP and the Justice Department for
“applying dictatorial means to achieve school desegregation more rapidly” and accused the Fifth Circuit
appellate court and the Supreme Court of “judicial despotism.” The Birmingham News argued that the
federal government was using Mobile as a “guinea pig” and attempting to “abolish all semblance of
freedom of choice” through “judicial fiat.” Despite the widespread displeasure, Thomas’ delay had been
effective in at least aspect: it was far too late in the year to attempt to appeal and alter the order before
school began.28
Disturbances marred the opening of schools in September. White parents assaulted the vehicles
of two black teachers as they arrived at Tanner-Williams Elementary School in the rural part of the
county. One woman who threw a soda bottle at one of the cars was arrested, along with another who
had to be subdued by sheriff’s deputies with mace. Four white parents in all were arrested, as the black
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teachers had to be escorted inside by deputies. Interracial fights were commonplace in the schools
themselves. One incident at Vigor High School in the working class Mobile suburb of Prichard resulted in
suspensions for two black students and one white student. Upon hearing that a white student was
suspended, 125 students and adults gathered in front of the school to protest the suspension and the
presence of around 100 black students and 3 black teachers. When police invoked an antidemonstration ordinance, the group moved across the street and continued to picket and to lament the
suspension of the white student, who happened to be a starter on the school’s football team. The
students also complained that teachers supposedly showed favoritism towards the school’s black
students, and that certain of the 100 or so black students were trying to intimidate the school’s 1,550
white students.29
STAND leaders vowed to continue their fight for freedom of choice. Along with the private
school movement, the organization was the most visible manifestation in the state of the law-and-order
doctrine of freedom of association for whites. The battle for states’ rights in the war on desegregation
had been lost. It was being redefined as a battle for individual rights within the liberal tradition. White
parents could disavow violence and hatred, avoid any mention of black inferiority or white supremacy,
and still claim they had a right to choose their associates. Lamar Payne revealed as much in an interview
with the associated press. “The federal government,” he said “told the American people in 1964 that
freedom of choice desegregation plans are to be implemented in the public school system whether we
liked it or not. We accepted it. But now,” he added, “the government says that’s not enough [and]
wants to bus or to create zones so that white children will be transferred across town to Negro schools.”
Payne elaborated on the organization’s philosophy: “I’m not anti-anything except Communists . . . . I
don’t hate Negroes, and STAND will not tolerate haters in the organization.” But above all, STAND’s
13,000 members and 20,000 petition-signing sympathizers would not tolerate compulsory assignment.
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They were prepared to “build [their] own private school system throughout the nation” if the courts did
not relent. Building such a system, Payne admitted, would be difficult, but it “could through necessity
become a spontaneous reality.” He added, “I realize Negroes and other minorities have their rights, but
white Americans have their rights under the Constitution, too.”30

“Freedom from Involvement” in Metropolitan Birmingham
Green v. County School Board had brought motions that summer for further relief in each of the
Birmingham metropolitan area desegregation cases, just as it had in Davis v. Mobile, in Carr v.
Montgomery, and in Lee v. Macon. Longtime Birmingham civil rights attorney Oscar Adams was
handling the Armstrong v. Birmingham, Brown v. Bessemer, and Stout v. Jefferson County cases. By this
time, Adams had started the first interracial law practice in Alabama since Reconstruction with a young
Jewish lawyer from New York named Harvey Burg. Burg had begun practicing in Alabama in 1964 while
still in law school and had moved to Birmingham to join Adams in 1966. It was Burg who filed the postGreen motions in the Birmingham area cases in July. The CRD followed with motions of its own in these
and the Fairfield case, in which Birmingham attorney Harvey Newton had also filed a motion. Each
system met the criteria set forth in Green. In Birmingham itself, only 8 percent of black students were
attending formerly all-white schools; no whites had elected to attend formerly all-black schools; and
teacher desegregation was negligible. Adams and Burg and the CRD sought some plan which moved
beyond freedom of choice and promised to increase faculty desegregation. Judge Seybourn Lynne,
however, was more like Daniel Thomas than he was Frank Johnson. If delay were permissible, he would
grant it. With much the same rationale employed by Thomas, Lynne denied the motion to accelerate
faculty desegregation and postponed ruling on the motion to move beyond freedom of choice pupil
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assignment until the following year. He acknowledged that the systems “[did] not pretend” to be in “full
compliance” with their desegregation plans, but he argued that it was “obvious that substantial progress
[was] being made.” Lynne approved the Bessemer and Jefferson County faculty desegregation plans
and ordered Birmingham to augment its own by adding 33 teachers to the 165 already in desegregated
assignments.31
Despite Lynne’s grant of a reprieve to the metropolitan area’s school systems, whites in the
Birmingham suburbs began to seek innovative solutions to their desegregation problem. Whites had
been fleeing residential encroachment and the mere threat of desegregated schools for decades. The
affluent suburban cities south of Red Mountain on Birmingham’s southern border had particularly
profited from the last 20 years of white flight. The menace of widespread integration had contributed
heavily to the refusal of Mountain Brook and Homewood to accept a 1964 merger plan with the city of
Birmingham. These cities’ refusals had doomed any merger which would have involved other small
suburban cities, like Tarrant to the north and Irondale to the east. Whites in the meantime had fled
black encroachment in the city’s industrial western suburbs – Midfield, Fairfield, and Bessemer – and
had established the small, working-class city of Hueytown in 1960. Black neighborhoods had been
drawn out of Hueytown’s limits at its inception, and in the summer of 1968, the city’s leaders moved to
keep blacks out of its schools.32
Although nearly 4,000 students attended Jefferson County schools in Hueytown, only around
2,000 of those resided within the city, all of them white. A group of parents formed a “Citizens
Committee” that summer and prepared a 15 page report on the virtues of separating from the Jefferson
County school system and establishing the city’s own school system for those 2,000 white students, just
as wealthy Mountain Brook had done. The committee distributed letters, pamphlets, and candidate
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cards supporting selected candidates in upcoming city elections. The literature assured residents that
the new school system would save money and be able to spend more per pupil than the county system.
Opponents disputed this and pointed out that the city would have to purchase its schools, equipment,
and transportation from the county. Hueytown residents were not nearly so well off as those in
Mountain Brook. Still many whites who had only recently fled to the city were attracted by the virtues
of an independent system extolled in the committee’s report: “control of . . . local schools vested in local
citizens, not officials elected by all voters in Jefferson County . . . freedom from involvement in federal
court cases concerning the Jefferson County Board of Education, and freedom from rulings resulting
from such cases.” It was too late to break away before school opened that fall, but the impetus
remained. It began to spread in other municipalities, in fact, and more and more parents started to
consider the independent school system in the lily white suburban city the preferred way to avoid
integration.33

Beyond Freedom of Choice in Lee v. Macon
Freedom of choice’s reprieve in Lee v. Macon proved to be fleeting. On October 14, the threejudge court granted the United States’ motion for clarification and denied Stone and Brewer’s petition
for modification. It was obvious from both motions that the court had “failed to make its [August, 1968]
opinion and order sufficiently clear.” The state officials’ motion, in particular, evidenced “a
misconception” of the order. Furthermore, a number of school systems which had complained of their
inability to meet the court’s requirements had themselves misconstrued the order. Nothing in the order
was intended to relieve the state or the many local systems of their constitutional obligation to take
affirmative and effective action to eradicate the dual systems based on race. This obligation, and the
failure of school boards to meet it, was the reasoning behind the faculty transfer and school closure
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provisions of the order. A number of school boards had argued since the order that teacher transfers
were impossible and that closing expensive and new black facilities was a waste and caused
overcrowding. The court clarified: the black school plants were not to be forever closed; they simply
could no longer be operated as black schools. The court acknowledged that teachers could not be
assigned where they did not exist and that students could not be assigned over the capacity of certain
schools. But the effort had to be there, and in many cases, it was not.34
In some cases, the court determined that school boards had legitimate concerns. A total of 57
systems had “completely or substantially” complied with the August order. The court concluded that in
19 others systems, school officials’ concerns were illegitimate and their good faith lacking.35 It added
those systems and their individual board members as parties defendant and ordered them to show
cause why they should not be ordered to use some method other than freedom of choice to further
desegregate. Johnson, Rives, and Grooms continued “to be dedicated to ‘freedom of choice’ as the
most feasible method to be used in [the] state” for systems to convert to unitary status. But the court
could not “make freedom of choice work without good faith and effective efforts on the part of the
school authorities.” Johnson and Rives followed this order up with another, ordering the 19 school
boards to show cause why the court should not lift the injunction against HEW funds deferral in relation
to their school systems.36
Brewer and Stone were beside themselves. Brewer also misguidedly felt that the court was
testing him, trying to see if he was really as defiant as Wallace or if his law-and-orderly demeanor was a
sign of weakness. The governor and state superintendent filed a motion, arguing that the teacher
transfer and school closure issues had not been properly raised by the pleadings, and asked that they be
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heard on the issue. They maintained that due process should have afforded the two an opportunity to
present oral evidence on these issues before the court summarily dismissed their petition for
modification. Johnson, in turn, was dumbfounded. In an order of denial he wrote, “This court is at a
loss to understand the basis for these contestations.” Brewer and Stone were “apparently . . . either
unwilling or unable to grasp the nature of [the] lawsuit.” Faculty desegregation had been before the
court since the March, 1967 order, at least, and school closure had been a part of the alternative
desegregation plan proposed by the United States prior to that. Johnson also noted that the state’s
attorneys had very recently represented the Crenshaw County and Barbour County school boards in
proceedings in which similar orders to the August Lee order had been entered. Stone himself had
spoken to both issues in his deposition in Lee. Maury Smith had also, in his plea for maintaining
freedom of choice at the August hearing, suggested that the court “prod” the state officials when
necessary. The court understood that it was now doing precisely that, since the state officials had not
submitted any desegregation plans as an alternative to the CRD’s or the school systems’. Johnson
argued that the court was doing the defendants a favor in formulating its own plans as “prods” as
opposed to adopting the CRD’s plan wholesale. Finally, Johnson called the assertion that Brewer and
Stone were entitled to a hearing on the motion for modification “simply preposterous,” and when based
on Brown, “border[ing] on the ridiculous.”37
The October orders ushered in the final phase of the Lee v. Macon litigation as far as individual
school systems before the three-judge court were concerned. Recalcitrant systems would be added as
parties defendant, ordered to show cause, and threatened with HEW action. The court’s dealing with
the initial 19 further established a pattern. School board members, superintendents, and their counsel
came to the courthouse to negotiate with Judge Johnson in chambers. The judge handled such
conferences on a weekly basis, and they began to take up a considerable portion of his time. Johnson’s
37
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clerks began calling these conference days “school board Saturdays.” The judge was sympathetic to
legitimate administrative difficulties and generally awarded good faith efforts with allowances until at
least the following semester. For example, Decatur city and Morgan County – the first of the 19 to be
removed as parties defendant – were afforded until January, 1969 to make some teacher transfers and
until the fall of 1969 to close certain schools. These sorts of delays were about as far as Johnson was
prepared to go, though. And all of this was contingent upon continuing review of the progress of
freedom of choice. Stone, the CRD, and HEW all maintained obligations to monitor the progress of
systems towards unitary status. By November, all of these initial 19 except Marengo County – which
attorney Solomon Seay called the most recalcitrant school system in Alabama – had negotiated
acceptable plans and had been removed from the order.38

*****
Post-Green orders in Alabama had thus forced freedom of choice closer to the edge, but
delaying actions by local school boards and the courts themselves kept it from teetering over. Local
whites continued to try and save it from its fate, encouraged in their resistance by the governor and the
state government in general. At a specially-called press conference, a visibly angry Albert Brewer called
the Lee court judges “devious,” and “callous” and called the denial of his motion a “shocking disregard
for due process of law” and a “subterfuge.” But what could he do? At a late October rally for Wallace’s
presidential campaign in Anniston, the governor again lamented the order and the “scapegoating” of
the 19 systems. He assured school boards that they would not lose state funds, but he stopped short of
saying he would call a special session of the legislature to appropriate emergency funds to replace lost
federal dollars. The Brewer way was to denounce court orders and fight them in court, but to avoid the
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kind of reckless defiance that had characterized his political mentor, Wallace. Wallace’s policies had
failed, after all, to prevent desegregation.39
Meanwhile that fall, Southern congressional leaders responded to the Whitten Amendment’s
failure to pass the Senate by claiming that they “had the votes,” if only everyone had been there. The
fact that the measure had garnered significant support outside the South was dubbed “a sobering
commentary on the national commitment to desegregation,” by the Southern Regional Council.
Whitten prepared to reintroduce it the following year, by which time southern Senators would be
rallying around two amendments to the extension of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA) proposed by Mississippi Senator John Stennis. The first “Stennis Amendment,” not unlike
Whitten’s, declared that freedom of choice was “an inviolate right” and sought to make it an established
national policy. The second sought to erase the de jure - de facto distinction which had protected
northern districts for so long. Stennis and others felt that uniform national enforcement of school
desegregation policy would be so distasteful to northern, Midwestern, and western whites that it would
force them to back off the South.40
Alabama Senator Jim Allen would support both measures, arguing that freedom of choice was
“the only solution for the chaos and confusion in the operation of schools in Alabama and across the
nation.” For this reason, Allen said, he and other southern Senators would “make an additional and
concerted effort” to add the Stennis language to the act in order to end the “HEW-Supreme Court policy
of requiring desegregation in the South while not requiring it in Northern schools.” The two efforts
were, of course, intertwined. Forcing a northern retreat on desegregation would hopefully mean
limiting it to freedom of choice in the South and elsewhere.41
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Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey and entered the White House in 1969 with a desire to
play to whites’ newfound preference for freedom of choice. But Nixon had to contend with not only the
established policies of previous administrations, but also the trajectory of 15 years of federal school
desegregation jurisprudence. Despite the efforts of ubiquitous white resistance and its political
courtiers, the circuit courts and the Supreme Court would continue in 1969 to push freedom of choice
over the ledge, along with “deliberate speed.” White tolerance for desegregation in general looked to
fall right along with them.
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CHAPTER 15: THE “FINAL RESTING PLACE” OF ‘ALL DELIBERATE SPEED’ AND THE SPREAD OF
COMPULSORY ASSIGNMENT, 1969

When the Nixon Administration took office in January, 1969 it inherited an executive which had
been committed to pressing school desegregation litigation over two administrations and for half a
decade. As one Civil Rights Division attorney remembered, the administration was faced with a choice
between what would have been its own policy preference and that which was already in place. Another
recalled having heard that Nixon was “left holding the remedial Brown bag.” Nixon had been swept into
office thanks in part to the votes of southern whites who immediately recognized his coded appeals to
maintaining the racial status quo. Nixon had adopted an entirely non-racial language supporting free
choice and law and order, while at the same time condemning busing, urban rioting, crime, and judicial
leniency towards criminals. It was a “colorblind” language which whites in the South knew quite well, as
they were the ones who had created and honed it over the preceding 20 years or so. As school
desegregation threatened other parts of the country beyond the South, and as riots rocked cities
nationwide, it was a language which resonated with many whites. At the same time, many blacks also
recognized the language for what it was. An educationist writing for the NAACP’s national publication,
The Crisis, understood that “law and order” meant “that Afro-Americans should get back in their place.”
She argued that “a few outstanding American leaders” recognized that “there must be justice to go
along with law and order,” as well as “respect for the Supreme law of this land.” These concepts, she
wrote, “are inseparable in a democratic society.”1
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Per its commitment to its “silent majority” constituency, the Nixon Administration would have
liked to have adopted a policy which stopped desegregation in its tracks. But in winning over
disillusioned southern Democrats – at least those not fully committed to third party candidate Wallace –
Nixon had not forsaken his Republican base. Many Republicans outside the South still felt that the Civil
Rights Act, the HEW Guidelines, and the court decisions which upheld and reinforced them were
warranted enforcement mechanisms aimed at an unconstitutional, southern, white supremacist order.
So, initially at least, the Nixon Administration improvised and committed itself to the Johnson
administration’s policy on school desegregation: de jure segregation in schools needed eradicating,
while de facto segregation was still off limits. Pursuant to that commitment, HEW continued in its Title
VI enforcement program, while the CRD lent its support to an appeal of the Fifth Circuit court’s partial
reversal of Judge Johnson’s order in Carr v. Montgomery. The course of certain other appeals, including
the Davis v. Mobile case, would soon force the administration to reconsider its policy, though.2
Indeed, by the end of 1969, school desegregation cases in Alabama and elsewhere were not
only bringing an end to the freedom of choice method of desegregation but were finally forcing school
districts into immediate and significant action towards eradicating their dual systems. The 99 Lee v.
Macon systems were taken to task one-by-one and were placed under “terminal-type” desegregation
orders by the three-judge court. The state’s junior colleges and trade schools were also placed under
closer scrutiny. District Judge Daniel Thomas continued to try and delay the implementation of districtwide desegregation in Mobile. Judge Seybourn Lynne in Birmingham did the same with the Jefferson
County cases. Both Davis v. Mobile and Stout v. Jefferson ended up before the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals yet again that fall. Despite the approval of compromise plans, whites in both counties
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vigorously protested more stringent desegregation requirements as the two cases awaited a
consolidated appellate court ruling. Meanwhile, the caution of the Nixon Administration forced the
Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division to oppose the NAACP-LDF in appellate courts for the first time
ever in a school desegregation case. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that it must follow up its
Green v. County School Board decision with three more decisions which sent shockwaves through the
South, particularly through the Fifth Circuit. None of these rulings was more important than the
Mississippi case, Alexander v. Holmes. While the Nixon Administration and Southern congressmen
worried about northern-style segregated education, the Court forced the South into the final phase of
eradication of its own dual systems. Of course, white parents and state and local officials did not let
deliberate speed – which had characterized the first 15 years of school desegregation – die without a
fight.

Johnson Vindicated in Carr v. Montgomery
Frank Johnson’s 1968 order in Carr had been appealed by the school board, which objected to
the provisions for granting free choice to black students wishing to attend the new Jefferson Davis High
School, and which “strenuously” objected to the fixed mathematical ratios Johnson provided for faculty
desegregation. Later that year, a Fifth Circuit panel including Judges Gewin and Thornberry, along with
District Judge J. Robert Elliott, upheld most of the order but reversed that portion requiring the fixed
ratios. The court relied on other Fifth Circuit court rulings – in Davis, Brown v. Bessemer, and Stell v.
Savannah – in which the court had “declined ‘to enhance Jefferson’s demands’” and had opted not to
“tinker with the model decree.” In the Bessemer case, the appellate court had in fact explicitly rejected
mathematical ratios. Accordingly, the court held in the Carr appeal that “the standards fixed by courts
with respect to faculty desegregation cannot be totally inflexible.” It modified Johnson’s order to
include the words “substantially” and “approximately” in regards to the ratio prescribed for the

584

upcoming year and determined that 3-2 need not be held up as a final benchmark simply because it
mirrored the ratio of blacks to whites in the system.3
Thornberry dissented, arguing that while novel, the decision to affix numerical ratios was “the
considered judgment of a district judge who was familiar with the Montgomery schools, had heard
testimony, and was making an honest effort to advance the conversion to a unitary racially
nondiscriminatory system.” He further characterized Johnson’s decision as “experimentation within the
spirit of Jefferson County.” The full appellate court denied a petition for an en banc rehearing by a 6-6
vote. Judge John Brown – then Chief Judge – wrote a dissent of this denial, in which he argued that
Judges Gewin and Elliott had made an “unfortunate” mistake. Brown wrote, “In the name of uniformity
[the decision] begets disparity, not just Circuit-wide, but within the single state of Alabama.” Brown
argued that the judges had misread the Bessemer decision, in which the court had had in fact left the
question of fixed ratios open and in which it had set an explicit deadline for full desegregation for the
fall of 1970. Brown wrote, “This is an area where it is not the spirit, but the bodies which count. . . .
Within scarcely 90 miles that separates the Birmingham area from Montgomery,” he added, “there are
two separate standards and, perhaps, two separate hopes.”4
The LDF appealed the panel’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The CRD
supported the appeal in its first major school desegregation action of the Nixon era. On June 2, 1969,
the Court issued what would turn out to be only the first of three major school decisions that year. It
reversed the Fifth Circuit panel’s decision, going out of its way in the process to commend Judge
Johnson for his initial order. Justice Hugo Black – Johnson’s fellow Alabamian and fellow white pariah –
delivered the opinion. Black contextualized the decision by noting that the Montgomery school board
had for over a decade “operated . . . as though [the] Brown cases had never been decided.” The
3
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subsequent four year process since the initial 1964 trial court order had been characterized, Black
wrote, by “an exchange of ideas between judge and school board officials” in which Johnson had “found
it possible to compliment the board on its cooperation” while at the same time “constantly urging that
no unnecessary delay could be allowed.” The Court felt that the record revealed Johnson’s “patience
and wisdom,” in light of which it was clear that the district judge had not intended the ratios to be
“absolutely rigid and inflexible.” Johnson had shown a marked willingness to modify orders to provide
for more time or leniency, and he understood that “the way must always be left open for
experimentation.” His Carr order had been entered “in the spirit” of Green, and the appellate court’s
partial reversal would only serve to remove “some of its capacity to expedite . . . the day when a
completely unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality, instead of a hope.” The
Court affirmed Johnson’s entire order as he had written. Jack Greenberg at the LDF noted the
significance beyond Alabama, announcing that HEW would have “to incorporate something similar” in
its subsequent guidelines and plans.5

System-by-System: Lee v. Macon
While the Carr case was on appeal to the Supreme Court that spring, administering the Lee v.
Macon case occupied over half of Judge Johnson and the District Court’s time. The process of
negotiation involving the 19 systems which had been added as parties defendant in the fall had to be
repeated with the other 80 systems involved in the case. Johnson’s willingness to involve the CRD, Fred
Gray, and the local school boards in what amounted to a continuous process of arbitration
demonstrated how right Justice Black had been. Nothing was rigid, so long as unnecessary delay did not
interfere with good faith. School boards and superintendents came in with their counsel and sat down
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in chambers. If necessary, they petitioned the court formally for a hearing and for modification of the
August, 1968 order as it applied to their system. In many cases, Johnson entered orders granting such
modifications.6
The case of Decatur City Schools is illustrative of the process, and it reveals the court’s
expanding use of percentage benchmarks. In February, the Decatur school board’s attorney requested a
conference before Judge Johnson. Johnson invited Fred Gray, attorneys from the CRD, and Judge Rives,
who all sat in conference with the members of the Decatur school board and the superintendent. The
August order had directed Decatur to close grades 9-12 at the all-black Lakeside High by September.
The local officials argued that this would cause formerly all-white Decatur and Austin High Schools to
become hopelessly overcrowded and requested that they only be required to close grades 11 and 12.
Gray and the CRD attorney objected because this would not bring the percentage of blacks in formerly
all-white schools to at least 30 percent. The school board later suggested that it be allowed to close
only grades 10-12, to which Johnson and Rives agreed.7
Some systems felt they would have a better chance of favorable negotiations and adjudication
with one of the state’s other federal trial court judges, namely Thomas in the Southern District or Lynne
in the Northern District, and several tried to get their particular cases severed and transferred to their
respective districts. Calhoun, Piedmont, and Shelby each tried to get their case – or supplementary
proceedings involving their systems, rather – transferred to the Northern District. In their combined
brief in support of these motions, Calhoun and Piedmont argued that having a case in the Middle District
was a hardship, as it required the school board to travel to Montgomery to file or to appear before the
court. Fred Gray objected, arguing that the motions were really “another device to impead [sic] and
6
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delay the implementation of the rights of the plaintiffs . . . .” Gray argued that fragmentation would
“create confusion, would cause a multiplicity of additional proceedings and would be inconvenient to
most of the parties.” The key parties were the state officials anyway, who were located in Montgomery.
The CRD also objected, pointing out that the school systems in question were not actually at that time
parties to the suit. It also noted that severance would cause undue delay, as judges assigned to the
many cases would have to familiarize themselves which each case. The controlling federal procedural
rule turned on the “interest of justice,” which Gray and the CRD argued would be frustrated if the
statewide suit were splintered. The court agreed and denied the motions. The three-judge court would
continue to supervise statewide desegregation for the foreseeable future.8
Meanwhile, Fred Gray and Solomon Seay filed a motion for further relief on behalf of the
Alabama State Teachers Association (ASTA), seeking protection for black teachers and administrators.
Per the March, 1967 and August, 1968 decrees, black teachers and administrators were supposed to be
absorbed into other schools in a system in the event of school closures. They were not to be
discriminated against under any circumstance. Yet in reality, school boards were dismissing, demoting,
and arbitrarily reassigned blacks. Black principals were routinely assigned to white schools as assistant
principals, often with a reduced salary and sometimes with additional teaching duties. Black assistant
principals were reassigned as teachers. Black teachers, particularly vocational and agricultural teachers,
were reassigned to positions for which they had not been trained, or they were simply dismissed. In
cases where dismissals were necessary, blacks were almost always the ones to be let go while whites
were retained. Blacks were often passed over for promotion, retention, or rehiring without a genuine
evaluation of their qualifications vis-à-vis white candidates. Gray and Seay sought an order which would
force state Superintendent Stone to compile and submit to the court a list of all black teachers and
8

Lee v. Macon County Board of Education: Defendants’ Brief on the Law in Support of Motion to Transfer,
Dec. 28, 1968; Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Transfer, Jan. 3, 1969;
Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Motions for Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a); Orders of Jan.
15, 20, 1969; all in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 22, Folder 4.

588

administrators who had been dismissed, reassigned, or otherwise affected by the August, 1968 decree.
They wanted Stone to determine which people had been discriminatorily dealt with and to “correct”
those situations.9
Stone filed a motion to dismiss the ASTA motion. The state superintendent claimed that he did
not have the authority to make the “corrections” which ASTA sought and that the administrative work
necessary for compiling the requested information would be “unduly onerous.” The court proved
sympathetic to the first claim and advised Seay at a hearing that the court could not require Stone to
rectify all cases of discrimination as such. The court granted the request for information, however,
which it regarded as “basically a motion for discovery and production.” This would allow Seay to analyze
the information and move the court for further relief against any individual systems as necessary. Seay
would eventually spend a considerable amount of time in the coming months, traveling the state and
negotiating with local school boards, trying to protect particular teachers and administrators from
discriminatory handling. It was the kind of leg work that the CRD had conducted in the case up to that
point. But Gray and Seay, not the CDR, represented ASTA, and so it fell to them to shepherd this phase
of the litigation. With Gray handling other cases, this meant, in effect, Seay alone.10

Trade Schools and Junior Colleges
That spring, 1969, the attorneys from the Civil Rights Division filed a motion for further relief in
Lee v. Macon which sought the disestablishment of the state’s dual system of trade schools and junior
colleges. The March, 1967 decree had provided for the desegregation of such schools, but the state had
done nothing to achieve this and, of course, would not do so without some judicial “prodding.” The
statewide order had been wholly appropriate in the case of these institutions, as they were directly
9
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under the control of the state board of education. The state board operated 27 trade schools, 21 of
which had been created and maintained for whites, and 6 for blacks. It operated 15 junior colleges, 13
white and 2 black. Each school had an attendance area which it served, thus the white and black schools
had overlapping zones. Some of the faculties had been token desegregated, most with only one teacher
of the minority race. There were significant disparities in funding between the black and white
institutions, and the white institutions generally offered a much more diverse selection of courses. The
CRD asked the court to require the state board to formulate and execute a desegregation plan for these
schools.11
The Lee court determined that it should treat the trade schools and junior colleges differently
than the K-12 schools. The judges decided that the principles established in the recent case against
Auburn University-Montgomery ought to apply. The state Public School and College Authority had
recently sought to issue bonds to finance the building of a new four year college in Montgomery, an
extension of formerly all-white Auburn University in nearby east Alabama. Blacks protested, arguing
that the purpose of this was to keep the city’s only other four year institution – Alabama State – all
black, and to provide another institution which would remain mostly white. Fred Gray filed suit for ASTA
in an attempt to block the bond issue. In the resulting decision, Judge Johnson spoke for the threejudge court and elucidated the particular challenges inherent in desegregating higher education. Public
elementary and secondary schools were “traditionally free and compulsory,” and students could
theoretically be assigned equitably to schools which were substantially the same “in terms of goals,
facilities, course offerings, teacher training and salaries, and so forth.” Higher education, on the other
hand, was “neither free nor compulsory.” Students chose which institution, if any, to attend, and they
faced “the full range of diversity” in terms of those same things. In determining when and where to
open a new institution, then, state officials had considerations which did not factor into such decisions
11
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for K-12 schools. The court concluded that reviewing such decisions would necessarily involve the
judges “in a wide range of educational policy decisions in which courts should not become involved.”12
Auburn University had been ordered five years prior to desegregate and to maintain a
nondiscriminatory admissions policy. The court felt that Auburn-Montgomery ought to be given the
chance to prove that it would do the same. Johnson wrote, “nondiscriminatory admissions in higher
education are analogous to a freedom-of-choice plan in the elementary and secondary public schools.
. . . Freedom to choose where one will attend college, unlike choosing one's elementary or secondary
public school,” he argued, “has a long tradition and helps to perform an important function, viz., fitting
the right school to the right student.” Green had “cast doubt on freedom-of-choice’s continued
viability,” but the court felt that Green did not apply to higher education. Neither the federal courts, nor
the Congress, nor HEW had gone beyond recommending or requiring nondiscriminatory admissions in
higher education, and the court was, therefore, “reluctant” to “go much beyond” that itself.13
According to those principles, the Lee v. Macon court ordered the state board of education to
formulate a plan which would eliminate racial identifiability and provide for free choice in the state’s
trade schools and junior colleges. The plan the state initially submitted was hopelessly deficient, and
the court was forced to specifically instruct the state officials to provide for the elimination of choiceinfluencing factors: overlapping attendance areas and transportation areas, racially identifiable faculties,
and dual programs and curricula in institutions in the same geographical area. When the state had
submitted no such plan by the end of the summer, the court ordered the HEW Office of Education to
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formulate one. The court had to afford the USOE time to survey the system and formulate the plan, and
so this phase of the litigation was effectively put on hold until the following year.14

Approaching “Terminal Orders” in Lee v. Macon
Meanwhile, the systematic desegregation of the 99 Lee v. Macon districts continued to require
further court action. In mid-June Ernest Stone reported to the court on the results of the March
freedom of choice period. Judge Johnson reviewed the report and advised Judges Rives and Grooms
that the overall percentage of black students in scheduled to attend formerly all-white schools that fall
seemed to indicate “excellent progress”: 33 percent in the county systems and 39 percent in the city
systems. But these overall statistical figures were deceiving. Johnson felt that the court should “take
some further action prior to the commencement of the 1969-1970 school year,” because freedom of
choice seemed to be making that “excellent progress” in only some of the 99 systems. Johnson wrote:

I do not believe that we can sit by without initiating some show cause order to school systems
like Sumter, 1%; Russell, 5-1/2%; Monroe, 12%; Marengo, 3%; Lee, 8%; Henry, 6%; Greene, 6%;
Baldwin, 9%; Demopolis, 2%; Dothan, 8%; Linden, 3%; Opelika, 9%; and Thomasville, 1%. It is
quite obvious that freedom of choice has not worked in these systems. I see no reasonable
probability that it will work. I believe we should enter a show cause order as to these school
systems, and any others you think appropriate, giving them approximately 15 days to show
cause why they should not file with this Court some desegregation plan other than a freedom of
choice plan.15
Johnson listed 10 other systems which he felt the court ought to move against.16 Judge Rives “heartily”
concurred, adding that the results in most of the systems were “much better” than he had anticipated.
He suggested that Johnson attach something to the show cause order, or issue some special order,
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“according credit” to the systems which had demonstrated good faith, in the hopes that this would
“have a good effect on the laggards.”17
Johnson soon spoke to Frank Allen, the lead attorney from the Civil Rights Division, and learned
that the CRD had also been reviewing the reports and was preparing to enter motions of its own,
pending approval from Attorney General Clarke. The court determined that it should wait until the CRD
had entered its own motions, so Johnson settled for writing a letter to each of the recalcitrant systems.
The judge alerted each system’s attorney and superintendent to the fact that no white students had
elected to attend black schools and that only a small percentage of black students had chosen to attend
formerly all-white schools. He requested that each system notify the court as to whether “any further
desegregation” was to be “accomplished . . . without further Court action prior to the commencement
of the 1969-70 school year.” Johnson ‘called their attention’ to Green v. County School Board and the
several Fifth Circuit decisions rendered subsequent to it. Linden and Thomasville responded and
developed, in conference with Johnson, further steps which would bring their respective numbers to at
least 17 and 30 percent that fall. Others did not, and the CRD prepared a motion to add those systems
as parties defendant.18
On June 14 the CRD entered its motion. Surprisingly, it determined that 32 of the 99 school
boards were in the process of implementing plans which would eliminate their dual school systems for
the upcoming 1969-70 school year. However, 25 systems had failed to carry out the provisions of the
August, 1968 order directing certain school closures or grade closures and were not poised to achieve
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any meaningful progress.19 Most of these systems were planning to continue operating “subminimal”
all-black schools – those with fewer than the state-approved minimum number of students. The next
day, Johnson approved the motion and added all of the 25 systems as parties defendant, ordering them
to show cause. Following a hearing, the court, in an August 6 order, dismissed two systems as parties
defendant and issued specific orders for each of the remaining 23. It ordered each system to achieve a
faculty desegregation rate of 1-in-4 for the upcoming year and an equalized system-wide ratio for 197071. Certain systems were ordered to stop busing black students past white schools closer to their
homes. Others were ordered to stop operating certain black schools that fall, and to stop operating any
and all black schools by the fall of 1970. Some were ordered to grant choices which they had denied.
Some were ordered to pair white and black schools. All were to report to the their court on their
progress. Finally, the court ordered the USOE to formulate its own plans for each system for total
disestablishment for 1970-71, in case continuing recalcitrance prevented the formulation or
implementation of an acceptable plan by the board themselves.20
The opening of schools that fall revealed substantially increased desegregation in all of the 99
systems. Notably, among those systems added as parties defendant at the end of the summer, several
had greatly increased their percentages of black students in formerly all-white schools: Baldwin County,
43 percent; Chilton County, 51 percent; Covington County, 89 percent; Dothan City, 26 percent; Opelika
City, 31 percent; and Phenix City, 26 percent. Five systems had failed to achieve what the court ordered.
Conecuh and Limestone Counties had not achieved reasonable faculty desegregation, and Demopolis
City, Russell County, and Pickens County had not achieved more than 16 percent black pupil
19
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desegregation. Johnson asked Rives and Grooms in October if the court ought to issue further orders
against the five, but the two judges balked. Johnson had wondered if they ought to “let [the systems]
ride” in light of the fact that it was already mid-fall and each was required to fully desegregate the
following year anyway. Rives agreed, arguing that teachers would be hard to find in mid-year for the
first two, and that the other three were “so predominantly black in student population and [faced] such
a difficult problem, that they probably ought to be “left alone” at the time. Grooms agreed and added
that the three needed time “to ‘season.’” The judges were thus not insensitive to the threat of
catastrophic white flight in majority-black systems, nor to individual systems’ circumstances. But it was
clear that all of the Lee systems would, nonetheless, be required to take all conceivable steps to fully
desegregate by the fall of 1970.21
As the court was entering the order against the newly added 25 systems, Solomon Seay was
filing a motion on behalf of ASTA asking the court to add 33 more systems as parties defendant.22 In
reviewing Stone’s court-ordered report, Seay had determined that these systems continued to
discriminate against black teachers and administrators in a litany of ways: denying blacks administrative
positions; maintaining disproportionate pay scales for blacks and whites; requiring black coaches and
athletic directors to work as full-time classroom teachers and paying them a smaller athletic supplement
than whites; transferring their top black teachers to white schools while at the same time transferring
their least experienced and qualified white teachers to black schools; reassigning black principals to
classroom positions, with a loss in salary and in some cases under white principals with less experience
and training; replacing black principals at black schools with white principals, while refusing to consider
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blacks for principalships at white schools; and demoting or terminating black Title I program teachers
and replacing them with white teachers. This was the last official act undertaken by the ASTA prior to its
merger into the NEA, which Seay and Fred Gray were also overseeing.23 The court allowed NEA to
intervene and denied the ASTA motion, feeling that the newly integrated NEA should not be bound by
an eleventh-hour order. Johnson noted the court was not prejudiced to hearing a similar motion from
NEA.24
At that point, in the fall of 1969, 28 of the 99 Lee v. Macon school boards were held to have
completely disestablished their dual systems. Of the remaining systems, 36 had been recently made
parties defendant and put under direct court order to do so by beginning of the 1970-71 school year.
This left 37 school boards under the Lee v. Macon umbrella which were not under court order to totally
disestablish their dual systems by 1970-71.25 Judge Johnson felt that it was “extremely important” to
issue an order against the remaining systems “right away.” Some of them had “not yet taken any
realistic approach designed to end their segregated public school operations.” Accordingly, on October
23, the court acknowledged “considerable progress,” but it ordered the remaining 37 districts to file
new plans with the court to achieve total disestablishment the following year. It then ordered the USOE
to file plans as well, in the very likely event that school boards’ own plan were inadequate. Johnson
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entered similar orders as the sole district judge overseeing the Barbour County and Crenshaw County
cases.26
Johnson was prepared to rely on the USOE’s Division of Equal Educational Opportunity (EEO) to
formulate realistic plans, which the court could then order these certain systems to implement. This
was an important task, as these were to be “terminal-type” orders, or those that would set each system
on a final, court-sanctioned path to elimination of its dual system. The Director of the EEO Division
subsequently wrote the superintendents of the 37 school systems named in the order and “call[ed]
[their] attention to the technical assistance available . . . under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” HEW
personnel were “ready to help,” he wrote. When Johnson received a copy of one of these letters, he
immediately contacted Montgomery-based U.S. Attorney Ira DeMent and informed him that “the casual
approach evidenced by the letters” would “not in any way comply with the orders entered in these
cases,” referring to Lee and the independent cases. Johnson reminded DeMent that the United States
was a party to the cases and had been “specifically ordered, through the use of HEW, to study operation
in each of the school systems concerned – whether invited or not – and to assist the officials of the
several school systems in preparing a terminal-type plan for presentation to the Court on or before
January 15, 1970.” The court had learned the hard way that the initiative simply could “not be left up to
the local school systems.” Johnson was thus forced to assert the court’s administrative authority and
advise DeMent to “call [the] matter to the attention of the proper authorities” through “whatever
channels” he considered appropriate.27
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Appeals in Davis and Jefferson
The reluctance of HEW to take a proactive role in the final enforcement of the Lee litigation was
indicative of a general retreat from strict enforcement of school desegregation policy and law under the
Nixon Administration. While more desegregation occurred during Nixon’s first term than under any
other presidential administration, this was the result of timing and resignation more than administrative
initiative. Nixon’s White House was ultimately not unlike southern school districts themselves,
begrudgingly resigned to accept the inevitable but not prepared to go any further than necessary. Some
have offered a more generous assessment, arguing that Nixon was improvising, or that he could have
done more to appease his southern constituency than he did. The marginalization of those in the
administration who would have been more proactive is perhaps more illustrative of the overall thrust of
administration policy than anything. Leon Panetta, for example, replaced Ruby Martin as the head of
the Office of Civil Rights but was forced to resign a year later because of his aggressive stance on school
desegregation policy. Those who remained were torn between the expectations of southerners who
had been awaiting a softening of enforcement since the election, liberals who expected a final push
towards meaningful desegregation, and the White House itself. Incoming HEW secretary Robert Finch
exemplified the often confused Nixon policy. He initially buoyed southern hopes by suggesting that the
HEW Guidelines would be rewritten to be “clearer” and bent more towards national, as opposed to
strictly southern, enforcement. But after an April policy meeting at the White House, Finch indicated
that there would be “no change” in the Guidelines. HEW subsequently began moving on certain
northern school districts to cut off funds.28
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At the same time, however, administrative actions indicated a clear stand down. HEW had been
insisting that school districts fully desegregate by that fall, 1969, but that summer it allowed 20 South
Carolina school systems to wait until the following year. Then the White House forced a delay in the
Mississippi school case, Alexander v. Holmes. A number of Mississippi school cases had come before the
Fifth Circuit on consolidated appeal, and the appellate court had initially ordered each to submit plans
for full desegregation that fall. Urged on by the influential Mississippi Senator John Stennis, the White
House pressured Secretary Finch to write Fifth Circuit Chief Judge John Brown and tell him that HEW
was “gravely concerned that the time allowed for the development of these terminal plans has been
much too short.” Finch – who would ultimately join Panetta in exiting the administration – dutifully
informed Judge Brown that widespread compliance with Green would result in “chaos, confusion, and a
catastrophic educational setback.”29 When the CRD petitioned the court for a delay in implementation
of the Mississippi plans until the following year, the appellate court granted the request. This had the
effect of pitting the Civil Rights Division against the NAACP-LDF in a school desegregation case for the
first time. It also set off what has been called a “revolt” at the Justice Department, in which a number of
attorneys, particularly within the CRD, openly questioned the administration. In some cases CRD
attorneys began quietly assisting local civil rights attorneys, and at least one resigned. The LDF ran a full
page ad in the New York Times accusing the federal government of “breaking its promise to the children
of Mississippi.” The U.S. Civil Rights Commission issued a statement, of its own, observing, “Those who
have placed their faith in the processes of law cannot be encouraged.”30
When Civil Rights Division Chief Jerris Leonard went before the Supreme Court during oral
arguments in Alexander v. Holmes and insisted that ordering the immediate enforcement of Green in
29
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these cases was a waste of time, many other civil rights supporters called the administration out on its
self-proclaimed “law and order” policy. The New York Times called such a position on Green
“astonishing as the declared stance of an Administration that, in its rhetoric, has so consistently vowed
to uphold law and order.” It continued:

With every new corkscrew turn of policy, the Nixon Administration demonstrates that its
approach to school desegregation is more responsive to the prejudices of Southern politicians
than to the legitimate demands to put an end to the illegally maintained dual school systems.
. . . Such contradictions can only reinforce Negro suspicions of separate justice for black and
white, thus inviting resort to mass disruption as a substitute for the essential faith in justice
under a government of law.31

The Baltimore Afro-American proffered a similar interpretation. The administration had “exposed its
own ‘law and order’ hypocrisy in an unprincipled declaration of the Justice Department’s inability,” or
more accurately “unwillingness, to enforce school desegregation.” Its “double-talk, pussy-footing
delays, [and] appeals for court slowdowns” were just the “type of encouragement for Dixiecrats to defy
court rulings that one would expect from George Wallace and other segregationists from Deep South
areas.” Leonard called the Times editorial “picayunish and pusillanimous” and claimed that the Civil
Rights Commission and others were “running off at the mouth” without all the facts.” Meanwhile, Nixon
was trying to reign in others in the administration, telling aids, “We have to quit bragging about school
desegregation. We do what the law requires,” he said, “nothing more.” One Nixon scholar has aptly
summarized the president’s political application of this standard: Nixon wanted to “sell the story that
the Supreme Court was responsible for desegregation and that there was little the administration could
do about it.” He would continue to “advance integration without taking much credit for it,” while at the
same time “rolling his eyes for all southern white voters to see”32
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The Nixon Justice Department thus continued to enforce school desegregation law while
simultaneously engaging in a cautious retrenchment. This included its handling of the Davis v. Mobile
case, though this was difficult to ascertain amid continuing rulings for delay issued by District Judge
Daniel Thomas. In April of 1969, Thomas had insisted that Mobile continue to operate that fall under its
existing hybrid desegregation plan – which he had developed himself, and the Mobile authorities had
implemented the previous year. The plan called for maintenance of freedom of choice in the rural part
of the county and in the metropolitan area’s high schools. The city’s elementary and junior high schools
would continue to operate under an attendance zoning plan, with zones drawn by Thomas himself,
along nonracial lines. The plan had resulted in a seemingly large increase in black students in formerly
white schools the previous year: from 692 in the fall of 1967 to 3,484 in the fall of 1968. But nearly 90
percent of the system’s 31,130 black students still attended either all-black schools or those which had
been token desegregated by a total of 253 white students, mostly from families poor enough to bear
the burden which wealthier whites refused to bear.33
Initially, the Justice Department litigated this aspect of the case as it always had. Both the LDF
and the CRD appealed Thomas’s decision to continue with his hybrid plan. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision on June 3, 1969. The appellate court argued that Judge Thomas had obviously “relied wholly
upon and [given] literal interpretation to” its March, 1968 declaration that new attendance zones “be
drawn on a non-racial basis.” According to the court, Thomas had also “ignored the unequivocal
directive to make a conscious effort in locating attendance zones to desegregate and eliminate past
segregation.” The district court’s attendance zones were “constitutionally insufficient and
unacceptable.” Furthermore, the freedom of choice plan for the city’s high school students had been
approved in direct defiance of the circuit court’s directive that no distinction be drawn between
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elementary and secondary schools. The freedom of choice plan for the rural part of the county,
meanwhile, had “singularly failed,” as only about 6 percent of blacks in the rural areas had chosen white
schools, and no whites had chosen black schools. A majority-to-minority transfer provision was proper,
the court held, but Thomas had also included a minority-to-majority provision which the court said was
“tantamount to an authorization to white students to resegregate.” The court also reversed Thomas’
decision to allow for construction at two black school sites, arguing that such construction should be
enjoined pending rezoning. Finally, it ordered Thomas to direct HEW to come to Mobile and attempt to
work out a plan with the school board. HEW was to devise its own plan for implementation in the likely
event that no agreement could be reached with the board.34
The Mobile school board did not bother developing its own plan or working with HEW on one.
The plan that HEW formulated on its own called for a total elimination of freedom of choice and
included non-contiguous zoning and pairing of schools. It would have required the busing of around
2,000 of the system’s nearly 80,000 students; most of these 2,000 would have been students from the
inner core of the metropolitan area, east of Interstate 65, bused out to other parts of the metropolitan
area. The proposed HEW plan unsurprisingly met with outrage and indignation in white Mobile. A letter
from Mobile’s congressional representative Jack Edwards to Robert Finch reflected the conflicting
pressures the HEW Secretary was under. Edwards called the HEW plan “the wild notion of [Finch’s]
stable of dreamers” and stated that he “could not believe” that Finch would “condone such a flagrant
violation of the law,” especially since it was “contrary to [Edward’s] understanding of [Finch’s] position.”
The Mobile school board estimated that implementing the plan would cost $13 million. Edwards asked,
“Where do you think [they] will get the money?” Finch had never seen the plan himself, but he agreed
to review it, in any case. The review was rendered moot when the ever-sympathetic Judge Thomas on
August 1, 1969 again softened the blow for white Mobile. He approved the HEW attendance zones for
34
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the rural county and that part of the metropolitan area west of Interstate 65. But Thomas would not
approve the HEW zoning plan for the area east of I-65, which included most of the city of Mobile, as well
as the cities of Prichard and Chickasaw. He ordered the school board to devise its own plan for this part
of the metro area and again ordered it to continue under the previous year’s hybrid plan – with freedom
of choice for the high schools and Thomas’ own zones for the rest.35
Once again Thomas’ attempts at moderation were met with displeasure from all sides. The LDF
immediately appealed the part of the ruling allowing a continuation of the status quo in the area east of
I-65. William Westbrook and STAND descended upon the next meeting of the Mobile school board in an
attempt to brow beat the officials into maintaining freedom of choice county-wide. Westbrook
announced that freedom of choice was “what America was founded upon. . . . We as citizens will accept
nothing less. We want no pairing of schools, no closing of schools, no busing of children, no rigid
boundary lines, no black history, no sex sensitivity courses, and no social welfare within our schools.”
Westbrook argued, “This is still America, we are still free, and we intend to remain free.” As the opening
of schools approached that September, STAND’s Pierre Pelham introduced a resolution into the
Alabama State Legislature, on behalf of former Governor George Wallace, declaring that freedom of
choice was “the lawful and least disruptive system of pupil assignment in the public schools of
Alabama.” The resolution called on parents to “take their children to the school of their original choice
and insist upon the enrollment of such children and peace remain at such schools until enrollment has
taken place.” It further called upon school officials to “take whatever action is required to
accommodate parents in their exercises of freedom of choice, including the opening of closed schools,
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elimination of busing to achieve racial balance, and prompt enrollment.” The resolution passed the
House 85 to 5 and the Senate 23 to 11.36
Wallace told a group of white parents in Prichard days before school opened, “Any parent
whose child is not being allowed to go to the school of your choice, I hope you will carry that child to
that school anyway – and let’s see what they do about it.” STAND subsequently put an ad in the Mobile
Register calling for a boycott of classes at formerly all-black or highly integrated schools. Thousands of
white students heeded the call on the first day of school, particularly in the newly zoned parts of the
county, where they either stayed home or simply showed up at the school of their choice. STAND
conducted a march that day to the school board offices to commemorate the “death of freedom of
choice” and held a rally later that night at which protestors burned an effigy of Robert Finch.37
The Nixon effect then manifest itself in the Davis case as the CRD chose to support Thomas’ plan
on appeal, putting it on the opposite side of the courtroom from the LDF for just the second time.
Assistant Attorney General Leonard submitted a memorandum in support, arguing that Thomas’s plan
was “consistent” with the most recent directive of the Fifth Circuit in Davis. The LDF meanwhile, was
petitioning Thomas for a contempt citation against the Mobile school officials for their failure to report
on fall enrollments and teacher assignments. The school board was also supposed to be formulating its
own plan for further desegregation east of I-65 to be filed by December 1, but it seemed to be hiding
behind the pending appeal. The Nixon Administration was particularly cautious in the Mobile case,
because any plan to substantially desegregate the city-county system looked to involve a good deal of
compulsory assignment and “busing.” This frightened whites outside the South, whom Nixon began to
promise he would protect. The president had begun appealing to both these whites outside the South
and the law-and-order types within it, signaling his intention to limit school desegregation by using the
36
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same coded language so familiar to southerners. By the spring of 1970, he was calling school
desegregation a “very difficult problem,” emphasizing “a fundamental distinction in so-called de jure
segregation and de facto segregation,” and arguing that there were “limits to the amount of coercion
that can reasonably be used” in “a free society.” He adopted the argument used by Alabama state
officials in NAACP v. Wallace: that federal officials should not “go beyond the requirements of the law”
in enforcing school desegregation. And he charted what he called a middle course between “two
extreme groups,” those who wanted “instant integration” and those who wanted “segregation
forever.”38
Meanwhile, the LDF was also appealing the district court’s approval of the Jefferson County
school board’s plan, along with the independent Bessemer City plan. After its ruling in Davis v, Mobile
that summer, the Fifth Circuit had, on June 26, 1969, reversed and remanded Judge Seybourn Lynne’s
approval of a county-wide freedom of choice plan which left the question of significant pupil
desegregation unresolved. The previous year, there had been 48 all-white, 28 all-black, and 29
desegregated schools in the Jefferson County system. The appellate court held that it was, therefore,
“clear that freedom of choice [had] not disestablished the dual school systems in Bessemer [city] or
Jefferson County.” Thus, the plan the district court had approved would “not meet the test of Green.” It
ordered Judge Lynne to consider a zoning plan which might achieve disestablishment – in accordance
with Green, Carr v. Montgomery, and now Davis v. Mobile.39
Lynne ordered Jefferson County and Bessemer City school boards to formulate such a plans, to
be put into operation that September. He wrote, “All recent decisions of the federal courts have
declared that ‘freedom of choice’ is unacceptable, in that, according to these courts, it does not tend to
end segregated schools.” But he added, “Within the framework of the federal court order,” school
boards “must continue” to operate schools and educate children “under existing conditions.” Despite
38
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Lynne’s seeming acknowledgment that “existing conditions” might give the school boards some leeway,
the Jefferson County officials issued a statement lamenting the decision and indicating to white parents
that they had fought against desegregation as hard as they possibly could. The board stressed that its
members had “consistently opposed the decrees of the federal court” and that they “did not feel that
the [recent] federal court decree [would] in any way help or benefit the educational system” of the
county. “However,” they continued, “despite our personal feeling relative to the unfair interference and
interruption of our educational program by the rulings of the Federal Court of Appeals, our nation is
based on a system of law and order.” Thus it was the “unfortunate duty and responsibility” of the board
to carry out the court’s orders.40
The Jefferson County and Bessemer school boards each then developed and adopted
geographic zoning plans. HEW had developed a plan which would have fully desegregated the Jefferson
County system in two years, but the county school board had declined to work with HEW and had
submitted its own. The school board’s plan was to be implemented over a three year period and called
for certain all-black schools to be “phased out,” “closed gradually,” or closed “as soon as possible.”
Bessemer officials worked with HEW and submitted an “interim plan” which called for the
implementation of limited zoning while a long-range plan was being worked out. The long-range plan
would, according to the board, potentially require “a complete reorganization of the entire school
system.” In most areas, the interim Bessemer plan and the first phase of the Jefferson County plan
simply called for filling white schools to capacity with nearby black students. Not unlike in Mobile,
compromise and gradualism did not appease white parents, however, who flooded courtroom hearings
in protest, as well as the offices of the Jefferson County school board. Jefferson County Superintendent
Revis Hall was perpetually besieged by angry white parents who felt that their children had been “kicked
out of their school because of those niggers,” and who advocated burning down schools rather than
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desegregating them. Outside a hearing at which plaintiffs voiced their opposition to the plans because
they did not go far enough, a Pleasant Grove man told reporters, “I will not send my kids to a Negro
neighborhood under any circumstances. I will go to a federal penitentiary before I do it.” A Midfield
woman added, “I don’t think it’s right for them to bus white children to Negro schools. That’s
something that white people aren’t going to stand for.”41
The plaintiffs in each case also vigorously protested a number of issues: the maintenance of
various all-black schools; the renaming of black schools in all instances where they were to become
desegregated; the token desegregation of a number of schools in wealthier white areas; the creation of
at least one zone which looked to remain perpetually all-black; and the planned construction of new
high schools in all-white areas of the county, like Midfield, where they were sure to remain mostly
white. The Justice Department protested the lack of a majority-to-minority transfer clause and the
prioritization of certain proposed construction projects – like the high school in Midfield – over those
which would tend to facilitate desegregation. Despite the objections, Judge Clarence Allgood – then
sitting for Judge Lynne – approved both plans on August 6, 1969. From the bench, Judge Allgood made
his disapproval of compulsory assignment clear. “Most of us may disagree,” he said, with the Alexander
decision and the recent Davis and Jefferson decisions. He explained, “In my opinion, the Jefferson
County freedom of choice plan . . . was and is doing the job in a feasible manner and has been accepted
by the general public in this area, both black and white.” But now, he lamented, the Fifth Circuit had
“changed its mind.” Allgood was obliged to order the implementation of the new plans, but not before
congratulating the Jefferson County school board on having already performed a “Herculean task.”
Oscar Adams and the LDF felt the plans did not go far enough and appealed the ruling. These appeals –
in Stout and U.S. v. Jefferson, Brown v. Bessemer, and Davis v. Mobile – brought the number of pending

41

Birmingham News, Aug. 4, 1969

607

LDF appeals pending in Fifth Circuit that fall to 13. The appellate court ordered the 13 cases
consolidated for an en banc hearing that fall.42
Meanwhile, schools opened in Jefferson County with much the same effect as in Mobile, as
everyone from parents and students to state officials decried what they understood to be increasingly
demanding orders. White parents from west Jefferson County formed a group they called Concerned
Parents for Public Education and sought to intervene in the Jefferson case. Pending a ruling on the
motion seeking intervention, the group began holding mass meetings to determine an alternative
course of action, should their attempt to litigate their way out of compulsory assignment fail. At one
such meeting in late August, Jefferson County Schools’ attorney Maurice Bishop fanned the flames of
defiance. Bishop told the group to support white teachers who refused to teach integrated classes and
to remember that the ballot box was their “most powerful arsenal in the repertoire of war.” Likening
black activists to Nazis, he added, “Ten percent of the Negro population has been calling the shots,”
because they were “well organized and well financed.” Whites needed to respond in kind in order to
“stop them from doing what they’re doing to the fine white people of Greene County,” where whites
were fleeing the overwhelmingly black system en masse. Bishop asked how many of the parents would
“not object” to a ratio of 15 to 20 percent blacks in white schools in the fall. Two parents raised their
hands. Bishop then asked who would not object if all Alabama schools were closed in lieu of integration.
The crowd then roared in approval. The group’s president told Bishop and Jefferson County
Superintendent Revis Hall that they were not necessarily interested in leaving the public schools, but
that the “present situation” would “not be tolerated.”43
Concerned Parents subsequently tried to spread its message of defiance across the county. It
took out an ad in the Birmingham News days later in which it accused the Fifth Circuit panel which had
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ruled in the Jefferson case that summer of “completely destroy[ing]” the county school system. The ad
posed a series of rhetorical questions for the judges, none of which involved race. Would the judges
“accept the responsibility for educating [their] children,” since the court would obviously “not allow the
Jefferson County Board of Education to do so?” When economic support for the county system dried
up, would the court reimburse it? Would the judges house thousands of students for which their
assigned schools would have no room?44
Governor Albert Brewer reiterated his support for groups like Concerned Parents and Mobile’s
STAND when he called for a southern governor’s conference with the U.S. Attorney General to discuss
what had become “an intolerable situation.” The governor blamed federal desegregation orders for a
recent spate of dropouts in the state and wondered if “people at the federal level” would ever “be
reasonable enough to see what they are doing to our schools.” He added, “Maybe it’s time Alabama
went into court and asked for equal protection of the laws.” The children themselves took their cues
from their parents, who were being reinforced by state officials like Brewer and Wallace. As an editor at
the Auburn University student newspaper, the Plainsman, noted, “Many of the children, black and
white, have gone to their new schools with an attitude of apprehension and distrust. These feelings
were “not based on contact with another race because they have had little such contact.” It was, he
argued, “founded on the emotions and prejudices of their parents.”45
Many students did not go their new schools at all, however. White parents in Jefferson County
were not mollified by the renaming of formerly black schools. They were instead encouraged by the
state legislature’s “freedom of choice resolution” and kept their children home or sent them to their
previously assigned schools. One thousand white students consequently began the school year in a
school other than the one to which they had been assigned per the new Jefferson County plan. For
example, 59 white students out of a projected 428 showed up to the newly named Graysville High – the
44
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formerly all-black Alden High. No white students showed up to the newly named McNeil High. At some
formerly all-black schools, parents complained of outdoor toilets, broken windows, and no lunchrooms,
although Jefferson County Superintendent Revis Hall was quick to argue that such complaints were
exaggerated and not indicative of actual conditions. An Irondale father whose child had been assigned
to a formerly black school said his family had “paid [its] taxes” and would therefore take its children to
the school of its choice. Hundreds of parents signed a petition which they submitted to the district court
asking that it modify the plan. Meanwhile, most schools allowed students attending “out of zone” to
remain where they were, just like the state legislature had told them to do. They were dubbed “visiting”
students and in some cases issued books and allowed to participate in classes. A month later, hundreds
of these students were still operating on their own personal freedom of choice plan in Jefferson County,
in addition to more than 400 students, mostly white, who had actually been granted school board
special permission to transfer to a school outside their zone. The disregard for assignments prompted a
CRD investigation and an LDF complaint to the court, where the record on appeal would reflect the
“visiting” phenomenon.46

Alexander v. Holmes and Singleton v. Jackson III
While the 13 consolidated LDF appeals were pending the en banc hearing of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court issued its second of three landmark school decisions of that year.
On October 29, the Court nullified the Nixon stand-down in the omnibus Mississippi case of Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education. Alexander was, ironically, the first major decision of the chief
justiceship of Warren Burger – whom Nixon had himself appointed after having failed in his first two
appointments. The new Berger Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s approval of delay and announced that
time had “run out on deliberate speed.” It ordered the originally approved desegregation plans for the
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33 Mississippi districts implemented immediately, holding that “every school district is to terminate dual
school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." With the Court to
blame, the administration subsequently backed off and allowed implementation to proceed apace – in
the South at least. The Justice Department subsequently set about enforcing Alexander in Mississippi,
including seeking a statewide decree along the lines of the decree in Lee v. Macon. Meanwhile, the
Alexander ruling put the Fifth Circuit in the unusual position of having to modify its own rulings to
effectuate a High Court-mandated speed-up.47
On December 1, 1969, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in the 13 consolidated LDF appeals –
including Davis, Jefferson, and Bessemer – under the styling Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate
School District (the third notable ruling under the style of that case). In a per curiam opinion, the court
acknowledged that Alexander “supervened all existing authority to the contrary” and “sent the doctrine
of deliberate speed to its final resting place.” The burden had shifted “from a status of litigation to one
of unitary operation pending litigation.” All school systems had to convert to unitary systems
immediately; then and only then they could litigate the details of their respective plans. In applying
these principles, the court chose to apply an HEW-developed policy which it had already adopted in the
case of U.S. v. Hinds County Board of Education that summer. In that case, the court had approved the
implementation of a two-step plan for “immediate” conversion to unitary systems: complete
desegregation of faculty, staff, transportation, services, and extra-curricular activities immediately and
the full desegregation of pupils with the start of the next full semester. The court felt that Alexander
necessitated the rehearing of all of the 13 cases at the trial court level to reformulate plans. “Despite
the absence of plans,” the court held, it would “be possible to merge faculties and staff, transportation,
services, athletics and other extra-curricular activities during the present school term.” But it would be
“difficult to arrange the merger of student bodies into unitary systems prior to the fall 1970 term in the
47
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absence of merger plans.” Accordingly, it ordered that everything but student bodies be desegregated
by Feb. 1, 1970 with full pupil desegregation to follow in the fall.48
The court included some specific instructions for the trial courts in the individual cases. In the
combined Jefferson County and Bessemer cases, there had been no substantial change in the systems’
plans since the appellate court had reversed and remanded them that summer. So, the court simply
reversed Judge Lynne’s most recent judgments and remanded them for compliance with Alexander. In
Davis, the court affirmed Judge Thomas’s approval of the modified HEW plan. It directed the court to
ensure the desegregation of the eastern part of the metropolitan area in accordance with Alexander
“and in accordance with the other provisions and conditions of this order.” In effect this meant that all
three cases would have to be reconsidered in light of Alexander, but with relief to follow in accordance
with Hinds County. All three systems, along with the rest of the 13, would be afforded until the fall of
1970 to arrange full, unitary pupil desegregation. The LDF – through the three Louisiana cases and the
Davis case – appealed this delaying portion of the December 1 decision, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and quickly heard the case.49
In a terse per curiam opinion styled Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, the Court held
on January 14, 1970, “Insofar as the [Fifth Circuit] Court of Appeals authorized deferral of student
desegregation beyond February 1, 1970, that court misconstrued our holding in Alexander v. Holmes
County Board of Education.” In its third and final major school decision of the year, the Court reversed
and remanded Singleton v. Jackson III and instructed the appellate court to issue judgments in the
affected cases “forthwith.” The opinion was so brief that four justices – Burger, Harlan, White, and
Stewart – felt compelled to include some further explanation for the court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit
had led the way in desegregation jurisprudence for nearly a decade, and here the Supreme Court

48

Singleton v. Jackson, 419 F.2d 1211; United States v. Hinds County School Board, 417 F.2d 852; Race
Relations Law Survey 1, No. 5 (Jan., 1970), pp. 203-4.
49
Singleton v. Jackson, 419 F.2d 1211; Race Relations Law Survey 1, No. 5 (Jan., 1970), pp. 203-4.

612

seemed to be issuing an almost peremptory rebuke. The four concurring justices sought to dispel any
notion that the appellate court had erred entirely in its interpretation of Alexander. Regardless, the
bottom line was clear, and on this the justices were in unanimous agreement: graduated relief was no
longer acceptable. School systems had to become unitary immediately. Nearly twenty years of
defiance, evasion, and foot-dragging had left no room for any further delay. The Fifth Circuit Court got
the message. From the time of Carter v. West Feliciana, it embarked on what legal scholars have called
a “judicial blitz” which had a “stunning impact” on the South.50
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CHAPTER 16: THE COMPULSORY ASSIGNMENT REVOLT IN MOBILE AND JEFFERSON COUNTIES, 1970-71

The death of freedom of choice had been protracted. For some it had been predictable. But its
final demise nonetheless hit many Alabama whites like a blow. By 1970 litigation had brought some
form of compulsory assignment to each of the state’s school systems. Dazed segregationists responded
with a wave of protest and resistance which was unparalleled in the history of school desegregation in
the state. The reaction was most virulent in the state’s major metropolitan areas, particularly
Birmingham-Jefferson County and Mobile. Students continued to defy court-ordered plans by attending
the school of their choice or by simply staying home. Parents protested and even accompanied students
to class in “sit-ins” and occupations. Violence erupted in some areas, further fueling resistance. More
and more whites chose to flee Birmingham for racially exclusive suburbs. In turn, more of these suburbs
considered breaking away from the Jefferson County school system. Increasing numbers of blacks
recoiled when the often inequitable terms of compulsory desegregation became clear. In Mobile,
disillusioned, frustrated, and angry blacks even began to support calls for black separatism and
resegregation.
As ever, white resistance was buoyed by state-level resistance, this time in the form of the
Albert Brewer approach. Brewer applied the fully matured law and order creed to his efforts and
continued to try and distance himself from George Wallace, whom he opposed in the 1970
gubernatorial race. . Brewer emphasized Wallace’s consistent failures to stop desegregation in the past
and argued that his solutions offered the most realistic chance to halt the steady march. The goal for
both by that point was a return to freedom of choice. But it was not be. Former Alabama State
Teachers Association president Joe Reed understood the position in which the state’s white officials had
placed themselves; the newly installed president of the black Alabama Democratic Conference said,
“The concept of freedom of choice is good, but in practice it has sometimes proved false. If it had been
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adopted 15 years ago, it might now be the law of the land.” Reed was right. It was too late for that.
Two decades of defiance and resistance and foot-dragging and disingenuousness and duplicity had
finally caught up with the southern leaders.1
Birmingham attorney for the NAACP-LDF, U.W. Clemon, echoed these sentiments while
speaking at the annual meeting of the Birmingham League of Women Voters in March, 1970. Clemon
cast aside whites’ misrepresentation of black activist-litigants’ goals and at the same time called into
question whites’ own rationale for resisting compulsory assignment. “There are those who think the
efforts to desegregate schools are efforts to mix, physically, black and white students,” he said, “but
intelligence knows no color or class lines. The true aim of desegregation,” he argued, “is to provide
equal educational opportunity. It really doesn’t matter whether black kids go to school with white kids,
[but] as long as there are all-black schools, there will be an opportunity to discriminate . . . .” In an
obvious reference to Governor Brewer, Clemon added that “quality education” was being tossed about
in the state’s political arena, because it had “an irresistible appeal” not unlike “religion, motherhood,
[or] apple pie.” But, he concluded, “it strikes me as strange that the governor and the legislators have
up until now neglected public education to the point that we’re last in providing quality education.”2

Carter v. West Feliciana’s Impact
The Supreme Court’s January, 1970 decision in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish was a direct order
for immediate system-wide desegregation, and at first it seemed as if its effect would be felt as such in
Alabama. In Singleton v. Jackson, the Fifth Circuit had interpreted the Supreme Court’s Alexander v.
Holmes ruling to mean school systems must take all feasible and immediate steps to complete pupil
desegregation by the fall of that year. In Carter, the High Court rebuked the appellate court, insisting
that school boards implement pupil desegregation plans which unified their districts not by the fall, but
1
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by February 1, through compulsory pupil assignment if necessary. Governor Brewer accused the
Supreme Court of “singling out” his state. He argued that the Court had “completely ignored the effect
[Carter] would have on the education of the children.” Brewer added, “All I can do is express my
wholehearted contempt for this action,” and he promised, “We shall leave no stone unturned in our
determination to fight this order with everything in our power.” And fight it the state would, along with
local school officials, white parents, and students themselves.3
One immediate effect of Carter was that the appellate court’s approval of a two-step
desegregation plan in Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile had to be thrown out. The case
was remanded on January 21, 1970 for the entry of an order which would effect the complete
desegregation of the city-county system by February 1. District Judge Daniel Thomas quickly requested
revised plans from the Mobile school board and HEW, to be submitted within four days. Despite a
second order, the Mobile school board refused to develop a plan. HEW submitted a revised plan, which
the Justice Department supported, and a more radical alternative plan, which attorney Vernon Crawford
supported on behalf of the parent-plaintiffs and the LDF. Thomas had only a few days to consider each
plan alongside the Supreme Court’s mandate, the logistical feasibility afforded by immediate
implementation, and the racial climate of the county.4
In a January 31 order, Thomas concluded that the HEW alternative plan was far too radical,
insofar as it required significant “busing” and paring of schools as far away as 15 miles. The revised HEW
plan supported by the Civil Rights Division did not call for busing, but it did require pairing and the
closure or restructuring of a number of all-black high schools. Thomas was “not willing” to order this, he
argued, out of respect for the wishes of many in the black communities. In rejecting both HEW plans,
Thomas also claimed that he was, generally, “unwilling to disregard all common sense and all thoughts
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to sound education, simply to achieve racial balance in all schools. . . . I do not believe the law requires
it,” he wrote. Thomas added that he would not be swayed by the demands of those who would “stir”
litigation “for the sake of litigation, without regard to the rights of children and parents involved.” He
therefore ordered the implementation of yet another court-devised plan which stopped short of
granting the relief sought by the plaintiffs and the United States, in the hopes that white Mobilians
might be more apt to accept it without violence or massive white flight. In this case, Thomas tried to
prepare the city for what he called necessary “drastic measures” which he hoped would, nonetheless,
make it “humanely and educationally possible to operate the schools.” The plan finally did away with
freedom of choice in the nine high schools east of Interstate Highway 65 in the City of Mobile. This fact
alone was sure to make the plan anathema to a growing group of furious and fearful white parentactivists. Additionally, the plan utilized the geographical zones which the school board had proposed in
December, with significant modification, and it called for certain grade realignments and a few school
closures.5
As Thomas himself acknowledged, the plan satisfied no one, again. The LDF and the CRD
appealed, the school board bristled and stalled, and black and white parents alike protested. Mobile
Superintendent Crawford Burns announced the school board’s understanding of the order: “We
interpret this to mean that we should move ahead without any delaying tactics, but not disregarding all
practical concerns.” The plan was supposed to be implemented “forthwith.” Thomas had insisted that
this did not mean “instantly,” but he set a deadline for the publication of zone maps, which the school
officials ignored. The day the maps were to be published, February 3, Burns described the school board
as being in the “preliminary planning stages” of implementing the plan, adding that the school officials
were “not deliberately dragging [their] feet or trying to thwart the implementation of the decree.”
Burns claimed he could not say when the plan might be implemented or how many students would be
5
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transferred from schools at which they had started the year.” White parents not only supported the
board’s continuing delay but petitioned for more. One white father beseeched the board members at a
February meeting to delay any action until the end of the year. The man warned the officials, “Our
children are sacred to us; they are inviolable. Believe it. But if they can come in here and tell us our
children must go to this particular school,” he said, then “the next thing they are going tell us is, ‘Alright,
now you’ve got to go to a particular church.’ And then they are going to eliminate our church.”
On the other side of the racial divide, blacks protested for a variety of reasons. Plaintiffs’ counsel
Vernon Crawford argued, “It’s far from being a desegregation plan. It just creates a little more
tokenism,” he claimed. At the same time, some blacks become increasingly apprehensive about the fate
of certain cherished black schools. This was particularly true of parents of students at Toulminville High
– which was slated to be rebuilt – and Blount High – which parents hoped would be renovated or
rebuilt. Other blacks committed to eradicating the dual system were more concerned with what
seemed like yet another round of foot-dragging. The local director of the American Friends Service
Committee claimed, “The black community is disgusted with the delays.” He called the court-approved
desegregation plan “a sham” which did “not come close to being a unitary one,” especially insofar as it
left four all-black high schools all-black. A local Catholic school teacher confided to a New York Times
reporter that the plan looked to be “designed to create chaos so the blacks would be so upset with it
they would say to hell with it.”6
One segment of Mobile’s black community was, in fact, so disgusted with the entire
desegregation process that it began to support a plan to fully resegregate the school system. Roy Innes,
the president of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), brought his message of black separatism to
Alabama’s port city in March. CORE had been responsible for the initiation of the famous “Freedom
Rides” in the early 1960s, but under Innes the organization had rejected integration for integration’s
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sake and had embraced the idea of autonomous black school districts as an alternative to compulsory
desegregation. Innes argued that this was what many local black people wanted. He accused the
NAACP of ignoring these “little people’s” wishes, and he even claimed to anticipate “an all-out war with
the NAACP, HEW activist-bureaucrats, and possibly the old-line, die-hard, failure-prone civil rights
aristocracy.” Innes chose Mobile as a testing ground for his plan partly because of its size and partly in
the hope that a substantial portion of the city’s proudly independent black population would be
disillusioned enough to favor a legal bifurcation of the public school system along racial lines. Innes was
not disappointed in this regard. Local blacks told representatives of the Southern Regional Council, “In
Mobile integration just won’t work because when we go to a white school they treat us like some dog.
We never get to be the officers of the class, so we’d rather just stay in our own schools.” Others
wondered, “How [could] you have integration” when “the white man” was “on top of the pole,” owned
“the power structure,” and “controlled the dollar.” Freedom of choice, they argued, was “something
the judge came up with to avoid integration.”7
The black activist group Neighborhood Organized Workers (NOW) threw its support behind the
Innes measure, and CORE helped organize a new group in Mobile which called itself Steps Towards
Educational Progress (STEPS). STEPS leadership announced that the plan “seemed to be a very
practicable and sensible solution to providing meaningful quality education for all our children in their
own neighborhoods where they relate to their neighbors and where their neighbors relate to them.”
Black parents concerned about Toulminville and Blount were particularly receptive to the notion. Other
black parents responded favorably when STEPS leaders claimed, “What we’re trying to get away from is
the notion that the only way a black kid can get a quality education is to sit beside a white kid in school.”
Innes’ plan called for the utilization of a law, passed by the Alabama state legislature to circumvent
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Brown, which allowed communities to separate themselves from a school system in the event that
enough voters in a district – and crucially, the existing board of education – approved. Unfortunately for
Innes, members of the Mobile school board publically dismissed his plan as “straight communist
doctrine.” And there was little hope that the courts would be receptive to such a plan either, given that
the plaintiffs in Davis were sure to oppose it.8
Meanwhile, Carter v. West Feliciana had resulted in a reversal and remand of the Stout v.
Jefferson County case as well. The district court had ordered the Jefferson County school board to
submit a plan which would comply with the Supreme Court’s directive to fully desegregate by February
1. The board submitted a plan on January 30 which essentially accelerated its previously approved
three-year plan into immediate-implementation mode. The district court approved the plan, which
called for the restructuring and renaming of a number of formerly all-black schools and the pairing of
certain white and black schools. Under the previously approved plan, this had been postponed pending
construction to enlarge capacities. Shortly after submitting its plan, the county school board entered a
motion requesting “emergency relief” in the form of certain “temporary modifications” to alleviate a
“most unbelievable situation.” District Judge Seybourn Lynne also granted this relief, arguing that there
was “overwhelming evidence of overcrowding,” and that some such relief was needed to “avoid double
sessions, prevent overcrowded conditions, prevent the threatened development of extreme health
hazards, avoid busing students many miles from their homes to attend overcrowded sessions, to protect
accreditation of the schools and enable the School Board to restore some degree of normal
administration.” Specifically, Lynne allowed all students in the system to return to the schools they had
been attending as of January 1 and allowed for the reopening of certain closed schools. Most of the 18
schools closed in September, 1969 had, in fact, been reopened by then. The integrity of zone lines had
not been rigidly maintained either. Many white students had done what they had done the previous fall
8
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and had simply shown up to the schools of their choice. So, the effect of Lynne’s ruling was, as
Superintendent Revis Hall articulated, that “students [would] simply continue to go to school where
they are going now.” Lynne gave the school board until May 15, after the school year was over, to
formulate a new plan for the fall, and he scheduled hearings on that and a new HEW plan for June. In
effect, he had changed the Supreme Court’s February 1 deadline to September.9
The LDF and the Civil Rights Division had a number of grievances with the Jefferson County plan,
even before Lynne approved the “emergency” delay, and both chose to appeal. Local plaintiffs’ counsel
U.W. Clemon called the plan “an insult to the black community” and called attention to the fact that the
essentially all-black Wenonah High School zone included a full third of the entire county’s black student
population. Clemon also claimed that the school board was unnecessarily closing certain black schools
in order to create an atmosphere of crisis, which it could then point to as evidence of unfeasibility. At
the same time, the LDF was also decrying an order entered by Judge Hobart Grooms in the case of the
western Birmingham suburb of Fairfield. Swayed by school board complaints of some 400 white
students withdrawing from school rather than attending the city’s formerly all-black high school,
Grooms allowed the reopening of 2 closed schools and the maintenance of the black high school as a
“vocational school.” At the same time, Grooms refused to enjoin the transfer of classes from black
schools to white schools fully “intact,” that is, with the same black teacher and black students. The LDF
had also requested a contempt citation from Lynne against the Bessemer school board, but Lynne
denied the request, arguing that “any further desegregation of the Bessemer system will seriously
disrupt the educational system.” The CRD entered motions in the Jefferson and Bessemer cases as well.
The CRD argued that not only Woodlawn, but also A.G. Gaston High and 3 other Jefferson County
schools were to be all-black, while Midfield High was to remain nearly all-white. The county had also
created a new Westfield school zone which would be substantially black. The CRD called for a hearing
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on the county plan and asked the court to force Bessemer to immediately implement the HEW plan for
its district. These disagreements awaited hearings as the Supreme Court’s February 1 deadline for
immediate unitary desegregation passed.10
Despite the rulings issued by Judges Lynne and Grooms which provided for emergency relief and
some measure of further delay, defiance and protest of the new compulsory assignment plans in
Jefferson County, Bessemer, and Fairfield were widespread. Students again remained at the schools of
their choice rather than transfer. Only about 20 white students out of an expected several hundred
showed up at formerly all-black Alden High (renamed Graysville), for example, and none of the 90
whites assigned to all-black Wenonah High and A.G. Gaston High appeared. In Fairfield, zero of the 200
or so white students assigned to the formerly all-black Oliver High showed up. A number of transferred
white teachers similarly refused to move into black schools as ordered. White students at Gardendale
staged a walkout and raised the Confederate battle flag on the school’s flagpole, demanding the return
of transferred teachers. White students also initiated a walkout at formerly all-white Minor High when a
group of black students showed up to enroll. Concerned Parents for Public Education coordinated yet
another walkout with students at formerly all-white Warrior High, which was set to receive black
students from the closed all-black North Jefferson High. Minor High, McAdory High, Wenonah High, and
Pittman Junior High were all evacuated upon receiving bomb threats. In the Center Point community,
Concerned Parents organized a parents’ “sit-in” at local schools which turned into in a “vigil” as parents
demanded the reassignment of students and teachers. White parents in the suburban Birmingham
communities of Adamsville, Tarrant, Oak Grove, Green Valley, and Cahaba Heights staged similar
protests. White parents set up tents at formerly all-white Raimund Elementary, outside Bessemer,
where the new county plan called for 100 black students and 36 white students to attend. The parents
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claimed they were not leaving “until [they] got [their] school back.” One of them offered an apology to
local reporters, saying, “We are not a bunch of racists, we just want to keep our school the way it is.”11
As they had the previous fall, white parent delegations descended upon the Jefferson County
school board offices and demanded to know “where the board [stood]” and why it did not “stand up” to
the federal court. Three hundred parents attended a meeting of the board and fired unrealistic
demands, jeers, and insults at its members for three hours. The Jefferson County PTA Council called on
the school board to “take every action within its power to obtain a return to educational sanity and to
resist compulsory assignments of children to specific schools solely on the basis of their race and in
order to enforce a racial balance.” A Vestavia representative from Concerned Parents suggested that
the board “give serious consideration to resigning” immediately. Another man argued that the school
officials were not answerable to the federal court, only to the electorate of Jefferson County. He urged
them to defy the court order and claimed that local parents would pay any subsequent contempt fines
or bail bonds. Other parents suggested that the board close down the entire school system temporarily.
When one parent asked what exactly would happen if the school board defied the court, the board’s
president replied that its members and Superintendent Revis Hall would probably be forced out of
office. The crowd of enraged parents cheered wildly at this possibility, while the bewildered officials
gazed on in amazement. Concerned Parents subsequently published its second full page ad in the
Birmingham News wondering why the local school officials could not tell them how the school system
had been “taken over for the purpose of achieving social goals.” They demanded to know why schools
had to have “a certain racial mix,” why teachers had to be transferred in mid-year, what good would
come from using students “like pawns on a bureaucratic chess board,” and where their children would
be enrolled in September. The activist-parents even sent thousands of telegrams to the White House
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urging President Nixon to reconsider the federal government’s level of commitment to freedom of
choice.12
Many black parents forced to abandon black community schools were not happy either. Some
black student groups showed up at closed schools in an attempt to force them back open. Others
petitioned the school board or the court. Blacks in Fairfield lamented the conversion of Oliver High into
a junior high school which fed into formerly all-white Fairfield High. For the same reason, black parents
in the eastern suburban city of Leeds called the new Jefferson County plan “a lousy, rotten deal,” and
argued, “It’s not fair to close our school and make our children go to a white school.” All-black Moton in
Leeds had been initially closed as part of the county desegregation plan and later set to house all of the
school system’s tenth graders. The Birmingham News described Moton as a shell of its former self,
where “athletic trophies glimmer[ed] from glass cases in the empty halls” and “class pictures smile[d]
out to no one.” School tradition there was “deceased.” For Moton’s former students, “identity with
one’s alma mater [was] a thing of the past.”13

Albert Brewer’s Law-and-Order Solution
White students and their parents had been, and continued to be, encouraged in their in their
protests and defiance by state officials. Chief among them was Albert Brewer. At the same time,
Brewer’s political mentor, George Wallace, utilized the controversy to drum up support for his next
presidential run. Speaking at a Concerned Parents’ “freedom of choice rally” in Birmingham, Wallace
indicated that he would seek the presidency again if “Nixon [didn’t] do something about the mess” the
state’s schools were in. Like surrounding Jefferson County, Birmingham City Schools had been forced,
after Alexander, to prepare a geographic zoning desegregation plan. They had done this, as
Superintendent Raymond Christian said, “as distasteful as it was,” because they feared HEW’s plan even
12
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more. Judge Lynne had approved the school board’s plan in December, and it was to be implemented in
the fall. Wallace told the crowd of 15,000, which included fearful parents from both the city and the
county, to ignore court ordered plans which called for either “busing,” the closing of schools,
compulsory faculty assignment, or any compulsory geographic attendance zones. At the same time,
Brewer was hosting a meeting of Deep South governors in Mobile to discuss how to meet the
“imperative” of “sav[ing] freedom of choice in our public schools.” The Alabama governor had already
said flatly, “I call on the local boards to say absolutely ‘no’ to busing.” After the conference, Brewer
announced that the group was taking its fight national and was preparing to seek legislation designed to
“restrict the authority of the Supreme Court” by declaring “that freedom of choice is the law.” Brewer
made a telephone report to the same rally at which Wallace had spoken, announcing the governors’
plans and assuring Concerned Parents that he would not hesitate to call the state legislature into special
session to enact a “freedom of choice law” similar to that being considered in Mississippi.14
Brewer and the governors then issued a collective statement in which they channeled the language of
the annually proposed Whitten Amendment and the soon-to-be-introduced Stennis Amendments to the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act:

We reaffirm our determination that no child in any state or any school system shall be
mandatorily assigned or bused for the sole purpose of achieving racial balance in our public
schools. We believe the same standards for operation of schools applied in other states should
be applied in the southern states. We resent the fact that we have been singled out . . . for
punitive treatment.”15

The Birmingham News lauded the governors’ effort, juxtaposing its “workmanlike realism” with
the “danger-packed emotionalism” of the “’Wallace approach.’” Wallace’s approach, it argued,
assumed that “defiance [was] the only answer left,” while Brewer’s assumed “that defiance, of itself,
14
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[could] only be the mother of more chaos.” Wallace wanted to “exploit the emotional impact of the
issue,” whereas Brewer wanted to “create an answer to the issue.” The upshot of the governors’
efforts, like those of Whitten and Stennis, was the hope that national enforcement would help northern
whites “foresee the handwriting on the wall – the same kind of radical uprooting of educational and
sociological processes that [had] beset the South – and see to it that the brakes [were] applied to
unreasonable judicial and administrative acts.” The News surmised, “When the same thing hits the
North that has struck the South, Northerners might become just as aroused and apprehensive as
Southerners,” and the “dose of reason the South has been seeking so futilely might then come.” In
short, Brewer’s “realist” strategy was more likely to be effective in blunting the effects of school
desegregation on Alabama’s whites than Wallace’s self-serving strategy. This, the News argued, was
“the real significance” of the Brewer approach “with all the rhetoric stripped away.”16
Brewer – who was facing a reelection campaign against Wallace – took his own personal antischool desegregation crusade a step further by filing a complaint with the Supreme Court, on behalf of
the state, against the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of HEW. The complaint sought an
injunction against regionally-biased enforcement of school desegregation. Brewer announced the suit in
a statewide televised law-and-order style address in which he lamented “teachers and students herded
about like cattle to bring about a racial balance in the schools.” He specifically mentioned the
“forthwith” orders directed at Jefferson County, Bessemer, Fairfield, and Mobile and decried the closure
of what he described as $15 million worth of school facilities. The governor cautioned Alabamians that
they would “not get solutions . . . in the streets, but through legal processes” and he claimed that “the
problem [was] not integration or segregation,” but “quality education.” After listing a number of
metropolitan school systems in the Northeast, Midwest, and West where schools were still segregated,
Brewer quoted Theodore Roosevelt, saying, “We in Alabama know we are not above the law, but
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neither are we below it.” He called the U.S. Supreme Court “the place where all our troubles began,”
and he insisted that his novel approach was more promising than the efforts of those who had
previously given Alabamians “false hope” of avoiding desegregation altogether, i.e. Wallace. Brewer
vowed, “I will not use our school children for political purposes. Instead,” he concluded, “I will assert
our rights as people to the equal protection clause of the laws – no more, no less – as is our right as
citizens of the United States.”17
The Supreme Court promptly refused to hear the complaint filed by Brewer, along with another
filed by Mississippi’s John Bell Williams, but Brewer did not stop there. He quickly filed a similar claim in
federal district court in Alabama, alleging that the attorney general and HEW secretary had violated the
1964 Civil Rights Act. He bitterly denounced the dismissal, saying, “It infuriates me that the highest
court in the land closes its doors to the people of Alabama who have been law abiding and have stayed
out of the streets.” The governor claimed that the court’s action “proved that we have two
constitutions – one for the Southern states and another for the rest of the country.” By the end of
February, 1970, Brewer had emerged from another meeting of deep southern governors, senators, and
congressmen determined to sponsor a state “freedom of choice law.” He called the state legislature
into special session on February 24 for “the sole purpose” of passing the law, which he said would
provide a “constructive way” to solve desegregation problems. The law was almost identical in wording
to a New York state law which other deep southern states were emulating. The first section indicated
that no person would be refused admission to a public school on account of race. The second declared,
“No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on account of race . . . or for the
purpose of achieving equality in attendance, . . . at any school, of persons of any one or more particular
races.” It also declared that no school board could establish a “school zone or attendance unit” for any
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such purpose. The Alabama version eliminated an introductory clause to this second section of the New
York law, which read, “Except with the express approval of a board of education . . . .”18
In a speech before the legislative special session, Brewer placed the freedom of choice law
squarely within the law and order narrative in which he had, himself, become the central figure. “Our
problem is not race,” he proclaimed, “as I have said before, the question is not one of integration or
segregation. We crossed that bridge several years ago,” he said. “The question is what kind of
education are we going to give our children.” The lawmakers responded with a standing ovation and
proceeded to interrupt him 15 more times with applause during the 18 minute speech. Brewer recalled
the history of desegregation in the state as he and they understood it, noting, “Several years ago, our
school systems were put under freedom of choice and our people reluctantly accepted this plan and
implemented it in good faith.” But, he continued, “because our people did not choose the way the court
thought they should choose, the court said, ‘you can’t have freedom of choice.’” He reminded them of
the origins of the law and order creed, saying, “Violence is no answer; the solution must come through
the legal processes in the courts and through the Congress.” Of course, the courts had “demoralized”
students and teachers alike by ordering arbitrary school closure and compulsory assignment orders, all
while ignoring segregation in places like New York and Los Angeles. The governor directly fueled
segregationists’ fears that integrated education would be a disaster, saying that he had learned from
teachers that they could no longer “do any more than try and keep order in their classes.” And why, he
asked: because schools had been closed by the courts, solely because they were black schools. The
“sum total” of all of this was that the children of Alabama were “not getting the kind of education [they]
ought to be getting.” Thus, with the new freedom of choice act, the state was “for the first time . . . on
the offensive, finally. We’re getting something done,” he assured them. Brewer reminded the
lawmakers and statewide television audience of the recent passage of the Stennis Amendment in the
18
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U.S. Senate and then concluded with an anecdote. During his own recent visit to Washington, Brewer
said he had passed by the Supreme Court building and beheld the inscription on the faced” “Equal
Justice Under Law.” “We have the opportunity,” he said, “to press the advantage we have gained over
the last few weeks to insure that the school children of Alabama shall indeed have and enjoy equal
justice under the law.”19
The state legislature unanimously approved the freedom of choice law on February 27, 1970,
and the governor signed it into law several days later. White leaders throughout the state roundly
praised Brewer, while some quietly suggested that the law’s impact would probably be minimal.
Attorney General MacDonald Gallion called it “the best available [proposal] under adverse
circumstances.” Gallion added, “Assignment of students to neighborhood schools is the goal of freedom
of choice and that seems to be what is wanted by both black and white parents.” The state’s attorney
general had recently joined other southern attorneys general in intervening in a Pasadena, California
school desegregation suit in a forlorn attempt to assist the Stennis-style push for national
implementation. Gallion said that comments he had heard while travelling across the country had been
“almost universally in favor of freedom of choice.” State Superintendent Ernest Stone, being intimately
familiar with federal court scrutiny, expressed cautious optimism, saying, “I am thoroughly in agreement
with the governor’s attempting to do something, but we will just have to wait and see the final
outcome.” One state Senator seemed to hope against hope that the Alabama act would have an effect,
telling reporters, “Maybe some of our judges will reverse some of their rulings.” Another added, “I don’t
know just how the bill will stand up in court, but the least we can do is try.”20
Brewer himself claimed the law was a reversal of past state actions – in which he had admittedly
participated – which were “in tune with the wishes of the majority of the people” but which were
“unrealistic in the face of problems and failed to get at the real objective.” Items like the state’s
19
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interposition resolution and its several attempts to pass tuition grant legislation were futile, Brewer said,
because “the Fourteenth Amendment, in all candor, will prevent getting back to a dual school system no
matter what Congress does.” But he argued that the new freedom of choice law had “a chance to stand
up to court tests.” The Birmingham News agreed, calling the new law the legislature’s “first constructive
effort on the school desegregation problem” after “more than a decade of noisy and hopeless defiance.”
It was, the News argued, a reversal of a “self-destructive trend in recent years,” during which the state
government “repeatedly ground out bills and resolutions that almost seemed destined to invite harsher
orders.” Now, the state could potentially “demonstrate once and for all that a policy of segregation no
longer exists” therein. But as Alabama’s black Democratic Conference president Joe Reed had recently
concluded, Alabama’s whites had missed the boat on freedom of choice. If they had adopted it in
genuine good faith 15 years prior, it might have stuck. But the litigation now had a life of its own. And
state and local officials had demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they would not eradicate
the dual system unless forced to do so.21
Local school boards immediately attempted to hide behind the new state law. The Mobile
school authorities passed a resolution stating that the school board would not, and school
administrators should not, follow the federal court’s January 31 order and that the system would
instead operate under the previously adopted plan. The board’s attorney admitted that there were
questions about the new law’s constitutionality but claimed that “until it [was] tested and declared
unconstitutional,” the statute was “valid.” At the same time, Vernon Crawford, John LeFlore, and the
LDF filed a motion in Davis asking the court to rule on the constitutionality of the law and add Governor
Brewer and Attorney General Gallion as parties defendant to the suit. The normally cautious and
flexible Judge Thomas was unwilling to abide such a direct challenge to the court’s authority as the
freedom of choice law seemed to present. On March 16, the day which the board was supposed to have
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implemented the January 31 court-ordered plan, Thomas issued a contempt-of-court order which would
go into effect if the board had not complied within three days. He threatened the individual members
of the board with a $1,000-a-day fine, insisting that state legislatures could not pass laws to contravene
orders of a federal court, nor could they pass laws which would have the effect of destroying rights
which such orders had sought to protect or restore.22
Thomas stopped short of obliging the plaintiffs’ motions for an outright judgment on the state
law’s constitutionality and for the addition of parties defendant. The case was “not the proper vehicle,”
according to Thomas, who was surely unenthusiastic about the added burden of fully adjudicating the
matter. The threat of contempt was enough, however, to force the school board to act, free as it then
was to plead helplessness before the white people of Mobile. The following day it agreed to implement
the plan by the end of the week, pending petitions for a stay of the order which were subsequently
denied by Thomas and by the Fifth Circuit court. Gallion himself then filed a counterclaim against the
United States and the plaintiffs in Davis, seeking a declaratory judgment from the district court on the
constitutionality of the freedom of choice law. A three judge court was assembled to hear the case, and
a summer decision loomed, though few could have genuinely believed the court would uphold the law.23
Meanwhile, the new Mobile desegregation plan went into effect on March 20, and 8,000 or so
of the system’s 73,000 students at 42 of its 93 schools were told to switch schools. Around 100 white
students at Davidson High protested by gathering outside the school and hanging Judge Thomas in
effigy. Beyond this incident and a flood of letters, petitions, and calls to the school board,
demonstrations were sparse and the “chaos and confusion” portended by the board was lacking, even
as violence and mass protest marred school openings elsewhere in the South. This was partly due to the
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fact that many white students again refused to transfer from the schools they had been attending.
About 80 white students reported to formerly all-black Williamson High, a school which had been the
object of much white protest, located as it was in what white considered a dangerous neighborhood.
That 80 whites actually showed up at Williamson surprised some, but the number of whites assigned to
the school was much higher. The plaintiffs in Davis would have liked the board to adopt a robust policy
of enforcement which ensured that these students moved to their newly assigned schools, it instead
adopted a lenient “irregular student” policy. The non-conformers were allowed to remain in the schools
of their choice, attend classes, participate in exercises and extra-curricular activity. The board indicated
that these students would, however, receive no academic credit for their work “pending further study”
by the board itself. Board members publically indicated that they would take no action to remove the
students until forced to do so by the court, demonstrating that such a study was probably not quickly
forthcoming. On appeal of Thomas’ order, the Fifth Circuit court at the end of March instructed the
board to compile a report of the actual attendance at each school in the system, with the likely next step
being some sort of forced implementation policy.24
Pending a hearing that summer in the Jefferson County case, the county system proceeded that
spring under Judge Lynne’s emergency relief ruling and the school board’s own lenient “irregular”
student policy, which was similar to Mobile’s. Many white students simply continued attending the
school they preferred until someone told them to do otherwise, which the school board was not quick
to do without court prodding. The county’s schools were, nonetheless, more integrated than they had
ever been, by far. A spike in interracial fights surprised no one. Of more concern was an increase in the
number of significant vandalism incidents. The school board reported fire damage and glass breakage at
five schools in the county between late January and the end of the school term. Most alarming of all
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was the destruction of a large portion of Graysville High – the formerly all-black Alden High – to which a
number of white students had been assigned, with few actually attending. Vandals, thought to be three
local white men, broke into the school at night in mid-April and embarked on a rampage that resulted in
myriad damage: nearly 100 broken windows, a dozen broken television sets, a destroyed intercom
system, multiple telephones and clocks ripped from the wall, swaths of ceiling torn down, library
equipment smashed, water fountains crushed, raw food strewn about the lunchroom, and portions of
sheetrock destroyed with an axe. By the end of the summer, both the Jefferson and Mobile school
boards would organize citizen patrols to keep watch on school facilities, and Jefferson would see its
property insurance cancelled. The boards in each case were not shy about publicizing the violence,
because like overcrowding it provided proof that desegregation did not work. Sensing this, white
students in some cases had already taken advantage. At Bessemer’s McAdory High, several white
students inflicted superficial razor wounds on themselves and reported that they had been cut by gangs
of blacks, only to later recant. Rumor-mongering and actual incidents of interracial violence further
eroded whites’ floundering confidence in desegregated schools. With positive reinforcement either
entirely lacking, or being drowned out by continuing rallying cries to defiance, the white exodus
continued.25

Secession Redux: Metropolitan Birmingham
Even before Carter v. West Feliciana, suburban Birmingham communities were preparing to
sever themselves from the Jefferson County system and form independent school systems which could
remain safely white. All-white Mountain Brook, the wealthiest city in the state, had already done so in
1959. Mountain Brook residents had also led a campaign to block a proposed merger of Birmingham
and its suburbs in 1964. But it was not just wealthy, “over the mountain” communities to Birmingham’s
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south which were considering secession. The all-white city of Hueytown on the city’s western edge had
been flirting with the option of severance for over a year. As Green v. County School Board, Alexander v.
Holmes, and then Carter made it progressively clearer that the Jefferson County desegregation plan
would involve some kind of geographical zoning scheme and perhaps even some level of “busing,” other
cities initiated the secession process. Like the black leaders in Mobile drawn to the Innes plan, cities
planned to use the state’s post-Brown law allowing municipalities over 2,500 persons to form splinter
systems in the event that a majority of the community and the county school board approved.26
In December, 1969, the city of Homewood – just over Red Mountain, south of Birmingham and
west of Mountain Brook – adopted a resolution setting up a school system and appointing a board of
education. It was followed in April by the city of Vestavia Hills, just south of Homewood and Mountain
Brook. Both cities planned to offer jobs to all teachers and staff in the city’s existing county schools and
to offer to purchase the schools themselves from the county. There were some intricacies involved,
particularly in Homewood’s case. Shades Valley High School could not be purchased from the county, as
it was outside the Homewood city limits. The school board planned to offer the county tuition for its
high school students to continue in attendance there until the city could build its own high school. The
all-black Rosedale High was within the Homewood city limits, however, and white leaders used this as
leverage to obtain support from the city’s relatively small, working class black population. Rosedale was
to be closed as part of the court-ordered Jefferson County plan, and the new city school board
suggested that it could keep the school open and operating for blacks in the event of a successful
splinter. After obtaining the blessing of the Rosedale PTA, city school officials touted the support as part
of a supposedly race-neutral effort at local control. The Homewood City Council admitted that it had no
problems with the way the county had run its schools, but it similarly refused to be totally forthcoming
about its flight. The council president announced, “We feel that by setting up a Homewood school
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system to operate on a local basis, we can better concentrate our energies toward providing our
children with the best possible education.”27
Over-the-mountain Homewood and Vestavia Hills had been directly preceded in their flight by
the all-white, working class city of Pleasant Grove – on Birmingham’s western edge, adjacent to
Hueytown. The Concerned Parents movement had begun in this western section of Jefferson County. In
fact, many western Jefferson white parents had been so angry about the county’s pending
desegregation plan that summer because they felt like the over-the-mountain white schools had been
allowed to remain nearly all-white, while – in the words of Concerned Parents president David Borella –
“the Western section [had] borne the brunt of all integration in Jefferson County.” Pleasant Grove had
thus in August, 1969 moved to set up a school board and had prepared to offer teachers at its schools
jobs in its new system. It had also initiated talks with the Jefferson County system about purchasing the
schools within its city limits. Pleasant Grove officials had made no mention of race or court orders, as
Hueytown had recklessly done some months before. The plaintiffs in the Stout v. Jefferson case had
quickly filed a motion with the district court seeking an injunction against the Pleasant Grove secessions,
however. Judge Lynne delayed any ruling on the motion as the repercussions of the Alexander and
Carter rulings manifest themselves over the course of the fall and winter.28
While no motion to include the over-the-mountain systems had followed the challenge to
Pleasant Grove, the plaintiffs in the Jefferson case believed that a ruling on one city would successfully
bind the others. Attorney U.W. Clemon argued as much and maintained that allowing the
overwhelmingly white city systems (or completely white in Pleasant Grove’s case) to break away would
be a clear frustration of the county’s effort to convert to a unitary system. “At the present time,”
Clemon said in January, 1970, “any community which is a white community, which seeks to withdraw
from a school system that is under a desegregation plan, is doing so for racial motives.” The
27
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Birmingham News was even more clear, declaring it “obvious” that “municipalities with few or no
Negroes would stand to preserve their racial characteristics by going independent. Within a larger
school system which has a nearly equal ratio of white to black students,” it continued, “such cities could
expect to gain more black students.” Each system would also, ostensibly, free itself from faculty
desegregation obligations. When the post-Carter desegregation plan for the county finally went into
effect, Pleasant Grove began operating its own schools, free of county interference. Homewood and
Vestavia remained part of the county system, as they planned to activate their independent systems in
the fall. But with the challenge from the plaintiffs in Jefferson to Pleasant Grove, each system’s status
hung in the balance, awaiting the decision of Judge Lynne, who finally set a hearing on the motion for
June. In the meantime, county officials remained wary of selling the school facilities to the city systems,
prompting Homewood to file a suit in state circuit court seeking to compel them to do so.29
The over-the-mountain suburbs continued to benefit from white anxiety over the implications of
compulsory assignment desegregation, and more and more whites gradually escaped the city of
Birmingham. The population of the so-called Magic City dwindled, as the populations of Mountain
Brook and Vestavia Hills especially swelled. Leading a great trek even farther south than those cities,
though, was the segregationist academy pioneer William Hoover. His Hoover Academy project was
floundering. Affluent white families were simply leaving the city, and others felt they could not afford
the private school option. The fledgling academy was forced to bounce from location to location within
and just west of the city of Birmingham in search of a permanent home which would draw an optimal
number of families. When its founders acquired public school property from the tiny western
Birmingham suburb of Brighton, a court challenge threatened the school’s future, and William Hoover
began to more seriously consider other long-term solutions to the school desegregation problem.30

29

Birmingham News, Aug. 15, 1969, Jan. 13, 26, 30, 31, Feb. 3, 5, 27, 1970.
1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of Population (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1972). The populations of the following cities increased as such from 1960 to 1970: Homewood, 20,289 to 21,245
30

636

Hoover’s gaze had, in fact, turned south and across Red Mountain years earlier. In 1953, just
months before the Brown decision was handed down, he had purchased land in a quiet residential
enclave south of Vestavia Hills, along the recently improved and expanded U.S. Highway 31. Shortly
after the Fifth Circuit ruling in U.S. v. Jefferson and the statewide order in Lee v. Macon in 1967, the
arch-segregationist, anti-Semite, and American States Rights Association financier founded the City of
Hoover. Its initial population was only 400, but the city almost immediately began annexing
unincorporated neighboring communities, and it grew rapidly. It soon became contiguous with the
cities of Pelham (incorporated in 1964) and Alabaster (incorporated in 1953) in neighboring Shelby
County, even further south. This created a chain of predominantly white suburbs which snaked south
along the route of Interstate Highway 65. Wealthy whites soon flocked to the exclusive neighborhoods
surrounding Hoover’s two country clubs and buzzed about its planned shopping mall –the Hoover Mall.
The scheduled expansion of the Interstate Highway system promised to bring the intersection of I-65
and the I-459 bypass to the center of the city, too. The certainty of a rapid commute by car to
downtown Birmingham and the possibility of swift economic development enticed still more wealthy
families to move south. In early 1970, the city’s population was still modest, and it remained within the
Jefferson County school system. However, its timely founding and strategic location placed it in a
perfect position to benefit from impending white flight, especially as the promise of independence from
the Jefferson County desegregation plan seemed a distinct possibility.31
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The Gubernatorial Election and New Court Orders in Davis and Jefferson
In early June George Wallace defeated Albert Brewer in the Democratic primary for governor,
which in Alabama was still tantamount to winning the election outright. According to Wallace
biographer Dan Carter, Brewer had been “one of the most capable chief executives his state had known
in the twentieth century." He was a “man of uncommon decency, integrity, and administrative ability”
who had “cared deeply about the details of government and worked hard to recruit first-rate, honest
administrators." Brewer’s own biographer has argued that he brought to the governor’s office “a
businessman’s zeal for efficiency, quality, and accountability.” By the end of his term, he had
significantly increased education appropriations, spending nearly $24 million on various reform efforts,
including increasing teachers’ salaries. Brewer had indeed been passionate about reforming public
education in Alabama, which required that he attempt to save it first.32
But Brewer’s education policy did not necessarily “[stand] out in stark contrast to the politically
motivated actions of the Wallace years,” as one historian has claimed. Brewer was a reformer, but he
was not above politics. Sensing that Wallace’s reckless defiance had run its course, he situated himself
in the midst of the developing law and order movement. He led resistance to court-ordered
desegregation in a way that he felt was politically responsible, choosing to reluctantly accept freedom of
choice while bitterly condemning compulsory assignment. He thought this would win over the majority
of the white electorate, who mostly felt the same way. Unfortunately for Brewer, the politically astute
Wallace also moved towards such a position, understanding that he had nearly exhausted the stand-inthe-door approach. Perhaps most tellingly, both men’s central position on school desegregation at the
time of the election was that parents should take their children to the schools of their choice despite the
adoption of the recent court-ordered plans. With little difference between them on the issue, Wallace
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was free to gain ground by taking the low road, which by then he knew so well, and which Brewer – to
his credit – proved unwilling to walk33
The de facto winner of the previous two gubernatorial elections, Wallace capitalized on his
previous defiance – ignoring his obvious failures, of course – and focused almost exclusively on courting
the working class. It was a clever approach, since the burden of desegregation often fell
disproportionately on poorer whites, who could not afford to move or to pay private school tuition, or
whose neighborhood schools were often slated to take the bulk of black students from closed black
schools. Wallace advisor Ace Carter began calling Brewer “Alabama’s number one white nigger,” and he
and other advisors suggested that Wallace try to “throw the niggers around Brewer’s neck.” In a
campaign that Dan Carter has characterized as “a low point even for Deep South race baiting,” Wallace
routinely called Brewer a “sissy britches” who was “soft on intergration,” despite the fact that Brewer’s
rhetoric and actions proved otherwise. It was especially ironic since Brewer’s own approach held out
more hope of successfully blunting integration than Wallace’s old, self-defeating approach. Wallace told
voters that Brewer was in the pocket of wealthy Mountain Brook types who talked school intergration
and then retreated to the “lily white” Mountain Brook school system and the “Mountain Brook Country
Club” where they would “sip on those little martinis with their little fingers high in the air.” He followed
with working class and regional appeals like, “The working man is going to see to it that his child is
treated that same as the child in the East, the North, and every other section of the country.” Reaching
into the political gutter at the same time, Wallace’s campaign also circulated doctored photos of Brewer
with the black boxer Cassius Clay and the Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad. Even more damning
was a Wallace campaign leaflet featuring a picture of a little white girl on a beach surrounded by black
boys, captioned, “This could be Alabama Four Years from Now!”34

33
34

Harvey, A Question of Justice, pp. 63-4.
Carter, Politics of Rage, pp. 385-95; Birmingham News, Sept. 8, 1970.

639

Wallace accused Brewer of cavorting with the Justice Department attorneys, whom he also
called “sissy britches from Harvard who spend most of their time in the country club drinking tea.” He
similarly accused Brewer of working with Richard Nixon, which in this case turned out to be more true
than Wallace even knew. Nixon feared Wallace’s imminent third party run for president and actually
funneled nearly half a million dollars, via clandestine hand-offs, to the Brewer campaign, which then
laundered the money. The Nixon White House also sent the IRS after Wallace’s carelessly corrupt
brother, Gerald. It was not enough for Brewer to stave of Wallace, however. Brewer placed first in the
May 5 primary but failed to win a majority of the votes. The ensuing runoff became, in Dan Carter’s
words, "a referendum on Alabama voters’ admiration for macho politicians and their fear of blacks." As
the sensible segregationist, Brewer carried the nascent black vote, as the lesser of two evils, and the
upper-middle and upper class white vote in the cities. Wallace dominated the rural districts, the small
towns, and the working class precincts in the cities, as the man who would “stand up and fight” like a
man for white integrity. Brewer had refused to stoop to Wallace’s level and engage in a “smear”
campaign. More importantly, Brewer’s strategy for preserving the remaining vestiges of segregated
education failed to arouse the same kind of passionate zeal in the average white voter that George
Wallace’s record of direct defiance still did, failure though it had been.35
In the midst and immediate aftermath of the campaign that summer, federal courts entered
important orders in the Stout v. Jefferson and Davis v. Mobile cases which had implications for
metropolitan white flight. In July U.S. District Judge Seybourn Lynne issued his ruling in Jefferson as to
the suburban splinter systems. Lynne allowed the three cities to break away from the Jefferson County
system, under specific conditions. Each was ordered to accept black students choosing to attend its
schools from a certain geographical zone near its borders. Homewood and Vestavia Hills were ordered
to hire black teachers to achieve a 25 percent desegregated faculty ratio by the start of the 1971-72
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school year. Vestavia was ordered to enroll black students, from an area adjacent to its borders, who
had formerly attended Vestavia Hills Middle School. Pleasant Grove was ordered admit 50 black
students from within a two mile radius of its borders. Lynne rejected an HEW plan which would have
paired the new municipal schools with predominantly black schools in other parts of the county. Had
these orders been issued to independent school systems five years prior, they might have stung.
Coming when and how they did, they amounted to a deal – between Lynne, the increasingly reluctant
Nixon Justice Department, and the municipalities – which essentially allowed the formation of the new
city systems under freedom of choice. The areas from which each was ordered to accept black students
were sparsely populated. In the event black students did elect to attend schools within the new
systems, no system faced the sort of black-white ratio which had caused parents to flee the Jefferson
County system in the first place. Meanwhile, the county system was left with a depleted tax base and
an obligation to pay tuition charges to those systems that did accept black students on transfer.
Perhaps most importantly, the racial ratio in the county was to be even more heavily black than it had
been before, which itself caused more parents to consider fleeing the system. The LDF appealed the
ruling, hopeful that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would reverse Lynne’s order.36
Already that summer, the Fifth Circuit court had reversed Judge Thomas’ most recent approval
of the Mobile desegregation plan in Davis. The Davis case had moved back and forth between the trial
court and the appellate court so many times since the original decree of 1963 that the Birmingham
News characterized the process as “legal ping pong.” On June 8 the appellate court instructed Thomas
to order the implementation of a more stringent plan, which it set out in its decree. Closely following
the proposals of the Civil Rights Division, the appellate court altered the attendance zones for the citycounty system such that only one of the system’s eight high schools and two of its fifteen junior high
schools would have racial minorities which constituted less than 10 percent of their total enrollment.
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The plan made use of pairing and grade restructuring but stopped short of utilizing non-contiguous,
“split” zones or widespread mandatory transportation to achieve desegregation – the hallmarks of
“busing.” The court ordered the implementation of a system-wide faculty desegregation policy which
conformed to the Carr v. Montgomery ruling, meaning the black-to-white teacher ratio in each school
would have to be roughly equivalent to that of the system as a whole (60 percent white and 40 percent
black). The court insisted that the desegregation plan include a liberal majority-to-minority transfer
policy with mandatory transportation. This was designed to give black students the freedom to transfer
from the system’s remaining majority-black schools to predominantly white ones, and it thus provided
the possibility of significant busing. Finally, the court ordered Judge Thomas to direct the appointment
of a biracial committee, which it argued would have potentially allowed the parties to avoid litigating
some the issues lately before it and the trial court.37
Judge Thomas entered the appropriate orders on June 13 and 14, which were themselves
appealed. Thomas had been faithful enough to the appellate court’s directive that it upheld his orders
in early August, with one change. The court ordered the pairing of two of the system’s seven remaining
all-black elementary schools with nearby white elementary schools. This would reduce the number of
black students attending all-black elementary schools to 5,310, or 17 percent of the total black
elementary school population in the system. White parents were livid. Around 80 of them marched on
the federal court building and demanded an audience with Judge Thomas, who shockingly granted the
spontaneous request despite its wholly irregular nature. Thomas allowed the parents to fill his
courtroom, and he listened patiently for nearly two hours as they begged for redress. One parent told
the judge, “You and no court can make us send our children into areas where there is violence, crime,
dope, rape, and what-have-you.” Another vowed, “We are not going to accept this situation at all, and
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there will be thousands of us doing the same.” He added, “We don’t want to get out in the streets or do
anything unlawful, but we must have something done. This is beyond tolerance.” Thomas responded
plainly and informally, admitting, “For nine years I have fought this thing and tried to slow it down.” But
he explained to them what so many whites across the state failed to understand: he was bound by the
dictates of the appellate courts. He said he would undertake another review of the system’s plan and
provide whatever relief he could, but he added, “Don’t expect any magic wands.” In late August as
schools were preparing to open, Thomas approved the alteration of 32 school zones “on the basis of
efficient school administration” and in the absence of any “racially discriminatory purpose.” On appeal
of this action, the LDF’s protested the trial judge’s impromptu meeting with white parents and flagrantly
biased statements, but the Fifth Circuit this time upheld Thomas’s decision. Understanding that, at that
point, the parties to the litigation were in the habit of appealing every order entered by the trial court,
the appellate court insisted that the plan, thusly altered, be put into effect notwithstanding any further
appeals entered by any party.38
Meanwhile, the state’s recently enacted freedom of choice law came before Judge Thomas as
part of a separate action. When state officials had sought court sanction for the law earlier via the Davis
case, Thomas had refused to rule on the issue. So the state filed Alabama v. U.S. and Davis. A threejudge court was named to hear the case, as it involved the constitutionality of a state statute. Thomas
and fellow Mobile-based Judge Virgil Pittman joined Tuscaloosa’s Circuit Judge Walter Gewin in
essentially brushing the law aside with the quick wave of the judicial hand. In late June, the court
argued that the effect of the law was “to make school administrators neutral on the question of
desegregation and [to limit] their tools for the accomplishment of this constitutional obligation to
‘freedom of choice’ plans.” Of course, “an unwavering line of Supreme Court decisions,” most notably
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Green, had established that freedom of choice was an inadequate remedy when other means were
reasonably available to allow systems to more quickly and effectively attain unitary status. Also, the
Court had firmly established that “more than administrative neutrality” was required of local school
officials. Accordingly, the three-judge court held, “The settled state of the law convinces us that there is
no substantial federal question presented in this case. Where Section 2 of the subject Act conflicts with
an order of a federal court drawing its authority from the Fourteenth Amendment,” it continued, “the
Act is unconstitutional and must fail. The supremacy clause of our compact of government will admit to
no other result.” Thus was the state’s latest legislative attempt at defiance summarily dismissed. Albert
Brewer lamented this and that summer’s other court orders and issued a ludicrous charge for the state’s
trial court judges to defy appellate court rulings. The lame duck governor argued that federal court
orders were “destroying the public school system” and added, “I would like to see a federal judge stand
up on his hind legs and say he wasn’t going to do it, if he felt it violated the law and not what some
other judge has said.”39

Fall, 1970 Openings
As school systems prepared to open in the fall of 1970, compulsory assignment orders had again
drastically increased the number of black students enrolled in predominantly white schools across the
state and the South. The number in Alabama had, in fact, quadrupled since the fall of 1968. Without a
freedom-of-choice state law to hide behind, school systems had to face the hard reality that direct
defiance of court orders was no longer feasible. Some state and local leaders spoke up in a desperate
attempt to avoid the kind of catastrophic school opening that many portended. A recently appointed
and, it turned out, short-lived state advisory committee on public education issued a law-and-orderstyle statement in which it set out two irrefutable facts: “The federal court orders under which Alabama
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and other Southern school districts will open this fall are binding and will be enforced, [and] disorder will
not cause court-ordered systems to be rescinded or modified” [sic]. The Birmingham News counseled
the citizens of Alabama, “Rules, however unpalatable some may find them, are essential and will be
enforced, and . . . order will prevail.” Some local systems made notable attempts to stave off potential
problems. For example, The Birmingham City Board of Education worked with the Greater Birmingham
Ministries of the United Methodist Church in organizing informational workshops and a rumor hotline
for the dissemination of facts about the impending plan ahead of schools’ opening. But the response
from parents was minimal. Concerned Parents groups, as it turned out, were much more effective in
mobilizing support.40
As with the reshufflings of the previous winter and the fall of 1969, white resistance remained
palpable, particularly in Jefferson and Mobile Counties. In Mobile, the county officials again set the
tone, reacting incredulously to the disregard for neighborhood boundaries in favor of “racial balance.”
The school board’s attorney attacked the appellate court-mandated desegregation plan set to go into
effect as “conceived in stupidity in just four days.” School board members objected to its “ridiculously
gerrymandered zones.” And Superintendent Crawford Burns argued that the plan was “so fraught with
mistake and error” as to be “functionally impossible” to implement. The board appealed the ruling to
the Supreme Court, where it awaited adjudication that fall alongside the Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg case, but school officials could not stop its implementation in the meantime.41
Vernon Crawford and the LDF appealed the latest Davis rulings as well, though the Justice
Department chose to support them. The LDF objected to the fact that, despite the redrawing of zone
lines, the section of the city east of I-65 – where nearly 94 percent of the metropolitan area’s black
population resided – continued to be treated as distinct from the western section. The effect of this was
that schools on the eastern side were 65 percent black and 35 percent white, while schools in the west
40
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were 12 percent black and 88 percent white. Actual enrollments that fall brought this into starker relief.
The numbers did not bear out the projections in the Fifth Circuit and district court plans and orders.
This was particularly evident in the city’s elementary schools, 9 of which remained over 90 percent black
and enrolled 64 percent of the metropolitan area’s black elementary school students. Actual
enrollments also revealed that 6,746 black junior and senior high school students, or over half of the
metro area’s total, were attending all-black or nearly all-black schools.42
Contributing to the disparity in projections and actual enrolments were large numbers of “nonconforming” white students, who were again supported by widespread white student and parent
protests and encouragement from state officials. The Washington Post called it “perhaps the strongest
challenge of the fall to the federal desegregation drive in the South.” At a Labor Day rally in the working
class suburb of Prichard, Governor-nominate Wallace counseled parents among the 6,000 gathered
whites to resist compulsory assignment. STAND’s Pierre Pelham introduced Wallace and took the
opportunity to take a jab at Governor Brewer, thanking the audience for taking the governor’s office
“out of the hands of the Big Mules and putting it in the hands of the people of Prichard, Alabama.”
Wallace suggested to all the parents there, “If I were you, on school day, I would exercise your freedom
of choice in the peaceful way you always do things, in the hopes that someday [you] are going to get
some relief.” He added, “Don’t give up now . . . ‘cause we going to keep on and on and on and on until
we get our schools back.” Wallace insisted that “the hardball movement, the working man’s movement,
the average man’s movement” was going to “get equity in school matters the same as many years ago.”
While Wallace spoke, members of Mobile’s newly organized chapter of Concerned Parents and Citizens
passed out flyers instructing parents to accompany their children to the schools of their choice and greet
the administration with, “This is the school of my choice. I will not leave until my demands are met!”
The flyers assured parents that it was the school board which was under court order, not them; parents

42

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).

646

were “legally within [their] rights to choose the school in which to have [their] child educated.” They
were told not to sign “conformist papers” and to remember that “freedom comes first!” Meanwhile,
from the capitol in Montgomery, Brewer called the Mobile desegregation plan a “pure case of
gerrymandering with no regard for school district or zone lines.” He added that he expected a peaceful
opening despite that fact that “most of us are not pleased with the court orders.”43
Over 1,100 of Mobile’s white students showed up on the first day of classes at the schools of
their choice rather the ones to which they had been assigned. In many cases they were accompanied by
parents who vowed to remain in these schools until they were satisfied that their children would not be
removed. One such woman claimed to reporters, “I am going to stay here every day until my daughter
is allowed to attend this school. This ridiculous business of having to go miles across town,” she added,
“with a school right around the corner has me just about crazy.” Concerned Parents and Citizens
members waited at desks outside formerly all-white schools and passed out information for potential
non-conformists. The local chairman of the group, Melvin Himes, accompanied his own daughter to
formerly all-white Mae Eanes Junior High in lieu of formerly all-black Booker T. Washington, to which
she had been reassigned. Himes sent his son to a nearby segregationist academy recently opened by his
church. He argued, “If we can’t enroll [our children] under freedom of choice, we’re not going to enroll
them,” adding, “I’m just exercising my constitutional rights.” The New York Times likened Himes and the
protesting Mobile parents to civil rights activists, compared their movement to the sit-ins, and
suggested sardonically that they might soon be singing the unofficial anthem of the classical phase of
the civil rights movement, “We Shall Overcome.” Concerned Citizens subsequently organized a 4,000strong “protest and prayer” march to the federal building in downtown Mobile. Led by Mobile Mayor
Joe Bailey, the group dressed in black and carried signs reading, “We Want Our Schools Back” and
“Supreme Court Has Outlawed Our Laws.” At the federal courthouse, they prayed that the Supreme
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Court might receive guidance and enlightenment while considering the pending Davis appeal and that
all federal courts might soon see the error of their ways.44
There were immediate problems in Mobile beyond these Concerned Parents protests. In
addition to those white students who showed up at their former schools regardless of their assignment,
a number of parents hastily moved to other zones where the percentage of black students was lower.
Others used the addresses of friends or relatives in these zones or simply falsified their addresses
altogether. The most blatant example of this was the Davidson High School zone, wherein a relatively
small number of black students were assigned to a new school on the mostly white, western outskirts of
the city. Davidson began the year over-enrolled by nearly 1,000 students due to the enrollment of
students who had changed their address just prior to the opening of school. Along with the nonconformers and the address-changers were those who simply stayed home. Many of these had either
enrolled or were preparing to enroll in one of the Mobile region’s nearly 30 segregationist academies.
All told, the impact on certain schools was profound. White students continued to boycott, in large
numbers, formerly all-black schools like Williamson High, where 786 whites were scheduled to join 323
blacks, but only 219 whites showed up. Fewer than 100 of 725 white students showed up to Booker T.
Washington Junior High, where 800 blacks were also enrolled. Fewer than 20 whites appeared at
Central Junior High, a formerly all-black high school where 1,200 blacks were enrolled. In neighboring
Prichard, around 150 whites out of a scheduled 850 showed up to register at formerly all-black Blount
High. Many of the whites assigned to Blount showed up instead at formerly all-white Vigor High. One
mother who accompanied her son to Vigor told nearby reporters, “It’s not integration [we’re upset
about], you know [it’s] all this mess – this utter chaos and confusion.”45
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White students also began to boycott certain formerly all-white schools on account of the large
number of black students assigned thereto. For example, 1,000 whites were scheduled to enroll and
attend Murphy High – the first desegregated school in the Mobile system and one of the first in the
state. Murphy’s troubles were compounded by the fact that it became the epicenter of the fall’s most
serious outbreak of violence between black and white students. It was slated to become the system’s
first majority-black school in the middle of a white neighborhood. The numbers of actual students in its
hallways on the first few days of school were augmented, on both sides of the racial divide, by nonstudents who infiltrated the school, anticipating and encouraging the outbreak of disturbances. The first
week of classes at Murphy began with 1,283 black students and 883 white students in attendance, not
counting these “outsiders.” Within two days, white students responded to complaints of black students
“shaking down” whites for money in bathrooms and began inciting fights with groups of black students.
A series of skirmishes led to an all-out brawl by the end of the week, prompting school officials to call in
the Mobile police, who responded with a riot squad to contain the “ugly, intolerable” situation. By the
beginning of the second week of classes, nine black students had been arrested on charges of disorderly
conduct. The continuing presence of the police restored “law and order” by the end of the week, but by
then there were fewer than 400 white students attending. White faculty at the school also threatened a
walkout if “trouble reoccur[ed].” The teachers and administrators issued a resolution to the school
board, declaring, “We shall consider not returning to school until federal marshals are provided for the
protection of faculty and students, since we feel the added protection should be federal and not entirely
at local expense.”46
The notion that restoring order and otherwise enforcing the court-ordered desegregation plan
ought to be the concern of federal authorities pervaded the white community in Mobile. The school
board took the position, for example, that the Justice Department or the court should take responsibility
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for eradicating the problem of non-conforming students. The chairman of the Mobile school board
announced, “It’s an asinine law, and its theirs and they can enforce it.” The Fifth Circuit appellate court
had already entered an order stipulating that “students who refuse[d] to attend the schools to which
they [were] assigned by the school board” could “not be permitted to participate in school activities,
including the taking of examinations” and receiving grades. Judge Thomas had subsequently taken the
unusual step of strengthening this with a declaration that students should not be enrolled in or
furnished textbooks by schools other than the ones to which they had been assigned. After the opening
of school revealed widespread non-conformity, the school board announced that it “assumed that the
court intended that nonconforming students shall be afforded all other privileges not explicitly denied
by his order.” The Civil Rights Division promptly petitioned Thomas for a further order prohibiting the
use of school facilities and equipment by non-conforming students. Thomas granted this motion and
entered such an order, but he stopped short of granting the LDF’s motion for a contempt citation
against the school board for its continuing tolerance of the situation. By the end of the second week of
classes, school administrators had begun to insist that the irregular students leave their campuses, and
the number of non-conformers dropped from over 1,000 to around 600 at 22 schools throughout the
system.47
Amid widespread desegregation in the South that fall, the Los Angeles Times observed, “No
state in the region has had problems as severe as Alabama.” The Times acknowledged that not only the
Mobile school board, but the Jefferson County school board as well, had “done little to enforce pupil
assignments under court intergration orders.” The enrollment numbers in Jefferson County schools
revealed a non-conformist movement and white flight movement similar to that underway in Mobile.
Around 6,000 students were attending the newly created Pleasant Grove, Homewood, and Vestavia Hills
school systems, whose existence had been recently sanctioned by Judge Lynne. No black students were
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attending Pleasant Grove schools, while fewer than 100 were attending Vestavia and Homewood
schools. In the county schools, white students and their parents followed the Concerned Parents
paradigm: they avoided formerly all-black schools and instead showed up at the schools of their choice
and refused to leave. One white student out of a scheduled 450 showed up at Graysville High, where
most of the 400 blacks scheduled to attend did arrive. It was common knowledge among school officials
that most of the whites scheduled to attend Graysville had simply enrolled in nearby, predominantly
white Minor High. Lone white students also enrolled at nearby Westfield High, with 812 black students,
and Woodward School, with 281 black students, and left shortly thereafter in each case. No whites
showed up at Red Ore School, Brighton Elementary, Brighton High, or A.G. Gaston High. The LDF
plaintiffs in the Stout case filed a motion with Judge Lynne’s court seeking a contempt citation for
Jefferson County Superintendent Revis Hall, whom they charged with blatant disregard for what they
estimated were 10,000 non-conforming students. Attorney U.W. Clemon argued, “These schools that
were all-black two years ago are still all-black,” as a result of widespread disregard of assignments.
Clemon insisted that it was the Jefferson County school board’s duty to “seek out those students” who
were refusing to conform to the plan “and see that they attend schools either in the zones where they
live or attend private school.” Clemon had already appealed the plan on the basis that certain schools
should have been paired, that transportation and priority space should have been provided for majorityto-minority transfer students, and that the school board should not have been allowed to make changes
in zone lines with no notice to the court or the plaintiffs.48
Birmingham City Schools experienced non-conformity and absenteeism as well, though not as
markedly as Jefferson County and Mobile. Enrollment in the first week in Birmingham was down
approximately 4,000 from an expected 60,000, as some students fled to neighboring districts or to
private schools. Many simply stayed home to avoid anticipated violence and ultimately returned in the
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coming weeks. In addition to the no-shows were the non-conformers, however. Around 70 parents and
students showed up at the formerly all-white Glen Iris School in lieu of the formerly all-black Center
Street. Five whites showed up at Center Street. Teachers were absent, as well. Only three of the seven
assigned to Center Street showed up for work. Superintendent Raymond Christian was rhetorically
resolute about his duties under the court order, saying, “I cannot register students who have not been
assigned . . . . I cannot accept their fees. I cannot issue them books.” Christian claimed that the school
system would also not tolerate teacher non-conformity, saying, “If a teacher who has been transferred
to a different school goes to her old school, then the principal will tell her she is at the wrong school and
ask her to go to the school to which she has been assigned. If she insists on remaining at her old
school,” he added, “she will be given no duties there” and would “in effect be giving up her job.”
Despite the tough talk, the parents and students were not removed, and the teachers were not removed
or replaced. Clemon was thus compelled to enter a motion for an order forcing Birmingham to remove
the students and parents at Glen Iris and to force teachers to conform or be fired.49
Judge Lynne was willing to quickly enter relief as to the more egregious examples of defiance,
but on widespread student non-conformity, particularly in Jefferson County, he was reluctant to act. On
the motion of the LDF, Lynne entered an order in which he acknowledged that parents in Birmingham
had “repeatedly accompanied their children to certain schools outside of their legally prescribed zones
. . . occupied those schools with their children . . . directed their children into classrooms in those
schools notwithstanding the request of school personnel to the contrary, [and] engaged in other
conduct disruptive to the normal operation of schools and interfering with the implementation of the
court order.” Lynne then threatened the parents with a show cause order and contempt citations if
they did not cease and desist. He also entered an order against protesting teachers in Birmingham. The
teachers were hiding behind the state’s teacher tenure law, which they claimed allowed them to appeal
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transfers to the school board and, if not satisfied, the state’s tenure commission. Birmingham-Jefferson
Concerned Parents had formed a Teachers Defense Fund upon realizing that the Birmingham school
authorities intended to abide by the court’s order and force the teachers to maintain their desegregated
assignments. But their efforts received a swift blow when Lynne ruled that “local teacher hiring statutes
may not be interposed to frustrate a constitutional mandate.” The Fifth Circuit had already ruled that
such statutes could not apply when their effect was to frustrate a desegregation plan. Lynne ordered
the teachers to conform or be dismissed in five days. A few of the teachers and their supporters made a
futile attempt to obtain an injunction in state circuit court, which was quickly nullified. Several
protesting teachers eventually reported to their assigned schools, while over 50 ultimately chose to
“resign.” In the case of Jefferson County, Lynne stopped short of entering contempt citations for Revis
Hall or the county school board for refusing to compel students to attend their assigned schools. The
board was instead ordered to compile, and to furnish to the court and the plaintiffs, an accurate count
of students enrolled in, or otherwise attending, each school in the system. This effectively gave the
school board and the non-conforming students a reprieve for the semester.50
Jefferson and Mobile Counties were not the only sites of this sort of resistance in the state that
fall. In Talladega, for example, 30 miles east of Birmingham, a group of white parents actually
commandeered classrooms in three public schools and began conducting their own, all-white classes.
Nine parents organized the effort on behalf of 500 white students who had been assigned to formerly
all-black schools in the county. In one instance, 170 white students assigned to formerly all-black
Ophelia Hill School instead accompanied their parents to Mumford School, where parents took control
of six classrooms and proceeded to operate a school of their own within the school. Parents repeated
these actions at two other schools – Talladega County High and Winterboro High – to which they
actively recruited students attending more heavily desegregated schools in the system. One of the
50
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purported ringleaders, local upholsterer Allen Lockridge, claimed that among the reasons for the
takeover were that black boys had been “pulling and pinching” white girls and that the marching band
had been forced to give up the Confederate battle flag.51
The Civil Rights Division was informed of the Talladega parents’ actions and asked the FBI to
investigate the situation. Upon ascertaining the leaders of the scheme and the schools involved, the
CRD quickly asked Judge Hobart Grooms for a show cause order against Lockridge and eight other
parents (the Talladega case had been severed from Lee v. Macon and reassigned to Grooms’ district
court). Grooms added the nine to the injunction against the school authorities. However, when
addressing the group in court, along with 300 white spectators, the judge issued a stern warning rather
than any citation, per the request of the CRD. He said that he was assuming the parents had acted in
ignorance of the law and that they appeared to be “decent, upstanding citizens” who were
“substantially law-abiding.” But he warned, “I hope I don’t have to punish anyone” in the future,
particularly for trespassing on school property. Grooms added that he had used the contempt power of
the court “sparingly” in the past and wanted to keep it that way. “I try to be tender-hearted and
merciful,” he said, “[but] I just want you to know that the court will not permit defiance.” Grooms
closed with the sort of apologia that Judges Thomas and Lynne often made. “I don’t make the laws . . . .
This court has no alternative but to obey the laws.” He concluded, “We must have order; I plead with
you to obey the law.” A substantially similar situation occurred in Tuscaloosa, where a group from the
Northport Concerned Parents organization commandeered a closed elementary school and began to
operate it as their own. Newly appointed Federal District Judge Frank McFadden ordered the parents to
vacate the building and threatened them with contempt. Parents had learned from state and local
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officials that they could, and should, push their resistance to force the federal courts to act. In these
more visible and brazen acts of direct defiance, the courts were obliged to do so.52
Federal courts had to take further action to prod other systems towards unitary status early that
fall. The Bessemer city school board was forced to implement a late summer Fifth Circuit appeals court
ruling ordering the pairing of certain schools “without delay.” And the Huntsville city school board was
forced to augment its desegregation plan, which the board argued was the “only desegregation plan in
the U.S. that [was] effectually working.” The Huntsville system had managed to remain on a combined
freedom-of-choice/zoning plan, but the CRD moved for further relief when it discovered that nearly a
third of the system’s black students had enrolled in virtually all-black schools that fall. Judge Grooms
ordered Huntsville to work with HEW on a plan which would eliminate freedom of choice and eradicate
the system’s remaining three nearly all-black schools: Cavalry Hill, with 925 blacks and two whites;
Council, with 141 blacks and 34 whites; and West End, with 150 blacks and 6 whites. Huntsville had
maintained a minority-to-majority transfer policy which allowed black schools to resegregate as such.
Its faculty was also not fully integrated per the Carr standard. Judge Grooms seemed particularly
disappointed to deliver the blow to what had been, arguably, one of the more cooperative school
systems in the state. “I’m sorry,” he said from the bench, “but I’m going to have to approve [the CRD’s
motion]. You have made tremendous progress,” he added, “but I’ll be reversed if I don’t approve this.
This court is only an agent of the appeals court.”53

Problems Linger into 1971
Many of the same problems which marred the first fall of compulsory-assignment desegregation
continued into the following winter and spring. Non-conforming students remained in the schools of
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their choice, particularly in Jefferson County, while school boards took their time in compiling reports to
submit to the courts. LDF attorney U.W. Clemon argued that the Jefferson County school board was still
fostering defiance of the desegregation plan. “In every case where whites have not shown up at a black
school,” he said, “you can go to the nearest white school and find an excess of white students enrolled
there.” Clemon compared the behavior of the county board with that of Birmingham city, which he said
had reluctantly but insistently forced strict compliance with its own plan. Clemon charged that the
county was refusing to force either students or teachers to accept assignments. The result, he said, was
that 3 out of 4 black students in the system were attended a school which was 99 percent black and that
only 12 of the system’s 88 schools had anywhere near the required 70-30 white-to-black teacher ratio.54
Violence between black and white students continued to be an issue as well, particularly in
Mobile. Teachers at Murphy reported a number of incidents to the school board over the course of the
school year: from fist fights to knife fights. Prichard’s formerly all-white Vigor – where a number of
black students from nearby Blount High had been assigned – was closed for a day in the fall of 1970
because of an early morning brawl between white and black students. In February of 1971, the situation
at Vigor became even more critical, as a series of skirmishes led to what police called a “general racial
melee” involving over 100 students. A week after the melee, a “major riot,” as newspapers recounted
it, broke out involving between 200-300 students. One hundred officers from the Prichard, Chickasaw,
and Mobile police departments and the Alabama State Troopers took 40 minutes to quell the “riot,” in
which ten students were injured and 13 arrested. The school board closed the school for several days
afterwards and only slowly reopened it. Groups of students were allowed to return over the course of
three days, under what was described a “massive armed guard.” The newly reinstalled Governor
Wallace sent his legal advisor to recommend that the school authorities pray to the court for relief in the
form of U.S. Marshalls or some sort of alteration of the system’s desegregation plan. School officials
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happily did so, offering the violence as still more evidence that the compulsory assignment plan was a
wrongheaded failure. They beseeched Judge Thomas for “emergency relief” given the “intolerable”
situation, asking the court to use its injunctive and contempt powers against offending students.
Neither the CRD nor the court was moved, however, as the tensions in the school died down and the
armed guard was able to restore a sense of normalcy. Many parents continued to keep their children
out of the school, and some undoubtedly saw the incident as the final push towards private schools or
another school district.55
At the end of the school year in May, a fourth major outbreak closed Vigor and brought police to
Murphy yet again. The state legislature took the opportunity to pass another doomed freedom of
choice law, this one introduced by Mobile’s state representative, Monty Collins. The new “student
transfer” bill, which passed handily, proposed to allow students to transfer to the school of their choice
if they had been “harassed, intimidated, or assaulted.” Wallace called the latest choice act a “must bill”
and “one of the finest ever passed by [the Alabama] legislature.” Even then Wallace and Alabama
legislators were conceiving an even more potent form of legislative resistance, one that allow
segregationists an out when they finally had to give way to compulsory assignment and abandon all
hope of freedom of choice.56

*****
A black Mobile school teacher went before Senator Walter Mondale’s Select Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity to testify in 1971. She told a story quite different than the one that
members of STAND and Concerned Parents had been telling each other and any else who would listen.
In trying to speak to the support in Mobile for the CORE/Innes plan, she argued that black students had
been “suspended, intimidated, harassed, and jailed.” There had been threats on the lives of black
55
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movement leaders, unexplained bombings, and “complete unresponsiveness [on the part of the] school
board to the desires of the black community.” It made one understand, she explained, “why the black
community might enthusiastically endorse any alternative to this continued method of desegregation.”
Black students had, in fact, started their own organization – the United Student Action Movement of
Mobile (USAMM) – and had opened a “center for the advancement of black awareness.” They started a
legal fund to represent members who had been jailed for participating in USAMM boycotts and
demonstrations against the manner of Mobile’s desegregation. Many had become bitter and
disillusioned.57
Members of the USAMM group from Vigor High, Toulminville High, and Toolen High explained
their views to an investigative reporter from the Southern Regional Council. One said, “Desegregation
won’t work, because when we go to a white school they treat us like some dog.” Even sincere attempts
by white teachers to make black students feel more at home were backfiring. One student explained,
“The teacher looks at [the black student] in the morning . . . and to make him feel good he says ‘good
morning’ to him and says nothing to the little white folks and that’s turning the white folks against him
and at the same time making him feel inferior.” Another student argued, “How can you have integration
when the white man is at the top of the pole?” The students felt that desegregation in Mobile was
forcing blacks to “become white.” Black students in white schools could never win votes for students
council, for the cheerleading squad, for other offices. When they did, it was “invariably the one with the
straightest hair.” Blacks at some schools were prevented from expressing themselves by, for example,
wearing Afros or dashikis; black males could not braid their hair, whereas white males could wear
ponytails. A third explained, “So far integration has only meant humiliation, oppression, and a loss of
identity to these black students. They can’t conceive of it working until black people control their own
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money and their own schools and their own districts.” The students in USAMM had become radicalized
as direct result of their experiences with desegregation. One student explained:

Here is what the system offers: using the constitutional rights, going to court, getting bogged
down. This is just what we were doing and getting nothing. As long as you have a racist judge
and a racist lawyer and a racist President, along with his cousin, George Wallace, working
through the system is like working through hell. The only way you can survive is to make white
people listen through violence.58
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CHAPTER 17: “HARVEST TIME”: PROTESTING THE REALITIES OF COMPULSORY ASSIGNMENT STATEWIDE,
1969-71

On August 26, 1971 Federal District Judge Daniel Thomas was holding court, not in his home
courthouse in Mobile, but in the federal satellite courthouse in Selma, in the west-central Alabama Black
Belt. The Wilcox County Board of Education was brought forth to answer for its continuing
recalcitrance. “I am willing to help anyone who will help themselves,” Thomas announced from the
bench, “but the Wilcox County school board has to come up with something. So far all I’ve heard is
excuses,” he said, “I want a plan.” The all-white school board had refused to work with HEW in crafting
a desegregation plan which used some method other than freedom of choice to bring about more than
token desegregation in the county’s largely black school system. Nor had they submitted any plan of
their own. Thomas ordered the school officials to meet with HEW as soon as possible to hammer out
some solution. As the judge was preparing to adjourn for the day, HEW attorneys asked the court to
order the school board to meet with HEW representatives right then and there. The federal authorities
argued that if the local school officials left the courtroom, HEW would not see or hear from them again
until they were called back into court. The school board was thus forced to sit down with HEW officials
at the courthouse and work out a plan. The two sides agreed to attendance zones for many of the
county’s schools, but the school board refused to agree upon pairing arrangements for other schools,
including formerly all-white Wilcox County High and all-black Camden Academy. The meeting broke up
in tension and frustration. As he prepared to leave, Wilcox Superintendent Guy Kelly told the
bureaucrats, “You will not live to see what you want to do in Wilcox County, not if you live a thousand
years.”1
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The school board drafted and submitted its own plan days later. The board opened its plan by
avowing, “In order to establish a so-called unitary school system in Wilcox County, the following
recommendations are made under duress. These recommendations are educationally unsound and will
completely segregate and eventually destroy the Wilcox County School System.” It then proposed a
zoning plan which left a number of schools all-black and which allowed whites to concentrate in a few
token-desegregated schools. Judge Thomas approved the plan. Superintendent Kelly and the school
board were operating from the assumption that compulsory assignment would lead inevitably and
justifiably to a total white exodus. Rather than implement such a plan in good faith and work to forestall
such an exodus, they fought to maintain some semblance of freedom of choice – which they had fought
bitterly against since the U.S. initiated a suit against the county in 1965.2
At the top of the school board’s plan, the school officials also included a quotation from Pope
John Paul in which the pontiff seemingly spoke in favor of parents’ “freedom in their choice of schools.”
When the Catholic Bishop of Mobile, John L. May, wrote a letter to the editor of the Wilcox County
newspaper arguing that the board had taken the quotation out of context, Superintendent Kelly wrote a
response to the bishop which revealed much about white opposition to compulsory assignment. May
was a distinguished clergyman who had recently risen to the bishopric and had warned Mobile’s
segregationists that the diocese’s parochial schools would not serve as havens for segregated education.
Kelly first called May a “misguided and uninformed religious zealot” whose ilk had “conducted the
Spanish Inquisition and brought reproach upon the church.” He then warned the bishop that if he chose
to get into a fight over the county schools with “a veteran” of such battles, he was sure to leave it “with
[his] clothes soiled.” May had argued that Kelly was making “a stand against integration.” Not true,
Kelly retorted. “My stand,” he said, “is against the destruction of education in this county for all children
regardless of race, color, or creed.” The Justice Department and “a little band of willful people” were
2
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dedicated to such destruction. “My quarrel,” Kelly added, “is with the government about the
abridgement of freedom of education which is the first and inalienable right and duty of the parent.” If
this sounded like it might be informed by the long-held white southern belief that the Civil War had
nothing at all to do with slavery and everything to do with states’ rights, Kelly removed any doubt by
adding, “The United States is continuing the Reconstruction of the South . . . .” The effort was “simply a
continuation of the economic war prosecuted by the North against the South from the beginning of the
1830s which inevitably led to the War Between the States.” Public education in Alabama had been
“built from the ashes of that struggle,” and Kelly vowed to do “everything in [his] power to thwart [the]
effort to destroy [it].” Bewildered HEW officials complained to Judge Thomas, “We have integrated the
entire South, and Wilcox County and Kelly are fighting as hard today as they were in the beginning.”
Wilcox Progressive Era editor M. Hollis Curl argued that such a comment ought to “stand as the highest
possible tribute to Mr. Kelly and the Board.” For many Wilcox whites, it certainly did.3
Across the state, whites mounted protests to compulsory assignment between 1969 and 1971.
The well-organized, massive non-conformity and picketing associated with Mobile and Jefferson County
was reflected in communities from Decatur to Evergreen, in the form of letter-writing, editorializing, and
petitioning. It was also reflected in the most significant increase in segregationist academy
establishment and enrollment the state had ever seen or would subsequently see. This was particularly
evident where whites did not have white suburbs or heavily-white neighboring districts to which to flee.
In each case, whites couched their protest and their flight in terms of their constitutional, and
sometimes natural, rights. They either demanded a return to freedom of choice or rearticulated it as a
freedom of association to justify their exodus to private schools. Though their epistolary efforts brought
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little in return, the segregationist academy movement matured, and a core of private, white schools was
established which has remained intact ever since.
Blacks did not universally celebrate the coming of compulsory assignment. In fact a black
protest movement developed in response to many of the realities of the process, which in some ways
rivaled its white counterpart. Blacks in many communities decried the closure of black schools. The
closures were a ubiquitous consequence of whites’ refusal to attend formerly all-black schools and the
recognition by courts and school boards that they could not force whites to attend as long as flight
options were available. And in Alabama, white flight options were by then available anywhere to those
who could afford them. Many blacks who were forced into white schools also began to protest the
symbolic vestiges of the Confederate Old South. Black students bemoaned being forced to cheer for the
Rebels, to play or sing “Dixie,” or to study biased textbooks which exonerated and venerated the
antebellum slave regime. Some were invigorated by finding a channel for their activism. Others began
to wonder if this was what the previous generation of activists had in mind when they sought to
desegregate schools in the first place.

Frank Johnson Bears the Brunt in Lee v. Macon
Over the course of late 1969 and early 1970, the 99 systems involved in Lee v. Macon County
had been made parties defendant to the case and ordered to formulate “terminal” desegregation plans,
most of which involved significant faculty desegregation, school closures, pairing, or geographical
zoning. That spring the three-judge panel determined that as soon as these “terminal-type”
desegregation plans were approved and ordered implemented for the 1970-71 school year, each system
would then have its case transferred to a single judge in its appropriate geographical district. Almost all
systems had been, or would soon be, ordered to use some method other than freedom of choice to
eliminate their dual system. In conferences with Judge Frank Johnson, attorneys Fred Gray and Solomon
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Seay, and representatives from the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, many school boards filed
their final plans to attain “unitary” status within the next year or two. Some school boards, particularly
in east and south Alabama, worked with educationists at Auburn University’s Center for Assisting School
Systems with Problems Occasioned by Desegregation to draft feasible plans which the court could
accept; the Center was awarded a U.S. Office of Education grant to fund its program and helped at least
75 school systems formulate their plans. Many other school boards either failed to draft acceptable
plans or refused to formulate any plans at all, in which case the court ordered HEW to draft a plan which
it would then order implemented. In some cases, the three-judge court approved a delay in full
desegregation until the fall of 1971, but every system involved in the case had some sort of plan in place
and was facing significant changes for the fall of 1970. When these terminal plans were adopted, each
system’s case was splintered from the main Lee v. Macon litigation and assigned to a single federal
district judge in that system’s district for monitoring progress in implementation.4
For segregationists who had only recently come to digest freedom of choice, compulsory
assignment plans were difficult to swallow. They responded with rhetorical assaults on the court, with
petitions and protests, and with a reinvigorated move to private schools. The most viscous assaults
were reserved for Judge Johnson. He had long been a lightning rod for segregationist attacks, in part
because George Wallace had singled the judge out for rhetorical barbs ever since the pair’s initial
struggle over voting records in Wallace’s Barbour County. As terminal, post-Green orders began to
come down in each of the Lee systems, whites focused their vitriol squarely on Johnson. Perhaps they
correctly perceived that Johnson was the chief administrator of the Lee case’s enforcement. Whatever
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the reason, the aging Judge Richard Rives and the more cautious Judge Hobart Grooms were spared the
worst of the threats and accusations and pleas.
An editor at the Greenville Advocate captured the thinking of many angry whites when he
responded to the pending implementation of the Butler County desegregation plan by damning Johnson
to hell. “The first crop of bitter fruit was harvested last week, Judge,” he wrote, “and it is just too bad
that you could not be there to share the fruits of your labor, you and the planners of the spiritless gray
world.” The student bodies of formerly all-white Greenville High and all-black Southside High had been
consolidated as part of the Butler County plan that fall. Whites had protested by bolting for the newly
established Fort Dale Academy, which opened the previous fall. Some of the public school’s remaining
whites refused to participate in integrated extra-curricular activities, including the marching band and
the majorettes. The Advocate editor told Johnson of the resulting “harvest of humiliation, sorrow and
despair” which he observed at a football game. The depleted Greenville marching band was evidently
outclassed by its visitor, causing some of its members to weep “silent, bitter tears” on the sideline. “You
gutted the group by edicts and decrees, Judge,” the editor wrote, “maybe there is an eternity of instant
replays of these children growing old before their time awaiting you. Souls laid bare are for God, not for
newspaper people. Damn you, Frank Johnson, damn you.” Johnson first become aware of the editorial
when a young Greenville man, a student at the University of Alabama, forwarded it to him, writing, “The
editor has expressed my feelings in such an outstanding manner that I am compelled to bring it to your
attention.” He added, “It is my sincere hope that you will spend an eternity in hell for the strife and
misery you have caused the people of Alabama.” He accused Johnson of “butchering” Greenville High
and of “playing God with other people’s lives.” In closing he wrote, “I hope that you will realize the
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extent to which you are despised in this state. If this realization disturbs your sleep in the least, than
this letter will have served a purpose.”5
Not all letters to Johnson were so venomous. A Decatur woman invoked heaven rather than
hell in a no-less desperate appeal. “The Lord laid it on my heart to write you,” she claimed. She asked
Johnson, “Do you know Jesus Christ as your own personal savior?” She also wondered, did Johnson
have children in school? “Or . . . like the President you do not have to send your children to school with
the negroes,” she speculated, “you do not have to eat and sleep with them.” She argued that God had
no desire for her to “mix with them,” for he had put a curse on Cain and made him black and made his
children “servants of servants.” She concluded, “He did not intend for us to intergrate” [sic]. She
warned Johnson, “Just as you are born you will go to one of two places, Heaven or Hell. . . . Which one
are you going to choose?” When Johnson stood before God, the Almighty would surely tell him,
“’Depart, I never knew you.’” Unless the judge decided to “pray and ask God for guidance in this matter
of intergration” and to “straighten out all of this.” In closing, the woman revealed the enduring political
attachment that had manifest itself in the recent gubernatorial election: “You hate George Wallace, but
thank God for a man that will stand up and fight for our rights. . . . Get right with the Lord.” She
attached some “literature” for the judge which indicated the endurance, as well, of certain long-held
segregationist beliefs: that the NAACP’s primary goal was to “promote intermarriages between whites
and negroes,” and that Martin Luther King, Jr. had been a revolutionary communist.6
Many of the most desperate letters came from whites in the Black Belt, where blacks
constituted the majority in all but a few systems. A letter from a Selma man to Judge Johnson captured
the fundamental fear which helped doom desegregation in the region. Henry Vaughan was an
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accountant and wanted to relay to Johnson what a client had recently told him. The client had
“expressed his concern over [the Selma] school situation so clearly” that Vaughan felt “a compulsion to
pass it along . . . . I am sure,” he wrote, “that it represents the way most parents feel.” The client had
told Vaughan, “‘You know, if the public schools here fold up, this community is doomed. . . . I have two
girls in the public schools, and I simply cannot send them to Hudson High next year.’” Vaughan
explained that this man and other parents had learned to accept the freedom of choice plan which
Selma had been operating under for four years. “However,” he added, “if we have only one junior high
and one senior high next year there will be more negroes than whites in each school, and parents are
literally afraid for the physical safety of their children.” Vaughan reiterated, such “a complete upheaval
where all at once white children in junior and senior high school are in the minority, is more than human
nature can absorb.” He asked Johnson, “Please help us arrive at a solution which will be in keeping with
the spirit of the law and still preserve our public schools.” Black students already at the city’s white high
school had warned that “if they make the rest [of the city’s black students] come next year there’s going
to be lots of fights.” Another Selma man had recently called the courthouse and warned of “an all out
battle” if freedom of choice were jettisoned. He told Judge Johnson that he did not care “whether he
went to jail or not” and that if he had to send his children to a majority black school he would “just as
soon die.” Parents like this began to swell the ranks of John T. Morgan Academy. Morgan had opened
after the first desegregation order hit Selma in 1965. In 1969 it had added a high school building with
science labs and an enlarged cafeteria. That fall, 1970, it was preparing to open eight new classrooms
and a gymnasium. With increasingly sophisticated private schools for whites, Vaughan feared that a
total exodus would occur, and he thought the court might consider that.7
One letter from a Pike County man demonstrated a comparably sensible yet equally futile
approach. It also illustrated segregationists’ continuing concerns about black teachers and black school
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closure and their desperate and doomed attachment to freedom of choice. Charles Johnston told Judge
Johnson that he reckoned that the two of them “had common ancestors” despite the slight difference in
spelling in their surnames. Johnston was a grandfather to two white girls in a Pike County elementary
school. He had seen “lots of water pass under the bridge,” and he was of the “firm opinion” that “the
freedom of choice” was the best program for Pike County. Due to a recent influx of funds and an
equalization project, the black schools were “by far the newest, most modern in the county. I have seen
with my own eyes,” he wrote, “the carpeted floors, central heat and air conditioning, sound proof
rooms, and the very latest in equipment of every description.” He “was told” that this applied to all
black schools in the county. Johnston had also talked to a number of Pike’s black citizens. “They
invariably tell me,” he wrote, “that they want their children in their own school.” He felt that the “main
problem” with the black schools in the past had been “that the Negro colleges turned out teachers with
degrees that they did not earn,” because “their standards were not up to the white colleges.” Whose
fault that was, Johnston did not know, but he figured it could be “corrected in time.” The upshot of all
of this was that Johnston was a wealthy man, and he had been “asked to make a substantial
contribution to a private school” – Pike Liberal Arts School, which had just opened that fall. He was
prepared to do so if necessary, but he told the judge, “If the freedom of choice plan is allowed to
continue in Pike County then I feel sure that we can and will have quality education in our public
schools.”8
Of course, the freedom of choice plan in Pike had not disestablished the dual school system and
thus would not continue. Many white families removed their children to Pike Liberal Arts or sent them
to schools in neighboring Dale County which were not as substantially desegregated. When Johnson
learned of the latter practice, he informed the Dale County school board that this was a “flagrant
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violation” of each system’s desegregation plan and ordered the students back to Pike schools. A Pike
County woman wrote Johnson in protest, asking “why there was such an immediate action taken.” She
argued that the students had already finished most of the semester at their new school in Dale and had,
in the case of the seniors, purchased caps and gowns and such. They ought to have been allowed to
finish the year there. She called their removal an “outrageous decision” and wondered why no one
cared about the children, in general. “They didn’t have any say-so whatsoever in this,” she wrote, and
“this is suppose to be a free country” [sic].9
An editorial in the Evergreen Courant revealed a similar law-and-order approach to rebuking not
just Johnson, but HEW and the Justice Department as well. When orders in Lee v. Macon forced the
Conecuh County school board to close all-black China Junior High and substantially desegregate formerly
all-white Evergreen City School for the 1970-71 school year, Conecuh’s whites reacted by opening Sparta
Academy. Many whites stayed in the county schools, though, leading the Courant to struggle to make
sense of “fine, practically new school buildings standing idle and unused” while “temporary or mobile
classrooms [were] being used at other schools because pupils from the closed schools spilled over the
available classrooms.” Why was this so? “Because the planners in Washington wish[ed] to achieve
something they call “racial balance” in the schools of the South,” the editor wrote. HEW and DOJ were
“doing the ‘balancing’ by closing perfectly good school buildings, by busing students in direct violation of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and by pairing.” Conecuh’s black citizens were not to blame; in fact, they had
“borne this intolerable burden” in a commendable manner. All of the county’s citizens, the Courant
argued, would “continue to obey the law and to get along with one another,” while “those in authority”
would “continue to seek legal redress through legal channels and only ask that HEW and the Justice
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Department and the Federal Courts be made by the Congress and the President to do what every citizen
does, OBEY THE LAW.”10
Another editorial, from the Randolph Press, revealed a particularly distorted understanding of
Judge Johnson’s role in Lee v. Macon, and of the federal judiciary generally. Randolph County – in east
central Alabama on the Georgia state line – had recently implemented a court-ordered geographic
zoning plan which closed certain black schools and resulted in over 400 black students in formerly-white
schools. White parents were irate and had been flooding the school board offices with complaints. The
superintendent was even physically assaulted by one woman. The editor wondered, “How could it
happen in what was a democracy?” All-black Randolph County Training School had been closed and its
several hundred black students moved to the formerly all-white county high school. This was, he
argued, “being done at the pleasure of some federal judge named Frank Johnson, and probably nobody
else’s.” Other all-black schools had been closed, too. “One man pointed his finger at the Pleasant Grove
School,” he wrote, “and it was no more.” The editor wondered if it ought to be renamed Johnson
Memorial. He felt that Johnson had assumed “absolute, near total tyranny in the area” and was forcing
integration upon it under the theory that “when blacks and whites are thrown in the common pot and
stirred until brown, universal salvation is at hand.” He tellingly evoked two charged metaphors, calling it
“a shotgun marriage” and “the enslavement of two races.” There was “no appeal,” he argued, from
Johnson’s rulings, unless “one dare[d] approach HEW,” which had “shown little consideration for health,
and none for education and welfare.” He concluded that to “go from one to the other” would only “be
crawling further up the anus.”11
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The mass influx of black students into formerly all-white schools jarred many white parents.
Some of the schools had already been desegregated, of course, but only in a token way. When white
majorities were threatened, parents panicked. One Russell County many indicated as much when he
sent Judge Johnson a telegram after county schools opened in the fall of 1970 under a geographic
zoning plan. “A group of responsible parents,” he wrote, had recently met with the county school board
“seeking answer to [the] unjust and unfair percentage ratio as [to] whites to blacks.” He broke down
the relevant particulars for Johnson: “In class with one daughter – 1 white pupil, 35 black pupils; in class
with one daughter – 2 white pupils, 33 black pupils.” He requested that Johnson use “the powers of
[his] office” to “change the situation at Mount Olive School from ungodly to fair for all, black or white.”
Many whites of a similar persuasion in Russell County began sending their children to Glenwood School,
a segregationist academy in the nearby Lee County town of Smiths which opened its doors for the first
time that fall, 1970.12
Judge Johnson often received a steady flow of letters from one community or school district. In
the case of Autaugaville in Autauga County, the concerns of the white community had been deflected by
the school board. Like many school boards, the Autauga County officials simply blamed the particulars
of their desegregation plan on Judge Johnson, with whom they had been dealing. White parents were
incensed that the closure of the 10th-12th grades at the all-black Autauga County Training School in 1969
was going to bring over 250 black students to the formerly all-white Hicks Memorial School. Hicks had
previously enrolled around 285 whites and about 40 blacks via freedom of choice. The Autaugaville
parents were particularly concerned that the school board was planning to concentrate the county’s
rural black students at Hicks, rather than among the county’s four rural, white high schools. They felt
that taking the black students on at Hicks would be “an impossible task” which would probably ‘destroy
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the school and possible the entire system. “We accepted the freedom of choice plan without trouble,”
they argued. They considered themselves “a law abiding community” with “peace-loving people” and
“hard-working, middle-class” who believed in “equal rights for all people.” And yet, now there would be
“no freedom of choice for either race.” It simply did not “seem fair.”13
Some Autaugaville parents wondered if the federal courts were becoming “communist
infested.” The United States was, after all, “a country founded on freedom.” One parent asked Johnson
to consider if he would want his child to “receive the standard of education in a school with the majority
being Negroes.” Would he want his child taught by a black teacher? Did he not “want justice.” Some
portended mass “disciplinary problems.” Some couched their concerns in terms of overcrowding. All of
the parents were ‘praying’ and ‘begging’ that Johnson would reconsider what they assumed was his
decision alone. Most expressed their protest in terms of constitutional rights. “According to the U.S.
Constitution,” one parent wrote, “everyone has equal rights, just as long as they do not infringe on the
rights of others, [but] we feel that if the Negroes are forced upon the students at Hicks . . . they are
infringing our rights.”14
When concerned Autaugaville parents assumed that white faculty would refuse to teach at a
majority-black school and that most white parents would remove their children from the school system,
they understood that local private options would soon be available. Autauga Academy was opening its
doors for the first time that fall, 1969, in an old public school building. It stood poised to accept as many
as 200 students and had plans to open in a new facility the following fall. One mother captured the
feeling of many when she wrote, “Some [home-owning parents] have already enrolled their children in
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private schools, others say they will send theirs to stay with relatives, that will leave just a few left here
which will make two Negro schools in our little town.” Some of the white parents who were trying to
stem the tide formed a Committee of 100 and petitioned the court for intervention. The petition was
denied, but the court did work with the school board and the CRD to restructure the county’s plan such
that Hicks Memorial took on only a portion of the black students from Autauga County Training School.
The following year, the county plan called for “freezing” students in the schools which they had
attended the previous fall. The court could not accept this and instead ordered the implementation of
the CRD’s plan. A parent wrote Johnson again and argued, “Although there was some feeling about
having over 40% colored students in the former all-white school last year (1969-70), the community
leaders urged acceptance of the law, [and] we had a successful year.” The new 1970 plan, however, had
caused the community to “split wide open.” It called for projected enrollments at Hicks (newly renamed
Autaugaville High) and Autauga Training (Autaugaville Elementary) of 401 black to 121 white and 443
black to 115 white, respectively. As they continued to press for relief from Johnson, some parents
argued that the county schools were “the only way” they could “afford to educate [their] children.”15
Some of these public school supporters described the difficult situation in which the segregationist
academies placed them:

Our opinion does not represent a majority of the white citizens and many strong feelings prevail.
A very active group of our citizens are directing their efforts toward securing a large enrollment
of white students for the private school being built in this county [Autauga Academy]. Our
mayor, all the members of the City Council who have school age children and many others have
thrown their influence and support behind the private school. Our elected member on the
County Board of Education, and all of our school trustees, except one, have resigned and are
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recruiting for the private school. Their competition for students, which is of course necessary
for financing, has put considerable social pressure on both parents and children.16

In addition to the many letters Johnson received, and the many editorials that were written,
there were petitions. And just like the letters and editorials, many of them were couched in the
language of constitutional law. One such petition from a group of Montgomery parents called on the
U.S. Congress to impeach Johnson. It read:

Whereas certain inferior Federal court judges have arrogated unto themselves unlawfully the
original jurisdiction over the sovereign State of Alabama as a party – (see Lee vs Macon County
et al . . . ), and whereas the time has come for the sovereign citizens of our State must call a halt
to these unlawful actions by judicial dictators in order to end tampering with the education of
our children, which is a right reserved to the people as provided by the Tenth Amendment . . .
Therefore, we the sovereign citizens of Alabama do hereby resolve, petition, and demand that
our representatives in Congress bring forth an instant Bill of Impeachment . . . .”17

Despite their preference for constitutional claims, many of these most passionate segregationists clearly
lacked a sound understanding of the federal judiciary. Alabama Journal Editor Ray Jenkins joked with his
friend Johnson, writing the judge in reference to this petition and with a nod to other federal judges
then in the spotlight, “Judge, when this movement gets going, you’re going to be in more trouble than
[Clement] Haynsworth and [Abe] Fortas together.”18
Of course, Johnson was not the only judge deciding matters in Lee v. Macon, and he and Judges
Grooms and Rives were, indeed, cognizant of the devoted resistance to desegregation at the local level.
In the terminal order for Sumter County, issued in the summer of 1970, the three-judge court
acknowledged, “Each member of this court is acutely aware of the customs and traditions of the people
16
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in this section of our country. We enter this order in this case,” they continued, “with the full realization
that . . . the student body in the Sumter County school system will, in all probability, be composed only
of Negro students.” The county school board had proposed a plan which would have allowed for the
retention of a number of all-black schools. Thus, the court was forced to order the implementation of
the HEW plan for Sumter County, which would render whites the minority in most county schools. Even
the court assumed at that point that whites in Sumter would flee for Sumter Academy, which had been
established in a former public elementary school the previous fall. The court was bound to order the
elimination of the dual system, however, and higher courts had already held that white flight was not a
justification for limiting relief. At the same time, the court could not force whites in Alabama to accept
minority status in schools, to attend formerly all-black schools, to accept black teachers, to dispel all of
their preconceived notions about black people in general, or to exercise the kind of moral leadership
which might have rallied other whites to any of the above. The one-time National Observer columnist
and future Ronald Reagan advisor Jude Wanniski observed in the fall of 1970, the “lead role in trying to
win acceptance for these [desegregation] plans has fallen to the public educators themselves. Where
they have given up,” he continued, “as in Marengo County, where Superintendent Fred Ramsey has
placed his own children in private school – there may be no integration at all.”19

The Maturation of the Segregationist Academy Movement
Many local newspaper headlines in the fall of 1969, 1970, and 1971 featured the assertion that
schools had opened “without incident.” The White Citizens’ Council newsmagazine, The Citizen,
accurately explained the significance of this claim: “What this means in practice is that no rapes,
19
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murders, or riots on the school ground were recorded on the police blotter that day.” The “main
underlying reason why” was the fact that “the segregationists [had] established an alternative to
federally-dictated education . . . by setting up private schools.” This had the effect of taking “the heat
and pressure off of integrated schools.” The Council might have overstated its case in several ways, but
fundamentally it was right. Segregationist academies had alleviated some of the potential for violent
confrontation in desegregated schools by providing an alternative for the most staunch segregationists
and their children. And in Alabama, the academies were booming.20
The majority of Alabama’s segregationist academies were established between 1965 and 1975,
with the most significant spike coming between 1969 and 1971. Academy establishment had been
closely associated with desegregation milestones: first the Brown decisions themselves in 1954-55, then
the first court orders and HEW efforts which produced the breakthrough of 1963-1966, and then most
especially, the post-Green compulsory assignment orders in 1969, 1970, and 1971.21 The number of
segregationist academies in the South as a whole nearly doubled from the fall of 1969 to the fall of 1970
(to over 600), and Alabama contributed its fair share. In 1965 there were 34 private schools in the state
which could be identified as segregationist academies. By 1970 that number had increased to 109: a
221 percent increase. By 1975, it would be 134. While the cities which already had multiple
segregationist academies – including Mobile, Montgomery, and Birmingham – each saw increases in the
number of private schools within their respective districts from 1969 to 1970, the number of districts
with one or more private schools increased dramatically during that period as well. Entering the 1969-
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70 school year, there were 38 school districts with at least one private school (14 city and 24 county
systems). The following year, there were 55 (22 city and 33 county systems).22
The increase in the number of pupils in private schools was even more dramatic, though it was
hard to accurately assess. A 1973 study undertaken by the LDF concluded that information on
Alabama’s segregationist academies was “minimal at best,” and that data on enrollment, specifically,
was “incomplete and almost meaningless.” The state department of education indicated that the
number of students enrolled in private schools in the state increased from 39,524 in 1968-69 to 68,123
for 1970-71. One Alabama educationist, in his doctoral dissertation, isolated the students in this data
who were determined to be enrolled in “private, non-sectarian schools”; this limited the number in
1970-1 to 20,500 but still indicated an enrollment increase of nearly 100 percent. By 1975, there would
be nearly 28,000 students in these schools, according to that study. But these figures were
problematized by the fact that many of the academies simply did not report to the state. According to
the LDF, the state in general did not enforce laws intended to regulate private schools. Sixty-five schools
belonged to the nascent Alabama Private School Association, which was itself affiliated with the Citizens’
Council-sponsored Southern Independent Schools Association. Of those 65, only 35 reported anything
to the Alabama Department of Education in 1970-71. The state did not even recognize the existence of
13 of the remaining 30. What everyone seemed to agree upon, however, was that enrollment had
increased significantly on account of the post-Green orders, and that accurate enrollment figures were
undoubtedly and significantly higher than those being reported by the state.23
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Post-Green orders in Black Belt systems had the most immediate and observable effect.
Between the fall of 1969 and the fall of 1970, the extent of the white exodus across the state was
directly proportionate to the percentage of blacks in the school system. In districts where blacks
constituted 25 percent or less of the student population, only about 1 percent of white students
withdrew. In districts where blacks made up 25 to 50 percent of enrollment, during the same time
period, the percentage of whites fleeing increased to 6 percent. The percentage of whites fleeing the
system increased significantly when the percentage of blacks in the system was above 50, or in other
words, when whites were in danger of becoming the minority race in schools. In systems in which
blacks were between 51 and 75 percent of enrollment, 21 percent of whites fled. When blacks were
more than 75 percent of the student population, the white exodus was 54 percent on aggregate, and
near total in some cases. Most Black Belt systems fell into the latter category.24
As one of the founders of Lowndes Academy later remembered, "I was working in the public
school system, and I could see that [as a result of compulsory assignment] there would be 5 white and
30 black children in the same class, and I could see that that would pull down education; it would not
elevate it.” At the time, most in the school’s leadership couched the school’s mission in terms of
freedom of association. Locally legendary head football coach and Lowndes Academy principal Mac
Champion told a reporter, “We don’t hate Negroes. There’s a difference,” he explained, “between
segregation and discrimination. We get along fine with them, but we believe that we have the right to
socialize and study the way we please and with whom we please.” Speaking to the possibility that a
black student might one day seek admission to the academy, Champion clarified exactly what that
freedom meant: “It’s not likely the student would be admitted, because that’s the reason for having the
school in the first place.” Referencing a portrait of Confederate General Robert E. Lee on his office wall,
47,098 students in 301 private schools in Alabama, with an expected increase for 1972-73; Los Angeles Times,
Sept. 4, 1972.
24
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Champion added, “That doesn’t mean we are not Americans. We are good ones down here,” he said,
“but America means freedom to choose what school you want to attend.”25
Lowndes Academy was successful from its inception, in part because of Champion, and other
schools attempted to follow suit. Champion worked with Lowndes County segregationist leader Ray
Bass to organize an “independent” schools’ athletic association, through the Alabama Private Schools
Association, in 1969. The two organizations eventually became the Alabama Independent Schools
Association, the primary purpose of which was (and remains) to coordinate athletics. A number of
segregationist academies subsequently exploited Alabamians’ love for football by recruiting successful
football coaches like Champion, then recruiting local white players from the public schools. The new
private athletics association allowed students to transfer in and immediately play. To prevent such
recruiting, the public association, the AHSAA, maintained rules which insisted that transfer students sit
out a year.26
Despite his quest to save public education, Governor Albert Brewer offered his encouragement
and assistance to the segregationist academy movement as well. When post-Green and post-Alexander
orders came down in Alabama, Brewer voiced his desire that public and private schools could “co-exist.”
He announced that he had received letters from “many parents who intend to send their children to
private schools and who suggest that part of the taxes they pay go to help support the education of their
children . . . .” He ensured the parents that his administration would try to find a “constitutional way” to
get such assistance to the “great many children” who were sure to be flocking to private schools, and he
reminded detractors that “each child who goes to private school takes part of the burden off the public
education system.” Despite the fact that even Brewer, himself, doubted if the state could still find a way
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to financially assist private school families, segregationist academies saw that substantial spike in
enrollment in 1970, and many existing institutions expanded their operations.27
Once desegregation proceeded beyond tokenism, many academies did not need to tout their
football team, nor did they need the assistance of the governor. When compulsory assignment orders
portended the desegregation of Lowndes County’s remaining predominantly white high school at Fort
Deposit in the late summer of 1973, Lowndes Academy began to benefit from a gradual but ultimately
total exodus of whites from the Lowndes County public school system. Lowndes Academy also
benefitted from white flight from surrounding counties’ systems when they were forced fully integrate
their last predominantly-white schools. From the vantage point of late 1969, Champion had correctly
predicted the future: “You wait until you have more than token integration. It’s one thing when there’s
10 percent Negroes in an all-white school. Wait ‘till it gets to 50 percent or more and see what
happens.”28
Another example of an existing segregationist academy which benefitted from increasingly
stringent desegregation orders was Greene County’s Warrior Academy. The private school had been
established in 1965 after the first HEW efforts to force token desegregation. From that time until the
fall of 1970, it had served only grades 1 through 8, enrolling around 200 students. When Greene County
was added as a party defendant to the Lee v. Macon litigation in 1969 and forced to implement a
compulsory assignment desegregation plan for the fall of 1970, Warrior Academy expanded to 12 grades
and prepared to double its enrollment to around 400 students, all white. White teachers bolted the
Greene County system almost as quickly as the students, as 25 of the district’s 40 white teachers
resigned that summer rather than teach in the fully desegregated system. When white teachers left, it
only exacerbated student flight, and the entire system quickly approached all-black status. As the
27
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attorney for the nearby Choctaw County Board of Education, John Christopher, described, “The main
complaint is the quality of teaching.” He added, “It is a fact that [white] parents believe the Negro
teachers are not qualified,” lacking “sufficient background and training. . . . That is why my son is at
[Jefferson Davis Academy in] Vimville,” Mississippi. By the opening of the 1970-71 school year, all but
about 20 of Greene County’s white students had left the public system and Warrior Academy’s
enrollment neared 500.29
While the ranks of the established segregationist academies swelled, white parents organized
and opened new academies across the state at an unprecedented rate. In Choctaw, parents like John
Christopher had sent their children to not just Jefferson Davis Academy in Mississippi, but also to
neighboring Marengo Academy. With the specter of compulsory assignment looming in Choctaw,
demand increased enough to warrant the opening of the county’s own South Choctaw Academy in the
town of Toxey in the fall of 1969. Among the other Black Belt segregationist academies that sprung up
in 1968 and 1969 as a result of compulsory assignment orders were Autauga Academy in Prattville;
Crenshaw Christian Academy in Luverne; Ft. Dale Academy in Greenville; Lakeside School in Eufaula;
Monroe Academy in Monroeville; and Patrician Academy in Butler. In 1970 more Black Belt schools
appeared and prospered. As the court had predicted, whites left the Sumter County system upon the
implementation of the county system’s compulsory assignment order. Fewer than 40 white children
joined 3,655 blacks in the county schools, while newly opened Sumter Academy enrolled over 450 white
pupils. Other segregationist academies which opened their doors for the first time that fall included:
Grove Hill Academy in Clarke County; Edgewood Academy in Elmore; Hooper Academy in Hope Hull;
Jackson Academy in Clarke County; Pickens Academy in Carrollton; South Montgomery Academy in
Grady; Sumter Academy in York; and Wilcox Academy in Camden. Segregationist academy growth was
not limited to the Black Belt during this period, though. Academies appeared elsewhere between 1967
29
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and 1972: Chambers Academy in Lafayette in east Alabama (69); Abbeville Christian Academy in Henry
County in the Wiregrass (70); Ashford Academy in Houston County in the Wiregrass (70); Bessemer
Academy in Bessemer (70); Cahawba Academy in Bibb County in west Alabama (70); Central Christian
School in Baldwin County on the eastern shore of Mobile Bay (70); Coosa Christian in Gadsden (72);
Coosa Valley Academy in Shelby County, south of Birmingham (70); Escambia Academy in Atmore in
south Alabama (67); Faith Academy in Mobile (as Lott Road Christian School in 1969); Glenwood School
in Lee County in east Alabama (70); Springwood School in Chambers County in east Alabama (70); and
Tuscaloosa Academy in Tuscaloosa (67).30
The various new schools were diverse. A study by an educationist in 1970 found, "Nothing
seems true of all such schools." Some schools enrolled upwards of 500, even approaching 1,000
students. Some had fewer than 100 students. Most fell somewhere in between. The physical plants of
the academies were especially varied. Some school organizations had the advantage of moving into old
public school facilities, while others were forced to convert old houses or recreation centers, or to
hastily build simple sheet metal or cinder block facilities of their own. Many of those which opened in
1968 or 1969 were able to move into new facilitates and expand in 1970 or 1971. Some which opened
in 1970 were able to expand soon thereafter. Some had the benefit of using nearby city recreational
facilities; for example, Montgomery segregationist academies used the city’s sports facilitates until
Judge Johnson enjoined the city from allowing the practice. With funding coming exclusively from
tuition and community fund raising (for operating expenses) and from donations (for capital outlay),
some struggled to meet students’ basic needs, particularly in their earliest years. But the desire to avoid
mass integration and potential minority status was enough to keep the school open. In some cases,
30
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schools came to thrive (each of the schools listed in the previous paragraph was still in operation as of
2012-13). What was true of public schools was exacerbated for these private schools: where families
were more wealthy, schools were better funded. Also, where there were more families to contribute,
schools were better off. Thus, the schools that struggled the most were those in sparsely populated
areas or lower class areas, and in the worst cases, both. Some benefitted from large donations from
wealthy individuals. Others were dependent on barbeques, bake sales, and deer hunts to make ends
meet. The only schools which suffered to the point of possible closure where those in places where
whites left the area entirely, not simply the public school system. This included the city of Birmingham,
where Hoover Academy and Jefferson Academy had short lives, and certain Black Belt counties, such as
Macon, where Macon Academy was forced to move from increasingly all-black Tuskegee towards
suburban east Montgomery in order to survive.31
In the spirit of law-and-order disingenuousness, these segregationist academies generally did
not – then or later – officially acknowledge their primary raison d’etre. Most segregationists described
them as bastions of freedom of association. As editors at The Citizen proclaimed, “Nothing is more
attractive to the patrons of private schools than the air of freedom.” Likewise, nothing was more odious
to integrationists, supposedly, than “an arrangement which promise[d] potential victims an avenue of
liberation.” The schools themselves often expressed vague commitments to something – other than
segregation and white supremacy – which the federal government was trying to take away. Bessemer
Academy’s founders, for example, proclaimed themselves to be “committed to building a school where
children could receive a challenging curriculum within a framework of traditional values.” Others
professed to be motivated by a need to provide students with “a comprehensive college preparatory
education in a safe and supportive environment.” The schools were often associated with local white
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churches, and indeed, the freedom to teach Christian values and to compel Bible study and prayer were
significant motivational factors for some school founders.32 Some sectarian, denominational private
schools were also racial exclusive, and several had purposefully expanded to attract students in the
wake of desegregation rulings. Most of the 1965-to-early-1970s wave of segregationist academies in
Alabama were expressly nondenominational, but they nonetheless professed Christian values. They
described themselves as offering a “Christian-based” education. Cahawba Christian’s founders were
concerned that parents would lose sight of the “philosophical differences that exist between Christian
education and public education.” As historian Joseph Crespino has argued, for some church schools,
particularly those established after 1972 under fundamentalist auspices, “race was one of the less
relevant lines along which they discriminated.” Crespino argues, though, that even the enrollment of
racial minorities in such schools “hardly bespoke their racial progressiveness.” Certainly for the schools
which were opened in Alabama between 1965 and 1972, race was the primary motivator. It manifest
itself in diverse, law-and-order style appeals: parents were lured to the school based on fears of
educational deterioration, cultural deterioration, violence, and in many cases miscegenation. These
were still motivating factors for families in 2013. A revealing recruiting “testimonial” from a teenage
white girl on the Bessemer Academy website in 2013 read simply, “I like coming to school and feeling
safe.”33
Alabama’s segregationist academies, church-affiliated and otherwise, benefitted from federal
tax exempt status. Black activists in Mississippi filed a challenge to the granting of such status in 1969.
And in January of 1970, Leon Panetta of the HEW Office of Civil Rights’ convinced HEW secretary Robert
32
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Finch to remove such status from schools which were clearly established to avoid desegregation (this
was one of the reasons why Panetta was forced to step down). Around the same time, a federal court in
Mississippi entered an injunction, in the case of Green v. Kennedy, against granting segregating private
schools tax exempt status. In a continuation of the Johnson Administration’s policy, the Nixon Justice
Department submitted a brief in the case supporting tax exempt status for all private schools. Nixon
himself privately argued that whites could not “send their kids to schools that [were] 90 percent black.”
He concluded, “they’ve got to set up private schools.” Later that year, having conceded the more
hardline southern segregationists to third party candidate George Wallace, Nixon’s advisors counseled
moving towards the political middle in an effort to woo more moderate segregationists. The White
House then announced that the official IRS policy would be to deny tax exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. For a while, it looked like tax law enforcement might deal a real blow to
the maturing academy movement.34
But behind the scenes, the Nixon Administration assured southern congressmen that the IRS
would accept written statements from private schools as proof of nondiscrimination; in other words,
segregationist academies would be able to claim nondiscrimination in principle and continue to
discriminate in practice. The IRS tried to persuade the court that the issues in Green v. Kennedy were no
longer relevant, since the administration had reversed its own course and had begun enforcing
nondiscrimination. The court, in what was by then styled Green v. Connally, ruled that the IRS must take
more affirmative steps to determine which schools were genuinely nondiscriminatory. The Supreme
Court affirmed this ruling under the styling Coit v. Green. However, the IRS proceeded to scrutinize
private schools across the country using two standards: a strict standard for Mississippi, where the

34

Crespino, In Search of Another Country, pp. 226-32, 252-3; Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127 (DC,
1970); Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp 1150 (DC, 1971), affirmed sub nom Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).

685

court’s injunction applied, and a more lax one for everywhere else. Alabama’s segregationist academies
were safe.35
Meanwhile, as early as 1970, Alabama Black Belt school systems were already beginning to
approach the all-black system status which some had predicted, and which had been, in essence, a selffulfilling prophesy. The percentages of black students in the Bullock, Greene, Sumter, and Wilcox
County systems increased from 77, 86, 84, and 83 percent, respectively, in 1965, to 98, 98, 98, and 92
percent by 1975. White parents in Wilcox filed a claim in that county’s school desegregation case
alleging that the school board had purposefully adopted the plan most unpalatable to whites, while
Wilcox Academy boosters, some of them members of the school board, were encouraging parents to
stage a “100 percent” white boycott of the public schools. At the same time, Lowndes and Macon were
on their way to a complete exodus of whites from the public systems, and in the case of Macon, from
the county altogether. Outside the rural Black Belt, the cities of Birmingham and Anniston each saw a
21 percent increase in the percentage of black students in the system from 1955 to 1975, while Mobile,
Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa each experienced at least a 9 percent increase during that time period.
These numbers portended a more complete exodus to come.36
Over the course of the following decade, federal court rulings and administrative decisions
would seem to threaten Alabama’s segregationist academies. In 1973, a federal court in Virginia ruled in
Runyon v. McCrary that private schools could not legally deny students’ applications on account of their
race, prompting the Southern Independent Schools Association to lament, “There is no longer a place of
refuge for any group.” The Supreme Court upheld the decision in 1976. At the same time – during the
Carter Administration – the IRS attempted to apply the Mississippi standard for tax exemption to the
rest of the country and to place the burden of demonstrating nondiscrimination back on the private
35
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schools themselves. If a school had been established and opened in close proximity to desegregation
orders, and if it continued to enroll an “insignificant number of minority students,” then it would have to
show that it had taken affirmative steps to recruit minority students. The Reagan Administration
ultimately reversed the Carter Administration’s policy, however, and attempted to support tax
exemption for all private schools. This prompted a successful intervention in the reopened Green v.
Kennedy/Connally case (then Green v. Regan), but an unsuccessful intervention in another case involving
racially discriminatory church schools, Bob Jones University v. U.S.37
A case which was closer to Alabama’s segregationist academy flowering, both geographically
and temporally, posed a seemingly greater and more immediate threat. In 1969 and into 1971, Hoover
Academy encountered legal opposition to its acquisition of former public school facilities and equipment
in the small City of Brighton, just west of Birmingham. Blacks filed a class action suit in federal court to
prevent the Brighton City Council’s lease of the old Brighton Junior High building to the segregationist
academy, which had already moved several times since its founding. In January of 1970, Judge Hobart
Grooms upheld the lease, which the plaintiffs had argued was not only unconstitutional but procedurally
dubious – the white mayor had voted twice to break a racially divided 3-3 tie in the city council vote
approving the lease. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the decision. The
appellate court challenged Groom’s assertion that Hoover Academy could not be proven to be a
segregated school, calling the academy “lily white from its natal day.” Judge Irving Goldberg delivered
the opinion of the three-judge panel, which included Judges Thornberry and Ainsworth. Goldberg
argued that “in historical context” the court would “have to be more naively unsophisticated than this
job allows to fail to recognize that the city fathers . . . were integrally involved in the founding and
funding of a private, segregated school in order to afford the children of Birmingham an opportunity to
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continue their education in a segregated facility.” The court held that “the city of Brighton’s
determination to sell a public school building to an institution which the city knew would operate an allwhite segregated school had the ultimate effect of placing a special burden on the black citizens of that
community.” It was a “relic of slavery . . . visited as much else upon the black man as a humiliation.”
The city had “in effect encouraged the maintenance of a segregated facility by its action” and had thus
violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The appellate court denied rehearing and
rehearing en banc.38
There were several reasons why these litigious developments surrounding tax exemption and
school facilities did not significantly damage the segregationist academy movement in Alabama,
however. First, the Hoover decision was not meant to be statewide or retroactive. By the spring of
1971, Alabama had already seen an explosion of segregationist academies, many of which had already
acquired public facilities. Second, tax exempt status was also most crucial when private school
foundations were setting up these school plants, often by way of land and facilities donations. Thus,
schools which were already established had less to worry about regarding their federal tax exemption
status, regardless of whether they had acquired public or private facilities. The third, and probably most
important reason the segregationist academies in Alabama were able to survive despite these decisions
was the simple fact that blacks in Alabama were not interested in mounting a further legal challenge to
them. Lee v. Macon plaintiff Anthony Lee said of his early involvement in the litigation, “I don’t even
think that we thought about [the segregationist phenomenon] that much.” Longtime Lee v. Macon
attorney Solomon Seay remembered bluntly, “[We] never really looked at it.” Few blacks were
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interested in following up one lengthy court battle with another one, only to have to pay tuition to
attend a school at which they were not wanted, in the event that such a battle even proved successful.39
Complicating matters was the fact that many white private schools proved, especially in later
years, willing to token desegregate in order to blunt any legal challenge that might come. As early as the
fall after the initial Virginia/McCrary decision in 1973, some academies allowed small numbers of blacks
to enroll, usually those of higher socio-economic background or those who excelled at athletics.
Montgomery Academy, for example, welcomed its first black student in the fall of 1973. As one Virginia
public school official put it, “The very elite private schools [were] aggressively after the qualified black
student so they [could] say, ‘Look at us, we are integrated.’” For many schools, the choice did not come
until years later, sometimes out of the desperate need for funds. In no circumstances did the academies
accept more blacks than would constitute a tiny percentage of the total student enrollment. Thus, all of
these schools which did accept some blacks were, in effect, able to reproduce the characteristics of
freedom-of-choice desegregation. Freedom of choice had, after all, proved most preferable to law-andorder moderates after the litigious breakthrough.40
A Lowndes Academy teacher explained that school’s decision to consider black students out of
necessity: "While they don't want a preponderance of blacks at Lowndes Academy, they will accept a
black." He added that he personally “would have no objection to an integrated school” if whites were
“not in the minority." Like most Black Belt segregationist academies, Lowndes was not forced to
consider accepting blacks until the late 1990s. And when it and others did, it was primarily because
each was in such financial shape that it needed to recruit black students to stay afloat. More successful,
even thriving, segregationist academies, like Montgomery Academy and St. James in Montgomery, also
actively recruited blacks, both as a shield from potential litigation and as a way to cultivate a more
39
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progressive image. Nonetheless, the legal challenge from the state’s blacks never came. The day after
the McCrary decision was handed down in Virginia, the Montgomery Advertiser observed that the
ruling, when upheld by the Supreme Court, “could lead to litigation challenging the all-white status of
private schools founded in the state as an alternative to desegregated public schools.” But, the
Advertiser continued, “the legal scenario for making the ruling effective nationwide would probably be a
repeat of public school desegregation efforts of the past 20 years – and might take as long.” Blacks were
exhausted from decades of litigation and direct action, some were disillusioned with the effects of
continuing white resistance, and most had no stomach for another 20 year battle. Many were more
concerned with how to improve conditions in the public schools to which they had finally won some
measure of equal access and, in some cases, how to maintain those which they had fought so hard to
develop under segregated conditions.41

“We Lost Our Full Identity”: Blacks Protest School Closures
As the historian David Cecelski has argued, “school desegregation was a far more complex
matter than a demand by blacks to attend school with reluctant or hostile whites.” In many school
districts which maintained white majorities, blacks mounted protests to the way desegregation was
actually carried out. This came into sharp focus when court-ordered compulsory assignment plans
began forcing the closure of black schools. The Lee v. Macon court had held that these school “closures”
did not mean that school plants should be closed permanently, only that they not be used as all-black
schools any longer. More often than not, however, school boards took certain whites at their word,
assumed that they would refuse to attend formerly all-black schools, and opted to close blacks schools
permanently. In some cases, they decided to turn these schools into vocational centers or alternative
disciplinary schools. In others they transformed formerly all-black high schools into junior high schools,
41
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or formerly all-black junior high schools into elementary schools. In the latter cases, these
transformations often came with a name change, which school boards thought would mollify reluctant
whites. Taken with the threat to black teachers and administrators of demotion, dismissal, or otherwise
discriminatory treatment, these changes amounted to what Cecelski has called the “dismantling of black
education” in many districts. This was especially true in a number of the Lee v. Macon systems.42
In the east Alabama city of Opelika, the city system’s 1970 desegregation plan called for the
retention of the all-black Darden High, as the renamed Opelika High-Southside Campus. Characterizing
the former Darden as a separate campus of Opelika High allowed the school system to count the two
student bodies as one and achieve the desired system-wide, 63-37 white-to-black ratio which the CRD
and the court desired. Southside Campus was operated that year as a vocational adjunct, open to all
who chose a vocational curriculum – all of whom turned out to be black. The existing Opelika High was
not large enough to house all of the system’s white and black students, and the school board argued
that whites would refuse to attend the former Darden. Johnson and the CRD temporarily accepted this
and allowed the “Southside Campus” situation to continue for a year, during which time the Opelika
school board had a large facility hastily constructed to accommodate all of the system’s high school
students. In 1971 the new Opelika High School took all of the students from both the former Opelika
High and the former Darden. The Darden facility was subsequently sold to the local Head Start
operation. Its loss was widely lamented in the black community.43
Darden had been named for Dr. J.W. Darden, the first black doctor in Lee County, and had been
a source of tremendous community pride. Historian Adam Fairclough has cautioned against the
romanticization of black schools in the Jim Crow era, but in a city like Opelika, with a reasonably strong
black middle class, the black schools were not as pitiful as some in the nearby rural Black Belt. The black
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community made Darden an integral part of its identity. And its pride was underscored by the
discriminatory conditions in which it had achieved this feat: the city’s black schools, like so many others,
were underfunded and neglected relative to the white schools. As one Darden student, Birdie Peterson,
remembered, “We had a premiere school, even in the fifties, that a lot of students around here didn’t
have. We kept that building up as if it were our home. You could open up the front door, and the
[hardwood] floors would just be sparkling.” The school’s principal and teachers were community
leaders. Assemblies were often community events. The community identified with the school’s colors
and mascot and football team. Shared memories and experiences from the school formed a community
bond. Additionally, blacks become minorities at the integrated Opelika High, where they had to
compete with whites for awards and for participation in extra-curricular activities. Darden student
Henrietta Snipes remembered, “We totally lost everything. For females . . . we lost cheerleading, we
lost majorettes. . . . It was not a good time for blacks, because most of us felt like we were forced to
change . . . to give up everything. It took a lot of adjusting and a lot of praying to get through.” Peterson
similarly recalled, “We lost our full identity. We lost everything . . . when we lost Darden.”44
Like the complaints of white parents, black parents’ concerns often manifested themselves in
letters to Judge Johnson. The judge suspected that certain petitions were the result of pressure from
white officials, particularly in the Black Belt, but many petitions, letters, and concerns were clearly
genuine. For example, a group of parents from Enterprise, in the southeastern Wiregrass region of the
state, beseeched Johnson to prevail upon the Coffee County Board of Education to retain all-black
Coppinville High in some capacity, rather than close it down entirely. They wrote, “We as citizens of the
Negro community would like to get the court order modified – we would prefer white children being
sent this way under the zone method.” They appealed to Johnson to consider the black children who
had made the Coppinville High football team one of the strongest and most successful in the 2A
44
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classification. They praised the condition of the former school plant and its many programs, writing,
“We had a new school – with auto mechanics, shop, art, band – and all this is going to be lost. . . . We
need two high schools.” The parents had already spoken to the school board, which had blamed the
court. The board had purportedly agreed “that they would send white children to this school instead of
wiping us completely out.” Another Coppinville parent wrote a separate letter with a similar plea. “We
have 60 band members and 10 majorettes,” she asked, “What will become of them when they are
transferred to an all-white school?” She added, “It’s suppose to be a freedom of choice then why are
we going one way” [sic].45
Even before freedom of choice had given way to system-wide compulsory assignments, black
parents were engaged in efforts to save black schools. After the omnibus August, 1968 school closure
order forced the Greene County school board to close all-black Jameswood school, the Jameswood PTA
used freedom of choice in an attempt to force the school back open. The PTA counseled all parents to
choose Jameswood as their first choice, followed by the all-white elementary school at the town of
Eutaw. The idea was that this would severely overcrowd the Eutaw school and force the board to
reconsider opening Jameswood. The school board’s attorney, Maury Smith, informed Judge Johnson of
the effort. Plaintiffs’ attorney Harvey Burg corroborated the information. Johnson advised asking Fred
Gray to go to the black parents and ascertain which ones actually wanted to attend the Eutaw school in
lieu of others, because Jameswood “would not be reopened” and the parents ought to be “impressed
with this fact.”46

45

Billy Cooper, Eugene Ford, and Joe Roy Berry to Frank Johnson, Oct. 16, 1969; Velma Williams, Sept. 19,
1968; both in Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 24, Folder 12. For concerns of authenticity
and pressure from white officials, see Hugh Lloyd to Frank Johnson, May 6, 1969, and Petitions of “trustees and
patrons” of Coxheath Junior High School (2), Undated, Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 26,
Folder 4.
46
Memorandum of Phone Calls, Sept. 13, 1968, Frank Johnson Papers: Lee v. Macon Case File, Container
25, Folder 14.

693

Black parents often had practical concerns, beyond attachment to community schools. A man
from sparsely populated Chambers County, on the northeastern fringe of the Black Belt, asked Judge
Johnson in a letter if he had considered the effect of “his” school closure order on children in the
county. “Surely you couldn’t have had children in mind who at the present time is riding a school bus 30
to 40 miles a day” [sic]. “Think about how much earlier they will have to leave home,” he wrote, “and
how late they will be getting home if they are forced to ride a bus 22 additional minutes each day – dark
when they leave home and dark when they get back,” at which time they would have to walk a
considerable distance in many cases down dark rural roads. What good would the children be, he
wondered, if they were sleeping all day and exhausted when they got home. “We honestly believe in
what you are trying to do,” he added, “but we are also interested in the health and welfare of our
children.”47
Often school administrators and teachers, themselves, pleaded for the retention of black
schools. The principal of the Lockhart No. 2 School in south Alabama’s Covington County, Mrs. Willie
Kitchen, sent an appeal to Johnson not only touting the school’s facilities, but also describing the very
practical concerns of its parents. Lockhart No. 2 had been ordered closed by the school board at the
insistence of HEW. Kitchen told Judge Johnson that no black children had to walk more than 5 blocks to
get to the school, situated in the middle of the tiny town’s black community. The school to which the
students were to be transferred, however, was 1.25 miles away – too short a distance to demand
transportation from the school board, but long and dangerous enough to cause concern. The principal
argued that there was “a very long and dangerous highway” that separated the black village from the
rest of the town. Also, most of the village’s black parents worked at the U.S. Air Force base (Eglin)
across the Florida state line and left their children very early in the morning. “Most of the children,”
Kitchen wrote, “can be left alone to go to school . . . with no fear of danger, [and] when the weather is
47
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bad the children can run to and from school.” This would not be so, she argued, if they were forced to
attend formerly all-white Harlan. “Judge, your honor,” she added, “it isn’t that we are fighting
desegregation, we are just thinking about the safety and welfare of our children.”48
Principal Kitchen also argued that Lockhart was in great shape. In fact, recent improvements
made by the school board in an attempt to avoid substantial desegregation had undoubtedly made it
the envy of blacks in neighboring school districts. Kitchen explained, “We have a new lunchroom, new
in-door restrooms, water cooler inside, and water fountains outside, televisions and record players in
each classroom, movie and film projectors, and the entire school is heated with electric, thermostatic
heaters.” Each classroom had “bookshelves, books, and maps,” and the school had “an automatic time
clock” and was “well-supplied with playground equipment.” She pleaded, “Let us keep this school
awhile longer.” The parents of Lockhart petitioned the court and the school board and were able to
delay the school’s closure for two more years. But no white children ever chose to attend it under
freedom of choice, and the board would not send white students to it. It was closed in 1969.49

“Old Times There are Not Forgotten”: Blacks Protest the Symbols of the Confederacy
Black complaints included more than black school closures. Some school systems were willing
to, or were forced to, incorporate to black schools into their desegregation plans rather than close them,
although this almost invariably involved renaming the formerly black schools to remove what was seen
by white officials as a stigma which would drive white parents to private schools. More often than not,
though, blacks were assigned to formerly all-white schools, and in these cases, the terms of integration
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almost always favored whites. Sometimes they were detrimental to all: for example, many schools
cancelled homecoming dances and proms rather than sponsor integrated events, while private parents’
groups then organized their own, segregated events. Many schools eradicated entire programs, like
marching band, rather than integrate them. But when it came to a school’s name, its mascot, its colors,
and its traditions, those of the formerly all-white schools were all generally retained in desegregated
situations. In many instances, this meant blacks attended schools which were nicknamed “the Rebels”;
which flew the Confederate “battle flag”; which played and sang the unofficial anthem of the Old South,
“Dixie,” at sporting events and assemblies; and which used textbooks like Know Alabama, which
glorified the antebellum South, apologized for slavery, lamented Reconstruction, and celebrated
Redemption.50
Know Alabama was only the most egregious and widely protested example of a distorted history
text in general use in Alabama; it was certainly not the only one. Like Know Alabama, the secondary
school text Alabama History for Schools also presented an apologia for slavery and described slaves as
docile and content. “While the Negro was badly treated as a rule in the foreign slave trade,” it read, “he
was generally very well treated by Alabama farmers.” It noted that “most of the slave trading ships
were owned and operated by Northerners,” and argued that, “with all the drawbacks of slavery, it
should be noted that slavery was the earliest form of social security in the United States.” According to
the text, “Slaves enjoyed little luxury but suffered little or no want . . . in clothing, as in food and
housing.” They were even able to live together in the slave quarters, which they liked to do “to keep
from getting lonesome.” Slaves also “received the best healthcare which the times could offer.”
Distortions unsurprisingly clouded the book’s coverage of the Civil War, as well. The “War between the
States” was not caused by slavery, but by “the crusade against slavery,” mounted by the abolitionists. If
“crusading abolitionists” had “stopped to realize that many of the slaves had been brought to this
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country by Northern slave traders who had made vast fortunes in this trade, they might have been more
willing to have the northern states share the cost of emancipating slaves . . . .”51
In another widely used secondary school text entitled The Land Called Alabama, all antebellum
white southerners seemed to share the one-time sentiments of Thomas Jefferson: “As a result of the
liberal atmosphere of the American Revolution, Southerners became apologetic about [slavery],
admitting that it was intrinsically wrong, but arguing that slaves existed in the South in such large
numbers that they could not be turned loose on Southern society.” They were soon convinced, though,
that “slavery was the best means of social and economic control of a subject race ever devised.” This
was partly because, “Generally, a planter took keen interest in his slaves, attending to both their
physical and spiritual needs,” even “encouraging family life.” The slave codes and “public opinion
generally functioned to give slaves fair treatment.” Also, “most masters wanted their overseers to enlist
the cooperation and appeal to the good sense of their slaves rather than use brute force.” After the
“War Between the States,” blacks constituted the “great bulk of the votes” in the Reconstruction
coalition, “but only a very small fraction could even sign their own names,” according to the text. The
Ku Klux Klan played a prominent role in overthrowing this “Radical” coalition. The KKK would “ride out
of the woods on Negroes coming home from Union League meetings, where they were being
indoctrinated by Republicans.” The Klan “did not hesitate to resort to extreme punishment under
certain circumstances.” There was scarcely any mention of the civil rights movement in the text, only a
few brief references to things like the Freedom Rides or the Montgomery bus boycott. But George
Wallace appears as a heroic figure who barred black students from the University of Alabama,
whereupon “only the introduction of federal troops forced the governor to withdraw.”52
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A study undertaken by a history professor at the University of South Alabama in Mobile
presented some generalized conclusions about history texts in Alabama schools in the early 1970s. The
study concluded, “The negro is never portrayed as an actor; rather, he is always acted upon, always
described as a passive agent,” with all of “his contributions to society . . . slighted.” There was also “a
deliberate attempt to perpetuate the image of the Negro as an emotional, trusting, lazy, childlike
creature.” It was an “inescapable conclusion” that the black person was “made to seem to prefer his
position,” because “almost no attention [was] given to his efforts to become an active member of
society.” At the same time, southern whites were universally portrayed as “the Negro’s friend and
protector, always kind and benevolent.” At their best, the texts surveyed in the study presented a
“heavily qualified objectivity.” The study concluded with a number of rhetorical questions regarding the
implications of these findings:

How can black children taught from such texts develop a sense of pride in their race? How, on
the other hand, can white children come to understand why so much criticism is leveled by
those outside their culture at practices which their formal education, at the very least, does not
condemn? How can they begin to understand the racial revolution in which they are
participants?53

Many blacks understood that the answers to all of these questions was: they cannot. The state NAACP
and local parents groups continued into the mid and late 1970s trying to eradicate such texts from
schools.54
Black students did not have to delve into their history books to find celebratory reminders of
their chattel past. Symbols of the Confederacy were all around them. And of all the old emblems of the
Old South which were prominently displayed in formerly all-white schools, “Dixie” was perhaps the most
the debates over the Missouri Compromise and the future of slavery famously argued, “We have the wolf by the
ear, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other."
See, for a convenient reference/citation, the Monticello website, http://www.monticello.org, Quotations, Famous
Quotations.
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abhorrent to blacks. Confederate flags were commonplace, of course, on school flag poles and in school
classrooms – sometimes above or in lieu of the American flag. But “Dixie” was participatory. At football
games and homecoming rallies, students sang – and the school band was forced to play – the song
which lamented the death of the old “land of cotton.” The song had begun as a parody act in a Jim
Crow-style, northern minstrelsy show, meant to be sung by a white performer in blackface portraying a
slave who yearned to return to the antebellum South. It was spontaneously adopted by southern
secessionists not long thereafter. After the defeat of the Confederacy and the implementation of
Reconstruction, the song became more of a dirge for a bygone era, for a lost generation, and for slavery
– the institution upon which the entire socio-economic structure of the white South had been
dependent. After the Redemption of the South by the Democratic, Bourbon white supremacists, the
song become a more gleeful nod to a glorious past. Then in times of successful civil rights activism, it
became a sad commentary on the state of things.55
Across the South, blacks in choruses and marching bands protested playing or singing the song.
When one student in Tennessee was expelled in May of 1969 for such a refusal, he filed suit in federal
court. During the trial, the plaintiff alleged that white students often replaced the words of the song
with lines like, “Nigger, go back and pick that cotton.” The following year, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals would decide 2-1 to uphold the boy’s suspension, accepting the argument that he had been
punished for walking away during a performance, not for refusing to play the song. Alabama schools
continued to celebrate the song in the meantime. In November, 1969, a melee erupted at a
homecoming ceremony in Anniston, Alabama when black students protested the playing of the anthem.
In response to this incident, W.C. Patton of the state’s NAACP called on state Superintendent Ernest
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Stone to prohibit the display of the battle flag and the playing of “Dixie.” Patton sardonically suggested
that the two might possibly be replaced by “The Star Spangled Banner” and the Stars and Stripes.56
Early in 1970, the Emancipation Association of Birmingham and Vicinity, of which Patton was
president, issued a statement in observance of the 107th anniversary of the signing of the Emancipation
Proclamation. The statement was broad in its aims but ultimately spoke to black’s concerns over
Confederate symbols. The group generally decried the fact that the promise of the 1963
demonstrations in Birmingham had not been fulfilled but instead had given way to “efforts at make
believe” and the building of “propaganda images.” They specifically denounced the notion of law and
order which the city’s white leadership had hidden behind since that time. “We believe in and seek to
participate in law and order as a way of justice and not a rage of bigotry. . . . We reject the concept of
‘law and order’ in the context of racism, dual justice, and as a cover up for economic and social bigotry.”
In this context, they argued that the Birmingham school board’s 1970 desegregation plan was “faulty
and unacceptable” and ought to be “opposed and fought in the courts.” The statement continued, “We
denounce and oppose the singing of ‘Dixie’ and the display of the Confederate flag by public schools . . .
as an activity, part of a program, and at athletic games.” Both were “symbolic of a cause, sprit, and
hostility which reminds us of division, disunity and an unhappy past.”57
Alabama’s black students, themselves, had protested Confederate symbols in desegregated
schools as early as 1968, when students at Shaw High in Mobile had unsuccessfully demanded that the
school’s mascot be changed from the “Rebels,” that its band cease playing “Dixie” at sporting events,
and that it allow the formation of an Afro-American Club for the study of black culture. When
compulsory assignment plans went into wide effect in the fall of 1970, such protests exploded across the
state. On a Friday night in October, 1970, black students at Huntsville’s Butler High engaged in an
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impromptu protest which ignited a firestorm in the city. Butler was the state’s largest school at the time
– with 2,600 students, 300 of whom were black. At a pep rally in preparation for the night’s football
game, around 100 blacks rose from the assembly and walked out when the band began playing “Dixie,”
which it had refrained from doing at each of the fall’s previous pep rallies. Moments later, 50 or so
black students returned, stormed the stage, and attempted to remove and destroy the Confederate flag.
The principal was driven from the stage in the ensuing brawl, which did not abate until the police
arrived, accompanied by a riot squad. When the school board announced that 113 of the black students
had been suspended, solidarity marches and demonstrations followed at the city’s Robert E. Lee High
and Huntsville High as well as at nearby Alabama A&M College. The suspended black students began
calling upon the school board for the dismissal of the 38-year-veteran Butler principal, who they argued
did not know “how to communicate” with blacks. White parents responded in kind, as a delegation of
30-40 PTA members turned into a throng which besieged the city superintendent at his office and began
firing questions. Did he support the Butler principal? What was the school board’s position on “Dixie”
and the flag? As the superintendent tried to deflect the queries, someone spontaneously began singing,
“I wish I was in the land of cotton; old times there are not forgotten!” The entire crowd then joined in
singing “Dixie” as the dismayed superintendent looked on helplessly.58
White counter-protests of this kind occurred elsewhere across the state. Two weeks after the
Butler incident, 400 white students at West End High in Birmingham walked out of classes and gathered
on a football practice field to protest what they characterized as preferential treatment for black
students. The West End principal had boldly attempted to appease black students by acquiescing to the
naming of a “Mr. and Mrs. Soul” in addition to the annual naming of a “Mr. and Mrs. West End” and
other popularity-driven distinctions to be published in the school’s yearbook. The 1,700-student school
was approximately 60 percent white, and voting on these things had broken down on strictly racial lines.
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Accordingly, the 28 ‘awards’ – like “Most Like to Succeed” – had all gone to white students. When black
students complained to the principal, he agreed that black students “ought to have representation.”
White parents responded by calling for his resignation, and the white students initiated the walkout,
which turned into a 750-student boycott on its second day. The white students subsequently listed a
number of grievances, chief among which was the band’s recent removal of two bars of “Dixie” from the
school’s anthem. The white principal audaciously defended the decision of the school’s band director,
who was black, by saying, “He possibly could find it offensive.”59
The protests and counter-protests continued. The Butler High Rebels had cancelled their game
the week of the melee but resumed their season thereafter. At the first football game after the
incident, the band initially refrained from playing the contentious song. But with the Rebels down late
in the game, white students began chanting “We want ‘Dixie,’” and the band relented. Whites in the
stands waved tiny Confederate flags as police, sheriff’s deputies, and state troopers discouraged any
further violence. One month later, Pell City High School in suburban east Birmingham was closed after a
series of fights. Black students had asked that the band not play “Dixie,” while whites responded by
protesting the appointment of two black cheerleaders to the school’s all-white cheerleading squad. On
the same day, Jones Valley High in Birmingham was partially closed. Fights had erupted there when
blacks refused to stand for the school’s alma mater in protest of the naming of an all-white homecoming
court. Blacks had only recently been forced to abandon the community schools which had served as a
source of identity for many. On top of that, they then felt forced to accept an identity which was not
only alien and offensive, but down right threatening to them.60
Whites responded with appeals to their own heritage and identity and, of course, their
constitutional rights. The organ of the national Citizens Council, The Citizen, ran an editorial in which it
castigated anyone who understood “Dixie” to be a symbol of slavery. Anyone who knew their history
59
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understood well that “the War Between the States was fought over tariffs and the right of secession –
not slavery.” The fact that “in Huntsville, Alabama the school band [could] not play “Dixie,” and no one
could “wave a Confederate flag,” demonstrated a “depressing declination of freedom of speech.” Some
Alabamians were equally incredulous that “Dixie” was even an issue. Alabama lieutenant-gubernatorial
candidate and Clayton attorney Jere Beasley argued, “The playing of Dixie has been a longtime southern
tradition that was never meant to be derogatory to anybody. And things are pretty bad,” he added,
“when this traditional right is threatened.”61
An Auburn woman echoed these sentiments in a letter to the editor, joking that the song was
being “picked on.” She added another, and perhaps unintentionally revealing, metaphor, insisting that
the song’s detractors were “’in heat,’ culturally speaking.” They had “never been on the barricades in
the fight for justice,” anyway, she alleged. Not content to rest there, she added that a case for “’racial
balance’ in the nation’s musical fare” could not be made, since the country’s taste in music had “already
tipped too much in favor of words and noises, imitative of music, which [were] not worthy of the nobler
virtues of the black race to whom they [were] credited.” Finally, she predicted that the assault on
“Dixie” would inspire a “musical backlash.” Not only would “Dixie” be “more ubiquitous than ever,” but
blacks might find themselves “treated to renditions of that more candid southern paeon [sic], ‘The Lay
of the Last Rebel.’” Its words were, indeed, more blunt: “O’ I’m a good old rebel, Now that’s just what I
am. For this ‘Fair Land of Freedom,’ I do not care a damn.”62
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CHAPTER 18: SWANN SONG, 1971-73

On the afternoon of May 15, 1972, presidential hopeful George Wallace took the podium at a
shopping mall in suburban Baltimore before a crowd of 1,000 loyal supporters and one would-be
assassin. A twenty-one year old bus boy and janitor from Wisconsin named Arthur Bremer had been
following the governor’s campaign for some time. He had heard the denunciations of the "briefcasecarrying bureaucrats" who were enforcing the "asinine busing decisions" being handed down by the
overbearing federal courts. Trial court, circuit court, and Supreme Court decisions in 1971 and early
1972 had put busing on the national agenda. This had only increased Wallace’s appeal to white,
working-class conservatives across the country. They had begun to see the Alabamian as someone who
would fight to keep their hard-earned tax dollars from being squandered on the welfare state. If the
Nixon Administration failed to put the brakes on busing before courts forced it upon cities across the
country, then perhaps Wallace would. An apprehensive Nixon had actually pressured Wallace into
running as a Democrat, instead of a third-party candidate, by threatening the governor’s brother with
prosecution for corruption. It was assumed that Wallace would not be able to win the primary and thus
not factor in the general election. But as of that day in May, he had already won three Democratic
primaries and was favored to win in Maryland.1
Wallace’s adoption of the politics of law and order had allowed him to appeal to voters’ racial
sensibilities with a colorblind language which scarcely resembled the fiery segregationist rhetoric of his
former speechwriter Asa Carter. But if his campaign speeches sounded different, a concomitant change
in his actions at home lagged a little behind. Wallace had at least one more round of hopeless defiance
left in him. While in Alabama, he embarked on a series of what were – many had come to realize –
1
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publicity stunts, which the national press sardonically dubbed the “stand in the schoolbus door.” Even
as he understood that Albert Brewer’s more restrained approach to resistance was perhaps more
effective, the governor knew there was still political hay to be made from direct defiance. So he
challenged the courts and the Nixon Administration to one final row over Alabama’s schools, only this
time it supposedly had nothing to do with race.2
Arthur Bremer did not care about any of this. Though Nixon worked behind the scenes after the
assassination attempt to paint him as a liberal, he was wholly unconcerned with politics or race or, as it
turned out, with anything but fame. He had, in fact, strongly considered killing Nixon. Instead it was
Wallace whom he stalked to the rally in Laurel, Maryland, where the governor accused the White House
of hypocrisy in its failure to stop “senseless and asinine” busing. After a short speech, Wallace
descended to shake hands with well-wishers, including Bremer, who shot him four times at point blank
range, gravely wounding the governor and three bystanders, including an Alabama State Trooper and a
Secret Service agent. Wallace was paralyzed from the waist down. He carried Maryland and Michigan
that night, but he had no energy or desire to continue the race. George McGovern won and was
subsequently defeated soundly by Nixon.3
In the year leading up to Bremer’s failed assassination attempt, metropolitan school
desegregation dominated political discussions. With the Supreme Court’s April, 1971 Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg decision, it became a national issue. Wallace tried to exploit it at home and
aboard. Every school system in Alabama was under some sort of desegregation order. The Lee v.
Macon case had been broken into 99 separate cases, and the three-judge court had only the issue of the
state’s junior colleges and trade schools to resolve. One of the severed Lee v. Macon cases, along with
the cases against Jefferson County and Mobile, would become entangled in the controversy over
“busing to achieve racial balance” and the many ways in which whites tried to avoid it. Ultimately,
2
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Wallace was as powerless against the thrust of two decades of school desegregation litigation as he was
against Bremer’s bullets. But metropolitan white flight continued apace, despite the best efforts of the
NAACP-LDF and some of the trial courts to shoot it down.

Loose Ends in Lee v. Macon: Trade Schools and Junior Colleges
Entering 1971 most systems under the Lee v. Macon umbrella had been placed under terminaltype orders and were in the process of implementing corresponding desegregation plans. Accordingly,
most of these individualized cases had been severed from the statewide case and the jurisdiction of the
three-judge court and had been transferred to single judges in their respective districts. The one issue
that remained under the purview of the three-judge court was that of the state’s trade schools and
junior colleges. During the first Wallace Administration, the governor and state legislature had spent
millions on an expansion of the two-year college system in an effort to make it accessible to,
supposedly, every student in the state. Certain aspects of the expanded system were made the
responsibility of a state Trade School and Junior College Authority. But since this body was established
under the state department of education, and since much of the two-year schools’ administration fell to
the state board of education, it had been easy to include them in the March, 1967 Lee v. Macon
statewide desegregation decree. In 1969 the court had ordered HEW’s Office of Education to formulate
a feasible desegregation plan for these schools, since the state board had proved incapable, or unwilling,
to do so. A year later, on August 14, 1970, the Lee court entered a decree adopting substantially the
HEW plan. The plan provided for the elimination of dual attendance zones and separate transportation
areas based on race, the elimination of racial identifiability through faculty desegregation, and the
elimination of duplicate programs at geographically proximate schools.4
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Beyond these broad goals, the desegregation of the junior college system required what Judge
Hobart Grooms called “a rather detailed treatment.” The state’s junior colleges did not have restricted
attendance areas; they were technically open to anyone. But most did not have dormitories, either.
They were “commuter-type” schools, and the state traditionally provided free bus transportation within
certain zones around the schools. This meant that each school had a de facto
attendance/transportation zone which it served, and the formerly all-white schools’ zones overlapped
with those of two black junior colleges. The state’s 15 white junior colleges had been token
desegregated, but the two black schools remained all-black. The black junior colleges were also
underfunded relative to the white schools and had limited curricula and course offerings. The state’s 21
white trade schools had been token desegregated along with the junior colleges. But Mobile,
Tuscaloosa, Montgomery, Birmingham, Gadsden, and Huntsville each had a pair of trade schools, one
predominantly white and the other predominantly or all-black. The same de facto attendance and
transportation policy applied to the trade schools, so these had overlapping zones as well.5
The court undertook to eliminate this duality by means that proved quite controversial. In the
Mobile region, for example, the court ordered the state board to split the attendance zones of formerly
all-white Faulkner State and formerly all-black Mobile State, and to restrict enrollment to those zones.
Faulkner had been recently established under the Wallace initiative in 1965. It provided southern
Alabama’s white students with a cheaper, more accessible alternative to the recently established
University of South Alabama, itself created in 1963 from extension programs previously administered by
the University of Alabama. Mobile State had been established in the 1930s as a two-year branch of allblack Alabama State in Montgomery. It had been granted independent junior college status under the
Wallace initiative, but it was located in the middle of large black neighborhood in downtown Mobile,
from which it drew most of its student body. Under the court-approved plan, Faulkner State would
5
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serve only Baldwin County on the eastern side of Mobile Bay, and Mobile State would take Mobile
County and largely rural Washington County to the north. The court also made the Trade School and
Junior College Authority a party defendant to the case and ordered it to undertake an equalization
program which would bring the facilities and course offerings at Mobile State up to par with Faulkner.
Until the equalization was complete, students would be allowed to register for courses at the school
outside their zone if those courses were not offered at the school in their own zone. The two schools
were ordered to exchange faculties through temporary assignments until each could attain a
substantially desegregated faculty of its own. “Substantially” was to mean equal to the ratio of whitesto-blacks in the State of Alabama, which was roughly 75-25 white. The court included provisions to
protect black teachers and administrators from discrimination and to promote the recruitment of
minority students. It also required the state board to report regularly on enrollment and faculty
assignment, just as it had done with the 99 elementary and secondary systems.6
One aspect of the court-ordered plan for Mobile was particularly unpopular. The court enjoined
further capital outlay for Faulkner State until the facilities and curriculum at Mobile State could be
brought up to standard. The school’s namesake – newspaper publisher and avid George Wallace
supporter James H. Faulkner, Sr. – called his longtime friend, Judge Richard Rives, to express his concern.
Faulkner had served as a state senator and had run for governor in 1954 and 1958. He had served as the
mayor of the Baldwin County town of Bay Minette at a young age and had remained tremendously
popular with local whites for his educational philanthropy and industrial development efforts. Rives had
been “personally and politically friendly” with Faulkner before, in Rives words, Faulkner had “[become]
so addicted to Wallace” and Rives had become a federal judge. In 1970 locals had just persuaded the
state legislature to rename Bay Minette’s new Yancey Junior College for Faulkner – it having been
previously named in honor of the fire-eating secessionist William Lowndes Yancey. Faulkner told Rives
6
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he felt that the school then bearing his name was being unfairly punished. He argued that it had been
more aptly funded than Mobile State because of contributions from local citizens, namely himself, not
because of inequitable capital outlay. He stressed that he and others associated with the school “had no
problem” with integration. Faulkner requested an in-chambers meeting with the judge, but an
uncomfortable Rives advised his friend to write all three judges on the Lee court and express these
concerns. Enough time passed that Rives forgot that he had suggested Faulkner write the letter, until it
arrived in September of 1970. Judge Johnson surmised that Faulkner intended to publicize the letter in
one of his papers and refused to respond, but he told Judges Rives and Grooms that they had his
approval to respond on behalf of the court. He pointed out that the issue of desegregating the junior
colleges had been under consideration by the court for three years, during which time the court had
purposely been “nursing” it along. It was “indeed a late hour” for Faulkner to be complaining. Rives
nonetheless forwarded the letter to each of the attorneys involved in the Lee case for any such action as
they deemed necessary.7
One week later, the defendants submitted a petition for modification of the August 14 decree.
They asked for a few minor alterations in the plan for the state’s trade schools and then turned to the
subject of Mobile State and Faulkner State. Faulkner enrolled nearly 800 full-time students, around half
of which came from Mobile County and would therefore be forced to attend Mobile State under the
new plan. The defendants argued that the Baldwin County school was obligated on a $100,000 bond
issue which it had used to recently build dormitories. These dormitories housed the students from
Mobile County, whose rent was used to pay the monthly debt obligations. They argued that there were
not enough students, black or white, in Baldwin County and that the school would lose too many
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students and too much revenue and thereby become insolvent. They thus petitioned the court to allow
students from Mobile County to attend Faulkner in the event that they furnished their own
transportation. Restricting their proposed relief to students with transportation was a seemingly raceneutral provision which would allow the court to maintain its stance on overlapping transportation
zones. But its effect would be to discriminate against poorer black students in the city of Mobile who
could not furnish their own transportation. White students were more likely to be able to provide their
own. The Civil Rights Division opposed the motion, ignoring the contention that the school might
become insolvent and simply reiterating that an “open door” enrollment policy was not enough to
discharge the state of its affirmative duty to desegregate the schools by the most effective and
reasonably available means possible. In mid-October, the court denied the defendant’s motion,
prompting an appeal to the Fifth Circuit. It was this portion of the Lee case that lingered before the
three-judge court in 1971.8
As the defendants awaited the judgment of the appellate court in the late winter of 1971, Judge
Johnson continued to receive complaints about the junior college desegregation order, particularly that
portion of the order requiring a statewide 75-25 faculty desegregation ratio, per the Carr v. Montgomery
standard. The faculty at Mobile State were among the dissenters, arguing that their ranks would be
“cherry picked” by the state board when it determined who should transfer to white schools. This had
been the case with the elementary and secondary schools, they understood, so why would their case be
any different. The outcry from white junior colleges which would be forced to accept a large influx of
black teachers was even louder, of course. An Albertville woman wrote to Johnson in January on behalf
of her “Home Makers Club,” insisting that the judge divulge how he arrived at such numbers as 75-25.
Why 25 percent negroes when “on the national average there [were] only ten percent approximately?”

8

Petition to Modify, Sept. 18, 1970; Response of the United States to Show Cause Order, Oct. 9, 1970;
Alabama State Board of Education, Notice of Appeal, Oct. 29, 1970; Lee v. Macon County, Frank Johnson Papers:
Lee v. Macon Case File, Container 23, Folder 1.

710

The area around Albertville and Snead Junior College – on northeast Alabama’s Sand Mountain – was
only 2 percent black, so the faculty provision in the order would deny both black and white teachers
their “right to choose their place of abode.” The judge was “in effect . . . usurping the rights and
privileges guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.” The club asked that Johnson please
reconsider the ruling, which would “only cause confusion” if allowed to stand. Another Sand Mountain
women’s club, the “Philos Study Club” of Boaz, issued a similar request, in which it appealed to “the
choice of professional people as to where they may work,” as well as to “simple human dignity.”
Johnson received other letters from garden clubs and the like, and a resolution from the Snead State
faculty, with similar requests and claims.9
Sand Mountain did, indeed, have a relatively small percentage of black residents, and
integrating the Snead State faculty would certainly have required movement of both black teachers in
and white teachers out. What white residents petitioning to Johnson did not admit was that Sand
Mountain had for decades proudly hailed itself as a place where blacks were not welcome. It had not
been long since crude signs warned, “Nigger, don’t let the sun set on you on this mountain,” and since
state Superintendent of Education Ernest Stone had recalled for George Wallace, “A negro was not
allowed to travel over Sand Mountain when I was a boy.” As with the elementary and secondary
schools, it had become easier to couch one’s concerns in terms of constitutional rights rather than race,
however.10
The flap over the junior college decree intensified in March, after a hearing on its
implementation for the fall of 1971. The Birmingham News published a front page story on the hearing
in which it insinuated that Judge Johnson did not consider the state’s junior colleges to be institutions of
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higher learning and in which it implied that the HEW plan for the fall was going to be implemented as-is.
Johnson received a number of letters from students, parents, and educators fiercely defending their
institutions and objecting strenuously to the HEW plan. Johnson was compelled to respond to some of
these and to indicate, yet again, that he was not the only judge hearing the case. He also pointed out
that the assertion that the court did not consider the junior colleges institutions of higher learning was
“exactly the opposite” of what the court had held. It had indeed applied the principles of the Auburn
University-Montgomery case (Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama Board of Education) to
the junior colleges and trade schools, broadly speaking. And finally, the HEW plan had not been
approved as-is but was subject to state objection and potential modification.11
Ironically, the clamor was increasing just as the trial court and the appellate court were
softening the blow by modifying the August, 1970 decree. On March 8 the Lee court entered an order
sua sponte in which it changed the meaning of “substantially” as it related to faculty desegregation in
the trade schools and junior colleges. The court determined, “Some of the junior colleges and trade
schools located in Alabama actually serve geographical areas that have comparatively fewer and others
have comparatively greater than the average ratio of Negroes and whites in the State as a whole.” It
held that requiring them to desegregate their faculties and staff such that the ratio was the same as the
state’s “may probably cause an unnecessary hardship on some of the institutions concerned and on
some of the instructors and teachers affected.” In determining what “substantially” desegregated
would be, the court would take into account the racial composition of each school’s attendance zone.12
Then, later that summer, the Fifth Circuit court stayed a portion of the decree pertaining to
Faulkner State and Mobile State. As the appellate court was considering the case, the student bodies of
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the two schools remained largely segregated: Faulkner State enrolled 699 white students and 85 black
students, while Mobile State enrolled 822 black students and 7 white students. But since the appeal of
the trial court’s order had been filed, the Trade School and Junior College Authority had initiated the
court-ordered equalization program at Mobile State, which included the construction of a number of
new facilities. And the state board of education had revised the curriculum at Mobile State, to include a
number of new course offerings and degree programs. In light of these facts, the appellate court turned
to the issue of attendance zones for the two schools. Citing the Auburn University-Montgomery case,
the appellate court announced that it felt “some reluctance to require school attendance zones for
college level institutions.” The court also pointed to the situation in Jefferson County, where formerly
all-white Jefferson State and all-black Wenonah State had not been ordered to submit to a similar plan.
The court thus stayed the portion of the trial court’s order requiring rigid attendance zones for Faulkner
State and Mobile State. This was, in essence, an application of the pre-Green principle for the
elementary and secondary schools. The court was willing to give the junior colleges a chance to
desegregate substantially under a free choice plan (in this case called an “open door” policy) once
choice–influencing factors were eliminated, that is, as soon as facilities and curricula were equalized and
faculty were fully desegregated.13
The desegregation of the trade schools and junior colleges would remain under the supervision
of the three-judge Lee v. Macon court into the following year. When the former president of Livingston
University in west Alabama petitioned the court for a temporary restraining order in the spring of 1972,
seeking his reinstatement, the court found occasion to dissolve itself. Judge Johnson wrote, “While the
current problems of desegregation could hardly be described as less serious than in the past . . . present
difficulties are of a more localized quality than was previously true.” The complaint in question, he
suggested, could have been brought as a separate action before a single district judge. Additionally,
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Johnson wrote, “the major constitutional issues have been decided and are no longer in question.”
Thus, “the time [had] come” for the transfer of individual state college, trade school, and junior college
cases to the relevant individual districts and for the dissolution of the three-judge court. Dick Rives, who
had been a Circuit Judge for over 20 years, told Judges Johnson and Grooms that the three-judge panel
had lasted longer than any other he had ever served on. It had, after all, been convened nearly a decade
before, in 1964. When “it is finally dissolved,” he wrote, “we three should get together at an early date
for a real celebration.”14

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
The U.S. Supreme Court’s April, 1971 decision in the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg case
demonstrated why Judge Johnson would a year later claim that “the current problems of desegregation
could hardly be described as less serious than in the past.” As the Lee v. Macon court was considering
the trade school and junior college issue in the winter of 1970-71, the Supreme Court was considering
the Charlotte case alongside four other cases dealing with the unresolved issues of metropolitan
desegregation and busing to achieve “racial balance.” One of these cases was the Davis v. Mobile case,
in which the LDF had applied for certiorari because it felt the school system’s plan was still inadequate.
The Nixon Justice Department had taken the position that the Mobile plan was adequate, and the Civil
Rights Division was, therefore, calling for the Court to uphold district and appellate court decisions
which approved it. Nixon had made opposition to “busing” the hallmark of his school policy, thus the
CRD was compelled to support a reversal and remand of trial and appellate court rulings in Swann which
had ordered and upheld significant busing of students in non-contiguous zones, the sort of which the
LDF was calling for in Davis.15
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In the Swann decision itself, the Court upheld the district court and appellate court rulings,
despite the CRD and the Solicitor General’s arguments to the contrary. It was able to issue a unanimous
decision despite the reluctance of Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Hugo Black to approve largescale busing to achieve racial balance. Burger ultimately wrote the opinion himself, insisting that the
Court had not “deviated in the slightest” in the seventeen years since Brown “from that holding or its
constitutional underpinnings.” Accordingly, the Court rejected the notion that the language of the Civil
Rights Act was intended to limit the powers of the courts to implement Brown. It instead held that, in
cases of plainly de jure segregation, a range of remedies was appropriate to bring about conversion to
unitary system, and that this range included busing students beyond the schools nearest to their homes.
Busing had been, the Court said, a “normal and accepted tool of educational policy” for years. Indeed,
segregating school boards had long bused black students considerable distances, often past white
schools, to maintain dual systems. When the facts of a case showed that assigning students to the
schools nearest to their homes would not effect conversion to a unitary system, then busing students
farther out was ‘favorably comparable’ with previous such transportation plans and, in the words of the
Fourth Circuit appellate court, perfectly “reasonable.” The Court did hold that reasonableness – or
feasibility in its own words in Green – could limit such busing as to time and distance relative to the age
of students. In other words, a transportation plan might be unreasonable if it called for busing
elementary students for an hour each morning and afternoon. But the Court stressed that appropriate
remedies might include plans that were “administratively awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre,” for
such was the price of eliminating de jure dual school systems.16
In addition to the deliberately ambiguous requirement that plans be reasonable, even though
they might also be awkward, inconvenient, or bizarre, the Court included other limiting factors in its
decision. It stopped short of declaring all one-race schools unconstitutional. It did not endorse fixed
16
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racial ratios for pupil assignment, even as it reaffirmed their validity in cases of faculty assignment, per
Judge Johnson’s Carr decision. And it did not require the readjustment of school zones every year after
the attainment of unitary status. Perhaps most importantly, it explicitly limited its ruling to instances of
de jure segregation, thereby giving school districts outside the South the relief for which they had
hoped. Nonetheless, the ruling was, in the words of historian James Patterson, “another large step
forward on the path towards serious enforcement of Brown.” Southern state and local officials had lost
their latest “colorblind” defense of white privilege: the “neighborhood school.”17
This became immediately clear in the Davis ruling, in which the Court reversed portions of the
district and appellate courts’ approval of Judge Thomas’ desegregation plan for Mobile. The Court first
upheld the Fifth Circuit court’s demand that the school system desegregate its faculty and staff such
that each school’s racial ratio mirrored that of the system as a whole – the Carr standard. It then held
that the lower courts should not have continued to consider the downtown area – east of Interstate 65
where 94 percent of the black students in the metropolitan area lived – as a distinct and separate area.
The appellate court had already ordered Judge Thomas to disregard the distinction as it pertained to the
metropolitan area’s junior and senior high schools and to utilize pairing and grade restructuring as
necessary. But it had allowed Thomas to continue to treat the eastern district in isolation in formulating
a plan for the metropolitan area’s elementary schools, six of which remained all-black. It had stopped
short of requiring large-scale busing across I-65 or otherwise between non-contiguous school zones.
Enrollment for 1970-71 had demonstrated clearly that the appellate court had based its plan on
inaccurate projections. As it was actually implemented, the plan produced nine elementary schools in
eastern Mobile which were over 90 percent black and housed 64 percent of all black elementary
students in the metropolitan area. More damningly, the appellate court had projected that zero junior
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or senior high school students would be in all-black or nearly all-black schools, but the fall had revealed
that over half of the metropolitan area’s black junior and senior high students were in such schools.18
Based on the fundamental principles in Green and on the ruling in Swann, the court held in Davis
that “’neighborhood school zoning,’ whether based strictly on home-to-school distance or on ‘unified
geographic zones,’ [was] not the only constitutionally permissible remedy,” nor was it “per se adequate
to meet the remedial responsibility of [the school board].” In cases of de jure segregation, the district
judge and school authorities were obligated to “make every effort to achieve the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation.” The district court
in Davis should have considered “the use of all available techniques, including restructuring of
attendance zones and both contiguous and noncontiguous attendance zones.” The appellate court had
clearly “felt constrained” to treat the eastern section of the city in isolation and had, thus, failed to give
adequate consideration to “the possible use of bus transportation and split zoning.”19
In short, “busing” was coming to Mobile. And there would be implications for Alabama beyond
the port city, too. Swann’s impact would be felt in the Stout v. Jefferson case and the splintered Lee v.
Macon cases, as well. Sensing this, the Birmingham News wrote, “What was hoped for [across the state]
was a Supreme Court statement to the effect that the Constitution does not require such measures as
massive busing of students to achieve integration or the establishment of ratios to determine
acceptable racial balance in school in a given district.” What was delivered, however, was going to be
“small comfort to those who believe that in some cases the courts have gone far beyond reasonable
criteria in determining whether a district [was] in fact in compliance with the law . . . .”20
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Swann’s Impact and “the Stand in the Schoolbus Door”
The most obvious and immediate impact of Swann in Alabama came via the companion Davis
ruling. The district court was compelled to order the school board, the plaintiffs, and the CRD to fashion
a plan which would satisfy the new mandate. This would have to include some sort of busing between
non-contiguous zones so as to meaningfully desegregate the eastern portion of the city. Longtime
Mobile activist John LeFlore celebrated the ruling. LeFlore reminded Mobilians that “one of the primary
causes [for] filing the school desegregation petition in 1962” had been the fact that “black high school
children living in Hillsdale Heights were being transported 52 miles to St. Elmo when Shaw and Davidson
were within three and four miles.” Such logic did little to dampen the white outcry.21
At a public meeting of the Mobile school board just days after the ruling, segregationist activists
seemed to accept a measure of finality in the Supreme Court’s decision but continued to vehemently
protest various perceived consequences of compulsory assignment. STAND’s William Westbrook
continued to warn of an exodus of tax paying whites from the public schools, while complaining about
the sensitivity training being required of Mobile’s teachers. The leader of the newly organized Unified
Concerned Parents of Alabama tried to warn the school board of the health hazards inherent in busing,
insinuating that black students were unclean and unhealthy and would transmit infectious diseases to
white children. Representatives of the Murphy High PTA lamented the demise of their organization,
which they argued had been ruined by black communist elements in the schools. LeFlore also spoke at
the meeting, however, and addressed his remarks to not only white segregationist activists and the
state and local authorities, but also to black separatists partial to the CORE/Innes plan. He argued,
“Those who would keep us divided . . . whether they be segregationists or separatists, are rendering our
country a serious disservice as they seek to perpetuate the unworkable social experiment of the last 352
years.” Segregation, he said, had “spawned a quagmire of prejudice, hatred, and confusion” and could
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certainly not be expected “to provide the answers to the problems in race relations that an
accommodating political power structure has helped to create.”22
Many white critics in Mobile continued the tradition of pointing the finger north and demanding
“equal protection” for the South. They latched onto the Court’s refusal to include de facto, northernstyle segregation in its ruling. One man wrote the Mobile Register to complain, “When it comes to the
full justice and human benefits which should come to all people of this nation, the same kind of handing
down of high court decisions should apply to all the land.”23
President Nixon had to face such criticism when he flew to Mobile shortly after the Swann
decision to speak at the dedication of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway development – a canal
project which was to connect the Tennessee River with Mobile Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. Nixon was
keen to court would-be Wallace voters in the upcoming 1972 presidential election, and the March 25,
1971 Alabama appearance provided the opportunity for him to appeal to them at a crucial moment.
Wallace was on hand at the dedication, however, and both men choose to keep their remarks light.
Wallace had not yet officially announced his candidacy – which would feature denunciations of "HEW
bureaucrats" using "every tactic existing to ram their guidelines down our throats" and engaging in an
“all-out onslaught to force integration regardless of the consequences." The Nixon White House knew
Wallace would run, though; it was even then investigating Wallace’s brother for fraud and corruption, in
an effort to convince Wallace to run as a Democrat instead of a third–party candidate. Nixon opened his
15 minute speech at the state docks in Mobile before a crowd of 20,000 by thanking “President Wallace
. . . of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Development Association.” The brief appearance before mostly white
Alabamians, and alongside the locally beloved Wallace, was not the forum for the president to speak at
length on desegregation, especially when a more appropriate venue was awaiting nearby.24
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Nixon left Mobile and immediately flew to Birmingham, where he delivered a lengthy policy
briefing before members of the Southern Press Association. In the absence of his rival, and with a
conducive format, the president was able to more effectively play to white Alabamians’ anger and
frustration, as well as their sense of law-and-order style responsibility. He condemned the continuing
tolerance of de facto segregation outside the South and doubled down on his rejection of busing. He
insisted that he had “nothing but utter contempt for the double hypocritical standards of those
northerners who look at the South and say, ‘Why don’t those southerners do something about the race
problem.’” He praised the people of the South for their “religious faith, moral strength, [and] idealism”
and claimed, “America needs it.” He applauded them for having done what the North as yet had not.
“Today 38 percent of all black children in the South go to majority white schools,” he said, but “only 28
percent of all black children in the North go to majority white schools.” There had been “no progress in
the North in the past 2 years in that respect,” while there had been “significant progress in the South.”
Nixon asked, “How did it come about?” And he answered, “Because farsighted leaders in the South,
black and white, some of whom I am sure did not agree with the opinions handed down by the Supreme
Court – which were the law of the land – recognized as law-abiding citizens that they had the
responsibility to meet that law of the land, and . . . dealt with the problem.” Nixon added, “The recent
decision of the Supreme Court [Swann/Davis] presents some more problems, but I am confident that
over a period of time those problems will also be handled in a peaceful and orderly way for the most
part.” It was precisely the sort of message white Alabamians had been articulating for years.25
Even though the Supreme Court had given the rest of the country a reprieve, Swann had at least
made busing, and school desegregation in general, a national issue. Nixon understood, as Wallace
intimately did, that white voters across the country would be receptive to the message of law-and-order
25
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resistance which whites in the South had crafted in the wake of desegregation’s litigious breakthrough.
By the time the campaign had begun in earnest the following year, Nixon sounded like Ernest Stone, or
like any of a number of school board attorneys in Alabama. He instructed his advisors to tell HEW and
the CRD to “keep their left-wingers in step with [his] express[ed] policy,” which was “to do what the law
requires and not one bit more.”26
Despite the president’s appeals to law and order, violence yet again erupted at both Murphy
High and Vigor High in Mobile, as the 1970-71 school year came to end. White students, parents, and
teachers blamed black students, prompting Mobile’s state representative in Montgomery, Monty
Collins, to introduce his take on a freedom of choice bill. The bill proposed to allow students to transfer
to another school if they were “harassed, intimidated, or assaulted.” Wallace supported it, and the
legislature passed it handily, that is, after the first attempted filibuster of a “nigger bill” in the history of
the Alabama state house. Newly installed in the state legislature were none other than longtime civil
rights attorney and LDF associated counsel, Fred Gray, and Tuskegee restaurateur Thomas Reed, both
representing Macon County. Reed and Gray resolved to mount an eleventh-hour mini-filibuster as the
clock wound down on the legislative session. House members could only speak for 10 minutes each on
a given subject, but as the end of the session’s last day drew near, and the state house had still not
passed the free choice bill, the state’s first two black representatives since Reconstruction seized the
opportunity. As the clock approached 11:30 pm, Reed took his ten minutes, followed by Gray. Gray
knew better than anyone that the bill was an “unconstitutional . . . waste of time and money,” doomed
to invalidation, and he told his colleagues as much. When his time ran out, Reed prepared to introduce
an amendment which would have given him an additional 10 minutes, with only 7 minutes remaining
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until the session ended at midnight. House speaker Sage Lyons refused to recognize the desperately
protesting Reed, however, and proceeded to call for a vote on the bill, which passed 65-10.27
Condemnation of the free choice bill from the black activist community was swift. The Mobile
NAACP passed a resolution in objection and argued that the bill would only incite more violence. They
and others understood that the law was intended to allow white students to transfer back to
predominantly white schools in cases of black harassment or intimidation – real or imagined. State
NAACP director K.L. Buford pointed out another potential use of the law, which he called a “racially
inspired . . . waste of taxpayers’ money.” Buford argued that the law “would encourage acts of
harassment and intimidation to black students in previously all-white schools in order to force them to
transfer back to segregated schools.” Buford wrote Monty Collins and told him as much, adding that the
state legislature had “placed itself in a position where it [was] attempting to defy the law of the land”
and engaging in a “criminal” act. Buford wrote, “We believe in law and order. It is strange that none of
the strong advocates of law and order choose to add the words, ‘with justice for all.’” Collins responded
by accusing the director of making “his living by trying to make racial turmoil where there [was] none.”
He claimed he would “not be affected by rabble rousers like [Buford].” The feud continued when Buford
spoke to a meeting of the Southwest Alabama Area NAACP. Buford asserted to great applause that “if
Monty Collins [was] naïve enough to sincerely believe that there [was] no racial turmoil in Alabama,”
particularly in Mobile, then the electorate there had “done all the people of Alabama a great disservice
by giving this man of limited knowledge and ability a seat in the Alabama legislature.” The law was, of
course, later invalidated, but the politics of defiance-cum-evasion still held rewards for those who
supported its passage. Wallace’s recent victory had proved as much.28
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Wallace had never been one to rest on his segregationist laurels. When the Swann decision
brought motions for further relief in other cases across the state that summer, the governor tried to
again channel the sort of defiance which had brought him repeated electoral success. In early August,
Wallace issued an executive order directing the Jefferson County Board of Education to reassign one
Pamela Davis, a white girl, to the school of her choice. Davis’ mother had written Wallace and asked
that he do something about their situation. Davis was assigned to Westfield School, a formerly all-black
school which was 20 miles from her home in west Jefferson County’s Mulga community. She had
previously attended Minor High School, which was closer to her home. Wallace once again invoked the
“police power” of the state in ordering the school board to reassign her to the closer school. Wallace
announced, “To bus students right by the school nearest their homes and to a school 20 miles away to
carry out a policy of the federal courts and HEW, which has been forced upon the board of education,
strikes me as wrong.” The following day, the governor ordered the Limestone County Board of
Education to reopen the New Hope Junior High School. New Hope had enrolled 184 black students and
5 white students the previous year and had been closed as part of the county’s desegregation plan.
Wallace purported to be acting on behalf of the New Hope community, largely black, and offered
$30,000 towards the renovation of the school. He announced his action at a speech at Troy State
University – where he was accepting an honorary doctorate – saying, “The president ought to find out
what busing has done to the schools,” adding, “This is not an Alabama matter . . . it is a national
matter.”29
Wallace stressed that Alabama had “accepted a policy of nondiscrimination,” and that his
actions were not meant to signal a desire to return to the segregated days of his first term in office. In
fact they were an attempt to continue winning favor with defiant Alabama voters, while at the same
time forcing the Nixon campaign into a corner. He wryly told reporters, “You might say Governor
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Wallace is working closely with the President to help carry out his desire not to have massive busing.”
He accused Nixon of being a hypocrite, adding, “People find no credibility in officials pledging no busing
and then appointing cabinet officers who openly advocate and push for busing.” Nixon had tried to
avoid such an attack by forcing the resignation of Leon Panetta and Robert Finch from their positions at
HEW. Nonetheless, Wallace knew that his defiant actions would invite motions against him in the
Birmingham and Limestone County cases, and that when that happened, the Nixon Administration
would be faced with moving against him. Wallace deftly described the potential conundrum by asking,
“Do you think the Justice Department is going to ask for a contempt citation when Nixon is against
busing?”30
The Civil Rights Division did not immediately seek such a citation against the governor for his
attempted interference in Birmingham and Limestone, but Solomon Seay and U.W. Clemon did. Seay,
the Tuskegee attorney and partner of Fred Gray, had recently handled the last phases of the Lee v.
Macon litigation and continued to represent black teachers and administrators in the severed individual
cases. The three–judge court – still sitting for the purposes of the junior college and trade school phase
of the litigation – denied the request. The judges argued that individual motions could be brought easily
enough in the severed Limestone County case and the Stout v Jefferson case.31
The Limestone case was being heard by newly appointed U.S. District Judge for the Northern
District, Samuel Pointer, Jr. Pointer was a Birmingham attorney who had been appointed by Nixon to a
new seat in September of 1970. He had been a law school student at the University of Alabama during
Autherine Lucy’s attempted enrollment and had subsequently returned to Birmingham and entered
private practice with his father. He quickly indicated that Wallace’s shenanigans would not be tolerated
in his court. When the Limestone County school board announced that it would comply with the
30
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governor’s order, Pointer conferred with members of the board and informed them that if they
reopened the closed school per Wallace’s order, then they could expect individual contempt citations
and $1,000/day fines. The board quickly announced that the school would remain closed.32
Meanwhile, Clemon filed a motion with the court in Stout v. Jefferson, seeking a contempt
citation against the governor for the Pamela Davis order. Clemon argued that the executive order was
intended to “sabotage” the county’s desegregation plan. Judge Pointer brushed aside Wallace’s order
to the Jefferson County board as well. He called it “an exercise of free speech” and ordered the school
board to ignore it. The next day the Jefferson County school board announced that Ms. Davis had been
erroneously assigned due to a clerical error involving her address and that she would be reassigned to
predominantly white Hueytown High. This was not how the governor had envisioned the unfolding of
what the Washington Post was already calling his “stand in the schoolbus door.”33
Wallace continued to run interference anyway. He threatened to have 7 white girls in rural,
southern Montgomery County transported by state troopers from a formerly all-black school to the
formerly all-white school to which they had previously been assigned. Nine whites had been initially
assigned to the Pintlala Elementary School, and two of those had announced their intention to enroll in
nearby the nearest segregationist academy, Hooper Academy, leaving the seven girls alone at Pintlala.
Wallace claimed he would have them transported to nearby Seth Johnson School, “unless the board of
education did something about it.34
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Lee v. Macon and Calhoun County
As part of his “schoolbus door” stand, Wallace also descended upon Alabama’s oldest all-black
municipality, Hobson City, in support of the small town mayor’s request that its all-black schools avoid
pairing with nearby white schools. Hobson City had been a self-governing black town since 1899, before
which it had been a part of Oxford – the sister city to Anniston in east central Alabama’s Calhoun
County. During the so-called Redemption, Oxford’s white authorities had petitioned the state
legislature to draw the all-black Mooree Corner neighborhood out of the city’s corporate limits, and that
section had then became Hobson City, just the second black-governed municipality in the United States.
Since then Hobson had de facto had its own all-black schools, which were maintained by the Calhoun
County school board. When Calhoun County was brought under the Lee v. Macon injunction, however,
this arrangement was threatened. Hobson was relatively small, with around 1,500 residents. Oxford
had around 6,000, but only 5 percent of them were black. Both towns were satellites of Anniston, which
had approximately 35,000 residents. All of Hobson and Oxford’s black students attended Hobson’s
Calhoun County Training School and Thankful elementary school. Oxford Elementary and Oxford High,
less than two miles away, served Oxford’s whites and whites from the surrounding areas of the county.
Motions for further relief filed in Lee v. Macon after Green v. New Kent had forced the Calhoun County
school board to adopt a desegregation plan which did more than token desegregate the county’s white
schools. The plan approved by the trial court proved unacceptable to the Fifth Circuit court upon appeal
by the CRD. It was the appellate court’s subsequent ruling, influenced by Swann, which brought Wallace
to Hobson City in the fall of 1971.35
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The situation in Calhoun County had been complicated in 1970 by the secession of Oxford from
the county school system. To avoid the impending compulsory assignment order, Oxford had followed
the lead of the nearby Birmingham suburbs and set up its own board of education during the summer of
1970 and had sought control of Oxford High and Oxford Elementary. The plaintiffs and the CRD had, of
course, objected and filed motions with the district court in protest. The county had only recently been
put under a terminal order and had its case transferred from the jurisdiction of the three judge court to
the Northern District when Oxford decided to separate itself. The case was placed on the docket of
Judge Frank McFadden – a Mississippi native and WWII Navy veteran who had returned from his studies
at Yale Law, and from a brief stint in New York, to practice in Birmingham in the late 1950s. Nixon had
appointed McFadden to replace Hobart Grooms when Grooms took senior status in 1969. McFadden
ruled that Calhoun County and Oxford City should be treated as one system for the purposes of relief in
the case. On appeal in June of 1971, a Fifth Circuit panel consisting of Judges John Minor Wisdom, John
Bryan Simpson of Florida, and J.P. Coleman of Mississippi held that city systems could not “secede from
the county where the effect – to say nothing of the purpose – of the secession [had] a substantial
adverse effect on desegregation of the county school district.” Citing several other trial court rulings
within the Fifth and Fourth Circuits, Wisdom added, “If this were legally permissible, there could be
incorporated towns for every white neighborhood in every city.” Neither historically maintained
distinctions, like Hobson’s, nor newly drawn distinctions, like Oxford’s, could be determinate if the result
was less desegregation.36
In addition to affirming the district court’s refusal to treat Oxford as a legitimately separate
school system from Calhoun, however, the appellate panel reversed McFadden’s subsequently
approved desegregation plan for the county. The Calhoun County school officials had initially proposed
36
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simply closing Hobson’s all-black County Training and Thankful Schools. Blacks in Hobson strenuously
objected, as did the plaintiffs and the CRD. The latter two parties proposed school pairing plans which
would have utilized the two schools as part of an integrated Oxford-Hobson system. Oxford objected
but had little say in the matter. The Calhoun County school board objected as well, arguing that the two
schools in Hobson would simply become all-black when whites fled the system for private schools rather
than attend an all-black school. The county came back with a counter-proposal. It was a geographical
zoning plan which – using the Hobson City boundaries – was to leave Country Training intact as an allblack elementary school and Thankful intact as a token-integrated, nearly all-black elementary school.
Some Hobson residents acquiesced in this plan, but the plaintiffs and the CRD objected. The trial court
nonetheless approved this plan for the 1971-72 school year, resulting in the appeal before the Fifth
Circuit in the summer of 1971.37
The principal flaw in the plan, from the appellate court’s perspective, was that it left 45 percent
of the county’s black students in the two virtually all-black schools in Hobson. Wisdom wrote, “When
historic residential segregation creates housing patterns that militate against desegregation based on
zoning, alternative methods must be explored, including pairing of schools.” The county school officials
had claimed that the people of Hobson took enough pride in their schools that they supported any plan
which left them in operation. While it was true that Hobson residents took pride in the schools, it was
not true that they were universally supportive of County Training being utilized as an elementary school.
The mayor himself had indicated on the record that the black community preferred to have the schools
continue “as they had in the past” insofar as they had served all 12 grades. Regardless of the Hobson
resident’s wishes, however, the court insinuated that one of the proposed pairing options ought to be
adopted. The court concluded, “The district court should require the School Board forthwith to
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constitute and implement a student assignment plan that complies with the principles established in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.”38
When Judge McFadden dutifully entered an order requiring the Calhoun school officials to adopt
a pairing plan which included the Oxford and Hobson schools, Wallace took it upon himself to order the
county and Oxford city officials to ignore the court. When the governor visited Hobson in August to
publically sign the relevant executive orders, he was greeted by a chorus of “boos” and shouts of “go
home!” Since the court-ordered pairing plan had reduced County Training to an elementary school, the
mayor of Hobson, J.R. Striplin, was supporting the governor’s orders and his visit. As Wallace shook
hands with Striplin on the podium at the ceremony after signing the executive orders, a heckler shouted,
“Get out of town, George, and take the Uncle Tom with you!” Striplin argued that the group of students
was being encouraged by an “outsider” who did not share the views of the majority of Hobson’s
residents. “We appreciate your coming to our town to give us some assistance,” Striplin told Wallace,
“We are sorry that there are some who don’t live here who feel otherwise.”39
In other appearances that same week, Wallace insisted that the federal government would have
to take him to court again to stop his issuing such orders. He couched all of them as “anti-busing”
orders, despite the fact that the Hobson case, notably, involved a pairing plan and no significant increase
in bus transportation. The governor claimed, “This matter has to be adjudicated,” as he criticized the
U.S. Attorney General, John Mitchell, for “failing to carry out the President’s mandate against busing.”
He added, “The only way we’re going to bring any solution to this problem is for people in these
prestigious offices to come out strong and tell Nixon and the other bureaucrats exactly where they
stand.” Wallace insisted that if the courts told him to stand down, he would do so. And he argued that
the “law-abiding folks . . . of the South” ought to do the same in that case. He did not immediately get
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his wish to have “the matter adjudicated,” however. The bewildered county school boards filed a
petition for instructions with the court. Meanwhile, Judge Sam Pointer scoffed at the governor’s latest
antics. He brushed aside the Wallace’s executive orders, calling them “legally meaningless.” The
governor was temporarily resigned to sniping at Pointer in the media, claiming, “[He] hasn’t got the
sense to fry a chicken egg.”40
Wallace followed up his “police power” interference with another attempt to legislate
resistance. He had an “anti-busing bill” introduced into the state legislature in late August, using
language taken directly from the Swann-Davis decisions. The bill sought to prohibit the busing of
children anytime parents felt that “time or distance” of their transportation would be “so great” as to
“risk the health and safety of the child or significantly impinge upon the educational process.” The law
would give parents the authority to send their children to the schools of their choice, compelling school
officials to admit them. Wallace reiterated his desire to have “President Nixon carry out his promise”
and send “his Justice Department and HEW back into court and ask them to stop busing.” He even
claimed that he would “defer and get out” of the presidential race if Nixon would “stop busing, go back
to freedom of choice, and restore neighborhood schools.” As the governor’s comment revealed,
“busing” and “neighborhood schools” had become bywords for any sort of compulsory assignment
desegregation plan – anything beyond freedom of choice. And Wallace knew there was nothing the
Nixon Administration could do to immediately turn back the tide of decades of litigation. Nixon had
arguably done his best to limit busing across the country. The CRD had supported the more limited plan
in Mobile, even. Wallace was trying to put his rival in an impossible situation. The bill passed with
overwhelming approval in the state House and unanimously in the Senate. Its few opponents correctly
predicted that the law would meet with a swift and unceremonious demise at the hands of the federal
courts. U.W. Clemon challenged the bill as part of the Jefferson legislation, which put it before Judge
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Pointer. Pointer argued that the law was simply “a freedom of choice option dressed in slightly different
clothing.” It was invalid on the basis of numerous earlier decisions, including Swann, which had itself
invalidated a North Carolina anti-busing statute. It was so blatantly invalid, in fact, that Pointer
determined that it was unnecessary to convene a three-judge court to hear the challenge, as would
normally be proper for a challenge to a state statute.41

The End of the Long Beginning in Mobile
Meanwhile, the Mobile school board and the plaintiffs in the Davis case had been attempting all
summer to come to terms on a desegregation plan for the coming school year. In July they announced
an agreement. It was a historic accord, billed as a “Comprehensive Plan for a Unitary School System.”
But it only inflamed opinions on both sides in the short term, and in the long term it failed to be the final
settlement which the Swann-Davis decisions might have seemed to portend. On July 8 Judge Thomas
entered an order adopting the plan. The school board was finally forced to concede non-continuous
zoning and busing of whites and blacks across I-65, into and out of the inner-city. Approximately 1,000
white elementary students were to be bused east into a number of the inner-city elementary schools
which had theretofore remained all-black, while more black students were to be bused west into
predominantly white schools. White enrollment in formerly all-black schools, such as Blount High in
Prichard, was to be annually increased until it “stabilized.” In all, the plan called for split-zoning in 19
elementary schools, five middle schools, and four high schools. The system had bused approximately
5,700 students the previous year; under the new plan, it would bus nearly 9,000 more, mostly blacks
into white neighborhoods. There was a provision designed to curb non-conformity and another to
ensure desegregation of the ‘central office’ school board administration and staff.42
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The NAACP-LDF, represented by local attorney A.J. Cooper, agreed not to challenge the plan or
its implementation for three years. Two black schools were to close, five to remain all-black, five more
to remain over 90 percent black, and still another five to remain over 75 percent black. As experience
had shown, these projections were probably best-case scenarios for the plaintiffs. It was only slightly
more stringent than the plan which the Supreme Court had just struck down. Cooper argued that the
LDF accepted it because a challenge would mean another year in Judge Thomas’s court, which would
probably mean more appeals and more time wasted. While the plan appeared to involve meaningful
concessions from both sides, the Swann-Davis decisions had mandated most of that which the school
board had agreed to. It was the LDF and plaintiff-parents who had compromised.43
Cooper was criticized by some in the black community, and not just the Innes-style separatists.
Many felt he had given up too much, especially on the heels of a huge Supreme Court victory which
seemed, to some, to signal a real change. The school board was yet again lambasted by segregationists.
William Westbrook of STAND called for the members’ resignation, again. A delegate from Concerned
Citizens condemned the “waste” of money on a “reckless” purchase of buses, which she argued had
been made “for the sole purpose of attaining a social goal desired only for the benefit of a minority
people.” So much consideration had been given to black children, she argued, but what about white
children, who were being “bused, cussed, beaten, shook-down, and utterly deprived of a quality
education.” Had it become “a misfortune to be fortunate?” A representative of the umbrella United
Concerned Citizens of Alabama echoed these sentiments, then lamented that none of the white
community’s concerns had been reflected in the plan and accused the board of betrayal.44
The most vehement segregationist reaction to the new Mobile school plan came from the local
chapter of a group calling itself The Southerners, headed by long-time Klansman, Citizens’ Councilor, and
Wallace speech-writer Asa Carter. They were, in their own words, “a deliberate group of Anglo Saxon
43
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white men,” who sought “to promote [their] racial heritage and culture, the knowledge of [their]
civilization and the perpetuation of the white race.” The Southerners had been first created some years
before , in the wake of Brown. The group receded from view for a while, then resurrected itself in 1970.
The rebirth came about, in the immediate sense, because of the need to construct a private, segregated
swimming pool in the small town of Red Level, Alabama, after court orders necessitated the integration
of the public pool there. Ace Carter soon shepherded the organization’s newly rapid growth and helped
organize “divisions” in Birmingham, Selma, Montgomery, Huntsville, and of course, Mobile. By the
summer of 1971, the group boasted of nine divisions – two in Mississippi – and was thought to have
between 5,000 and 10,000 members, many of whom were former Klansmen. Its members wore gray
armbands with Confederate battle flags on them and attended bimonthly meetings, at which the
primary focus was generally to “take up programs to help our children.”45
Each division of the Southerners was named for a Confederate war hero. The “Admiral Ralph
Semmes Division” represented Mobile; Semmes was the captain of the celebrated commerce raider, the
C.S.S. Alabama. In the spring of 1971, Southerners of the Semmes division had begun distributing
leaflets on Mobile street corners. The segregationist appeals were the same as they had always been.
For example, men needed to recognize that there was an “obligation that manhood [owed] to his
womanhood and his children,” and that this was “not being lived up to by the bulk of Southern men.”
But there was a newfound urgency in the message: “War [had] been declared upon an entire generation
of little white children, who [were] fighting for their lives, their right to decency, and their heritage of
Christian civilization.” And it was “little white girls” who were “bearing the brunt of this savage assault.”
The politician was “turning his face away,” and the newspapers were “attempting to hide the murder
and death of an entire generation of Southern white children.” Would the man who read such a leaflet
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“honor his obligation of manhood towards . . . white children and womenfolk?” Or would he forsake it
“out of fear [or] laziness?”46
A telephone number at the bottom of the Southerners’ flyer sent callers to a recorded message
which was even more explicit: “Today in the so-called public school system of Mobile, Alabama, little
white girls are being savagely attacked by gangs of Negroes, [and] white boys are being intimidated,
threatened, and severely beaten by roving gangs of blacks.” One “brother” in the Southerners had been
forced to pay for an abortion for his daughter, who had purportedly been “raped by two niggers with a
loaded shotgun.” According to the messenger, white children who were able to escape these “atrocities
[and] physical anguish” were “having their minds destroyed by the Communistic teachings of a Karl
Marx or a Martin Luther King.” They were being taught “to look to government instead of God for their
needs” and “being robbed of their Christian heritage,” which had been “bought and paid for with the
blood of their forefathers.” In general, the “public school system [was] a nightmare” wherein “white
children [were] being savagely brutalized by niggers while the limp-wristed, weak kneed school officials
[looked] the other way.” The school officials were being “matched in disgrace” by the biased news
media, whose “blanket of silence” kept whites from knowing the truth. The end result was sure to be
children “with banana-colored skin, wool for hair, and the light blown out in their brains. . . . Not since
Reconstruction” had such a “black cloud of despair” hung over the “proud southland.” Then the South
had been “occupied by nigger troops, governed by northern trash, and prayed for by blue-nosed
hypocrites whose prayers got no higher than the ceiling.” The recorded voce asked, “Sounds a lot like
today doesn’t it?” The rhetoric of racial Armageddon was straight out of the late 1950s: fears of
miscegenation, of communism, of a loss of manhood, honor, Christian faith, even heterosexuality; along
with appeals to honor, duty, aggressive masculinity, and the Lost Cause.47

46
47

“The Southerners – The New Klan?” NAACP Papers: K.L. Buford Files.
“The Southerners – The New Klan?” NAACP Papers: K.L. Buford Files.

734

If the rhetoric was the same, the solutions had changed. The Southerners urged that
“something must be done now,” and according to the FBI, that something included preparing for race
war by hoarding weapons and drilling in the Talladega National Forrest. But even this seemingly militant
group had a law-and-order style plan. Carter insisted that the group asked violence of no one, and that
anyone who said it was a violent organization was “a damn liar.” Even as they asked for donations for
the man whose daughter had purportedly been raped at shotgun-point, the Southerners offered hope in
the form of non-violent resistance: “You can send your child to an all-white, segregated Christian school
at no cost to you. That’s right, no cost.” The Southerners primary goal was to, in Carter’s words, “take
every little white girl and every white boy out of the savage jungles” that were the “so-called public
schools.”48
On June 20, 3,000 Mobile whites gathered at the Mobile Stockyards to eat fried chicken, to drink
iced tea, to listen to country, bluegrass, and gospel music, and to listen to Ace Carter extoll the virtues of
the “holy cause.” Carter lamented “what that federal judge is going to do to our children,” along with
“that H.E.W. man and that Internal Revenue man.” He railed about “the Negroid” and his communist
connections and sniped at “limp-wristed” politicians. Given his group’s self-proclaimed identity as “a
deliberate group of Anglo Saxon white men” who sought “to promote [their] racial heritage” and “the
knowledge of [their] civilization,” it was ironic that Carter also claimed that the St. Andrew’s Cross in the
Confederate battle flag represented “the old Scotch, English, Irish, and Dutch” who were now called
“rednecks.” Finally, he got to the point. There at the stockyards, on the site a former cattle barn, the
Southerners were building a church called the Assembly of Christian Soldiers, a “commissary,” and a
Christian school. The plan was desperate and doomed from the start. The “commissary” was really just
a segregated grocery store, which Carter thought could garner tax exemption through its connection
with the church. The profits from the commissary were to provide free tuition for working-class parents
48 48
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to send their children to the on-site school, or to any segregated school, but only “until one single nigger
[was] admitted.”49
Therein was the problem. The Southerners may not have openly advocated violence. And they
may have accepted private schools as their only solution within the confines of some conception of law
and order. But that conception had not developed along with that of the law and order vanguard. The
politicians which Carter criticized – which by then included Wallace himself – had come to realize that
successful maintenance of white privilege and white majorities in schools meant some sort of
concessions beyond just non-violence. Ace Carter would not even accept freedom of choice. And his
plan for what can readily be described as a segregationist commune flew in the face of a decade of
federal legislation and litigation. Thoughtful and successful segregationists had adapted.50
Implacable and dogmatic segregationists like Ace Carter often simply gave up and, occasionally,
self-destructed. Carter managed to do both, with a brief period in-between which was both literally and
figuratively something out of a Hollywood movie. The Southerners petered out by 1974, and Carter
disappeared, resurfacing in Texas under the name Forest Carter. He changed his appearance, claimed to
be a half-breed Cherokee Indian, and began writing novels and children’s books. His Education of Little
Tree garnered critical success, and his Gone to Texas was adapted as the Clint Eastwood film, The Outlaw
Josey Wales. His real identity remained mired in secrecy until his death in the 1980s, when he choked
on his own vomit after a drunken feud with one of his sons.51

Swann, Jefferson, and Splinter Systems
In Jefferson County in the summer of 1971, many segregationists felt secure in their choice to
flee the Birmingham or Jefferson County school systems for the newly established municipal school
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systems of Pleasant Grove, Vestavia Hills, and Homewood. These three were joined in 1971 by the
industrial western suburban city of Midfield. All of these districts had been created since the original
filing of the case in 1965. Prior to that, the cities of Mountain Brook, Tarrant, Bessemer, and Fairfield
had all splintered. Judge Seybourn Lynne had guaranteed the post-1965 systems’ independence in his
1970 ruling. Each had been ordered to accept token numbers of black students from areas near their
city limits, but each remained safely white. They were guaranteed not to have to support a black
student population over 25 percent – the percent of blacks in the county itself. Homewood and
Vestavia were over 90 percent white. Pleasant Grove remained entirely white.52
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, applied Swann to Stout v. Jefferson on July 6, 1971,
just one week after it ruled against the City of Oxford in the Calhoun case. The appellate court panel
reversed Judge Lynne’s ruling and directed the district court to “require the school board forthwith to
implement a student assignment plan for the 1971-72 school term which [complied] with the principles
established in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg . . . and which encompass[ed] the entire Jefferson
County School District as it stood at the time of the original filing of this desegregation suit.” The court
more explicitly stated, “Where the formulation of splinter school districts, albeit validly created under
state law, have the effect of thwarting the implementation of a unitary school system, the district court
may not, consistent with the teachings of Swann . . . recognize their creation.” This was a blow for the
splinter systems but not necessarily a total loss. As long as they did not ‘thwart the county’s
desegregation plan,’ they might still exist, even with majority white schools.53
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The district court was forced to enter another order which more affirmatively asserted the
splinter systems’ role in the Jefferson County plan. Judge Pointer dutifully entered such an order.
Pointer described from the bench the new standard, as he understood it, for the independence of the
splinter systems:

The standard is not to deny the possibility of a creation of separate systems that is allowed
under state law, unless that state law interferes with the disestablishment of a dual school
system. There is nothing inherently wrong with it. The test . . . is to look at the particular school
district involved and see whether the recognition of that district – with whatever modification
would be made – thwart[s] the implementation of a unitary school system in the county as a
whole. Then if it does, then to that extent, the Court would disregard the creation or existence
of that system.54

Pointer insisted that the four independent systems should be judged by the same standard and that the
court must look at the county as a whole. However, he proceeded to describe what was, in effect, a
class-based standard for scrutiny.
The judge argued that it was “pretty clear that the demography, the location of people and their
colors,” was “different” in the southern, over-the-mountain area than it was in what he called the
midwest, where Pleasant Grove and Midfield were located. In other words, the over-the-mountain
suburbs were overwhelmingly white, whereas that area of the county on the western edge of
Birmingham was relatively mixed. Pleasant Grove itself had been forced to make a conscious effort to
draw blacks out of its municipal limits. “It very well may be,” Pointer held, “that more recognition in
that sense of the viability of Homewood and Vestavia can be given than may be given to Midfield and
Pleasant Grove, simply because of the reality of the situation of where the people live.” The effect of
this would be that the two working class cities beyond Birmingham’s western industrial sector would be
forced to accept more blacks than the affluent white suburbs beyond Red Mountain on the city’s
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southern belly. If either Pleasant Grove or Midfield asserted their independence in an attempt to thwart
the county plan – for example, by refusing to accept an appropriate number of black students or to hire
enough black teachers – then their independence might be more readily challenged than that of
Homewood or Vestavia Hills.55
This was precisely what happened later that summer. Pleasant Grove refused to accept its role
in the Jefferson County desegregation plan, and Pointer was obliged to act. Pointer had ordered the
implementation of a plan in which 400 black students were zoned into the Pleasant Grove school
system. The Judge had instructed the city to provide bus transportation to the students, all of whom
lived just outside the all-white city’s limits. The city argued that it could not do this because it owned no
buses. The LDF appealed to Pointer for relief, and the judge ordered the city in mid-September to
purchase three buses from the Jefferson County surplus fleet and begin transporting the students. The
ten-year-old busses were relatively cheap at $500 apiece, but the Pleasant Grove board argued that it
could not afford them, adding that the state board of education did not approve transportation in
busses over 10 years old. Pointer responded by ordering the Jefferson County Board of Education to
take control of the Pleasant Grove schools in late September, 1971. Richmond, Virginia segregationistapologist James Kilpatrick called it “Appomattox redivivus,” as Pleasant Grove was being ordered to
“rejoin the union.” George Wallace called it “another example of frock dictators on the bench
overriding the will and wishes of the average citizen.” Pleasant Grove Superintendent Rick McBride
provided an even more explicitly law-and-order commentary. McBride called Pointer’s decision “the
most extreme ruling in a school case on record” and argued that “the rights of the citizens of Pleasant
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Grove [had] been trampled upon and their flourishing school system stripped from them because they
would not buy old surplus busses and initiate a student transportation plan.”56
The Pleasant Grove school board immediately appealed the decision, and U.W. Clemon,
Solomon Seay, and Jack Greenberg prepared to argue the LDF’s case before the Fifth Circuit. But the
appellate court was compelled to await the adjudication of two cases, then pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court, which involved the question of splinter systems. The Court had granted certiorari to
two Fourth Circuit cases wherein the appellate court had upheld the independence of splinter systems
in rural Greensville County, Virginia and rural Halifax County, North Carolina. In Wright v. City Council of
the City of Emporia and U.S. v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, the Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit court and cited with approval the Fifth Circuit’s own splinter system rulings in the Lee v.
Macon and Calhoun County case and the Jefferson case the previous year. As soon as Wright and
Scotland Neck came down, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in the Pleasant Grove appeal in Jefferson. In
September, 1972 it upheld Judge Pointer’s determination that Jefferson County should take over the
Pleasant Grove schools. The appellate court also vacated part of Pointer’s order, mandating alterations
in certain attendance zones and insisting that the district court eliminate the county minority-tomajority transfer plan and replace it with a strictly minority-to-majority transfer plan. It noted that
splinter districts were “not forever vassals of the county board.” The court ought not “remove local
control indefinitely,” only until the system was willing and able to prove that it intended to comply with
its role in the county’s desegregation and that its “commitment to desegregation [would not] falter.”
Rather than comply, the Pleasant Grove school board appealed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.57
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If whites fleeing to the suburbs of Alabama’s three largest cities – Birmingham, Mobile, and
Montgomery – were beginning to more deeply fear the trajectory of desegregation law, their fears were
soon assuaged. Two months before the post-Swann decisions in Jefferson, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals had reversed and remanded a District Court ruling in the Richmond, Virginia school
desegregation case, Bradley v. Richmond. In January, 1972, District Judge Robert Merhige had approved
a desegregation plan which would have forced the city schools of Richmond (70 percent black) to join
with the suburban county systems of Chesterfield and Henrico (91 percent white) in a metropolitan
area-wide busing system in which blacks would be bussed out of the city and into the suburbs and viceversa. The appellate court in June, 1972 held that such a plan was unconstitutional. A federal court
could not “compel one of the States of the Union to restructure its internal government for the purpose
of achieving racial balance” unless it found evidence of “invidious discrimination in the establishment or
maintenance of local government units.” The school districts had been established 100 years prior, and
the court could find no evidence of their establishment being racially motivated, nor could it find that
the counties and city had colluded to effect segregation in the systems. In May, 1973 an evenly divided
Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s decision in a terse per curiam order, effectively issuing no
opinion. The Court had explicitly held in Swann that the sort of relief prescribed for Charlotte was
limited to cases of established de jure segregation (Charlotte had merged with its large, surrounding
county in 1960 and, like Mobile, was one huge system). The Richmond ruling affirmed the distinction by
denying such relief across district lines which were ostensibly de facto segregated.58
One year later, the Supreme Court even more firmly established the distinction, and the limits of
busing in general, when it struck down a massive cross-district desegregation plan for the Detroit
metropolitan area in Milliken v. Bradley. Chief Justice Warren Burger argued for the 5-4 majority that
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“the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative
convenience” was “contrary to the history of public education” in the United States. The court agreed
that discrimination had been proven in Detroit’s school system, but it failed to find it in the 53 suburban
cities and towns which were to be joined with the city. The court therefore ruled the inter-district plan
to be “wholly impermissible.”59
The five justices who constituted the Milliken majority were the four Nixon appointees (Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist) and Potter Stewart. These same five also constituted the majority in the
1973 case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. The district court in Rodriguez had
held that the school financing system in Texas – based as elsewhere on local property taxes – was
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed
and held that the equal protection clause did “not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages,” that education was not a “fundamental interest” under the Constitution, and that
financing was not the sole determinant of educational quality in any case. Both Milliken and Rodriguez
were crushing blow for proponents of equal educational opportunity via litigation. Thurgood Marshal
called Milliken a “solemn mockery” of Brown and called Rodriguez a “sham.”60
In Alabama, it was mostly good news for segregationists. Jefferson County could rest assured
that it would not soon be forced to enter into a desegregation plan with the increasingly black city of
Birmingham. The post-1965 splinter systems (excluding the defunct Pleasant Grove system) would
remain tethered to the county plan, of course, per the post-Swann decisions in Jefferson. But Judge
Pointer’s recognition that the over-the-mountain systems would effectively be exempt from massive inbusing of blacks would stand. There were blacks in the vicinity of these suburbs, just as there were
blacks in the vicinity of western-edge Pleasant Grove and Midfield. The difference was that the blacks
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close to the over-the-mountain systems were mostly in the city of Birmingham itself. Thus, the Bradley
v. Richmond and Milliken v. Bradley rulings were a major relief to the over-the-mountain Jefferson
County suburbs. Also off the hook was increasingly populous, suburban north Shelby County, on
Jefferson County’s southern border, where the cities of Pelham, Helena, and Alabaster were located.61
Whites who remained in the Mobile and Montgomery systems would have to live with some
level of busing. There were increasingly numerous private school options for these families, however,
and many took advantage. Others began to move out into whiter areas of the county where the
likelihood of ending up in a majority black school decreased. Still others moved to bourgeoning
suburban communities in neighboring counties. White Mobilians moved eastward across Mobile Bay
into Baldwin County, where Daphne, and later Fairhope and Spanish Fort, benefitted. Montgomery
whites moved to Prattville in neighboring Autauga County, or to Millbrook in Elmore County. Of course,
all of these systems were desegregated as well. But none was faced with the sort of black majority
which compulsory assignment threatened to bring about in or near the major cities themselves. Blacks
were ostensibly welcome to buy homes in these suburban communities, though many remained mired
in the kind of poverty which kept them ghettoized. For some of those who could afford the house and
the car, discriminatory practices in real estate and lending excluded them. Meanwhile, white who had
fled to the suburbs refused to acknowledge that they enjoyed what historian Matthew Lassiter has
characterized as a “racially exclusive” and “federally subsidized version of the American Dream.”
According to historian Kevin Kruse, white flight had come to be seem “innocuous and natural” to them.
It had exempted them “from responsibility for problems which they had done so much to create.”62
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In Birmingham proper in the summer of 1973 – ten years after the Armstrong boys first
desegregated the state’s schools – two prominent figures on opposite sides of the legal struggle seemed
to agree on the fundamental problems. The school system had become approximately 60 percent black
and 40 percent white. Forty schools were nearly all-black, 20 were nearly all-white, and about 30 were
substantially integrated, according to the city schools’ superintendent, Henry Sparks. The city had not
been subjected to a district-wide, non-contiguous mass busing plan, in part because the city had never
utilized bus transportation, even when segregated, and it owned no buses. White resistance in the form
of non-conformity, sit-ins, and picketing had declined since the immediate aftermath of the first
compulsory assignment orders. LDF attorney U.W. Clemon argued that this was because the most
recalcitrant whites had “either moved out or put their children in private schools.” He added that black
disillusionment was eroding support for the LDF’s program, as well. Not only did desegregation “hinder
people’s opportunity to develop a black consciousness,” it had showed them that, in practice, it meant
demotion for black teachers and administrators. Clemon continued to fight the school board for equity
in teacher and administrator assignment. But even Birmingham Schools’ Sparks agreed that white flight
to the suburbs was a problem. “We’ve done what the courts have said,” he argued, “but I think they
realize that a man still has a freedom of choice about where he will live.”63
In the winter of 1973, the Alabama Council on Human Relations co-sponsored a study of school
desegregation in 43 of the South’s cities, which seemed to confirm Sparks’ frank admission. The study
found that myriad problems existed in all of the districts, including obsolete and inadequate
desegregation plans, widespread demotion of black administrators, lack of black student participation in
extracurricular activity, discriminatory discipline policies, “tracking” or grouping students by ability into
virtually segregated classes, voluntary social segregation, and a general lack of programs for black
students. It also found that segregated schools were commonplace in many of these districts. In

63

Montgomery Advertiser, April 15, 1973.

744

Birmingham, 18 of the city’s 89 schools were all-black, while 13 were all-white. A further 14 were
between 90 and 99 percent black, while 6 were between 90 and 99 percent white. Five were between
80 and 90 percent black, and six were between 80 and 90 percent white. If more than 20 percent
minority representation constituted a desegregated school, then 62 of Birmingham’s 89 schools were
not desegregated.64
In the Jefferson County system, the same standard revealed that 59 of the county’s 76 schools
were not desegregated, while 23 were between 99.9 percent and 100 percent one-race. The splinter
systems of Mountain Brook, Homewood, Vestavia Hills, and Midfield were all over 90 percent white. A
more damning indicator of white flight in metropolitan Birmingham, if only symbolically so, was the fact
that four of the five members of the Jefferson County school board, along with Superintendent Revis
Hall, lived in one of the county’s splinter system municipalities. And it was not just BirminghamJefferson County. In Montgomery 24 of the system’s 50 schools were not more than 80/20 percent
desegregated. There were no fewer than 23 non-Catholic private schools in the county, too, which
continued to take in whites fleeing the system by the thousands. In Mobile, 21 of the system’s 81
schools remained segregated by the 80/20 criterion. The title of the Alabama Council study’s published
findings was, It’s Not Over in the South. Indeed, it was not.65

Law, Order, and Taxes
George Wallace was physically enfeebled for life by Arthur Bremer’s attack, but he recovered
quickly from any political ill effects. In the spring of 1973, some in the state legislature had come to
question Wallace’s ability to lead the state. He was in constant physical pain and subject to demanding
daily physical therapy. The governor made almost no preparations for the regular 1973 legislative
session and was blamed for its accomplishing very little. More than his physical condition, what kept
64
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the paralyzed Wallace from compiling a legislative program was his return to electioneering. He had
finally secured a constitutional amendment to allow gubernatorial succession and had already
announced his intentions to run again in 1974. He had privately vowed, and most in the public
assumed, that he would again run for the presidency in 1976, as well. The “stand in the schoolbus door”
proved to be Wallace’s last campaign of outright defiance, but it was by no means the end of his
resistance. In subsequent years, he and others mounted an indirect, law-and-order style assault on
desegregated education, by way of the state’s property tax system. It was, in many ways, the
culmination of the law-and-order style of resistance.66
The idea of attacking desegregation by way of taxation had been conceived prior to the attempt
on Wallace’s life, in the wake of the post-Swann decisions, although the anti-busing campaign was not
the only impetus to action. As a federal court would determine decades later:

The convergence in one year, 1971, of four federal mandates requiring reenfranchisement of
African-Americans, reapportionment of the Alabama Legislature, fair reassessment of all
property subject to taxes, and school desegregation, had . . . created a "perfect storm" that
threatened the historical constitutional scheme whites had designed to shield their property
from taxation by officials elected by black voters for the benefit of black students.67

By 1971 blacks were already gaining control of local offices in a number of Black Belt counties like
Macon and Greene, thanks to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the continuing scrutiny of the Civil
Rights Division. At the same time, the electoral reapportionment mandated several years before by the
Reynolds v. Simms decision looked like it would soon contribute to a sharp increase in the number of
black legislators. The final impetus for protective state action had been a three-judge federal court’s
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decision in Weissinger v. Boswell, also in 1971, which mandated the creation of a fair and uniform
statewide property tax assessment system. The state had traditionally used a ridiculous patchwork
system in which some land was valued absurdly below its market value for the purposes of taxation.
When the Weissinger decision called for a reform of such a system, it portended potentially widespread
property tax increases.68
Even then, in the midst of his more dramatic “schoolbus door” stand, Wallace linked his
opposition to tax reform directly to the school busing decisions and urged legislators and voters to stand
with him against both. In addressing the 1971 legislative regular session, the governor said, “I believe
under existing revenues we can have a teacher salary increase, a better free textbook program, [and] a
better retirement program . . . .” Wallace insisted he was proud that during his first term they had been
able to achieve “a breakthrough in education” funding without any increases in property taxation. “But I
am frank to tell you, and to tell educators,” he said, “that the people of Alabama are simply turned off
on education and some educators because of what the Federal Courts and HEW have done to their
children from Huntsville to Mobile. Every one of you know I am telling you the truth when I tell you
that.”69
Powerful landholding lobbies in Alabama were also vehemently opposed to property tax
increases, particularly the Alabama Farm Bureau and the Associated Industries of Alabama. Wallace
supported the Alabama Farm Bureau’s plan to constitutionally mandate a property gradation system
which would serve to limit taxes on farm and timber land. As he defied the federal courts one last time
on busing, the governor told voters that the details of this proposed property tax scheme were
unimportant. What was important, he argued, was that the hated federal courts had not only issued
their abominable school decisions, they had compounded them with a ruling insisting that Alabama
68
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reassess all property (Weissinger). According to Wallace, this meant that Alabamians would soon have
to pay more taxes to support increasingly desegregated schools, if something was not done. As a result,
in 1971 the legislature passed the first so-called “Lid Bill” Amendment to the 1901 state constitution,
which state voters approved in 1972 as Constitutional Amendment 325. It established an assessment
classification system and corresponding “lids” on property tax millage rates: utilities property was to
taxed at a maximum 30 percent of its fair market value; business property at a maximum 25 percent;
and residential, farm, and timber land at a maximum 15 percent. This had the effect of
constitutionalizing the de facto classifications in place before the 1971 Weissinger decision mandating
statewide reassessment.70
As black political power continued to increase across the state, a “local option” in Amendment
325 was determined to be a fatal flaw. The local option was designed to give the legislature, and
ultimately the counties themselves, the authority to vary tax rates from county to county, so as to
maintain the status quo. But the old Black Belt planter and Big Mule industrialist types, represented by
the Farm Bureau and Associated Industries, owned thousands of acres of farm or timber land. They
were certain that that as soon as blacks took control of county tax offices, they would initiate the
highest rates possible as a way of not only funding increasingly all-black school systems, but also of
simply exacting retribution from the old white power structure. As Sam Engelhardt had once asked
rhetorically, “If you had a nigger tax assessor, what would he do to you?” The Mobile Press-Register
more tactfully observed, “Senators representing some of these counties are considered fearful that the
black political leaders, who also enjoy voting majorities, will exercise local options and set property
taxes at the highest rates possible in order to raise additional funds for their governmental operations.”
These taxes would be paid, the Press-Register continued, “by the property owners, considered by the
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senators to be white owners of large farms and corporate interests with large timberland holdings.”
With the Big Mule industrialists once more in bed with the old Bourbon planter elite, opposition
mounted. The local option was similar enough to the provision struck down in Weissinger that it was
vulnerable to a legal challenge. That part of the Lid Bill Amendment was, thus, subsequently attacked in
federal court on nonracial, equal-protection grounds and found to be unconstitutional.71
It was for these reasons that Wallace came in the mid-1970s to support an amended Lid Bill
provision which ultimately became Constitutional Amendment 373. Despite his physical limitations and
his growing cadre of skeptics in the legislature, Wallace was reelected in 1974 and subsequently put his
weight behind the new measure. Amendment 373 was approved by voters at the end of Wallace’s term
in 1978. It eliminated the local option but retained the property classification system. It even lowered
the maximum assessment rate for residential, agricultural, and timber land 10 percent and made that
low ratio applicable to “current use” of the land, rather than fair market value. This meant that timber
and agricultural land would end up being taxed at a rate substantially lower than the already absurdly
low 10 percent.72
By that time, Wallace no longer had to make the connection between the maintenance of
Alabama’s historically low property taxes and funding for desegregated education. The state’s property
tax system was itself a product of the Redemption Constitution of 1875 – which had first put caps on tax
rates to shield white money from going to the education of freed persons – and the white supremacist
Constitution of 1901 – which had mandated a local referendum for any proposed tax increases. When
the latter was amended in 1971 via the first Lid Bill, Wallace had made the appeal as explicitly as he
could. The federal government had mandated changes in the state which would allow black political
leaders to extract money from wealthy whites for blacks in desegregated school systems lately
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abandoned by those same whites. By 1978 white voters understood that this could not, would not,
happen.73
Like Wallace’s segregationist rhetoric, white resistance in general had undergone a superficial
transformation. A 20-year effort by activists in the federal courts had forced segregationists to find
some solution within the law. They begrudgingly accepted that token desegregation, then compulsory
pupil assignment desegregation, were the “law of the land.” But by no means did they capitulate. They
refashioned their resistance into a defense of their own constitutional rights, then they regrouped and
mounted a counter-offensive. With a decade of experience in fighting legal decrees with legal
strategies, they crafted a facially defensible, ostensibly colorblind strategy of resistance which would
preserve white “freedom of association” while at the same time shielding white money from being used
towards the advancement of increasingly black education. The endgame was the preservation of white
privilege. The driving force was school desegregation litigation. And so it was that the Lid Bill became,
in the words of one legal scholar, “the instrument preserving the status quo of Alabama’s past.”74
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EPILOGUE: “IF EVER IS GOING TO HAPPEN”

On an unusually warm afternoon in February of 2012, eighty-one year-old Solomon Seay sat at
his dining room table, looking pensively at a stack of boxed files in the corner by his personal computer.
He thought back to 1995, when his health had temporarily failed him. At that time there had been some
30 Lee v. Macon cases still in the courts, and Seay had been representing the plaintiffs in all of them,
trying to ensure that each system continued to work faithfully towards unitary status. He had
concerned himself, especially, with safeguarding the rights of black teachers, administrators, and staff.
They were still at risk of being passed over in hiring and promotion. Black students in predominantly
white schools, too, were still disproportionately excluded from extracurricular activities in some systems
and were sometimes singled out for harsher disciplinary measures than white students. Seay
remembered continuing litigation in Opelika City, in Pickens County, in Decatur City, and in many other
districts. He wore a Disney Mickey Mouse t-shirt – part of a collection of memorabilia he had begun
compiling after Marengo County Superintendent Fred Ramsey derisively referred to the assiduous
Montgomery attorney as “that Mickey Mouse lawyer.” In 1995 Seay had been forced to turn many of
the remaining Lee cases over to junior partners at Fred Gray’s firm in Tuskegee. “For health reasons I
couldn’t carry that load,” he said. “But I kept one case,” he added, as he looked back over to the stack
of boxes, “I kept Randolph [County].”1
Seay kept the Randolph County case, he said, because during prior negotiations, he had been
able to obtain for the plaintiffs “the very best public school desegregation plan that [he] had gotten in
any system,” a plan which “touched on every facet of education in a public school system.” Seay was
proud of the consent decree which established the plan, and he wanted to “see that through.” The
decree had been entered earlier that year, the result of motions for further relief filed in 1994 by the
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plaintiffs and the Civil Rights Division. The motions had been occasioned by the actions of part-time hog
farmer and Randolph County High School principal Hulond Humphries. Humphries’ racist outburst that
year thrust Alabama back into the national civil rights spotlight and simultaneously revealed how far the
state had come in race relations since the early 1970s, and how very far it still had to go.2

Making Mistakes: Lee v. Randolph County
Randolph County – on the Georgia border, just southeast of Calhoun County and the city of
Anniston, and just north of the Black Belt fringe counties of Chambers and Tallapoosa – was a typical
rural central-Alabama county. It was mostly farm land and forest, with a few small towns. Its
population had hovered around 20,000 since the 1960s, and its racial demographics had changed little:
approximately 75-25 percent white-to-black. Some white parents sent their children to segregationist
academies or out of district, but the county schools were significantly integrated as of 1994. Randolph
County High School had a student enrollment of around 700, 62 percent of whom were white, and
nearly 48 percent of whom were black. Humphries had been the principal of the high school in the
small town of Wedowee since 1969. He had been there when the court had ordered Randolph to adopt
the HEW plan for the county system and when Seay had quickly obtained an additional temporary
restraining order against the unwarranted dismissal or demotion of black teachers and administrators.
The school board did not quickly achieve unitary status, and Humphries himself was cited by the U.S.
Department of Education in the late 1980s for operating segregated buses and for continuing to mete
out punishment to blacks more liberally than whites. Despite these facts, the local authorities operated
the county’s schools quite uneventfully under the 1970 consent decree and under the scrutiny of the
court, the Justice Department, and Seay – that is, until 1994.3
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At an assembly in February, 1994, Humphries addressed his student body about something that
had been deeply troubling him: interracial dating. It seems that students at Randolph County High,
during 20 years of desegregated education, had come to understand that “miscegenation” would not, in
fact, mongrelize the white race and destroy Western civilization. Interracial couples had become more
and more common. Humphries, however, understood this development as an abomination to God,
rather than a sign of improved race relations. He asked the assembled students how many planned on
taking interracial dates to the upcoming prom. When a number of them raised their hands, Humphries
became incredulous. He insisted that this would not happen on his watch and claimed that he was
cancelling the prom if such was the case. Junior class president ReVonda Bowen – herself the legitimate
child of a happily “mixed” marriage of 18 years – boldly raised her hand to ask, “Who should I bring?”
Humphries responded that therein was the problem: Bowen’s parents had “made a mistake” by
conceiving her, and he did not want to see any more of those mistakes being made at Randolph County
High. Bowen began to weep. Humphries began backtracking as soon as the calls started coming in the
next day. He announced that the prom was back on. He took a page from the early 1960s
segregationist book and claimed that he was only concerned that interracial dating would lead to
violence. It was too late.4
Seay and attorneys from the Civil Rights Division filed separate motions for further relief in the
Lee case against Randolph. Bowen also filed a civil suit of her own, in which she was represented by
Morris Deas of the Southern Poverty Law Center. In the Lee case, the plaintiffs and the CRD argued that
the Randolph school board – which had one black member – had generally failed to operate the school
system in a nondiscriminatory fashion per the 1970 consent decree. Each motion cited not just
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Humphries’ remarks and actions at the assembly, but a pattern of discriminatory school board actions in
hiring, discipline, and curricular choices. It had come to light in the aftermath of the prom cancellation,
too, that Humphries himself had a disturbing pattern of behavior relative to interracial dating, which
some termed an obsession on Humphries part. He had, for example, periodically asked white students
into his office to question their dating choices and to threaten to tell their parents, and he had
reportedly told white girls that white boys would no longer “have them” after they had been with a
black boy. The school board initially fought the actions and backed Humphries. A number of white
teachers also backed the principal, with one saying publically that his words had been misconstrued and
that Bowen had simply “gone overboard” in filing a lawsuit.5
In the weeks that followed, white parents organized motorcades in support of Humphries, while
black parents initiated a boycott of the public school system and set up temporary “freedom schools” in
local black churches. Unprecedented media attention fell upon the tiny town, and old wounds which
many must have thought were closed for good began to rupture. The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference cancelled a planned demonstration in Wedowee when Ku Klux Klansmen from nearby
Georgia threatened to stage a counterdemonstration. Bowen began receiving death threats, and the
FBI installed a guard at her home. The prom was ultimately held, but Bowen and her date were
reportedly the only interracial couple there. Many of those boycotting the public schools attended a
“protest prom” instead. After a mostly uneventful summer, someone burned down Randolph County
High School in August. The school board ultimately settled the civil case field by Bowen, agreeing to pay
$25,000 towards her college tuition. And Seay and the CRD attorneys, including Assistant Attorney
General Deval Patrick, were able to obtain an amendment to the consent decree in Randolph’s Lee case
in December. This provided for the plan which Seay called the best he had ever secured and which
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Assistant Attorney General Patrick said would effectively “remove barriers to equality of educational
opportunity” in Alabama. It touched every aspect of the schools’ operation, including student discipline,
teacher and administrator hiring and firing, and extracurricular activities. As an example of the plan’s
thoroughness, the school board was required to bring in cheerleading coaches from historically black
Alabama State and Alabama A&M for its schools’ summer cheerleading tryouts.6
But the status of Hulond Humphries hung in the balance. Per the agreement between Seay, the
CRD, and the school board, Humphries was reassigned to an administrative position overseeing the
construction of the new high school and was barred from existing school grounds without expressed
approval. Some black community leaders protested, arguing that Seay had not adequately represented
the black community, which wanted Humphries fired. But District Judge Myron Thompson – the black
Yale graduate from Tuskegee who had taken Frank Johnson’s seat – ruled in favor of Seay and entered
the order approving the amended decree. In a move that dumbfounded many, Humphries subsequently
won the county superintendent’s office, even carrying a few black precincts. Wedowee slowly fell out of
the national spotlight. Seay remained on the case over the next 18 years, after which time the consent
decree was again revised to include only requirements for personnel and discipline reporting. After
Seay was able to recoup his attorneys’ fees for the preceding two decades of monitoring the case, it was
closed administratively in the summer of 2012.7

The Vestiges of Segregation: Knight v. Alabama
The Randolph County case was not the only significant litigation involving discrimination and
segregated education in Alabama to be filed in the years after 1973. A number of the Lee cases
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remained open into the 21st century, and as of 2013, some school systems still had not attained unitary
status. Some of the non-Lee school desegregation cases, including those of Jefferson County and
Huntsville, remained open as well. In all, nearly half of the state’s school systems were either under a
permanent injunction or were still involved in active cases. The litigation which had the most farreaching potential, though, was certainly the long-running case of Knight v. Alabama, whose progeny,
Lynch v. Alabama, was pending appeal in 2013.8
The Knight case began as a suit aimed at public higher education. Despite court-ordered token
desegregation in the 1960s, all of Alabama’s public four-year colleges remained nearly all-black or nearly
all-white in the 1980s. The Auburn University-Montgomery decision (Alabama State Teachers
Association v. Alabama Public School and College Authority) had insured that satellite campuses of the
state’s two flagship historically-white universities (HWUs) – Auburn University and the University of
Alabama – could be built in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Huntsville. Since that time, those schools
had functioned to syphon off any potential white students who might have otherwise chosen to attend
either of the state’s two historically black universities (HBUs) – Alabama State and Alabama A&M. The
mere existence of the satellite HWU campuses, along with a diverse and lengthy pattern of
discriminatory state administration, ensured that the two HBUs remained virtually all-black, underdeveloped, and unattractive to white students. Montgomery state representative Joe Knight and a
number of others associated with the two HBUs filed suit in 1981, contending that it was the intent of
the state to “make sure the content, values and style of blacks' education prepared them for
subordinate roles in society, and to ensure that white persons would never be forced to submit to the
authority of black persons.”9
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Knight v. Alabama was initially assigned to none other than U.W. Clemon – who had become
Alabama’s first black federal judge when Jimmy Carter appointed him District Judge for the Northern
District in 1980. But the case was ultimately heard by Georgia’s Thomas Murphy. Judge Murphy was
specially assigned on account of what the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined was Judge
Clemon’s conflicting interest and potential impartiality as an attorney for plaintiffs in such litigation in
the recent past. The appellate court felt that Clemon would be inclined to find for the plaintiffs. As it
turned out, Murphy’s ruling in 1991 was something of a mixed bag. For example, he found that the ACT
college admissions test was clearly adopted in Alabama as a means of preventing blacks from enrolling
in HWUs, but he held that it had not had an impermissible impact on black students. On the principal
issue, however, the court found for the plaintiffs. Murphy found that “vestiges of segregation” in higher
education existed and that the state was under an obligation – via Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment – to eliminate those vestiges “root and branch.”
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit appellate court found that Murphy had closely anticipated the standards
articulated by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Fordice, (1992), and it upheld most of
the trial court’s ruling.10
After a partial reversal and remand, another trial was held, and in 1995 Murphy entered a
broad-ranging remedial decree not unlike the one issued in 1967 in Lee v. Macon. The court took the
extraordinary step of enlisting the assistance of a panel of five neutral, higher education experts in
fashioning the decree. The panel and Judge Murphy determined that the state’s four year institutions
were, in fact, racially identifiable, and that the state was obligated to increase black access to white
institutions and to encourage white attendance at black institutions. The more specific obligations of
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the state included: increasing black representation on faculties and administrations at the state’s HWUs,
diversifying the curricula at the HBUs, eliminating some duplicate programs, increasing the funding of
the HBUs, improving facilities at the HBUs, and unifying the agricultural cooperative extension system
and research programs at the state’s white and black land grant colleges (Auburn and Alabama A&M).11
The court retained jurisdiction and established a monitoring system for a period of 10 years.12
Two years before this 10 year period expired, the plaintiffs in Knight entered a motion for
further relief which took the case in a bold new direction. They argued that under-funding of not only
higher education in the state, but also elementary and secondary education, had prevented the state
from fulfilling its obligations under the 1995 remedial decree. More specifically, the plaintiffs contended
that “constitutionally entrenched policies for raising revenues” to fund education continued to have
“racially segregative and discriminatory effects,” namely that of “shielding the property of whites from
being taxed to support the education of blacks” and thereby “denying black citizens equal access to
attend and to complete higher education . . . .” With the help of expert testimony from history
professors Robert J. Norrell and J. Mills Thornton, the plaintiffs tied the 1971 and 1978 constitutional
amendments, known collectively as the “Lid Bill” Amendments, to the state’s 1901 and 1875 white
supremacist, “Redemption” constitutions. The purpose of the property tax provisions in the archaic
1901 constitution and in the two amendments, simply put, was to prevent white money from going to
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black education. Ever since, Alabama’s property tax rates and revenues had been far below national
and regional averages. In fact the state’s per capita property tax rates and revenue in the 2000s were
significantly lower than those of any other state. Furthermore, local governments in majority black
school districts continued to be especially adversely affected relative to majority white districts. In the
Black Belt, for example, white individuals or corporations owned the vast majority of the land, which
was in most cases protected by the classifications and “current use” provisions of the Lid Bill. If whites
owned thousands of acres of farm or timber land, or even just hunting land, then the rate at which it
could be taxed was restricted. The Knight plaintiffs felt that these restrictions choked off revenue from
local school districts which had become all or nearly-all black as a result of white resistance to
desegregation. This, they argued, was always the government’s intention. The effect of “crippling”
revenues was the crippling of per-pupil spending, which placed black students at a crippling
disadvantage.13
The plaintiffs, the Civil Rights Division, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office thus sought an injunction
against the enforcement of the Lid Bill. They asked the court to have the state give itself and local
authorities the power to raise state and local ad valorem tax revenues to an amount at or near regional
or national averages; to ensure that property classifications and current use provisions did not adversely
affect majority black districts; to raise state and local funding for K-12 schools to “a level of adequacy”
determined by the state department of education; to raise per-pupil funding in majority-black districts
to an amount at or near that of majority-white districts; to raise total funding for higher education to a
regional standard as determined by the Alabama Commission on Higher Education; and to provide
sufficient needs-based financial aid to offset the impact of impending tuition hikes on black students in
low and middle-income districts. The state’s attorneys argued that the state did not discriminate in
13
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educational funding disbursement and that the state’s limited tax capacity was a result, simply, of a
historical antipathy to taxation traceable to Reconstruction and perhaps beyond.14
In a 2004 ruling, Judge Murphy agreed with the plaintiffs that the Lid Bill was part of a long
tradition of enacting constitutional provisions to protect white landowners from having to pay for the
education of black children. In his published opinion, he relied heavily on the testimony of professors
Norrell and Thornton to explain how the state’s ad valorem tax structure was “a vestige of
discrimination inasmuch as the [state] constitutional provisions governing the taxation of property
[were] traceable to, rooted in, and [had] their antecedents in an original segregative, discriminatory
policy.” Based in part on the testimony of University of Alabama law professor Susan Pace Hamill,
Murphy also accepted the argument that the state’s restrictive tax policy (income, sales, and property)
served to “unfairly burden poor and lower-income Alabamians.” Murphy argued that the Lid Bill,
specifically, was the mechanism which kept the property tax base “at a mere fraction of the property's
value” and guaranteed “that no level of millage rates [would] produce minimally adequate property
taxes.” For example, timber lands constituted 71 percent of all of Alabama land. They were also owned
almost exclusively by wealthy whites, or in many cases, large corporations controlled by wealthy whites.
The Lid Bill ensured that the tax revenues collected from such lands averaged less than $1 per acre and
therefore accounted for only two percent of all property tax revenue. Eighty-five percent came instead
from commercial properties and residential homes. That, along with income and sales tax, was what
constituted the bulk of educational funding in Alabama. Murphy agreed that the effect on poor,
majority-black school districts was indeed “crippling.”15
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Nonetheless, Murphy refused to hold that Alabama’s tax laws were unconstitutional. He argued
that discriminatory tax laws did not necessarily foster segregation, and that the plaintiffs had not proven
that the tax laws were responsible for the inadequate higher education funding which was preventing
poor black students from attending college. As to the tax laws’ effect on K-12 education, Murphy ruled
that the Knight case was not the proper venue for such a claim to be adjudicated. The plaintiffs had
failed to convince the court that there was a meaningful connection between inadequate K-12 funding
and the desegregation of higher education, which was the subject of the Knight litigation in the first
place. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Murphy, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.16

A Vision Eviscerated: Lynch v. Alabama
The fact that the trial court in Knight had found the state’s property tax restriction to be
purposefully discriminatory was a promising impetus to further litigation. The plaintiffs in Knight
regrouped, organized a new group of plaintiffs, and in March, 2008 filed a new claim under the styling of
Lynch v. Alabama. The “sole purpose” of Lynch was to obtain a declaratory judgment that the tax
structure was purposefully discriminatory, and to then obtain a prohibitory injunction against its future
enforcement as such. The difference from the 2003 Knight motions was that, in this claim, the plaintiffs
were school children in K-12 schools in Lawrence and Sumter counties and their parents (though it was,
of course, brought as a class action). The claim was also carefully stated as to indicate that the plaintiffs
did not seek court oversight of a reform or overhaul of the state’s entire property tax system – the court
surely would have held that this was the responsibility of the state’s legislative branch alone. The
plaintiffs thus sought only to enjoin the enforcement of the Lid Bill. They argued that the restrictions
therein led to inadequate revenues, which in turn resulted in underfunded and hopelessly deficient K-12
education, particularly in rural and majority black school districts. They noted that Alabama had the
16
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lowest property taxes of all the 50 states: three times lower than the national average and two times
lower than the next lowest states. Property taxes only accounted for five percent of the state’s tax
revenues, over half of which came from regressive sales and income taxes. It was “neither just nor
practical” to seek more revenue from sales or income tax. Merely raising the millage rates on property
would not do either, when the average assessment of residential, forest, and agricultural lands was 8.33
percent of fair market value. The only solution to a system – born of segregation and discrimination –
which disproportionately disadvantaged black school children, was to enjoin those elements which most
directly led to the chronic underfunding.17
At the Lynch trial in April of 2011, the defendant state officials argued that the authors of the Lid
Bill Amendments had no racial motivations and were animated solely by a fear of rising property
assessments, not race or class. The plaintiffs supplemented the extensive expert testimony presented in
the Knight trial with that of several other scholars, including Auburn University historian Wayne Flynt
and Auburn graduate Jeffrey Frederick. The plaintiffs argued that the state’s tax system was violative of
Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was not being heard by Judge Murphy or Judge
Clemon, but District Judge Lynwood Smith, a Clinton appointee and University of Alabama graduate
from Talladega. Unlike Murphy, Smith was not convinced that the inadequate funding of education
disproportionately affected black children. He therefore held that the tax laws were not offensive to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Smith did, however, issue what was accurately described as a “scorching
denunciation” of not only the discriminatory background of the property tax scheme, but also of the
current state of education in the state. In his 875-page opinion, the Judge cut to the heart of the
matter, embedded as it were in the body of desegregation and resistance: “State powerbrokers perceive
little benefit from investing in a quality statewide public school system, because the children of their
most influential constituents are generally enrolled in exclusive suburban school systems, with large
17
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local tax bases, or in private schools.” Many of these schools, and school systems, had of course
“sprouted following court-mandated integration.“18
But Smith refused to conclude that white flight to the suburbs or to private schools had
“disproportionately harmed blacks.” Instead he argued, “It also punish[ed] many white students who
remain[ed] in the public school systems.” The “children of the rural poor, whether black or white,” were
“left to struggle” as best they could “in underfunded, dilapidated schools.” For Smith the issue was
class, not race. The plaintiffs understood that in Alabama, the two were inextricably linked. Blacks were
disproportionately represented among the ranks of the rural poor and almost exclusively represented
the urban poor. The very history recounted in the plaintiffs’ briefs and in Smith’s own opinion was a
testament to that fact. Smith was ultimately unconvinced or unwilling, though, to make the connection.
Failing to observe any racially discriminatory effects, he argued that the court was thus constrained by
Supreme Court jurisprudence, namely San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973).19
Smith decried the legacy of Brown but laid the case’s failures squarely at the feet of the Burger Court:

When massive resistance to the Brown mandates eventually was overcome, states grudgingly
attempted to preserve their separate independence (“sovereignty”), while giving the
appearance of complying with federal decrees, by providing a meager public education to white
and black students, and allowing a parallel education system to evolve – one in which only the
wealthy can access a quality education for their children, either by moving into exclusive
suburbs with public schools well-funded by local tax revenues, or by paying for their children to
attend private schools. In other words, because federal courts refused to permit states to focus
limited public resources on the education of a chosen few, the states chose to not incur voter
disapproval of increased tax levies for the support of an integrated public school system. In
Rodriguez, the Court blessed this terrible choice and eviscerated the vision of Brown.20
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Smith eloquently lamented the failures of education, nationally, to provide for those without the benefit
of proper distinctions of “class, wealth, race, and place.” The country had allowed its prejudices to
withhold from those of unfortunate birth the benefit of knowledge – a “commodity more precious than
pearls” and “unlimited in its ability to provide an abundant life for those who are accorded the means to
pursue it, and one that is essential to the functioning and continued existence of our still-young
experiment in representative democracy.” Smith evoked the era of 1960s activism by ending his opinion
with a quotation from the Bob Dylan song “Blowin’ in the Wind.”21
Veteran civil rights attorney James Blacksher, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs, could only call
the decision “regrettable.” The judgment, he said, was “regrettable for the plaintiffs, schoolchildren in
the Black Belt and other rural counties, who [would] continue to receive an inferior education relying on
an inadequate tax base” and for “their brave parents and communities who wanted a better future for
their children." In the end, the condemnations and acknowledgments of injustice were moot without
the proper judgment of the court on the central question. Blacksher announced an appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit. Given just under two hours to appear before an appellate panel in December of 2012,
Blacksher fielded pointed questions from Circuit Judges Adalberto Jordan and Senior Judge Lanier
Anderson.22 The judges seemed to question the causal connection between the tax laws and
disadvantaged education in certain districts.23
As the Lynch appeal awaited the Circuit Court’s judgment in early 2013, Alabama lawmakers
passed a supposedly colorblind law which, in effect, looked to even further erode support for schools in
the state’s poorest communities. Republicans in the state legislature clandestinely tinkered with an
education bill in committee and ultimately secured passage of the Alabama Accountability Act. The bill
purported to hold “failing” schools ”accountable” by giving $3,500 income tax credits to students at
21

Lynch v. Alabama, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155012 (ND, AL, 2011), pp. 800-3, Lexis-Nexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com, accessed May 16, 2013.
22
The third Judge sitting was Maine’s Brock Hornby.
23
Huntsville Times, Oct. 22, 2011, Dec. 6, 2012.

764

such schools who chose to attend a private school or a better-performing public school. In praising his
fellow Republicans for passing the act, Governor Robert Bentley channeled Albert Brewer, avoiding any
mention of race, even as he acknowledged class and residential geography. Bentley announced at a
press conference, "I truly believe this is historic education reform and it will benefit students and
families across Alabama regardless of their income and regardless of where they live." He added, "I'm
so proud we have done this for the children of this state and especially the children who are in failing
school systems and had no way out. Now, they have a way out.”24
While white Democrats focused their vitriolic criticism on the backroom nature of the
Accountability Act’s passage, black leaders across the state displayed their usual willingness to hold the
act itself accountable for what it truly was. First, it was difficult to separate the act from the state’s
history of tuition grant legislation, in the same way the Lid Bill Amendments could not be understood
apart from the state’s historical antipathy to funding black education with white money. Additionally, it
was difficult to understand how the bill would help students in poor, black communities. The money
was made available as an income tax credit, not a voucher, which would have been a payment in
advance. Most poor families would either be unable to front the money for private school tuition. They
also might be unable to gain acceptance to a private school, or unable to provide transportation for
themselves to either a private school or a more distant pubic school. The President of the Alabama
NAACP, Benard Simelton, mockingly thanked the state legislature for discovering “the cure for our failing
public schools,” which was evidently “to cut the funding to public schools, and take away some of their
resources and give it to the private schools,” thereby “magically turn[ing] those failing public schools
24
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into thriving academic powerhouses.” Simelton argued that the bill would leave failing schools “but a
devastated piece of real estate” and would “leave students of color and poor children with little choice
but to remain at [those] failing school[s] with no hopes of improving.” He added, “If this bill is allowed
to stand, then . . . Alabama will return to the days of segregated schools where separate is not equal.”25
When the list of “failing” schools was released in the summer of 2013, it revealed that 32 of the
77 schools were in Black Belt systems, and 41 were in the urban systems of the state’s four largest
metropolitan areas – Huntsville City, Birmingham City, Jefferson County, Midfield City, Fairfield City,
Montgomery County, and Mobile County. State Superintendent Tommy Bice admitted, “Almost all of
the schools on the list are Title I schools that have high numbers of free and reduced lunch and are
typically in school systems that have little local funding.” The effect of the tax credits looked to allow
those families that could afford it – white or black – to transfer out of district or to private schools,
provided they could gain entry into the latter. Since state funding was based on enrollment, critics
argued that this would siphon of precious remaining dollars in the state’s most poorly funded systems.
Proponents evoked the spirits of the battle over compulsory assignment and called it a victory for
choice. Senate President Del Marsh, one of the bill’s sponsors, said, “It’s important to make sure
parents in those schools know that they have a choice; they’ve never had a choice before.” The
powerful teachers’ lobby the Alabama Education Association (AEA) challenged the act’s passage
immediately and promised further litigation. AEA Executive Secretary Thomas Mabry called the law
“absolutely wrong” and announced, “There is going to be lawsuit after lawsuit.”26
When the inevitable first lawsuit was filed against the Accountability Act in August of 2013, it
was the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and not the AEA, which had filed it. The organization
represented eight students in Black Belt counties and sought an injunction against the act’s
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enforcement. Richard Cohen, SPLC President, contended that the law disadvantaged poor families
which either could not afford private school tuition in advance of a reimbursement, or which did not
have private school options in their vicinity, particularly private schools participating in the program.
The suit acknowledged what the lawmakers did not – that the law’s discriminatory effect on the poor
made it particularly damaging to black students. Cohen argued that the law’s promise to provide new
opportunities for students was an “empty” one, adding, “The reality is just the opposite. Children in
Alabama’s Black Belt, most of them African-Americans, are still trapped in failing schools, still being
given the short end of the stick.”27

“Sleepwalking back to Plessy”
In the 40 years since the entering of terminal orders in the 1970s, significant integration had
become a reality in many of the state’s school systems. But prejudice and discrimination were clearly
not erased in the process. They seemed quite prominent, in fact. Though events like the Wedowee
controversy garnered much media attention, the descendants of the law-and-order generation of white
Alabama power-brokers understood that the most promising path of resistance avoided outright
displays of racism. The fight to preserve the state’s discriminatory tax structure was fought in this
tradition, and the Alabama Accountability Act appeared to be, at best, half motivated by race and half
by class. The tax struggle was easily characterized as a fight in the libertarian tradition, even the
American revolutionary tradition. Alabama’s whites were not opposed to funding black education, they
claimed. They were simply opposed to any increases in taxation, particularly those mandated by a
federal court. The Accountability Act was being pitched as a victory for “choice,” even as the realities of
school “failure” clearly showed that poor districts crippled by the tax structure would be made still
poorer by the choosing. Litigation was pending in both cases in 2013, but it did not appear particularly
27
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promising for the plaintiffs in either. Since 1973, forty years of litigation on top of the 20 since Brown
had brought black activists closer to the goal for which the plaintiffs in the original school desegregation
cases had striven: equal educational opportunity. But as events continued to show even in 2013, it
could not quite get them there.
Political scientist Gary Orfield has argued that interracial contact in schools is one of the
necessary conditions for effecting the kinds of social transformations desegregation ought to achieve.
Solomon Seay called it the “mixing bowl” theory. Economist and professor of law and public policy
Charles Clotfelter has argued that while interracial contact in public schools increased dramatically as a
result of Brown and subsequent litigation, white resistance significantly stunted its growth. If interracial
contact was one of the principal goals of desegregation, then there have certainly been important
examples of success in Alabama, even if many students in significantly desegregated schools continued
to segregate themselves socially, at lunch, at assemblies, at sporting events, and away from school.
More ominously, Orfield has warned that “once a district [has been] pronounced unitary” and freed
from court oversight, “the historic constitutional debt to minority children is declared paid in full, and
civil rights groups are told that they must rely on politicians.” Clotfelter has also identified a number of
specific factors which have combined to limit interracial contact in desegregated schools, and most of
them are relevant to Alabama: continuing white resistance in general, the availability of segregated
private schools, cross district and metropolitan white flight, and the willingness of state and local
officials to accommodate white resistance.28
Like the Wedowee episode and the Knight and Lynch litigation, the results of continuing massive
resistance in the style of law-and-order revealed in Alabama, from the vantage point of 2013, both how

28

Bagley, A Meaningful Reality; Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics,
http://nces.ed.gov, accessed Jan. 10, 2013; 2010 Census of Population, U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov,
accessed Jan 10, 2013; Gary Orfield, Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education
(New York: New Press (Norton), 1996), pp. 332, 346; Charles Clotfelter, After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School
Desegregation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Seay Interview.

768

close blacks had come to genuine educational equality and how far from it they still remained. On the
Black Belt’s periphery, there were cases of meaningful integration. In the east Alabama city of Opelika,
15 miles north of Tuskegee, the continuing presence of a vibrant segregationist academy did not drain
the public schools entirely of white students. The was partly because the City of Opelika had not had a
majority black population at any point during or since the 1960s. What it did have was law-and-order
style white leadership which fought to maintain the public system for the purpose, notably, of industrial
recruitment. In 1970 the city had a racial breakdown of 69-31 white-to-black [13,067 white, 5,955
black]. Since then the black population in the city of Opelika had increased slightly, while the white
population remained relatively stable. As of 2010-11, the city’s population was 51-44, white-to-black.
There was an initial drop in white enrollment in Opelika City Schools in the 1970s, occasioned by
compulsory assignment and the opening of Opelika’s Scott Academy and neighboring Auburn’s Lee
Academy. The two segregationist schools later merged to form Lee-Scott Academy, which became one
of the state’s most successful private schools. From the 1970s, however, the ratio of whites to blacks in
the Opelika public system remained roughly 33-62 percent. Despite lingering reminders of
discrimination – such as tracking and disproportionate discipline rates – Opelika achieved “unitary
status” and freed itself from its Lee v. Macon consent decree in 2002.29
Tellingly, the Interstate Highway which ran through Opelika, I-85, was named in the early 2000s
for Lowndes County arch segregationist Ray Bass. Bass had gone on from his humble beginnings as a
segregationist academy pioneer in Lowndes to become Highway Director under the latter Wallace
Administrations. Fifty miles to the south of Opelika, I-85 became the Martin Luther King, Jr. Expressway
in Montgomery. A massive sign proudly announced the Expressway to passing motorists, under which it
read: “As Designated by the Alabama State Legislature, 1972.” The state’s white lawmakers had wanted
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to assure that they got credit for their token recognition of a safely nonviolent black figure. Ironically,
the public schools in the state’s capitol remained in 2013 among the most segregated in the state.30
Montgomery was 37 percent white as of 2010, but its city schools were over 90 percent black.
Its two “magnet” program high schools were significantly integrated and offered some promise for
continuing integrated education in the county. Excluding the magnet schools, the system’s whitest
school was the Halcyon Elementary School on the largely white eastern edge of town; it was 30 percent
white as of 2010-11. Its whitest high school was Robert E. Lee High, which enrolled 18 percent white
students in 2010-11. Jefferson Davis High School – built in an affluent white neighborhood in 1967 to
provide a haven from desegregation – enrolled 42 white students out of more than 2,000 total. The
majority of Montgomery’s white families – those that could afford it at least – sent their children to one
of the city’s segregationist academies (for example, St. James School or Montgomery Academy) or to
one of the city’s racially exclusive sectarian schools (for example, Trinity Presbyterian). Each of these
schools was desegregated, but each continued to control the number of black students it admitted, a
number which would undoubtedly remain token. Montgomery Academy enrolled 27 black students
among 819 total; St. James, 49 out of 996; and Trinity, 1 black student in 906. Perhaps the most telling
example of desegregation’s effect in Montgomery was Harrison Elementary. The school had been built
in 1954 for white students on the city’s southern fringe. It had stood in stark contrast to the Vineyard
School just a few hundred yards away and had been the impetus for the state’s first attempt at
desegregation after Brown. In 2010-2011 it enrolled 229 black students and 1 white student.31
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In general, the number of white students in private schools in the state was not overwhelming.
As of the 2010 Census, there were 833,270 students enrolled in K-12 education in Alabama, and only
93,815 of them were in private schools: just over 11 percent. Black students, though, were enrolled in
private schools at less than half that rate. There were 220 private schools in the state in 2013, according
the state department of education. Blacks in many parts of the state – especially the major cities and
the Black Belt – remained mired in poverty and could not afford them. In most Black Belt counties, the
public schools had become nearly all black, while segregationist academies continued to serve as the
primary educator of those counties’ white children. Since the invalidation of the last Alabama Tuition
Grant Act, and since the Coit v. Green ruling upholding the IRS’s removal of tax exempt status from
segregating private schools, some had struggled to maintain quality teachers or even adequate facilities.
Many, if not most, had token desegregated, if for no other reason than to take on a few more students,
particularly those who might help the schools’ athletics teams. All had nonetheless retained the
demographic profile that proved most desirable to law-and-order whites: overwhelmingly white schools
with a small enough black presence to avoid censure.32
Leaving western Montgomery, the stretch of U.S. Highway 80 upon which the Selma-toMontgomery marchers had once trod had subsequently been designated by the National Park Service as
part of the “Selma to Montgomery National Voting Rights Trail.” Alabama lawmakers also designated it
the Walter C. Givhan Highway – Givhan being one of the fathers of the White Citizens Council in
Alabama and perhaps the most dedicated segregationist lawmaker in Alabama history. The highway
penetrated Lowndes County, home of Ray Bass. In 2011 Givhan and Bass could take pride that Lowndes
was a paradigm of rural white flight. Lowndes Academy enrolled 241 students in grades K-12, 239 of
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whom were white and 2 black. Lowndes County Central High School, meanwhile, enrolled 272 students,
268 of whom were black and 3 of whom were white.33
The results were similar across the Black Belt. In Wilcox County, the public schools enrolled
1,440 students in 2010-11, all but 10 of whom were black, while Wilcox Academy enrolled 301 students,
all white. In Tuskegee, where the Lee v. Macon suit began, Booker T. Washington High School enrolled
736 students in 2010-11, and none of them were white. Like many segregationist academies, Macon
Academy struggled to remain in operation over the years with parents forced to pay all of the school’s
expenses out of pocket. This was exacerbated by the fact that whites simply abandoned the City of
Tuskegee and Macon County altogether in the face of growing black political power. As of 2011, the City
of Tuskegee was 96 percent black and less than 2 percent white. As Macon Academy’s enrollment
dipped (to 115 students in the 1990s), it moved into a new facility, farther west toward Montgomery.
There the capitol city’s eastward residential white flight pattern provided the school with a larger
population base. The newly renamed Macon-East Montgomery Academy enrolled 409 students in 201011: 397 white and 2 black.34
Further south, I-65 joined I-10 and carried drivers through the Mobile River via the George
Corley Wallace Tunnel. There in Mobile, the situation was similar to that of Montgomery. The city of
Mobile was 45 percent white, but many of those families sent their children to the city’s private schools.
Once all-white Vigor High School, scene of so much violent discord, enrolled 836 black students and 8
white students in 2010-11. The exodus was not as complete as it had been in Montgomery, though, as
schools like formerly all-white Murphy High maintained substantially white student bodies (742 white
out of 2,354). However, most children in affluent families attended either elite U.M.S. Wright
33
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Preparatory or St. Paul’s Episcopal School, two of the state’s pre-Brown, opportunist segregation
academies. In 2010-11 U.M.S. Wright had an enrollment of 1,150, with 24 black students, and St. Paul’s
had an enrollment of 1,405, with 39 black students.35
In metropolitan Birmingham, where the Elton B. Stephens Expressway – named for the
educational philanthropist and EBSCO founder – carried drivers through a cut in Red Mountain and into
the southern suburbs, the situation was unique. There had been a nearly complete exodus of white
families from the city itself into the over-the-mountain suburbs, along with more recently chic suburbs
to the east of the city. None of the southern suburban municipalities was less than 75 percent white.
Each either had its own school systems or was part of the mostly-white Shelby County system. The most
prosperous of the eastern suburbs – the newly thriving and 90 percent white City of Trussville – severed
from Jefferson County Schools and formed its own system in 2005. Jefferson County Schools remained
among the most significantly integrated in the state, however, as a substantial number of families in
rural parts of the county or in working class suburbs continued to choose public schools. Pleasant Grove
and Hueytown had been forced to remain within the county system. And all of the successful post-1965
splinter systems remained tethered to the county’s desegregation plan in some way, negligible though it
may have been. With all of the exclusive suburban public options, there had not been the sort of rush to
segregationist academies that had occurred in the rural Black Belt and in Montgomery and Mobile.
White families seeking to avoid highly integrated schools had simply moved east or over the mountain.36
The reasons for the more complete flight of whites from the City of Birmingham itself were
myriad, bound up in the intricacies of municipal politics, the ability of whites to capitalize on the region’s
35
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geography, and the economic decline of the once prosperous industrial city upon the departure of U.S.
Steel.37 Whites, in short, escaped because they could. Along with those families and with those
students went precious funding, as sales and income tax and residential property tax revenues
disappeared. Not only did Birmingham’s city schools become the most racially exclusive of any system
outside the Black Belt, the system was beset in 2013 with massive fiscal shortfalls, dreadfully
underachieving schools, and the sort of violence and drug problems endemic in some of the city’s
poorer communities. It was threatened with a takeover by the state board of education in 2012-13 and
was facing mass layoffs and school closures. Meanwhile, the suburban City of Hoover and Shelby
County school districts boasted two of the most highly regarded systems in the state, if not the entire
nation. As legal scholar James Ryan has argued, education policy, for a variety of reasons, remained
“largely something that happen[ed] to urban districts, not something that [came] from them.”
According to Ryan, politics continued to matter as much as policy, and education politics continued to
“[work] to protect suburban districts” rather than to “maximize the potential of urban education
reform.”38
For all of the benefit that desegregation litigation had brought, then, it appeared that Alabama
might have been, as Orfield described, “sleepwalking back to Plessy.” 39 It was just the way the
proponents of law and order would have had it. To have awakened the state and to have tried to drag it
kicking and screaming back to Plessy would have been the old, defeatist way. Over the course of the last
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60 years, whites had learned to be quiet. And they had learned to assert their claims in such a way as to
make them unassailable. Even when they screamed, their message was pitched to resonate with the
founding principles of a white nation which had come to sympathize and identify with the South in many
ways, rather than isolate and condemn it. Neither Alabama, nor the South more generally, were
exceptional, and southerners knew it better than anyone. They always had.40

Efficacy and Social Justice
The realities of education in Alabama in 2013 were murky, as they were across the country. And
it had been precisely the goal of those who championed law and order and freedom of association to
muddy the waters. The Lid Bills, for example, were arguably colorblind enough that even a judge as
seemingly disgusted with those waters as Lynwood Smith could not bring himself to conclude that the
bills themselves were unequivocally dirty. The broader debate about the efficacy of Brown reflects
some of this ambivalence apparent in Alabama’s experience with school desegregation. Some have
argued that Brown has been a failure or, at best, an accidental and only partial success. Legal scholar
Gerald Rosenberg famously argued that the Supreme Court in general was too constrained and offered
but a “Hollow Hope” to those seeking social justice. Rosenberg’s work elicited widespread criticism and
was alternatively condemned and acclaimed by proponents and opponents of rights-based litigation.
Others subsequently took a similarly dim view of the Brown decision, specifically. For example, leading
legal scholars Charles Ogletree and Derrick Bell have argued that the decision mostly failed to live up to
its promise. Bell – a former CRD and LDF attorney – has even suggested, to the delight of segregationistinclined conservatives, that perhaps the Court should have enforced the Plessey standard instead of
overturning it. Michael Klarman has argued that Brown only mattered insofar as it mobilized direct
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action protest, which in turn sparked a violent backlash, which then accelerated the sort of reforms
sought by the direct action movement.41
Legal historians have convincingly challenged all of these pessimistic conclusions. Brian
Landsberg has argued that the Lee v. Macon case demonstrated the ability of the three branches of the
federal government to overcome the “constraints” placed on the Court and to effectively enforce the
Brown standard. Paul Finkelman has also argued that the Brown litigation achieved its modest goal –
the elimination of the de jure dual school system. Finkelman maintains that Brown was also important
because it was subsequently applied by the courts to other forms of legal segregation and that, as a bold
statement by a branch of the federal government, it became a “cultural watershed.” He concludes that
Brown “set into motion the forces that eliminated segregation” and that it remains “the greatest
decision of the last century” and the “centerpiece of justice in America.” Martha Minow, the Dean of
Harvard Law School, has also forcefully acknowledged Brown’s enduring symbolic and cultural impact.
Minow, Finkelman, and Landsberg though, all have admitted that equal educational opportunity
remained in 2013 “an unachieved goal,” and that the real irony of Brown was that it resulted in the
effective desegregation of almost everything but schools.42
Focusing on Alabama takes our gaze away from the Supreme Court and the Brown decision
itself, but it provides us with a unique perspective on these broader debates. If the goal of black activistlitigants in Alabama was as modest as the application of Brown, then it was certainly achieved. Prior to
41
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Brown there was widespread disregard for the law. After the 20 year fight to enforce the decision, there
was widespread compliance. From a law enforcement standpoint, then, school desegregation litigation
in Alabama was an almost unquestionable success. In the sustained drive which brought not only the
litigious breakthrough, but the decades-long fight to ensure compliance, black activist-litigants found in
their attorneys, in the LDF, in the CRD, and in the federal courts a measure of equal justice under the law
which it is inconceivable that they could have attained any other way. Their success was not simply the
product of violent resistance to direct action and a subsequent backlash. The breakthrough was as
much the result of a sustained litigation campaign inspired by Brown and supported by changes in the
composition of the courts within the Fifth Judicial Circuit.
At the same time, the tortured compliance years in the decades after that breakthrough
revealed that litigation can only do so much. Continuing litigation in 2013 demonstrated that the goal of
many advocates for racial justice in Alabama was more than simply the dismantling the dual school
system. Equal educational opportunity was at stake in the pending Lynch litigation and had been the
goal of some all along. Klarman and a number of his detractors have agreed that litigation cannot, by
itself, effect social justice. But Finkelman’s interpretation allows us to see what Klarman’s does not: that
the ability of segregationists to carefully craft a seemingly compliant strategy of massive resistance has
been of far more consequence than the few instances of violent resistance to school desegregation.43 It
was their rearticulation of defiance which limited the effect of school desegregation litigation to prima
facie enforcement of the law. And it was their newfound reliance on a narrative and legal strategy of
defending constitutional rights which rendered their fortress of resistance ultimately unassailable.44
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What they created in the litigious crucible, as a narrative which made sense of their resistance,
they subsequently adopted as a mantra. A long series of disingenuous claims in the unspoken name of
segregation and white supremacy gave way in Alabama to a genuine belief that whites who had avoided
integration had simply exercised their Constitutionally-mandated and God-given individual rights. Those
in elite white academies felt no pang of responsibility for the poor in “failing” schools. Rural whites in
struggling segregationist academies refused to accept responsibility for the shoddy state of both public
and private education in many parts of the Black Belt. Suburban whites did not acknowledge that what
they enjoyed was the benefit of white privilege, buttressed by a state and federal government policies.
They were all exonerated by choosing to maintain law and order, by choosing to attend a private school
rather than shut the public schools down, by eschewing violent resistance, by acting through political
channels to further their interests, and by asserting their right to freedom of association. Meanwhile,
many of the voices of those who could perhaps have seen the situation more clearly remained silent –
irrelevant since the initial triumph of massive resistance in the 1950s. The ultimate victory for
resistance, though, was in convincing others that there was nothing against which to speak out. Socalled massive resistance was easily condemnable. Rearticulated resistance was not, because it had the
full strength of the law behind it. For many, the picture was clear enough: for all of Alabama’s
disparities, the courts themselves had spoken. The resulting order was thus bolstered by the law of the
land.

*****
Still sitting at his dining room table, Solomon Seay began to tell another story. He began to
describe an encounter he had in another one of the Lee v. Macon splinter cases – against Marengo
County, which he had called the “most recalcitrant” school system in the state of Alabama. Seay
remained passionate about the efficacy of litigation in enforcing the law and disturbed by the lack of
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attention to the role of litigation in the civil rights movement generally. But the story he told pointed to
the limits of litigation when it was up against the weight of history, the power of narrative, and the
stubbornness of human nature. Near the conclusion of a particularly contentious court hearing in the
Marengo case, Seay had found himself, as he sometimes did, on the witness stand. United States
District Judge Brevard Hand asked him, “Seay, do you think we will ever get to the point in this country
where race makes no difference?” Seay knew his answer but feigned introspection to blunt its effect.
“Sure,” he finally said, “because ever is a long, long time, and it’s bound to happen ever.” He paused,
then added, “But it will not happen in your lifetime or mine.” Hand wanted to know why Seay felt that
way. “Judge, I’m really not sure,” he said, “but maybe it’s because I’ve been black too long, and you’ve
been white too long.” Recounting the story years later, Seay mused, “If ever is going to happen, it’s
going to be because these youngsters begin to communicate with each other. You and I can’t do it.”45
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